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JOURNAL of SOCIAL FORCES

SEPTEMBER, 1924

Number 5

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Published in November, February, May, and August; edited by members of the Department of Economics in Harvard University. Contents for August: The Coal Commission Reports and the Coal Situation, by *M. B. Hammond*; Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Social Cost, by *F. H. Knight*; The United States Steel Corporation and Industrial Stabilization, by *Abraham Berglund*; Competitive Illusion as Cause of Business Cycles, by *Thomas W. Mitchell*; The Immigration Law of 1924, by *Henry P. Fairchild*. Price, \$1.35 a copy; \$5.00 a year.

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The Search After Values

With this number, *The JOURNAL of SOCIAL FORCES* completes its second volume. To "point with pride" to the reception which has been accorded its first two years of efforts, while gratifying, is less important than to indicate some of its plans for the future. While, therefore, some reference will be made subsequently to its two-year contribution, the essential task of this page is to proceed to a partial summary of coming features.

Perhaps the first item should be that concerning its editorial group. *Gerald W. Johnson*, who has been a contributing editor, joins the editorial board and becomes resident at the University of North Carolina as head of the new work in journalism. Readers of *The JOURNAL* will recall some very recent articles in the *American Mercury*, *The Survey*, and *The JOURNAL of SOCIAL FORCES*. That they combine keen social analysis with fine literary expression will not be doubted by any who have read "Mr. Babbitt Arrives at Erzerum," "Behind the Monster's Mask," "Is-sachar Is a Strong Ass," "Critical Attitudes North and South," "How the North Looks to the South," "The South Takes the Offensive," and "Saving Souls." Readers of *The JOURNAL* may, therefore, find confidence in this added strength to its editorial policy and method.

The National Community Center Association, of which *Robert E. Park* of the University of Chicago is President, and *Le Roy E. Bowman* of Columbia, Chairman of the National Conference of Social Work Committee on the Community, is Secretary, has made arrangements with *The JOURNAL of SOCIAL FORCES* to utilize a department called "The Community" for its official expression. The coöperative plan will begin in November, the first number of the new volume, with *Le Roy E. Bowman* editing the Department, and will, in the judgment of many, offer one of the most distinctive opportunities for contributions to this field that has been proposed anywhere. It is almost superfluous to say, therefore,

that readers may count on something else that is different, to which they may look forward with each bi-monthly *JOURNAL*. *Dr. Steiner* will continue his own articles on community organization and with *Mr. Bowman* will be looking for the best contributed articles on this subject.

George B. Logan of the University of North Carolina, whose articles on "The Reconstruction of Humanism," and "The Uses of Liberty" will be recalled by readers, will contribute regularly under the several departments, brief but usable abstracts of articles dealing with social work and social technique, exclusive of the more theoretical articles and differing from the usual abstracts. And *Guy B. Johnson*, who has joined the University of North Carolina Institute for Research in Social Science, will from time to time contribute news notes in the several departments condensed and summarized to help the practical worker. He has contributed to *The JOURNAL* so far "A Sociological Interpretation of the New Ku-Klux Movement" and "The Negro Migration" and will present soon a study of the families of college graduates.

In the effort to double the circulation of *The JOURNAL* so that its values may be more widely distributed *Guion Griffis Johnson* will take charge of the circulation program. There are many evidences that all that *The JOURNAL* needs to increase its constituency rapidly is to become known in specific ways. *Mrs. Johnson's* degree in Journalism from the University of Missouri and her experience in teaching will enable her to coördinate the circulation problem closely with the editorial and research policies of *The JOURNAL*.

The Library and Workshop needs no new emphasis to call attention to the scientific book review department conducted by Professor *Barnes* and Professor *Hankins*, which will generally be admitted to be the best of its kind in the field of sociological literature. Aside from the very limited budget now being set aside for this work, *The JOURNAL* ought to have, and must

have in time, an adequate special fund to insure "The Library and Workshop" against unnecessary limitations.

Other special features, together with announcement of many new articles, will be listed in the "Search After Values" for the November JOURNAL, and may be omitted here in order to take a little look-back at the previous numbers of *The JOURNAL*, and to point out briefly some of the volumes that are coming from JOURNAL articles and something of the present contributors to the September number. Other items which should be included are excerpts from letters to *The JOURNAL*, as they criticise *The JOURNAL*'s standard of "values." Mr. Powell of Richmond feels strongly that the publication of *Mr. Herskovits'* review of "White America" was disgraceful, while others criticise *Professor Hankins* on the ground that he is too severe on the Catholic Church. But these will have to wait.

The foregoing discussion concerning the policies, plans, and interpretations of *The JOURNAL* may well be supplemented and illustrated by a short summary of its contributions during the first two years. Interest in such a summary has been accentuated by the frequent requests that have come to the editors' desk as to the availability of *The JOURNAL* for classroom teaching. Of the contributions, for instance, from university and college workshops there have been not less than 135, while more than one hundred similarly valuable contributions have come from the active field of public welfare and social work. If these contributions again be classified under the divisions of "general social theory" and of "practical applications" there would appear in the former some four score, and in the latter more than 150. A still further classification reveals the fact that three score of these were leading contributed articles while the others presented a wide variety of departmental offerings. The distribution of departmental articles shows at least thirty-four under "Teaching and Research in the Social Sciences," forty-three under "Conferences for Social Work," forty-five under "Public Welfare and Social Work," twenty-one under "Inter-racial Coöperation," eighteen under "Church and Social Work," twenty-one under "County and Country Life Programs," sixteen under "Work of Women's Organizations," and twenty-one

under "Progress of Town and City Government." The "Library and Workshop" has presented well written reviews and notes of more than 250 volumes by some fifty different specialists, while the editorials have attempted to present viewpoints germane to social interpretation.

The teacher in search of dependable social theory will find articles by Professor *Franklin Henry Giddings* on "Measurements of Social Forces," "Social Variables," "The Pluralistic Field and the Sample," "Classification of Societal Facts," and a half dozen more to come; also from Columbia University Professor *John Dewey* on "The School as a Means of Developing Social Consciousness," by Professor *W. H. Kilpatrick* on "Problems and Dangers of the School and Education"; by Professor *W. F. Ogburn* on "Business Fluctuations as Social Forces"; from Harvard two articles by Dean *Roscoe Pound* on "Law and Morals"; from Yale three articles by Professor *Charles A. Dinsmore* on "Religious Certitude in an Age of Science"; from Wisconsin several articles by Professor *E. A. Ross* on "Roads to Social Peace"; and articles by Professor *Gillan* on various topics; from Missouri by Professor *Charles A. Ellwood*, "Scientific Methods of Studying Human Society"; from University of Chicago by Professor *James H. Tufts*, "Some Larger Aspects of Social Work"; by Professor *Ernest W. Burgess*, "The Interdependency of Sociology and Social Work," and Professor *Charles A. Merriam* on a number of topics; from Brown University by Professor *J. Q. Dealey* on "Government in Relation to Social Progress"; from Minnesota, articles by *Chapin*, *Mudgett*, and others; from Dartmouth, by *Malcolm Willey* and *Staurt Rice*; from Smith College, by *Harry Elmer Barnes* and *Frank Hankins*; and others from the Universities of Kansas, Colorado, North Dakota, North Carolina, Alabama, California, Southern California, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, West Virginia, Montana, Washington, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Tulane, Cornell, Goucher, Swarthmore, Haverford, Hunter, Wellesley, Wake Forest, Elon, Fisher, Berea, Tuskegee, Baylor College, Texas A. and M., North Carolina A. and E., North Carolina College for Women, Butler, Ohio Wesleyan, Northwestern, and others.

One of the most interesting observations growing out of an examination of this list of contributions from university and college workshops is the wide range of interest reflected in the studies presented by college men, so that, after all, there is no close line of demarcation between "theory" and "practice" as attempted above. The vast amount of material that is coming to *The JOURNAL* from college and university workshops constitutes one of the finest evidences that sociological study and social work in this country is on the eve of a really creative epoch. And among the

most hopeful signs will be found in the array of younger students who are giving evidence of a very dependable future.

No less important or interesting are the similar varied contributions made by leaders in the fields of public welfare and general social work. A glance at the index which comes as a separate supplement will suffice pending a special illustrative summary to be brought out in the November issue. In the meantime the September contributors will prove of interest.

CONTRIBUTORS TO THE JOURNAL

The leading article on "The Study of Cases" by Professor *Franklin Henry Giddings* constitutes Chapter Six of a volume now in press entitled "The Scientific Study of Human Society." The full contents of this remarkable volume, besides the preface, introduction, and other detailed matter, will include:

Chapter I, Societal Patterns.

Chapter II, Societal Variables.

Chapter III, The Scientific Scrutiny of Societal Facts.

Chapter IV, The Classification of Societal Facts.

Chapter V, The Pluralistic Field and the Sample.

Chapter VI, The Study of Cases.

Chapter VII, The Significance of Casual Groups.

Chapter VIII, Societal Teleology.

Chapter IX, The Validity of Inference from Societal Experimentation.

Chapter X, Exploration and Survey.

Chapter XI, The Measurement of Societal Energies and Trends.

Chapter XII, Methods of Measurement.

The book, for which proof is now being read, will appear from the University of North Carolina Press in early November, and will undoubtedly be one of the most distinctive contributions that Professor *Giddings* has made. A further special statement concerning the volume will be made in the November *JOURNAL*. Indications

are that it will have a very quick and large circulation, both among all students of the social sciences and as a classroom text for advanced classes. The beauty of it is that it will be timeless as a type, while such chapters as I, VI, and VIII will open up new resource and method for the teacher.

The second article in the September number, by Professor *Edward Alsworth Ross*, is Chapter II of one of Professor *Ross's* most timely books which is appearing from the University of North Carolina Press in early October. It is published under the title "Roads to Social Peace," and other chapters include:

I, The Avoidance of Sectionalism.

II, Quenching of Sectarian Strife.

III, The Promotion of Peace Among Nationalities.

IV, Mitigation of Class Struggle.

V, The Allaying of Town-Country Conflict.

VI, Conclusion.

Since this book went to press many incidents in the United States have transpired to indicate that Professor *Ross's* book, written in his usual lucid style, is one of the most timely contributions that could be made.

Professor *E. C. Branson's* article in this number on "The Farm Women of France" is Chapter 32 of a volume which will appear some time during the fall from the University of North Carolina Press, dealing with aspects of what Professor *Branson* calls "the rural end of civilization" in Denmark, France and Germany. The

volume will be different from the usual type, in that its presentations are interesting stories, frankly presented, without any claim of dealing with any more comprehensive view of such civilization than is apparent in these letters which *Dr. Branson* wrote while abroad.

Professor *R. D. McKenzie's* series of articles on "Non-Partisan Politics in Seattle, Washington" have been reprinted with paper covers under the title "Social Forces: A Study of Non-Partisan Politics," and can be had from *The JOURNAL of SOCIAL FORCES* or the University of North Carolina Press.

Other volumes to be appearing either from the University of North Carolina Press or from some of the New York publishers will include "Southern Pioneers in Social Interpretation," and "A Decade of Social Progress," with others to be announced later. Some very valuable manuscripts are being promised, like those of Professors *Gold-enweiser* and *Calhoun*; while "State Systems of Public Welfare," begun in this number, will make an excellent small volume invaluable as a reference.

Howard Woolston's article on immigration policy in this number is a fitting companion to his recent reinterpretation of the Malthusian doctrine. From the University of Washington at Seattle also comes the first of a series of articles on "State Systems of Public Welfare" by *B. W. Willard*. *R. Clyde White* in this number has contributed a second article since going to Texas A. and M. a year ago. Readers of *The JOURNAL* have come to expect from *Stuart A. Rice* and *Malcolm Willey* of Dartmouth, contributions which are to be read and not put aside. *George B. Logan* of the University of North Carolina is presenting another aspect of his discussion of the dynamics of liberty. *Edgar Legare Pennington* is a Georgian who sees many things below the surface. *Floyd H. Alport's* volume on "Social Psychology" is still going strong. *A. W. Calhoun* of Brookwood Labor College has recently contributed "Functional Democracy." *J. L. Gil- lin* of the University of Wisconsin will continue the discussion of "Economic Factors in the Making of Criminals." *Mrs. Sheffield's* article was presented in substance at the National Conference

of Social Work. *W. E. Garnett* is head of the Department of Rural Sociology at the Texas A. and M. College. *John Francis O'Brien* will complete his article on "The Socialization of the Church" in the next number. *Frederick E. Lum- ley* sends us "The Preacher's Right to Marry" from the Yale School of Religion. *Andrew Rals- ton*, who contributes "What Race Equality Means to the Negro," was awarded one of the competitive prizes in Paris a few years ago. *Wil- son Gee* has organized the Department of Rural Social Economics at the University of Virginia. *T. Earle Sullenger* is Professor of Sociology at the University of Omaha. *Laurence Vail Cole- man* is practicing what he preaches in making available the Smithsonian resources at Washing- ton. *Harry Elmer Barnes* gave courses at the University of Wisconsin, and *Frank H. Hankins* at Cornell University during the summer sessions. The personnel of the remarkable group of book reviews may be found from an examination of the reviews themselves, beginning with Professor *Bernard's* timely discussion of present trends in Social Psychology.

NEXT MONTH AND NEXT

Following his discussion in this month's "Li- brary and Workshop" Professor *Bernard* of the University of Minnesota will begin in the Novem- ber issue a series of articles on "The Concept of Progress." The first will deal with population problems in relation to progress; the second with theological; the third with metaphysical; and the fourth with scientific theories of progress.

Other articles now ready include, besides papers of *Giddings*, *Ross*, *Barnes*, *Ellwood*, *Bernard*, and others previously mentioned, those by *Bogar- dus*, *Chapin*, *Steiner*, *Kilpatrick*, *Hayes*, *Radcliff*, *Davis*, *Thompson*, *Reed*, and many others. There will be continued the special discussions of social- industrial problems, and special critical analyses of Georgia, Virginia, Maryland by *John Wade*, *Ivan McDougale*, and *Iva L. Peters*.

In an early issue *Monroe W. Work* will pre- sent an interpretation of *Booker Washington* in the list of Southern Pioneers, while in the same series a number of special features will be ready for announcement soon.

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The JOURNAL of SOCIAL FORCES

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THE STUDY OF CASES

FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS

THE ATTRIBUTE or trait, in virtue of which an individual or other unit is assigned to this or that class when we sort things, is an abstraction. We arrive at it by analytical thinking. In the real world it does not exist apart from the person or thing that is sorted, and in whom or in which it is associated with other attributes. No scientific study can prosper when this elemental truth is more than temporarily forgotten, or is too often or too long ignored. Always we must come back from our abstractions and our generalizations to a new scrutiny of concrete aggregates; to actual human individuals, actual animals and plants, actual inorganic things.

Also, we must keep in mind the fact that every individual or other so-called unit that we can study is in reality an aggregate. It is made up of components, each of which is an aggregate made up of components, and so on back through molecule and atom to electron, which looks to us now like *ultima thule*, but presumably is not.

Therefore, it seems, everything that we can study is a pluralistic field, and, in strict theory (as has already been remarked) every pluralistic field in the world of actuality which we can actually know is a sample, or a part of a sample, taken from an infinite field.

To say all this in so many words is perhaps to be too scrupulously academic. To students of the older sciences I suspect that it is, but I have reason to think that to students of the sciences of society it ought to be said now and then. The societal field is so extensive and so complicated

that it is not easy to keep it all in view. By keeping it all in view I of course do not mean attempting to become proficient in the study of every part of it. That would be out of the question. I mean only attempting to see how every part of the societal field is related to every other part, and every aspect to every other aspect, and therefore to realize the necessity of checking up expert work in one domain by expert work in another. At the moment I am trying to help the scientific student of society to see that there are two elementary and fundamental aspects of his subject matter which he must continuously keep in mind, and never permit to become dissociated in his thinking.

One of these aspects is *the distribution* of every attribute or trait that he discovers. How widely, for example, is the attribute "blondness" distributed in a population; how widely is the status "foreign born" distributed; how widely is the condition "dependency" distributed; and so on? This is a statistical aspect.

The other aspect to be kept in mind is, What and how many distinguishable attributes are found *in combination*, first in any reasonably good sample of a pluralistic field; second, in any given component group or individual or other unit entering into the composition of the sample. For example, what other conditions besides dependency, and what attributes of status, habit or trait may be discovered in the make-up of a dependent family or a dependent individual?

It is plain that we have here two definitely contrasted procedures. In the one we follow the

distribution of a particular trait, quality, habit or other phenomenon as far as we can. In the other we ascertain as completely as we can the number and variety of traits, qualities, habits, or what not, combined in a particular instance. The first of these procedures has long been known as the statistical method, which of course it is. The second procedure has almost as long been known as the case method, or the study of cases. It is sometimes called the monographic or intensive method, a name associated with the life work of LePlay. It is also sometimes called the diagnostic method.

The term last named reminds us that at this point we should observe the distinction between case *study* and case *work*. In case work the social worker of whatever description is attempting to bring about a reconditioning and improvement in his "case." The nurse coöperating with the physician is attempting to restore her patient to health. The psychiatrist is attempting to bring about an orderly and normal mental functioning. The worker among destitute or degenerate families is attempting to bring about normal relations, activities and status. The neighborhood worker is trying to clean up, stimulate and re-order the neighborhood; the community worker is undertaking to deepen the sense of community responsibility, to make community organization more complete and effective, and to raise the standards of community welfare. Real achievement in any of these fields, it should be unnecessary to argue, is impossible unless effort is directed by knowledge. The "case" must be diagnosed and understood before it can be effectively handled and bettered. This preliminary enterprise is case study.

The range of case study in the societal domain is as wide as human interests, its continuity is as prolonged as human history. The case under investigation may be one human individual only or only an episode in his life; or it might conceivably be a nation or an empire, or an epoch of history. The cases with which social workers are apt to be concerned are individuals, families, neighborhoods and communities. The cases in which ethnologists, historians, and statesmen are apt to be interested are non-civilized tribes, culture areas, historical epochs and politically organized populations. Demographers are concerned with the evolution and degeneration of populations in respect of their biological and psychological quality, and of their vitality.

The study of cases in a field as complicated as the societal has naturally enough been more or less unsystematic. Sometimes it has been more pretentious than painstaking, but on the whole it has made headway. It has developed, or rather it is developing, a technique, by no means perfect but distinctly promising. The first rule and principle of it is summarized in the one word "thoroughness." The first task, when taking up the study of a case, is to find out all that can be found out about it, and to scrutinize every seeming fact to make sure of actuality. A careful person of good intelligence, who is plodding and conscientious, can become a successful student of cases; a brilliant student who is careless and unmethodical never can. The second rule and principle of case study is that as rapidly and as widely as possible comparisons must be made of case with case. There is always a presumption that a case is, to a certain extent, unique; that nothing exactly like it is to be found elsewhere or has ever appeared before, and it is of the first importance that its exact variation from everything else should be determined; but there is also a presumption that in many respects it is like other cases. If it is, a certain norm, or "usual" complex of factors can be ascertained. To describe it accurately is essential. Quantitative data may be discovered. It may be found that in certain numerical features a case is average, below average, or above average. The measure should be determined.

The greater part of social work must necessarily proceed with reference to norms of one or another kind. The case that is to be bettered in any way is presumably one that in various particulars is below normal, average or standard. If it were not known or suspected to be so it would probably not receive attention as one calling for the effort of the social worker, and there would be no particular point in trying to help it. Therefore, plainly enough, it is the duty of the diagnostician to determine with as much exactness as possible what the norm, average or standard for this class of cases is.

Roughly, it usually is determined by case observers and monographists by mere observational comparison. The norms arrived at are approximations only. But such studies are year by year becoming more precise, which means that statistical methods are being more and more employed and perfected. They are even being introduced

with success into ethnological studies and into studies of legislation. In demographic studies they are, of course, highly developed, and invariably are employed, as they are also at the other end of the case range, namely, in strictly scientific physiological and psychiatric studies of individuals. It is in the middle range, namely in studies of families, neighborhoods and communities that exact methods are least developed and in which, it is to be hoped, they will presently receive more attention.

The circumstance that students of social work cases are largely occupied with subnormal and abnormal phenomena creates an intellectual danger which calls for mention. Unless these investigators are constantly on guard their thinking gets "off side." They see humanity and the societal order in deceptive colours, inaccurate proportions and distorted perspectives. Now and then they acquire unfortunate "hunches." To correct these errors and to avoid bias social workers and students of social work cases need to keep in touch with researches that are being carried on in the study of normal social and societal evolution, and to familiarize themselves with attested results. There has been much discussion of the value (or lack of value) of historical and systematic sociology for investigators in the fields of deficiency, delinquency, and dependency, and of neighborhood conditions. Teachers and social workers have been interviewed and their opinions have been collated. The net result has been an expression of doubt, running into dogmatic denial, of the "practical" value of sociology. If I may be permitted to express an individual reaction to this attitude, it is that the unbelievers have missed the point. I do not recall instances in which the writers of replies to questionnaires have pointed out what I believe to be the most substantial and important service of sociology to social workers. It cannot give them rules of technique; those must be developed out of trial and error experimenting. But sociology can give them, and should give them, poise and balance, a comprehensive view, a sense of relative values, an apprehension of proportions and of probabilities. Attentive study of the trend and sweep of societal evolution from primal folkways through barbarisms and historic civilizations, to the compre-

hensiveness and complexity of our existing societal order cannot fail to nurture the saving grace and the sanity of common sense.

One further aspect of case phenomena is significant, and an increasing recognition of it will greatly facilitate fruitful case study. Any case whatsoever is either fortuitous or historical. The fortuitous case is accidental or occasional. It "just happens," once, or now and then. Often it is generative. That is to say, at the moment when it comes under observation the complicated phenomena which it presents are arising and beginning an evolution which may go on indefinitely. The historical case already when we encounter it "has a past."

Study of the historical case may or may not reveal origins; the data may have been lost. The generative case illuminates as nothing else can the beginnings of things, the process of causation. Generative cases are every day, every hour arising in human society, and to this fact we owe the possibility that one of these days we shall begin really to understand the nature of our societal activities and relationships; but if we were to study these only we should go far astray in our attempts to understand what processes have in them real promise of continuity and contribution to human well-being. To get knowledge of this latter sort we must learn also, as the historians have learned, how to study with scientific care and precision the historical case.

In point of logic scientific method in history is only an application of those procedures of scrutiny which all sciences avail themselves of to determine fact, and which in earlier pages I have described, but it is an application of them to one class of facts in particular, and it has become highly detailed and technical.

The facts with which history has particularly to do are facts of record, and these are indispensable not only for history in the narrower meaning of the word but also in every domain of science and art, since an observation once made exists thenceforth only as recorded. Therefore, in the systematic accumulation and comparison of observations in any field of scientific study, it is necessary to use or to rely upon the technical procedures of historical criticism.

These procedures comprise, first the discrimination of all secondary sources (including ab-

stracts and paraphrases) from primary sources; second, the discrimination of copies (including both variants and exact transcripts) from originals; third, the analysis of originals into components or elements, any of which may have an alluring history; and fourth, the scrutiny of testimonies recorded.

The critical study of records, documentary and other, variously known as archaeology, paleography and epigraphy, proceeds through the systematic comparison of record with record, or group of records with other groups, in which all perceived differences and resemblances are noted.

Upon human testimony all our inferences and conclusions from narrative and statistical data ultimately rest. When we have discovered that historical or statistical documents are genuine as records, we still have to inquire whether the story they tell is credible.

The scientific sifting of testimony, proceeds by observing resemblances and differences among witnesses, and by grouping or grading them with reference to specific qualifications. Only those witnesses are competent:

1. Whose position in time and space is, or has been such with reference to the alleged fact, that they can or could have seen or heard it. This throws out hearsay, or secondary testimony, as of secondary value.

2. Who (a) have no motive to falsify, and who (b) are not liars by habit.

3. Who are intellectually competent to observe or to hear and to report accurately; (a) sane and not feeble minded, (b) not under hypnotic control, (c) not under the control of an overmastering passion or interest, and (d) not under the control of a mastering idea or suggestion.

Until recently the challenging and sifting of testimony has been more meticulously, and, now and then, more expertly conducted in courts of justice than elsewhere. Cross examination chiefly has been relied on, and historians have lamented their inability to put dead witnesses on the stand, and to exclude irrelevant and misleading allegations by application of standardized rules. Experimental researches of psychology have now shown that legal procedures and safeguardings are far from satisfactory. Occurrences of which the observers have had no previous intimation have been enacted in the presence of exceptionally competent witnesses, in one instance a congress of psychologists. Their written reports of doings and sayings have been compared with one another and with the unbiassed testimony of cinema and dictophone. The revelations of human fallibility have been disconcerting. When truth is what we want, the eye witness must be checked up by circumstantial evidence, as that in turn, must be checked by the eye witness.

THE QUENCHING OF SECTARIAN STRIFE

F. A. Ross

ONE OF THE most cheering developments of the modern epoch is the general abandonment of the conviction that one wins God's favor by extirpating those of alien faiths. What rivers of blood have run because God was conceived of as a "jealous" Being to whom the worship of another, or worship of Himself under other than His true name, is an affront! Both Judeo-Christianity and Islam, being monotheistic, have intolerance in their marrow. The ferocious religious wars which lacerated Europe from the middle of the sixteenth century to the middle of the seventeenth, testified to the possibilities of reciprocal extermination which lurked in the non-

toleration of religious differences. There is indeed, no limit to the torment the human race may inflict upon itself if it follows *that* path.

Hence, there reigns among the discerning ones, a tacit agreement to dwell in peace with those of other faiths and overlook religious difference in all civil relations. This understanding might almost serve as a touchstone of true Americanism. In most of us dread of sectarian strife is so ingrained that we shun as a leper the fool who sounds the old jarring tocsin that God is displeased at some people's beliefs and observances and will be grateful if His true followers spare Him this displeasure. Today most ministers of

religion realize their solemn obligation to tread warily among the lightly slumbering hyenas of religious bigotry and he who stirs the passions which made men slay their fellows in the name of Jesus is looked upon as the thrower of a poison gas bomb.

There is no scourge of society worse than strife over religion, for it is the elite who are decimated. The coarser natures, the sensualists, take small heed of religion and reck little how others worship. It is the idealists, whose care is for the spiritual who become frenzied at the spectacle of another man's heterodoxy. When a church backed by the state demands that man conform or rot in jail, the grosser sort say, "Oh, very well!" It is only the nobler who will suffer loss or exile rather than give up an ideal. This is why the English Puritans and the French Huguenots, who sought the American wilderness rather than be dictated to in the matter of religion, provided a superior breed which has run bright threads down through American history.

Unless they are using religion as a cloak for exploitation or lust of power, the persecutors, likewise, are far above the rabble in their concern for doctrine; so, if their heads are broken, the human stock is so much the poorer. Hence, as a means of eliminating the idealistic strains and leaving the fat-heads and belly-worshipers to be the master breeds, nothing can surpass bloody religious strife.

Again, most other social oppositions fade and soften with the lapse of time. The quarrel somehow settles itself or it drifts out of the focus of vision as new interests call for new alignments. Not so is it with religious opposition. If today God is angry that we tolerate those who worship Him in different ways, He will be just as angry tomorrow—or the next day—or the day after. Then, too, there is no other form of strife in which the strivers do not feel at liberty to compromise when the struggle is seen to cost them more than victory can bring. Sectaries, however, imagining themselves under the eye of their God, dare not compromise lest they incur God's disfavor. So they go on helplessly like fighting stags whose horns have become locked.

Nothing has contributed more to the cause of social peace than the American discovery that religion does not languish if it ceases to be sup-

ported and guided by the state. In Europe the refusal of the civil power to accept any responsibility for the protection and maintenance of religion has generally been interpreted as betokening an indifference as to what may befall the spiritual interests of the people. A state recognizing no form of religion is called "godless;" while the disestablishment of a state church is branded as an "act of national impiety." American experience proves that such epithets are underserved. Not only does religion flourish better here than in countries with a state church, but European visitors find no churchman on this side the water who wishes the state to reassume the care of religion. De Tocqueville testifies:

I do not hesitate to affirm that during my stay in America I did not meet with a single individual, of the clergy or the laity, who was not of the same opinion on this point.

Münsterberg observes:

While society remains indifferent as long as religion is enforced by external means, it becomes energetic as soon as it feels itself responsible for the general religious situation. . . . A religiously inclined population which has made churchliness a social and not a political obligation, affords the American church the most favorable conditions for its success that could be imagined.

One might suppose that the neglect to sanction and sustain some nobler form of faith would handicap it in rivalry with the gross or benighted forms. When a minister of religion has nothing to live on but the free-will offerings of the faithful, will not the representative of an enlightened and social faith be at a disadvantage among us in competing with the propagators of ignorant and fanatical varieties of religion? Just this has occurred in certain backward parts of this country. In the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century more silly sects were spawned in the United States than in any other part of the world, save only Russia. The one thing which finally checked the multiplication among us of cranky sects, at odds with the spirit of Christianity and with the real welfare of society, has been the immense development of public instruction. It is not long after the state disestablishes the church before it resolves to establish the school. A state which should do nothing for either church or school would soon find the bulk of its people too little socialized to meet their responsibilities as citizens.

When religion ceases to be supported by revenues from endowments or the proceeds of taxation but must depend upon the gifts of parishioners, it has to submit to a process of democratization. Where the constitution of the church is elastic, the laity share more in the control of the church. Where this is fixed, the clergy are obligated to consider more the wishes and feelings of their flock, to persuade rather than command. Then, too, religion is obliged to become simple and graspable. De Tocqueville says:

I have seen no country in which Christianity is clothed with fewer forms, figures and observances than in the United States; or where it presents more distinct, more simple, or more general notions to the mind.

There are no Romish priests who show less taste for the minute individual observances, for extraordinary or peculiar means of salvation, or who cling more to the spirit and less to the letter of the law, than the Roman Catholic priests of the United States.

The participation of the congregation in worship is emphasized. In an endowed or state-supported church often you find elaborate and beautiful services being conducted although scarcely any are present save the officiating clergy. The absence of the faithful makes no difference for, after all, God is being glorified and propitiated. The people, on the other hand, are loth to pay for a worship in which they have no voice nor part. The Divine services they support will be valued less for themselves than for their efficacy in stirring an emotion of adoration in the worshiper. For the same reason the costly adornment of the sanctuary is less prized, for the human heart is regarded as the real seat of worship rather than a sanctified place before a sacred altar.

In the state-supported church the clergyman's whole duty may consist in the performance of the religious rites on appointed occasions. But in the church dependent on the free-will offerings of the members, he does not come off so easily. His sacerdotal functions shrivel, but he is much more occupied in giving the parishioner solace, counsel or instruction. The pastor becomes a combination of priest, public teacher, personal counselor and social worker.

Finally, a people-supported religion is likely to exhibit a practical spirit. A decade ago a French visitor, De Constant, was much impressed with this aspect of American religion. "It concerns itself with the present and especially with the

future—the future of humanity." "It exalts everything that strengthens courage, confidence, self-sacrifice and initiative." He quotes Bishop Philips Brooks as saying: "The mystery of the Holy Trinity appears insignificant in comparison with the enormous amount of moral and social work to be done by the American churches. Let every one enjoy his liberty and his own beliefs; the essential thing is what the church can do for its neighbors and the country."

The complete separation of church and state implies:

- a. Freedom of religious belief and the free exercise of worship within the limits of morality and public order.
- b. No religious test to be imposed for naturalization, voting, office-holding or jury duty.
- c. No one may have his civil or political rights abridged by ecclesiastical provisions, nor may religious views absolve one from the performance of his civil duties.
- d. No recognition of ecclesiastical jurisdiction.
- e. No public money to be devoted to the support of religion.
- f. Cemeteries to be controlled by the municipality rather than the church.
- g. No indoctrination or obligatory participation in worship in public schools or state educational institutions.
- h. Ministers not to make the exercise of citizen functions a matter of conscience, or threaten spiritual penalties for one's political activity.

Most of this program was early realized in this country and of late it has been spreading rapidly over Christendom. What the English clergyman and essayist, Sydney Smith, thought about this American innovation a century ago is worth recording:

It is hardly possible for any nation to show a greater superiority over another than the Americans, in this particular, have done over this country. They have fairly and completely, and probably forever extinguished that spirit of religious persecution which has been the employment and curse of mankind for four or five centuries—not only that persecution which imprisons and scourges for religious opinion, but the tyranny of incapacitation, which, by disqualifying from civil offices and cutting a man off from the lawful objects of ambition, endeavors to strangle religious freedom in silence and to enjoy all the advantages, without the blood, and noise, and fire of persecution. What passed in the mind of one mean

blockhead is a general history of all persecution. "This man pretends to know better than me—I cannot subdue him by argument; but I will take care he shall never be mayor or alderman of the town in which he lives; I will never consent to the repeal of the Test Act or to Catholic Emancipation; I will teach the fellow to differ from me in religious opinions!" So says the Episcopalian to the Catholic—and so the Catholic says to the Protestant. But the wisdom of America keeps them all down—secures to them all their just rights—gives to each of them their separate pews, and bells, and steeples—makes them all aldermen in their turn and quietly extinguishes the fag-gots which each is preparing for the combustion of the other. Nor is this indifference to religious subjects in the American people, but pure civilization—through comprehension of what is best calculated to secure the public happiness and violated by the insolence of any human being, in the garb and under the sanction of religion.

What embitterment we missed by the early separation of church and state may be guessed from certain laws found necessary in countries which have disestablished the Roman Catholic Church. In France, according to the Law of Separation of 1905, buildings used for worship belong to the public; no political meeting may be held in a church; no religious sign or emblem may be fixed on public monuments or in any public place save buildings used for worship, cemeteries, and monuments of the dead. The clergyman is prosecuted who, in a place of worship, insults or defames a public official, or who incites to resist the execution of the law or the legal acts of public authorities, or tends to arouse or arm one section of the citizens against the others.

In Mexico in the Laws of Reform and the Constitution of 1857 one finds:

The suppression of monasteries and the nationalization of their property.

Prohibition of novices' taking the veil.

Abolition of religious holidays, save those specified by law.

The ringing of church bells to be subject to local ordinances.

By the Constitution of 1917, the church is forbidden:

To own real estate or mortgages on same.

To own church buildings or any other buildings.

To possess invested funds or other productive property.

To maintain convents or nunneries.

To conduct primary schools.

To direct or administer charitable institutions.

To solicit funds for its support outside of church buildings.

To hold religious ceremonies outside of church buildings.

To clothe its ministers with a garb indicative of their calling.

Ministers of religion may not publicly criticize the government or officials. They may not vote, hold office, or assemble for political purposes. No political assembly may be held in a place of public worship. No political party may bear a name indicative of relation to any religious beliefs. No religious periodical may comment on political affairs. No studies carried on in theological seminaries may be credited in a state university. Official permission must be obtained before opening a new temple of worship for public use.

These gyves are not wanton and persecutive, but are means found necessary for freeing the state and political life from clerical meddling. We dispense with such drastic measures in this country only because here the distinctness of church and state is understood and accepted by all.

MEANS OF AVOIDING SECTARIAN STRIFE

Various policies suggest themselves for safeguarding and perfecting religious peace.

1. Neither churches nor groups formed on a religious basis should endeavor secretly to control political parties, nominations, elections, appointments, or public policies. If a church feels justified in supporting a man or a measure, let it do so openly and avow its real motives.

2. In matters political or civic one's religious convictions or church affiliations should be neither asset nor liability. They ought, in fact, to have no weight at all. Gratuitous allusion to them should be resented as injection of a foreign issue.

3. Clergymen should beware of preaching a political sermon under the pretext that the issue is between simple right and wrong.

4. Charter provisions as to the church affiliation of the members of the governing board of a private educational, research, philanthropic, or civic institution are to be deplored. An instance is the former requirement that not less than two-thirds of the trustees of the University of Chicago should be Baptists.

5. It is bad policy for church members to throw their custom, their patronage or their votes to the merchant, professional man or candidate who is their fellow member. Other churches will

follow suit and soon the community will be split along sectarian lines. The fewer the social, political, commercial, or professional advantages church membership bestows and the greater the spiritual advantages, the better will be the feeling among the churches.

6. The churches should have a tacit agreement not to regard one another's membership as a pasture for proselyting.

7. The churches should avail themselves of every opportunity for public coöperation in moral, civic and social welfare movements.

8. Now that there is a wholesome tendency to exalt life above ritual and character above creed, those who revive and stress points of doctrinal difference among the churches instead of emphasizing their common treasure, should be sent to the rear.

9. Clergymen who insist that their church shall have its own distinct newspapers, schools, social centers, recreation centers, charitable societies, lecture courses, boy scouts and factory welfare work and who forbid their members sharing in community undertakings along these lines are contributing to segregate people by religion and to delay the advent of civic consciousness and loyalty.

10. There should be dissemination of the study of the greater religions of the world as expressions of the religious impulse in the human heart. Such study, disclosing that each religion speaks to its adherents with the same tone of authority, would break down that "absoluteness" from which spring fanaticism and intolerance.

While religious liberty is as settled in America as anything can be, we may see strife spring up over the relation of church and state to education. It is not in the field of middle or higher education that the tension will arise. In this country church colleges led the way and the state university was an after-thought. Academies and church schools were in the field before the public high school became a power. But the public school was here before the church elementary school and one wonders what is the motive of the new policy of withdrawing the children of communicants from the public school and impounding them in the parish school.

Religious people are quite justified in objecting in an elementary education so bare of religion as that of the public school must be. The remedy is to set aside week-day periods during which the

pupils of the community school may go to appointed places and receive religious instruction according to the wishes of their parents. Until this is provided for one can understand why many devout parents prefer the separate school with its emphasis on religion.

But this denies the civil organization access to the budding mind. The modern democratic state is very far from being a mere coercive organization. To procure respect for its laws it puts its trust in civic attitude rather than in fear. By bringing the young under appropriate training in the public school it aims to *socialize* its future citizens. Now, if the children know no other schooling than that of the church, the democratic state misses all opportunity to build citizenship into them. The church is free to mould at will the sprouting conscience and to teach the child always to put her claims above those of the state, although the latter is the organ of the whole society.

Again, segregation all through the formative years with those of its own faith in school and on playground is a poor foundation for a citizenship which shall respect the equal rights of fellow citizens of other faith or no faith, recognize generously their virtues, and coöperate with them freely in every department of life save only that of religion. Separate church schooling has in store for us not the good will and fraternal spirit of the better type of American community but the old-world mutual suspicion and aloofness such as you find it in Trans-Caucasia where the life streams of Georgians, Armenians, Germans and Tartars flow side by side without mingling.

If the segregation of two and one quarter million children in church schools is a civic blight, it does not follow that the American state should imitate Oregon in disallowing the private school. There is a chance that a satisfactory division of the child's time between public school and church school may be worked out. It may be that nothing should be attempted now, but that anxious patriots should trust the matter to be corrected by a change of sentiment within the religious bodies responsible for setting up the parochial school. As the public school is bettered and as ample opportunity is offered to impart religious instruction to the children enrolled in it, perhaps the will of the American Roman Catholics, Lutherans and Adventists to maintain separate schools will crumble away.

COTTON AND SOME ASPECTS OF SOUTHERN CIVILIZATION

R. CLYDE WHITE

COTTON is the outstanding economic fact of the majority of the states south of Mason and Dixon's line. Other agricultural products and manufacturers are by no means unimportant, but they are secondary to this one means of livelihood. Any one so prominent as cotton culture is likely to dominate observations concerning civilization in a given region. It is the most obvious; it is to be found everywhere; prosperity is reckoned on it as a basis. In the Central North an observer is equally impressed with small grain culture; he cannot escape its presence. It is the nature of the human mind to grasp the obvious first and then to make first observations a reference point for more specific analyses. So it is not at all exceptional that cotton has been pointed out as the cause of both the good fortunes and the misfortunes of the southern states. "The South" is supposed to be the most homogeneous large section in the United States. It is called the "Solid South," when politics is the subject, or the "Old South," when manners and customs are being discussed. When specific things are pointed out, it is often characterized as the place where cotton, Negroes, farm tenancy and illiteracy are found in abundance and where they exist in correlative relations.

One of the tasks of sociology is to analyze scientifically facts upon which social theory and public policy rest. Every sociologist knows that often what is most obvious is not most important, and yet public policy is too frequently based upon unsystematic observation and inadequate analysis. • Complex matters, such as race relations, labor supply, illiteracy and farm tenancy may be aggravated through political action based upon wrong interpretation of the facts. All four of these problems are receiving increased attention, and that is particularly true in the southern states; some of the attention less well-directed than the other. A sound public policy regarding any one or all of them will deal with causes rather than effects. The problem is to discover the causes. This study will not attempt to go very far with this; it will only point out some of the facts which must be taken into consideration.

What is the relation of cotton culture to illiteracy, to farm tenancy and to the percentage of Negroes in the cotton producing states? In order to answer that question the eleven states in which cotton is an important crop were selected: Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, Texas and Oklahoma. In each of these states samples of the counties were taken—not random samples. In each case the counties with the highest percentage of improved land planted to cotton were chosen, because it was believed that, if cotton production is correlated with the other factors mentioned, it would be best shown in the high acreage areas. In all 151 counties in the eleven states were taken. These counties represented 40.4 per cent. of all the cotton acreage in the eleven states. That would seem to be a fair sample. Acreage is a better test than production for two reasons: it fluctuates less widely, and the amount of labor to cultivate an acre is about the same regardless of the production per acre. The percentage of improved land was calculated from the 1920 Census report; that is, the facts are for the cotton year, 1919.

I. COTTON AND NEGROES

Farm labor shortage in the southern states has caused considerable anxiety on the part of the farmers since the war. Large numbers of Negroes have migrated to the northern states. In some places this has accentuated race conflicts, because the white people have sought to stop migration. The press has had a good deal to say about the effect of this change in population on the labor supply available for cotton production. Negroes have been threatened, if they did not go into the cotton fields; such measures, however, have not been widespread. They only indicate that the white people believe that Negroes are essential to the production of cotton. Looking at cotton culture as a whole, is that a true estimate of the situation?

With the use of Carl Pearson's formula some correlations have been worked out which throw light on this problem. First, the 151 counties were used. In each county the percentage of

improved land in cotton was calculated; likewise the percentage of Negroes in the total population of the counties. If high acreage and high percentage of Negroes go together, this procedure ought to show it very conclusively for the counties used. When the coefficient of correlation was calculated, it was found to be .123. The probable error was .0484, which divided into the coefficient 2.5 times. In social statistics the coefficient should be at least six times the probable error to be significant.¹ Consequently, we must conclude that .123 is not significant and that in these counties Negroes were not present in proportion to cotton acreage. If they were not present in 1919, they did not help to produce the crop. The migration to the North was going on then, but it had not reached such proportions as to affect greatly this coefficient. It is by no means proved that in all localities Negroes did not participate in raising cotton; they did. It only shows that as a *whole* the cotton crop is not proportionately dependent upon them.

But suppose we vary the area considered. Forty counties in Texas were included in the 151. Let us take these alone and see what the situation is in Texas. These counties are the highest producing counties and constitute a little over 51 per cent. of the total acreage of the state. The coefficient of correlation here is $-.154$; it is negative. The probable error is .1013 and divides into the coefficient 1.5 times. Thus, the acreage and Negroes tend to vary in Texas inversely, but the correlation is so slight that it is not significant. So we could say that there is really no correlation between the two factors here.

Varying other areas show still different results. If Oklahoma and Texas are omitted and the other nine states considered, the coefficient of correlation between Negroes and cotton acreage is .399. The probable error is .061 which divides into the coefficient 6.5 times. Thus, the coefficient is positive and barely significant. In the area represented by these nine states Negroes are much more important to cotton production than in the other two. If Mississippi is left out of this group, however, the coefficient is reduced to .307; the probable error is .069 and divides into the coefficient 4.4 times, which is very likely not important. Why does Mississippi affect the cor-

relation so much? There are two reasons: first, the population is 86 per cent. rural, and, second, 54 per cent. of the rural population is Negro. In no other state is the composition of the population like that.

We may say, then, that locally Negroes are essential to the cotton crop, but as a whole they do not seem to have figured greatly. Where a county is largely rural, has a high percentage of Negroes and plants a high percentage of its improved land in cotton, it is obvious that correlation would be high. But the coexistence of these factors in the proportion required to substantiate popular opinion is not often met with.

II. COTTON AND ILLITERACY

Illiteracy is relatively high in the southern states. It has been said that lack of proper schooling can be charged to cotton; the nature of the culture and the low per capita income make good schools impossible.² In this analysis near-illiteracy could not be tested, because the information is not available. But the data contained in the 1920 Census report concerning illiteracy were used. The same counties as above were used and the same percentage of cotton acreage employed.

A coefficient of correlation for cotton and illiteracy in the 151 counties was calculated first. It is .099, and the probable error is .054. Dividing the coefficient by the probable error, we get 1.8. Thus, the degree of correlation is very small and of no consequence. If Texas and Oklahoma, which are about as much western as southern, are left out, the coefficient is .15 and the probable error is .07, which divides into the coefficient 2.1 times. Again the correlation is too small to be important. Calculated for Texas alone the coefficient is .04, which is about as near zero as one could get without arriving. It is unnecessary to calculate the probable error. In all of these groupings the correlation between cotton acreage and illiteracy is very nearly nil.

It would seem, then, that the nature of cotton culture does not predetermine illiteracy. Other factors, perhaps some of which are historical, are needed to explain the prevalence of illiteracy in the southern states. It would be unwarranted to conclude from this that the nature of cotton cul-

¹ So King; Secrist; and Jerome.

² Tannenbaum. Frank, *The Century*, p. 816, Oct., 1923.

ture has no relation to the level of education above complete illiteracy, but the implication is strong enough to forbid the opposite conclusion without further investigation. Cotton is produced in a warm climate; if one might speculate a little on the basis of Ellsworth Huntington's theory of climate and civilization, it is possible that there is higher correlation between mean temperatures and illiteracy than between cotton and illiteracy.

III. COTTON AND FARM TENANCY

Farm tenancy is a fact which is everywhere notable in the South. It ranges from very low in some counties to 95.4 per cent. in one county in Mississippi, but the average for the 151 counties is 66.78 per cent. That is relative to the whole country very high. But it does not necessarily mean that cotton and tenancy vary together; it is possible that some other type of farming might have a preponderance of tenancy. If the correlation is high, however, the presumption is in favor of a genuine connection between the two factors.

The correlation formula was applied to these data just as in the above cases. When all the counties were used, the coefficient was .511 and the probable error .0408. The coefficient is 12 times the probable error. Therefore, it is decidedly significant. Cotton and tenancy do vary together, and the correlation is high. If Texas and Oklahoma are left out again, the coefficient for the remaining counties is .63 and the probable error .043, which divides into the coefficient 14.6 times. This is higher than in the whole area. Taking Texas alone, we find the coefficient to be .77 and the probable error .052. The coefficient is 14.8 times the probable error. There seems to be something in the nature of cotton culture which is favorable to tenant production.

But what is that "something"? A coefficient of correlation does not answer that question: it only points out the fact of coexistence or the absence of it. Other methods of research are necessary to determine the cause of the correlation. It may be accidental, but the probability is that it is not. On the other hand, whatever the present cause, it might be removed so that cotton could be raised just as well or better by a large number of small proprietors as by a few proprietors and a large number of tenants. It is by no means necessary to abolish cotton culture to eliminate underisable tenancy. All that the correlation means is that

under present conditions cotton and tenancy do go together in a very large per cent. of the area considered.

IV. TENANCY AND ILLITERACY

Since cotton and illiteracy are not correlated, it was thought that the application of the Pearsonian formula to the two factors, tenancy and illiteracy, might reveal an important connection. The coefficient for tenancy and cotton was high. Illiteracy exists in the cotton area. Then, may not illiteracy be connected with the social rather than the economic factors?

For the 151 counties this coefficient is .537 and the probable error .039, which divides into the coefficient 13.7 times. It is positive and high. Considering the area as a whole, these factors are certainly connected. Why does illiteracy go with tenancy? We may guess a number of reasons, but the degree of correlation throws no light upon that. For the forty counties in Texas alone the coefficient is .33 and the probable error .052. Thus, the coefficient is 3.5 times larger than the probable error and is not significant. If we leave Texas and Oklahoma out, we get a coefficient of .38 and a probable error of .063, which divides into the coefficient just 6 times. The coefficient is much less significant than the first one. Yet the area covered by these nine states is the "Old South," where illiteracy is high, tenancy high and cotton acreage high. Quite evidently some other factor or factors than tenancy are determining.

V. SUMMARY

If put in tabular form, the coefficients of correlation are as follows:

	Cotton and Tenancy	Cotton and Negroes
11 States511	.123
9 States63	.399
Texas77	— .154
	Cotton and Illiteracy	Tenancy and Illiteracy
11 States099	.537
9 States15	.38
Texas04	.33

There is wide variation, and yet the tendency in each pair of factors is fairly clear with the exception of cotton acreage and Negroes. The mistake has often been made in social statistics of calling a coefficient of correlation a "law." It is

very infrequently that; it is a description of relations at a particular time under given conditions. Another decennial Census would undoubtedly show variations in the coefficient for each pair of factors in each group of states. But it is believed that these calculations describe the factors considered in a representative way in the South.

One important negative conclusion can be made on the basis of this analysis: in a strict sense "the South" is little more than a geographical expression. It is generally believed to constitute a well-defined cultural region, but like the careful study of any culture, primitive or modern, this study shows great heterogeneity, where uniformity is usually assumed. It is not a cultural unit.

PROHIBITION AND STATISTICS

STUART A. RICE

OF FALSITIES, it is constantly being said there are three kinds: lies, damn lies and statistics. The three categories, it will be noted, are arranged in *crescendo*. The first two are common, or back-fence varieties, and relatively harmless. Falsehoods which are clothed in statistical or graphic form, however, are properly regarded as more impressive. They demand public homage. In the fraternity of "whoppers" they wear the gilded robes.

If we use the term in the sense of quantitative data concerning social relationships, statistics have always been in discredit among large numbers of people. It is not because the average man is unable to comprehend statistical methods and results; the public is seldom able to understand the means employed by scientists in arriving at their conclusions, yet these conclusions are accepted. The trouble is that statistics are used to support partisan causes. The common verdict of common people, which in some fundamental way so often approaches wisdom, has amended the old aphorism that "figures don't lie" by the addition "but liars do figure." Those of us who use statistics do not *mean* to lie, as a rule. We would not intentionally tell one of the common or "damn" varieties, yet we are often willing to condone the most flagrant statistical errors on behalf of a "righteous" cause. Distorted or inadequate tables and graphs still testify to a double standard of rectitude when it comes to winning an election or promoting a program of social reform.

This double standard of probity is perhaps nowhere better illustrated than in the controversy regarding prohibition. Here is a social policy

which wiped out huge economic interests and changed the habits of vast numbers of people on behalf of a "social" end. Many of the results of this policy appear to have differed widely from those which its advocates anticipated. The question of enforcement or modification has become a vital political issue and has even affected our international relationships. There seems to be need on every hand for an accurate description of the workings of this policy up to date, and an unbiased, reliable calculation of its social consequences.

The writer with a colleague was recently called upon to appraise a variety of statistical evidences concerning prohibition, including data which had been widely circulated by the best known organizations on both sides of the issue. He was forced to the opinion that no unbiased and statistically sound conclusions regarding either the enforcement or the social consequences of this policy are at present available to the American public. The few well-founded indications which exist are buried by propaganda. No more valuable contribution can be made at present to the prohibition controversy, in his opinion, than to point out the dangers to clear thinking which reside in this propaganda, both "wet" and "dry" alike.¹

The flimsiness of the statistical evidences which underlie many of the arguments of the anti-prohibition organizations seems to defy moderate characterization. One example will suffice: Bearing the date of June 14, 1923, a memorandum was submitted to his home government by Sir Auck-

¹ The study referred to was made by the writer in collaboration with Mr. Hugh S. Carter of Columbia University, on behalf of the Research Department of the Commission on the Church and Social Service, of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, by whose kind permission the material cited below is presented.

land Geddes, British Ambassador at Washington, on the subject of the effects of prohibition in the United States. In this memorandum were tables under the following headings: "Present Consumption of Intoxicating Liquors," "Arrests for Drunkenness," "Deaths from Alcoholism" and "Effect on Crime." The figures in these tables were "compiled by the three Bureaus in which the most detailed statistics as to the effects of prohibition are available," namely, the Anti-Saloon League, the Association Against the Prohibition Amendment and the Federal Prohibition Unit of the Treasury.

The impartiality of the Ambassador in gathering the material for his report in this manner is only to be commended, yet it should be noted that no effort was made to examine into the sources of the "statistics" given him. The method of "compilation" in the case of the Association Against the Prohibition Amendment was one of guess-work, pure and simple. The "detailed statistics," which seem to have been accepted in good faith by the British Ambassador, and given currency abroad in an official document, were based, in the words of the National Secretary-Treasurer of this "anti" organization, upon "observation" and "newspaper accounts," as mentally tallied up from day to day in the mind of a prejudiced paid opponent of prohibition. So far as the writer's interview with this gentleman disclosed, not one scrap of evidence, obtained by processes of orderly collection, summarization and analysis, was utilized in preparing the figures given to the Ambassador for world-wide distribution.

But let us turn to the other side:

The writer has before him a pamphlet just received without solicitation from the Anti-Saloon League of America. It is entitled "\$100,000,000 saved Connecticut in Three Dry Years." He has been informed that this pamphlet is the first of a series under preparation, presenting the alleged social effects of prohibition in individual states. The opening paragraph of this pamphlet is as follows:

Prohibition has been worth over \$100,000,000 to Connecticut in the first three years of its enforcement. It has saved the lives of 11,784 people, reduced preventable illness by the equivalent of 23,568 persons continuously ill for one year each, postponed the payment of over \$4,000,000 in insurance policies, decreased commitments to the county jails by 29,144 and to the penal and reformatory

institutions by 846, kept 487 children from becoming dependent on county support because of the death, neglect, imprisonment or other failure of their parents, reduced the number of almshouse inmates by 2,774, produced 166 fewer cases of alcoholic insanity, prevented fatal auto accidents to the number of 283, made unnecessary over 40,000 arrests by the police of the various cities of the state, added \$55,000,000 to savings accounts.

Examination of the statistical tables which follow in this pamphlet, and upon which the foregoing assertions appear to be based, indicates that prohibition has been regarded as the sole factor responsible for any favorable development in the state of Connecticut since the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment. No credit is given for the work of other agencies striving for social betterment. No attempt has apparently been made to ascertain whether, for example, decreases in mortality, preventable illness or commitments to county jails were to be found before prohibition as well as after. No account is taken of *trends* with respect to any of the data presented.

More than half of the \$100,000,000 "saving" claimed for prohibition is attributed to increases in savings bank deposits. This claim appears to be based on the four years increase shown by comparing the "dry" year ending Oct. 1, 1922 with the "wet" year ending similarly in 1918.² This increase slightly exceeds \$55,000,000. According to the very same table from which this result is derived, the increase during the three "wet" years preceding 1918 was \$48,000,000, or the equivalent, at the same rate, of a four year increase during the "wet" period of \$64,000,000. The utter absurdity of the claim that prohibition was responsible for the increases in savings bank deposits since 1918 is made still more apparent when it is noted that the increase was only 15% during a four year period, that no account is taken of increases in population during that period, that no consideration is given to changes in the real value of money or to changes in wage scales and interest rates; finally, that no attention is paid to changes in the business cycle, with which, according to authorities, the volume of savings bank deposits is closely correlated. Yet it is upon this hopelessly insufficient evidence that the Anti-Saloon League rests its case in what it seems to regard as a valuable contribution to knowledge regarding the effects of prohibition.

² Table 9, page 14.

The recognized canons of statistical accuracy have been habitually violated in still more flagrant fashion by the Board of Temperance, Prohibition and Public Morals of the Methodist Episcopal Church. An offense repeatedly committed by this organization consists in the graphic exaggeration of the ratio existing between data compiled for two separate periods or years. A typical example is shown in the accompanying facsimile from its "Clip Sheet," purporting to demonstrate that prohibition has increased the consumption of milk.³ The ratio which is alleged to exist between the gross consumption of milk in 1917 (wet) and 1922 (dry) is approximately that between 82.5 and 100. This ratio is indicated graphically by two milk bottles. The size of the larger of these bottles as compared with the smaller has been increased in *all dimensions* according to the ratio stated. The impression obtained by the reader is that of a quart bottle and a pint bottle, indicating a consumption that has doubled under prohibition.

But this is not the only aspect of the figure that is likely to deceive the unwary reader. Once again, no account is taken of *trends*. There seems to be little doubt that the sale and consumption of milk have been increasing in this country more rapidly than population for a number of years,—before the adoption of prohibition as well as after. According to the United States Department of Agriculture, the per capita consumption of milk increased from 42 gallons in 1914 to 49 gallons in 1921.⁴ This is equivalent to an increase of 16.7% over a period of seven years. Whether the increase was more rapid during the "dry" years in the latter part of this period is not indicated by the Department's figures. However, the consumption of milk is somewhat dependent upon the number of milk cows, and the latter is known for each of the years in the period mentioned.⁵ Reducing these numbers to index numbers on the base of the 1914 figure, the number of milk cows in the United States may be represented as follows:

1914—100
1915—102
1916—107
1917—111

³ July 14, 1923. The Clip Sheet is sent to newspapers and other periodicals in the United States for their reproduction of matter which it contains, with or without credit.

⁴ Yearbook, 1922, p. 287.

⁵ Yearbook of the Department of Agriculture, 1921, p. 690.

1918—112

1919—113

1920—114

1921—114

It is clear that the rate of increase in the number of milk cows has tended to decline rather than to gain under prohibition.

But lest this demonstration should be appropriated by the anti-prohibitionist, let the writer hasten to assert that these figures are probably as meaningless for any association between prohibition and milk consumption, as are those of the Board of Temperance, Prohibition and Public Morals. There are many uses for milk in addition to household consumption. It is quite possible that the latter has increased during the "dry" period at a more rapid rate than formerly because of artificial stimulation. The Department of Agriculture says:

During the last three or four years educational campaigns have been conducted in many cities to increase the consumption of milk. Health officials, schools, and various agencies have assisted in these campaigns because of the belief that it was to the advantage of the people that a larger quantity be consumed. . . . As a result of this educational work, the consumption in several large cities has been increased as much as 10 to 20 percent, and the increase maintained. . . . Similar campaigns are being conducted in rural districts, and it is probable that during the coming years the consumption of milk will be materially increased throughout the country.⁶

The foregoing analysis is sufficient to indicate that prohibition, instead of doubling the consumption of milk, as the unsuspecting reader of the "dry" propaganda cited would suppose, has had little if any effect upon its increased consumption.

The writer has no desire to bring particular condemnation upon the organizations mentioned. They serve to illustrate a vice which is widespread. The vice does assume particular importance, nevertheless, in the case of the Anti-Saloon League and the Board of Temperance, Prohibition and Public Morals, because of the intimate relationships which have existed between their central offices and that of the Prohibition Enforcement Office of the Federal Government.

Nor does the writer desire to belittle the motives of men and women who are devoting their lives to movements in which they believe. His plea is on behalf of clear thinking, accurate state-

⁶ Yearbook of the Department of Agriculture, 1922, pp. 288-89. It should be noted that the rural districts, for the most part, have long been "dry."

ment and intellectual honesty within the fields of their endeavor. Ignorance of a law exempts no one from the consequences of its violation. If this principle has become almost axiomatic of man-made statutes, its validity should be even more apparent in the realms of natural and social casuation. The wish or the expectation that prohibition will cause an increase in the consumption of milk does not bring the event to pass, and

the assertion that it has come to pass, with other statements of like validity, will return to plague the organization that makes it. There is reason to believe that religious and social agencies of reform have been injured immeasurably during the past half century, together with the "causes" which they sought to promote, by the failure of some of them to recognize that untruths are still lies, even though they be robed in statistics.

THE USES OF LIBERTY

GEORGE B. LOGAN, JR.

THE STORY of man as an unwearied adventurer after freedom still awaits the telling. Lord Acton, perhaps the profoundest scholar of the last century, spent most of his life in accumulating a great mass of literature, from every age and country, bearing on the development of thought, the struggles of creeds and institutions, the growth and subsidence of ideals, which was to be the material for a history of liberty, "the emancipation of Conscience from Power, and the gradual substitution of Freedom for Force in the government of men." After forty years of preparation he died before the results of his labor could be given to the world, and no later historian has ventured to take up and carry to completion the unfinished plan.

One wonders whether the thing will ever be done. In this time of restless disillusion it is a work that would help in enabling us to look at the world we live in with renewed steadiness and singleness of vision. Liberty is in a way a touchstone for the integrity of life: its history means little less than the progress of enlightenment. Of the forces that have been working in and moulding the modern world this is one of the strongest, and man's attempt to capture and harness it comprehends a good part of his life for the last five hundred years, the microcosm of his mind, and the extension of his will into the future. The freedom of the individual, the freedom of the corporate mass, and the swaying balance of one against the other are prime realities in the evolution of social consciousness. The spirit for liberty is one of the true master-currents driving ahead through modern life, often beneath the surface

but never completely lost or turned aside; its dynamics belong among the deeper impulses of human character in every age. In it are concentrated the cardinal issues of society since the close of the middle ages. It could be made to yield as simple and as large a view of our civilization as we are likely to get—the only view, it may be, that could piece together a disjointed and uneasy prospect. Nothing else would so light up the venerable duel of the fact and the right, the age-long conflict between the world that ought to be and the world that so discouragingly and persistently is.

Liberty is of course no end in itself, but a state in which men can develop most fully their own capabilities. Its conditions need therefore to be redetermined and reasserted by every changing generation. Acquiesced in, even for a little while, it is lost. And the continual redetermination and reassertion of the terms under which it can live constitute an epic of man who never knows when he is beaten. The making of our own free institutions covers only a part of the whole, but it is perhaps the most significant part for us today. We know, for example, that the fourteenth century was a time of readjustment in civil life, the sixteenth century a time of religious upheaval, the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries of the issues of political mastery, the present day of industrial strife. These periods of crisis mark the culmination of long movements, gathering slowly under ground, which have suddenly broken into the forefront of the world's interest. They are each a stage in the unfolding of the conception of a society that is in all respects its own

master. Through cycles that are to be measured in hundreds of years rather than in years, our ancestors have fought out the successive great battles whose results have secured (dare we say?) freedom of law, freedom of thought and conviction, freedom of government; and we are seemingly entered now on a fourth momentous struggle for freedom of work, whose outcome lies beyond our sight. The goal has not been liberty in itself, but liberty employed for the advancement of some particular ideal—an ideal so powerful that many of the strongest habits and institutions of its time have gone down before it. These revolutions are a part of our inheritance; we are living in the midst of one; and the rekindled fires of those whose first heat has passed we are still sometimes called upon to face.

The first of them began with the breaking down of that organization for social control we know as feudalism. Feudalism itself had risen to win for a rougher time freedom of the most fundamental sort—the right to settled existence—but in the brilliant and thoughtful life of the thirteenth century came the first signs that its usefulness was over. The leaders of that age were medievalists who attempted for the last time the reconstruction of society on a feudal basis, unaware that society was already beyond their means of control. Working beneath the irresponsible and capricious power of the old system, it had begun the forging of a link that should bind together the individual and his community in a juster and more congenial relationship than they had known before. The sense of law as something apart from the agency that enforces it, dimly recovered from Rome or carried through from more primitive beginnings in the north, began to take on a new meaning and strength. The old conception of it as necessarily a creature of privilege that had for its sole purpose the keeping of the peace gave way gradually before the realization that it could be made to act equally in declaring and preserving certain definite rights of the individual. Men were coming to see that private law need not depend on the pleasure of a sovereign nor continue to be the mere compilation of ancient custom, but exists in every age as a logical entity capable of growth and adjustment to the varying needs of the time. Against such a feeling the bases of medieval authority could not long stand.

The conquest of the law by the people of every country marks the merging of the middle ages into modern times, in whatever century it has taken place. The final achievement amounts to something vastly different from the purposes of those men who took the first steps toward it, and it has been brought about, like all the major revolutions, by an involuntary alliance of natural forces in many fields, economic, political, religious, and social, with the widening consciousness of men. The process may be traced, first and most strikingly, in England of the thirteen and fourteen hundreds, through the great pestilence that swept the country, the social chaos that followed it, the panic of the landlords and the series of repressive enactments from Parliament, the revolt of the peasants, its failure, and the quiet gain, in the succeeding decades, of all that had apparently been lost. The rebellion, falling as all rebellions have done into more radical and more ruthless hands than those that began it, could not secure even its earlier moderate aims, the abolishing of serfdom and the commutation of existing feudal duties for an annual rent on land. The peasants were dispersed, their leaders hanged, and many landlords used the reaction that followed to re-vindicate the worst features of their ancient claims. But the temper of the time was not so easily to be withstood. Through the fifteenth century villeinage continued to decline, feudal administration faltered, the power of the old landed interests departed, and before its close the serfs had become freemen who were proudly jealous of their equality in one respect with the most powerful baron.

So along with the first right of common life there came in time to stand this first great individual liberty. The idea of the universal sway of law and its impersonal regard of all men has supplanted most of the medieval allegiances in the mental habit of the race. It is, beyond question, a permanent part of our thinking. True that the victory has nowhere and at no time been complete, for the spirit of feudalism, with its disabilities for certain groups of men owing to their traditional status, holds on grimly, and apart from the serfdom that persisted in parts of Europe almost to our own day Catholics or Protestants, Jews, the yellow and black peoples, women, and other classes have often enough been

denied the most elementary civil rights. True, too, that in the heat of sudden passion it can lapse into a perversion and mockery of itself. But however imperfectly won and in spite of the faults that cling to its administration private law must always stand as a function of the only freedom worthy the name. It remains the first bulwark against special privilege in every form.

As the world of Langland passed into the world of Erasmus it became aware of a still sterner issue that had to be met. The great stirring of men's minds that we call the renaissance worked (at its best) through a dozen eager impulses to the ideal of humanism, the attempt of man, with a new clearness of mental touch, to reconstitute himself as a free being in a wholly free environment. Feudalism, as a bar to civil liberty, had been the first to go; the Catholic system, conformity of the inner man in an age that had begun to see the soundness and the possibilities of spiritual progress, was not to endure much longer. Tremendous forces were aroused which swept aside the exclusive tradition of the Roman church; and the most difficult labor of the new era came to be the creation and assertion of some norm of life which should fill the void that the fall of this cosmic philosophy had left.

From the vantage of the present it is becoming evident what a tragic thing, in so many ways, was the break-up of Christendom. Since Luther burned the books of the canon law at Wittenberg and Cellini cast his bronze Perseus in Florence men have lost completely the old feeling of unity, the sense of a single corporate truth binding all life together which gave to the middle ages their most distinctive character, and there seems nothing in the multiform society of today that is ever likely to give it back to them. Even that enfranchisement of the intellect and the spirit which stands as the one clear gain the world was destined to hold in exchange for a hundred and fifty years of blood and bitterness took a long time to find its better self. In the passion of ecclesiastical warfare the first promises of the new spirit were quickly swallowed up. Calvin's assent to the murder of Servetus was only the most conspicuous betrayal of the victory that had been announced over the ancient evils of dogma and authority. The baiting of Anabaptists and Socinians and Quakers went forward as furiously

among the reformers as the anathematizing of Antichrist, and it became evident that the right of private judgment was as strange a doctrine to the moderns as it had been to the medievalists. Every movement of revolt that achieves some measure of success is fronted by the same tragic development—dogmatism of its own, hardening of the spiritual arteries, and in the end perhaps a new tyranny as unbearable to men as the old from which it delivered them. The broad disposition of tolerance and reason was as rare as it was unintelligible to that time. Its truest adversaries were not Luther and Pope Leo, or even Calvin and Loyola, but each and all of them together against Erasmus and the temper of which he was the most constant exemplar. Between these antagonists his life was crushed out.

Yet in the end the thing that was won proved worth the price that had to be paid for it. With the dying down of the wars and persecutions of religion a period in the progress of enlightenment was completed. Men were at last set free to think and believe and express themselves (on most matters) as they saw fit; and conscience began slowly to take its place with law among the ministers of personal liberty. It meant the release of a moral faculty whose first great discrimination was clearly not to be its last. As law is in the best sense conservative, so is conscience radical; it can cut to the heart of prejudice and sham and raises every man to high distinction as the arbiter of all human values. It has since broadened far beyond the field of religious conviction, and stands as the mother of those rights of speech, of assemblage, of petition, and of the press that we hold among our most basic securities. In later days it has only too often been silenced and repressed and frightened half out of its wits, and its sources muddled or vitiated, but it can never be altogether lost. In every crisis of history, whatever the question of the hour—popular government, or negro emancipation, or the democratic control of industry—independence of thought and expression must be gained before any real settlement can begin. Honored in the past, it is challenged and always to be won again in the present. More and more fully it reveals itself as a vital spirit in the continuance of civilized life.

The English civil wars point to the beginning of another epoch. Milton's life was spent in the

divided service of two ideals—freedom of conscience and freedom of government—and he lived to see the first cause all but won and the second all but lost. For although the old feudal organization had broken up no less completely on political lines than on civil, there was no such broadening down of rights and responsibilities in the former field as there had been in the latter. Society split apart from the elaborate hierarchy of the later middle ages into the sharply opposed forces of king and commons; the people had secured the privileges of the law, but it was the monarch who gathered into his hands the political strength that had belonged to the old baronage and developed it into a system of personal despotism. Through the renaissance this new conception of the state was growing up; Machiavelli's Prince became a reality on half a dozen thrones; and out of the collapse of medieval authority emerged a number of secular powers, well-integrated, ambitious, and internally oppressive, backed by the philosophy of the divine right and the moral irresponsibility of kings.

Revolt was the natural and inevitable corrective. The new absolutism had been gained partly at the expense of ancient popular constitutions; Calvinism, translated into terms of government, demanded that authority be delegated from below rather than imposed from above; and civil freedom under political oppression declared itself an absurdity. Yet both the Dutch and English commonwealths, first of the great attempts against the tide of despotism, were confused and weakened by the issues of religion that remained unsettled. Cromwell is remembered more as a champion of religious moderation than of political liberty: many of his acts were those of a tyrant no less arbitrary and far more determined than King Charles. In a sense he deserted one cause as many of the reformers before him had deserted another, riding to power on the crest of a rebellion whose better principles he was afterwards compelled to repudiate in the name of law and order. Hating anarchy more than despotism, he was forced reluctantly to choose between them. The pathos of his career lies in the continual frustration, by the men and conditions about him, of his sincere efforts at some beginning of representative government.

He failed, and thirty years afterwards the work had to be done again. Under William of Orange

the first enduring foundations of the new freedom—the responsibility of the people for government and their ability to act on it—were laid. Among English-speaking peoples its later development has been fairly steady and, with three or four striking exceptions, not spectacular—a business of roll-calls more than of street barricades. The rest of Europe was not yet prepared for it. The greater part of the eighteenth century, the period between the wars of religion and the wars of patriotism, is at its face value one of the darkest in the moral history of the race. The old fires had burned themselves out, the new were not ready to be lighted. But beneath the surface their materials were being raked together; the slow and fascinating education of a submerged middle class in the doctrines of political and social liberty was going forward. Behind the cynical philosophies and debased policy of that time the forces of change rose once more to their great moment of expression. When the crash came, in France, not only government but every accepted element of the social order was cast into solution. The French Revolution took a matter of eighty years or so to work itself out: the theories of two generations were granted two vivid generations of experiment. It swept quickly to its extreme; attempted a recovery; was captured and perverted by Napoleon ("I am the Revolution."—"I have slain the Revolution.") in the wasting of a tremendous opportunity; got swamped by the stupidest of reactions; forced a compromise under Louis Phillippe; reasserted itself in the turbulence of '48; fell again before the gilded glory of Napoleon III; and merged itself into the main stream of political progress only after the nation had been humbled in the dust by a foreign conqueror and the last of its sans-culottes had fired the capital. Long before, the French armies had spread abroad the revolutionary idea, and the history of the nineteenth century is in large part the alternation of ebbings and flowings which succeeded the first momentous wave. It was above all the age of national union and independence, and along very different lines, each with its peculiar problems and solutions, half a dozen peoples have won to a degree of autonomy, power, and self-respect that has created a type of political state unknown in the world a century and a half ago.

The intensity and strength of those forces that may be summed up in the words democracy and nationalism are only too familiar to us. We do homage to them; we draw back in terror from their logical extremes; and we are by no means ready for a final evaluation of either of them. Meanwhile an era has been closing at our backs. The twentieth century is plainly not to be a mere continuation of the nineteenth. The passion for the popular control of government has been very notably, if far from completely, satisfied; we have been able to watch it slowing down, ceasing more and more to be a prime mover in the march of events, while the turning of men's attention to problems of a very different sort may be marking our own day as the transition to a new stage of history. There is no such thing any more—if there ever was such a thing—as pure politics. Its content and motives have been wholly changed by those forces that during the past hundred and fifty years have remade and are still remaking the world in another pattern. Their prophet is perhaps to be found in Nathan Rothschild, the little money-lender of Frankfort who on one afternoon was a spectator on the field of Waterloo, and the next, after a swift journey by horse and clipper ship to London, was coolly buying his fortune on 'Change before news of the battle could reach the city. That legendary stroke may well stand as a symbol of the time, just then beginning, in which the masters of finance and industry were to gather into their own hands the triumphs that once belonged to armies and empire. The quiet revolution that was ushered in a few years before by Arkwright and Watt has since that time affected the most intimate part of all our lives. The center of gravity has been shifted from the villages to the city, from simple crafts to complicated machinery, from statesmen, soldiers, and landlords to the men who own and use money. The powers of the last century have been more and more impressing on man that he is no longer importantly a churchman, and no longer exclusively a citizen, but above all a worker, a creature of the industrial machine that is striving to keep pace with the material demands of the world which must be met or must be created to be met. Life has become, we say, predominantly economic in character, and it is on economic lines that the most vital conflicts of the present day are being waged.

It is hardly to be denied that our industrial warfare is only the latest phase of the long battle men have been winning and losing and winning again for freedom. We are still on the upward sweep of the movement: the crisis, if there has to be a crisis, is ahead. For the great capitalist has become the inheritor of those uncontrolled powers over men's lives that belonged to the barons, the ecclesiastics, the kings, and the influential ministers of other days. The principles of absolutism, barred in turn from civil, religious, and political fields, have broken through as confidently as ever in industry. Our system of the production and distribution of goods is, in its widest implications and pushed to its logical limits, as indefensible in a free world as any of the older tyrannies and paternalisms that have been beaten on their own ground. Its benefits have been many and necessary; its inevitable fatal weakness lies in the historic incapability of aristocrats to use irresponsible power for the common good. The feudal, the clerical, and the political castes have all risen to meet the needs of their day, have all slowly lost popular confidence through perversion of trust, and have all at length been discarded as incidents—major incidents—in the march of progress. The specific indictments of our own system, from Fourier and New Lanark to Bertrand Russell and the U. S. S. R., may or may not be worth listening to; but historically the economic unrest of these days has become the stirring of man as a producer and consumer of goods to feel the way to the mastery of his environment as his fathers have mastered the repressive conditions of theirs. The battle is not of necessity between laborer and man of wealth, or trades-union and trust—not even, in the last resort, between soviet and parliament. However men and their institutions may range themselves on either side, it is joined between the forces that act for liberty and the forces that act for bondage, and the continuity of their opposition has held through centuries of changing terms. And as we view in perspective the course of like action and reaction it is difficult to doubt that the end here will be as it has been before, that out of many stumblings and strayings will come in time freedom of work, control by the ordinary man over the conditions of industrial life.

Such, in barest outline, is the course of that feeling for liberty by which society has been continually remoulded during the last five or six centuries. Its path through the modern world bears the characteristics of a true evolution, lying in great circles that swing upward to mark out a rough sort of spiral progress. On each new level, with different weapons and under different names, a variation of the same battle is fought over. The authority of private law, the free play of opinion, government answerable to the common will—these are the landmarks of our civilization, to which the twentieth century may succeed in adding the principle of democracy in economic life. The first two were charters of the modern man, releasing him from the cramped corporate life of the middle ages; self-government and the beginnings of economic unrest, turning away from the excesses of individualism, have spoken for the liberties of men in new communal relations. Centuries have gone into the making of each of them. It is the main line of succession and emphasis that we have traced, and among different peoples they have come at various periods, and have often overlapped or been curiously crowded together in time. Actors, types of mind, and sequences of popular mood appear and reappear in them all. History has had to repeat itself time and again to secure the ends that men have so incurably desired.

So much for our background of historic liberty. The understanding of it ought to be of some value to us in resolving the questions that front our own generation. It confirms our sense of the continuity and the fundamental orderliness of life behind its apparent interruptions and confusion. It furnishes a frame of reference, as the mathematician would say, on which to hang a large number of events as they occur and by which to relate them to one another and to their fixed origin. It enables us to look on our contemporary world neither as the prodigal heir of the ages, nor as a new kind of swift and intricate life cut off from all the past, but as a moving point in a history that ever has been and will be conditioned by the almost unchanging qualities of human nature. It endorses the pronouncement of Walt Whitman that "it is provided in the essence of things that from any fruition of success, no matter what, should come forth some-

thing to make a greater struggle necessary." And it sees that in the growing complexity and intense-ness of life there will be found wider opportunities for the assumption of power by special interests, more subtle temptations toward its abuse, more destructive agencies of protest, and increasing difficulties in the formation and expression of genuine public convictions, through which the drama of freedom is to be played out in the future. We may set down under three broad heads, I think, the diverse problems that liberty in the making has opened for us—problems which the twentieth century, in the light of its own knowledge and purposes, can hardly dare not to answer. I state them directly as to their immediate urgency; but they are all in some fashion being attacked together and will have to be worked out concurrently.

The first is a matter of mere self-preservation. It has taken the shock of the war to teach us that for none of the past achievements of liberty has the world been made wholly secure. If civilization goes to smash in a more terrific conflict than the last, freedom of every sort will go too, because it will not have been strong enough to protect its own conquests. For wars, which have almost always destroyed liberty, are chiefly the result of liberty denied or incompletely won. Our own holocaust came out of the survival of old issues that we once thought safely dead and the evil aspect of newer issues that had not been intelligently met. The mutual jealousy and suspicion of neighbors who built up a vicious circle of defense and counter-defense that threatened the very powers they feared; the refusal of the forms and the sense of law to pass across national frontiers, of the state to submit itself to any legal or moral discipline whatever; the vitiating of independent thought by all those agents of privilege that gain by prejudice and armed conflict; the spirit of aggressive nationalism; the facts of economic ambition, ruthless competition for markets and the menace of armaments planned as servants of diplomacy in its designs for commercial power—these are coming to be seen as its true causes. The ragged ends of barbaric lust, of feudalism, of bigotry, of autocratic power in many fields, which had never been gathered into the scheme of a free world but were left hanging loose, needed only a spark to set them off into a blaze. These are the

forces that have to be dealt with before an end can be made to war. And the first line of attack is more liberty of the kinds we already know, the full responsibility of all peoples and all the people for their common good in every sphere in which they have now only partially attained it. We can salvage civilization only by everlastingly fighting for our great inheritances, filling in their gaps and completing their structure, widening the range of their influence until it becomes a universal and constant quality in our life, purging them of the poisons administered by their secret enemies. We have faith that mankind—our own fellow men, with their eyes open and their hands free—can make the world a place of harmony and peace; or if we have not such faith it is idle to talk of liberty at all.

Growing out of this is another group of problems calling for creative work of the first importance. The economic freedom that looms ahead of us is not to be won or maintained in a vacuum: it will become part of a social organization already old and elaborate, and must be fused and blended with those valuable elements that have been worked into the fabric before it, and especially with the most recent of them, political democracy. There is a curious parallel between the situation we find ourselves in and that of England during the seventeenth century, when religious liberty and free government had to be reconciled and interadjusted in much the same way as our two preoccupations will have to be. Somewhat as Hampden or Halifax found that they could not separate conscience and the church from the new statecraft toward which they were working, so our leaders will find more and more that there is a perpetual osmosis going on between the issues of politics and those of economics that cannot be denied. It is true today that every political question has its economic aspect, that in the more important of them that aspect tends to overshadow all others, and that every economic question is becoming one of political determination as well. Yet the two points of view are seldom in harmony with each other. Once before, civil and religious liberties proved themselves impossible under political tyranny, and we are beginning to see the difficulty and the danger of upholding the autocratic control of industry in a thoroughly democratic state. The way out is perhaps not the road

to communism, nor to syndicalism, nor yet to the socialist state; but as the inevitable shifting of power goes on, no other economic system can develop indifferent to government, nor can government remain unaffected by it, particularly in this country where national life began with the rise of capitalism and has always been closely bound up with its fortunes. How the process of interaction may be directed to the preserving of both elements in the public interest will be the concern of the next two or three generations, and if they do their work well industrial life and democracy will come out of the trial as greatly altered as the governance and conscience of England were altered and remodelled between the Tudors and the house of Hanover.

There remains a further essay in liberty, an essay that we are impelled to make with regard to anything that we perceive to be subject to the laws of growth. This is nothing less than the finding of some means by which its progress may be consciously directed. One cannot but be impressed with the slowness, the waste, and the bitterness that these long cycles must seemingly involve before the right one out of a thousand revolutionary ideas can be purged of its dross and erected into a pillar of the common morality of society. Are none of our future struggles to be consummated without going the way of all the others, with the swaying triumphs of violent and intolerant forces that have marked their course? Must the autocrats and the extremists have their day again and again before each new victory can be assured? Or is it possible in some manner to cut through the prevailing evolution of freedom, to get sight of the goal at once and move directly toward it instead of plunging about through the costly methods of trial and error to which we have always been accustomed?

Here we are on different ground altogether. It is ground that belongs to the student of man who is also something of a prophet, and I leave the subject with these queries. Beyond doubt, the free society of the future is to be founded on the dignity and vigor of its long heritage: law and opinion, government and industry can be made the vehicles of a better way of life; but these things are after all nothing more than social mechanics, and their value is to be measured in the collective purpose of those who in any age

are able to use them. The world of tomorrow will be essentially what the men are who make it up; the social order to come will sink its deepest roots in the heart. And the achievement of the ultimate liberty will come through the education of men in the knowledge of themselves, and through their power of acting on that knowledge to affirm the basic capacity for good in human nature and the responsibility of society as a whole for its own welfare. Science and mysticism collaborate here in the truth that makes us free—the release of those deeper hidden faculties that have been ours without our awareness of them, the emergence, slow or swift, of the authentic man who is worthy of freedom from behind all the abnormalities and preoccupations with which his long road has been cluttered. As freedom has been declared and nurtured for so many other

ends, so now it will have to be declared and nurtured in the service of the spirit of man himself. Hope rests in his willingness to make himself normally and steadily what he knows, by shining intimation or the faithful interpreting of fact, that he most genuinely is. So the progress that we have traditionally conceived in terms of social contract and material invention may become only the framework of a renaissance that will sweep us far beyond the limits we are accustomed to set to human perception, human power, and the possibilities of human brotherhood. Our possessions have been too often our limitations; and a society can be well imagined that is in outward respects more simple, less hampered by its restless needs for money and things, and happier in the unfolding of those generous impulses that most truly reveal its heart.

THE LAND OF "I RECKON" AND THE LAND OF "HADN'T OUGHT"

EDGAR LEGARE PENNINGTON

AS I LOOK through the open window, I see a nearby sky-line of oaks and pecan-trees, all wearing a foliage of several weeks' maturity. Here and there the vague purple of an umbrella China gives a touch to the landscape. On the street below, straw hats, shirt-sleeves, and high-school boys in baseball suits are in motion. I have no reason to doubt. For though it is spring by the almanac, it is summer by the thermometer. And yet, a year ago to-day, I boarded the "third rail" on Genesee street and was carried through a hundred miles of snow before I beheld a sign of thawing. Central New York and the state of Florida are not two days apart on the railroad and they are seldom two inches apart on the map. They revel in a certain community of interest: both sections read *The Saturday Evening Post* every Thursday, buy gasoline and accept air and water, tell the same jokes about "flivvers" and prohibition, and listen to the same Hindu lectures during Chautauqua. Why should there be a difference?

For difference there is: the two sections have the wildest, most indefinite theories about each other. Of course, the misunderstanding arises from lack of knowledge; but why the lack of

knowledge? The map says, "Come and let us reason together." The locomotive screams, "Come and let us reason together." The same invitation is honked by countless automobile horns. The months mount up on Time's speedometer; and while the North and the South trade, exchange letters, and call each other "sister," somehow they do not lay bare the secrets of the heart. Instead of frank, open intercourse, there is the barrier of caution and formality. In the old days, several evil spirits either forbade or discouraged companionship. Before fast trains and good roads assaulted the stern, tyrannical dignity of the mile-post, a trip was as tedious as well as an expensive feat. Inevitably the sections will become warm friends, but so far they have not passed the introductory stage.

The explanation is simple. Of the millions who stay at home, how few read with the curiosity or the discrimination of investigators! And should they do so, their sources would seldom be dependable. Of those who do not stay at home—how few tourists hit anything but the high spots! One man dives beneath the Hudson, shoots through the sign-boards of "Joisey," hears the guide at the Capitol explain the cost of the mural

paintings, crosses into the Old Dominion with the blessed assurance that he is South. Thereafter he runs into railway stations through the back streets of towns, passes cypress swamps (which, to his chagrin, do not afford him the sight of innumerable alligators), sees from the Pullman window little to substantiate the stories of ante-bellum luxury and wealth; finally he lands at a big hotel, conducted by a man who knows Cape Cod better than Biscayne Bay. Should a cold spell assail the land of the citrus, the tourist would feel that the weather man has violated his contract; and, it must be confessed, propagandist literature is often too partisan to be exact. Anyway, let us assume that the traveller has spent a glorious winter in the Land of Flowers; let us grant that he has decided to spend every winter among the palms and mosses. Still, what does he know of the South? How close has he come to the stable, middle-class citizenry? How much has he seen of those whose ancestors changed the Southern forest into a frontier, a settlement, a feudal civilization? He has never visited the old towns, full of traditions and legend; he has never felt the thrill of lofty Greek columns, high ceilings, cornices with wooden nails. He has experienced a transplanted North in the Florida peninsula and has caught a glance of a negro cabin and a few razor-backs; and now he is ready to discuss and write up the South with the calm discernment of full observation.

The Southerner who goes North is just as inconsistent. He is less apt to write; but we may be sure that his knowledge is superficial. The Empire State means to him Manhattan Island. He may indulge in a Hudson River trip for good measure; but he is most impressed by the tension of the crowds, the tall buildings, the lights of the theatre district, and the sea lion at the aquarium. Should he exceed our expectation and invade the Adirondacks and the Fulton Chain, it is but for a moment: he certainly does not pause to study man's proper study—humanity. No wonder his friends and relatives get the impression that New York is solid city from the Brooklyn Bridge to Lake Erie; no wonder the human element sinks into insignificance.

For the last three years it has been my good fortune to live among the villagers of the Mohawk Valley and the Tioughnioga River. As I read

Cooper's novels, a boy in middle Georgia, I pictured Natty Bumppo pouring the tepid red waters of Hard Labor Creek over the treacherous Indian's head; I never dreamed that some day would find me close to Otsego Lake as a resident. But there's a divinity that shapes our ends. I mingled in the joys and sorrows of people who never before had come in contact with a native of the South. When they told me their troubles and demonstrated that hospitality is not limited to the cotton belt, I was impressed that men are members of one big family.

Lest I seem obtrusively didactic, I may digress to say that I grew very hungry for grits and fried chicken gravy. Somehow doughnuts protested against the name "fried cakes," and "parched peanuts" did not become "roasted." I longed to hear the children say "Yes, Sir" and "Yes, Ma'am," and the constant "Fatherr" and "Motherr" always seemed less intimate than the "Mamma" and "Papa" which not once I encountered along the N. Y. C. But I was very happy. I enjoyed the friendly people, I enjoyed the "crick" and the mountains. The "typical New England village" in which my first parish church was situated bore a striking resemblance to the average county seat of middle Georgia. Water oaks line the sidewalks of Madison and Greensboro, maples of the same size beautify the "Homeville" of David Harum. The "green" corresponds to the courthouse square. The same quality of gossip prevails in small towns both North and South. The similarity of the villages is surprising.

Large cities of the up-to-date sort have little distinctive about them. Whether situated East or West, we may look for the same restaurants, cigar stores, shopping districts, hotels, and traffic cops. I think with cities, the characteristics are those of number rather than locality. There are bustling, noisy cities in every direction; likewise there are slow, unprogressive cities North and South.

The small towns are much alike; the cities owe less to geography than to arithmetic so far as their internal spirit is concerned; it is in the rural sections that the great contrast exists. Small farms and severe climate are the Northern peasant's problem; strange to say, they have made him what he is to-day. He must turn every minute and every inch to account; he cannot rely on a benignant offering from Ceres. He has worked

and saved; to-day his home is painted and equipped with water-works, electric lights, and a telephone; his car is parked near the silo; his forty acres are a garden. All this time the Southern farmer rents his land, plants one crop, buys his food at "time prices," and never surmises his sad plight. More large cities in the South would doubtless afford the farmer a market for his vegetables; he would turn to dairying and truck-farming. The immensity of the estate often hinders careful supervision. There are obstacles here as there, but they may be overcome by ambition and toil.

While living in a small town, I had no difficulty in learning the Yankee's idea of the South. First, the superiority of his section in wealth, education, energy, and progressive spirit was an axiom; sometimes he seemed so far to discount the Southern Nazareth as to expect no good thence. It is true that he had buried the Civil War hatchet—for which God bless him—but he illogically expected the South to respond by assigning all Rebel chieftains to oblivion and exalting the wearers of the blue. The theory of states' rights, which at least vindicates the sincerity of the South, I found inadequately presented; instead the pupils of the local academies believed that the South fought solely to retain her slaves (who received all the chastisement of which Whittier complains). One afternoon I saw a school dismissed so that the children could attend a stock-company presentation of *Uncle Tom's Cabin*. There was no malice,

but surely a misunderstanding. The Northerner was courteous in listening to the other side, whether he believed it or not; in fact, the books on Lee in the public libraries show many a thumbprint. In the whole time I spent in the North, I do not recall a single person who thought less of me as a Southerner; really, if anything, my origin was a credential.

For somehow, spite of former hostilities and partisan politics, the opinion prevails that the Southern type is the embodiment of manhood. Slow he may be called and unaggressive; his integrity is assumed. Surely in this tacit recognition, in this deference, we have something on which to build more cordial relations. Build we must—North and South—the fabric of sympathy and affection.

True brotherhood will not be fostered by jealousy, ridicule, and superciliousness. It will be the product of what we share in common. We have much to learn from the North in enterprise, coöperation, and intensive culture. The North, with its crowds, its multiplying ghettos, its alien elements, is already looking to the South as a stabilizing force. We can no longer live under the same flag as strangers; the drawing together has begun—it is more than a pipe dream. By better acquaintance, we discover faults as well as virtues, but we forget all grudges. We are bound by the same language, laws, and history; we are brought face to face by modern science; is there any warrant for envy and distrust?

WANTED—AN AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY

HOWARD WOOLSTON

THE LAST Congress was called upon to revise our immigration law. Its committees soon discovered a demand for restriction by some selective method. A bill embodying sudden and drastic reduction of numbers was reported. Immediately the administration protested that such summary action might endanger friendly diplomatic relations, as foreign representatives objected to the distinctions made between nations. Our legislators responded by passing the measure in a high spirit of independence; the

President was constrained by political necessity to sign it, and the new law went into effect at once. Let us examine its provisions.

First, it limits the number of immigrants admitted yearly to two percent of each nationality as counted in the census of 1890, with a minimum quota of one hundred. This reduces the stream of newcomers to less than half the present flow, i.e. from a maximum of nearly 356,000 to about 161,000. After July 1, 1927, the total is fixed at 150,000, distributed in proportion to the 1920 census—an interesting change of base.

Second, in addition to the quotas, the foreign born wife of an American citizen and his unmarried children under eighteen years of age may be admitted. So too, sojourners for pleasure or business, such as ministers, teachers and students, are allowed to enter. Natives of other American countries are exempt from all quota restrictions.

Third, the proportion of arrivals from southern and eastern Europe is reduced by selecting as the basis for quotas a census in which their ratio was comparatively low. Thus "Nordics" may compose nearly ninety percent of the new immigration, while "Latins, Slavs and Jews" will fall to less than one-sixth of their former numbers. Further, the law excludes all persons ineligible to citizenship from any quota arrangement. This provision debars Orientals, since they are not "free white persons" nor "of African descent." Hence the measure seems to be highly selective of quality.

Finally, the law provides for issuing immigration visas by American consuls overseas, and for spacing these so as to keep the incoming flow practically constant throughout the year. If these details can be worked out, they will apparently aid in enforcing the criteria for exclusion proposed in 1917. Herein the law seems to promote efficient administration.

Now let us criticise these measures. In the first place, the quota and number fixed appear to be arbitrary and adventitious. From reading the committee reports and congressional discussions, one finds no convincing reason for limiting immigrants to 161,000 or 150,000 a year. Apparently these figures are the result of compromise between those who favored an open door policy and others who demanded action approximating exclusion. It is not evident that such inspired calculation will long stand the test of changing economic and political conditions at home or abroad. Nor is it plain why three percent of the foreign born as enumerated in 1870 or seven percent on the basis of 1850 was not fixed as the quota, if the older type of immigration was to be favored.¹ Certainly either would have increased the proportion from northwestern Europe. And if this is desired, why switch later to the less favorable census of 1920? So far we are the only nation

that has attempted to regulate numbers in a fashion so rough and ready.

Conservative critics of the bill early struck at two vulnerable points in its provision for non-quota immigrants. They called attention to the exception of alien wives and children of American citizens. This, they said, might lead to an endless chain of imported relatives. They further pointed out the loop holes left by granting free entry to persons from other American countries. This feature might bring about step by step immigration from Europe or Asia by way of South America, Mexico or the West Indies. It is conceivable that such exemption may promote the smuggling of debarred persons on a large scale.

So the law appears to develop both surprising weakness and undue rigor. But the fundamental defect is its devious partiality. It is evident that the purpose is to check the immigration of people unlike us, without stopping the arrival of those we prefer. But instead of specifying the qualities considered desirable, the law favors those nations whose representatives we like, and debars others by general provisions. It seems to me that such procedure involves a three-fold error.

First, it disregards the wide range of individual differences among the members of any group. This is what Professor Shaler pointed out in *The Neighbor*, as the fallacy of the universal. For instance, our patriots sometimes reason thus: "Alexis is a revolutionary Anarchist. He is also a Russian. Therefore all Russians are dangerous Anarchists." Although it is well known that all Russians are not Anarchists, and that many Anarchists are opposed to all violence, similar illogical thinking often results in fastening the vices of a few unpopular persons upon an entire nation. Some of our mental testers and amateur statisticians have contributed to the currency of this and the following misconception.²

In the second place, such generalization tends to confuse racial traits and cultural development. For instance, it is sometimes claimed that Orientals cannot be assimilated in America, because their appearance, language and standard of living are so different from our own. Now it is evident that color, stature and form of features are hereditary traits that can be changed only by breeding. But it is also obvious that language, occupa-

¹ One may surmise that a tacit wish was to encourage "thrifty German Nordics" and to restrain "improvident Irish Celts" without offensive designation. See *Abstract of Fourteenth Census*, p. 302.

² See Mr. Jennings' criticism of samplers and lumpers in *Science*, Mar. 14, 1924.

tion and religion are learned by every individual from the social group in which he is reared. Hence the latter acquisitions are subject to alteration through education, and so furnish no sure indication of a man's geneology. Otherwise we should be surprised to find that Negroes in the United States speak English and join the Baptist Church, neither of which methods of expression appear to be innate characteristics of persons of African origin.

Confusion is worse confounded when both physical traits and mental development are identified with country of birth. Let me illustrate the resulting absurdities by examples. Neither Dr. Wellington Koo nor Mahatma Gandhi could be admitted under any quota, because the former is Chinese and the latter was born in the barred zone of Asia. But all Mexicans and Haitians not excluded for obvious defects may enter this country and claim citizenship. Their children born here or covered by the naturalization of their fathers are also free Americans, regardless of defects. Japanese are debarred because they are not of the "Caucasian Race."³ High caste Hindus may be "Caucasians," but they are not popularly recognized as "white."⁴ Syrians and Armenians are "Semites," not "Asiatics."⁵ In another case it was held that a Syrian who claimed Caucasian descent could not be naturalized, because the common understanding of "free white person" in 1790 was limited to those of European origin.⁶ This decision was reversed upon appeal,⁷ but the words of the judge seem pertinent. "The argument that the statute as it stands⁸ may be arbitrary, illogical, unjust, even absurd in its provisions, in that it makes color, race or geographical habitancy, and not moral and mental merit, the basis for granting the privilege of citizenship, is one to be addressed to Congress and not to a court of law."

Anthropologists must blush at such references to the prattle of their childhood. The distinctions recall the Irishman's question: "If kittens were born in an oven, would they be biscuits?" The point of citing these opinions is, that *under the law, nationality is determined by country of birth or residence,⁹ naturalization depends upon parent-*

age and blood,¹⁰ while citizenship is supposed to be based upon personal merit. Thus aliens born in territory transferred by war are to be considered as natives of the country that acquires such domain.¹¹ Minor children take the nationality of their parents, and a wife may assume that of her husband.¹² Now it appears that in fixing the quota of any country upon this territorial basis, the possibility of its nationals applying as immigrants may be limited without regard to race and parentage. And so the right to naturalization as American citizens is made to turn upon the vagaries of geographic bounds as affected by the accidents of political history.

Such patent discrimination is likely to establish among us an attitude of prejudice toward whole peoples, not only regarding those who are excluded, but also against their countrymen who have been properly admitted. Our contempt provokes the aliens' reaction of distrust and dislike. So they often tend to withdraw from helpful association with their American neighbors, thus splitting the community into hostile factions. Nor does the mischief of stirring up resentment stop here. You can't call a man a son of Ishmael—implying that his ancestors were horse thieves and cutthroats—without embroiling his kinsfolk. The countrymen of aliens thus stigmatized grow indignant at such aspersions, and may develop animosity toward all who countenance the calumny. Witness the recent demonstrations of the Japanese against what they consider an insult to their nation. Such protests may easily grow into warlike reprisals, so unstable is the basis of international friendship.

It is a chastening experience for an American to live in a foreign country where his nation is not popular. The writer still smarts under the recollection of uncomplementary remarks concerning all English speaking people, delivered bluntly in his presence by Levantines who considered him too stupid to understand their language. These persons had evidently suffered or heard of exploitation by unscrupulous travelers who happened to speak English. Consequently they inferred that every one using that tongue is a brigand, and expressed themselves accordingly. It is a sore trial to submit to such hazing without retaliation toward any person who may be con-

³ *Takao Ozawa v. U. S.* (43 S. C. 65).

⁴ *U. S. v. Bhagat Singh Thind* (43 S. C. 338).

⁵ 174 Fed. 735, 834.

⁶ *In re Dow* (213 Fed. 366).

⁷ 206 Fed. 145.

⁸ Sec. 2169, Revised Statutes.

⁹ Public Law No. 139 (68th Congress), Sec. 12.

¹⁰ 195 Fed. 645.

¹¹ P. L. 139, Sec. 12, c.

¹² *Ibid.*, Sec. 12, a.

nected with one's tormenters. Recognition of this elementary psychology may help us to understand the emotional bias underlying much legislative rationalizing. Hate begets hate and is repaid in kind. That is an axiom for statesmen as well as for preachers.

There remains for brief consideration the means of enforcing the new law. It seems evident that the success of American consuls in securing accurate information concerning the many points required from an applicant will depend upon the coöperation of foreign governments. If they do not give the emigrant the official documents demanded or do not suppress forgeries of the same, the plan of examination overseas will fail. This feature of the law clearly rests upon the assumption of international agreement. Therefore our position that the regulation of immigration is a purely domestic matter, must be modified by recognizing that extra-territorial authority to regulate involves either *force majeure* or sanction by other powers. Perhaps it was some such point that Secretary Hughes had in mind when he warned the legislators to proceed with caution. The art of diplomacy is not necessarily perfected in the practice of local politics.

Having taken exception to several features of the law, the critic is bound to suggest alternate means for effecting its purpose. This is attempted, not with the idea of setting up another program to limit immigration, but to indicate certain principles that seem applicable in establishing a rational American policy toward the question.

Assuming that the state has the right to choose whom it will accept as immigrants, and that applicants cannot be satisfactorily designated *en bloc* by the reputation of their birthplace, the first point offered is SELECTION. *By this term is meant deliberate choice abroad of desirable individuals, upon the basis of uniformly high standards of physical, mental, economic, and moral attainments.* In brief, pick the most promising candidates wherever found, instead of letting in from designated sources those who can prove their capacity to pass minimum tests. Canada and Australia approximate this method. It seems to be sound eugenic procedure. Just what points of excellence may be deemed essential, can be determined as indicated later. But having established our high standards, all those who can qualify should be accepted without quibbling over

non-essentials. Let quality determine quantity of immigration. As conditions change the severity of the tests may be slightly increased, diminished or allowed to compensate. So the number of entrants can be regulated, as is done in armies and universities. Such a method cannot be accused of loose discrimination.

Assuming that we can secure human material suitable for developing American citizenship, the next step is to certify it. This means REGISTRATION. *The term signifies the inscription of every alien in the United States with the Bureau of Immigration, until such time as he leaves the country or becomes a naturalized citizen.* Some method of keeping track of all persons is common on the Continent. Since the war it has been adopted for new comers in Great Britain and Australia. It is regarded as a protective measure both for the stranger and for the community. Every country has some period of probation for aliens, during which time outsiders and natives observe each other to see how well they can get on together. Visitors are expected to leave after a brief period or obtain permission to extend their stay. Persons unfit to remain in the group are deported. Those found suitable soon establish new home ties that bind them to the community. It is to verify their preliminary record that the system is most useful. There is nothing novel about this proposition. We use immigrant records now in the United States. It is desirable that they be more effectively employed for the identification and protection of strangers among us.

The third principle is DISTRIBUTION. *This connotes adequate information as to conditions at proposed destination; rapid, safe and comfortable transportation thereto, and suitable occupation upon arrival.* The Division of Information now supplies here and abroad data as to opportunities in the United States. But these are neither specific nor timely enough to forestall the massing of ignorant foreigners in crowded urban centers. The facts must permeate the sources of migration or they are of slight avail to the traveler ticketed to some unknown region. Argentina is so eager to get workers on the land that they are conducted free to the place where they are needed. Much can be done in our own country to facilitate and make secure the movement of new arrivals from ports of entry to distant points. Employment has always been the rock upon which

both liberal and conservative policies have stuck. The contract labor clause is an absurd provision in that on one hand it encourages recklessness, on the other it limits opportunity, while quite generally it promotes perjury and collusion. If there is no work for the immigrant, he is not needed; if there is, he should know exactly where to find it. Australia secures employment for aliens upon arrivals, and Brazil grants settlers supplies and credit to till the land.¹³

The last desideratum is ASSIMILATION. *This means rapid, complete and reciprocal participation in the life of the adopted country.* For aliens who have been carefully selected, intelligently placed and faithfully observed in their new surroundings, no long time should be required to establish fitness for citizenship. Why not authorize a minimum probation period of a year or two before naturalization for those who have shown special competence and aptness? Even prison sentences may be shortened by good conduct. Here is a practical way to make the registration system attractive, by using it as a means to secure credits toward approval of early naturalization. Not all foreigners will so quickly assume the responsibilities of citizenship. But those who can would be a source of strength if they soon shared with the natives all rights and duties. Those who fail to enter at once into all our ways may yet bring valuable gifts of culture. Were we to consider them as persons with a somewhat different social background, instead of perverse and stupid animals because they do not ape us slavishly, both natives and foreigners might more easily enter into intelligent and sympathetic coöperation.

Having proposed these principles, the practical question at once arises, how can they be applied in any workable plan? The following outline indicates a scheme for organizing the methods suggested.

1. *A simple basic law* establishing the principles for controlling immigration. Details are un-

necessary and cause confusion when subject to political alteration.

2. *An expert commission*, permanent, non-partisan and with broad administrative powers comparable to those of health authorities. This body, rather than Congress, should issue regulations covering methods of selection, registration, etc.

3. *International conferences*, frequent or continuous, to advise national authorities, to adjust difficulties between nations and to arrange details of administration concerning wider aspects of the problem. The International Labor Bureau in Geneva might be considered a suitable basis for such coöperation.

4. *Scientific revision*, periodic, authoritative and public, through learned bodies concerned with technical questions involved. Every year biologists, psychologists, anthropologists, statisticians, economists, political scientists, sociologists and other groups concerned with certain aspects of migration and race contacts, meet to discuss their problems and findings. To such bodies a commission might submit doubtful points, and from them receive suggestions for accurate readjustment of measures. This would remove certain partisan aspects of debatable issues.

It is a large task to build a nation, and so prepare the future in America. We have well-nigh neglected a magnificent opportunity to conduct an experiment in social selection such as may never again be possible. Eugenists now perceive the significance of the situation and are urging us to choose more wisely for the years to come. An intelligent program from such efforts may be confidently expected. Social scientists, too, are beginning to lay foundations for a real Eutopia here upon the earth. If they can help devise a rational policy of national administration in this one respect, America may thereby lead the world into better ways. If we can merely learn to avoid the ancient errors of prejudice, partizanship, and provincialism, we shall have taken at least one step forward. Perhaps for the present, that is sufficient.

¹³ For all these points see *Emigration and Immigration*, International Labor Bureau, Geneva, 1922.

Teaching and Research in the Social Sciences

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs, and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

SOCIAL CHANGE: AN ANALYSIS OF PROFESSOR OGBURN'S CULTURE THEORY

FLOYD H. ALLPORT

FROM the standpoint of the social psychologist an attempt to discuss culture apart from the human behavior which gives rise to it must appear as fundamentally inadequate. The 'super-organic' is only a descriptive concept. Human action is the force; culture the result. To say that culture itself is a cause is to use the word cause in a loose and metaphorical sense. It would be unfair to say that Professor Ogburn's book¹ ignores the psychological factors underlying culture; yet the treatment of these factors is superficial and their value for social causation is often controverted.

A brief summary of the work will reveal the features which are salient for discussion. Culture, the product of concerted human action, includes materials, tools, knowledge, beliefs, morals, law, religion, and custom. It is as old as the race, yet its greatest development has occurred within comparatively recent times. Civilization is modern culture. The process of its growth and modification and the adjustments both within culture itself and between culture and human nature comprise the data of *social change*. The behavior of an individual as a member of society is the joint result of his original nature (biological, psychological) and the cultural heritage by which he is surrounded. These two behavior sources are often confused, and much is attributed to original nature which is more accurately ascribed to the culture medium, that is, to the social environment. Differences between the Americans and the French in the trait of thrift, for example, may be due to such cultural factors as a necessary policy of conservation of resources, rather than to innate disposition. Cultural traits are to be distinguished from racial traits.

False emphasis upon the biological factor to the neglect of the cultural has, according to the author, been especially pronounced in discussions of social change. Social evolution, which involves organic changes in the race, is not the same as cultural evolution. The meager evidence from prehistoric culture shows that at a comparatively late date in the biological evolution of man culture was at its very beginning. Its whole course of development has covered only a few thousand years, a period during which anthropological data give us no evidence of a parallel change in the biological equipment of man. Striking evidence exists of development *previous* to the last ice age and to the dawn of culture; but skeletal remains from that era do not differ essentially from the morphology of modern men. The likelihood of mutations is dismissed after pointing out that in the few available researches, such as that of Morgan upon the fruit fly, *drosophila*, their occurrence has been extremely rare.

From this marked disparity in the rates of cultural and biological evolution it is deduced that the former does not depend upon the latter, but follows its own course, guided by laws of its own. Culture makes possible, and in fact inevitable, the occurrence of inventions by affording the necessary stock of materials and concepts for the inventor to draw from. Thus the existing culture may be said to be the "mother of invention." The achievement of the genius is the inevitable product of the thought of the age. This thesis is supported by a formidable list of discoveries and inventions made about the same time but independently by two or more investigators.

Cultural evolution proceeds according to the following laws. Its stream accumulates with the passage of time; it changes, dropping obsolete

¹ *Social Change: with respect to Culture and Original Nature*. New York. B. W. Huebsch, 1922.

and superseded forms and acquiring new ones (selective accumulation); it differentiates; it causes individuals to specialize in various parts of it; it grows by inventions which are instituted from the existing culture base; its rate of growth though irregular is fairly geometrical, one invention may cause a sudden spurt by making a large number of later developments possible; it is also subject to forces making for inertia. As causes of inertia are introduced certain psychological factors opposed to cultural change, such as a substituted utility for some culture form, causing its persistence as a 'survival' of its original usefulness. Further barriers to culture evolution are the difficulties of invention and of diffusion, lack of resources, lack of correlation with parts of existing culture, vested interests, power of tradition, habit, social pressure, orderliness of social organization, forgetting the unpleasant in an apotheosis of the tradition of the past, radicalism, curiosity, and conservatism.

The attitude of treating culture as an entity separate from human action is continued into the discussion of cultural maladjustments. Maladjustments between the various parts of culture are brilliantly and convincingly treated under the caption of "cultural lag." In the complexity of our civilization rapid advances in one portion of culture often fail to be accompanied by proportionate advances in other portions; and maladjustment arises until the lagging elements have been brought into line. The effects, for example, upon the economic and social organization of the family resulting from the transition from an agricultural to an industrial civilization created numerous maladjustments which lasted until other necessary cultural changes, such as compulsory public education, juvenile courts, and child labor legislation, were developed to meet the needs arising from the altered conditions.

The last part of the book is devoted to the vital question of whether culture has been carried along too rapidly by its own momentum so that it is in serious conflict with the primitive and unchanging biological nature of man. In discussing whether our original 'cave man' instincts are given full play in modern life the author makes a psychologically valuable distinction between acts externally stimulated (e. g. flight) and those internally stimulated (e. g. hunger, sex). By rec-

ognizing the latter class we can replace the notion of instincts as innate reservoirs of power that must be liberated. The internal stimulations take care of themselves, and do not depend upon culture for their arousal. Professor Ogburn refers to the fact that the rejection of drafted men by army boards on the grounds of nervous and mental disease was greater for city than for country districts. This may indicate a morbid trend resulting from excess of modern culture as seen in large cities. Statistics of admissions to insane hospitals in recent years are of course impossible to interpret as bearing upon the question of whether insanity is on the increase. Neurotic tendencies have been pointed out among primitive peoples. Mental conflict in childhood, a condition much noted in recent years, seems to be due to special family environments, rather than to the necessary effect of modern culture. Possible evidences for maladjustment to culture are seen in a number of social problems, such as crime, sex problems, and selfishness.

Though no conclusion is reached as to the degree of disharmony between man and his cultural environment, methods are discussed for helping to resolve such discrepancies as may exist. Either human nature or culture must be changed so that the two will conform. Changing human nature by breeding methods is dismissed as impossible in our present ignorance of eugenic laws. Too much pressure upon the individual by environmental agencies is also to be deplored since it results in harmful repression. Sweeping changes in culture are equally impracticable. Civilization cannot be controlled; the effects of invention, diffusion, and other social changes are unpredictable. Minor adjustments however are possible in special regions of cultural maladjustment. Examples of these are the better adaptation of the sex instinct, (relieving psychoneuroses), sublimation, relief from strain, substituted activities releasing the energies of the primitive instincts and emotions. Games, sports, and other methods of recreation offer practicable methods for better adjustment through the substitution process.

In the present writer's opinion Professor Ogburn's book would have been more convincing had he limited himself to an exposition of cultural factors often neglected in theories of social

change. The attack upon the biological and organic factors is not necessary for proving the importance of culture, and it considerably weakens the argument. This criticism is the more pertinent because the psychological factors in social causation are not distinguished by the author from the discredited biological elements, or else they are obscured by being incorporated in the notion of culture itself. By 'biological factors' the author seems to mean the innate equipment of man (instincts, intelligence, etc.) which is practically unchanging and therefore cannot be considered the cause of cultural evolution. By 'culture' he means not only social products but, by continual implication, the *acquired habits* of individuals through which culture is learned, used, and—in short—given its reality. Having thus smuggled in human behavior to give solidity to the notion of culture, he turns his back upon it and proceeds to discuss culture as though it were a thing apart from human nature and subject to its own laws and principles of change. This apparently unconscious inconsistency may be illustrated by the following quotations. On page 344 we read: "In the first place, man always appears as active agent in any social change, in the sense that none of these changes could take place without man." But on page 342: "Culture grows because of purely cultural factors, despite the fact that this growth occurs through the medium of human beings."

Turning for the present from the question of culture as a behavior phenomenon, let us examine those innate or constitutional factors which Professor Ogburn terms 'biological.' It seems surprising nowadays to find a scientist basing an argument for the absence of changes in mental endowment upon external and morphological similarities between prehistoric and modern man. Psychologists have proved the extreme unreliability of physical measurements as indicators of capacity for achievement. Another argument is that which deduces the cultural causation of large culture differences between neighboring Indian tribes from the fact that these tribes come from a common ancestral stock and therefore cannot be supposed to vary in innate (biological) endowment. How do we know, in the absence of mental measurement, that the intelligence of the Athapascan is equal to that of the Northwest coast Indian? In the same manner one might

argue that the backwardness of culture among the mountain whites is due to cultural causes, such, for example, as barriers to diffusion. Every one knows however that this backwardness is due primarily to defect of intelligence and accompanying traits, intensified through isolation and inbreeding. Yet these people come from the same racial and national stock as those who have developed the complex cultures of the more flourishing areas of the eastern states. Isolation and barriers to culture diffusion are here not causes but results. Failure in competition with more intelligent people has operated selectively to force the mountain whites into the isolated and unfavorable regions. Low intelligence level is furthermore a barrier to the assimilation of such culture as may penetrate into those places. In view of the many recent findings in differences in intelligence, few psychologists would care to assert, without the employment of actual tests, that Indian tribes living in adjoining regions have equal innate capacities, and that no differences significant for cultural development exist.

Intelligence is best defined as learning capacity. Differences of intelligence are therefore interpretable as differences of ability to learn (assimilate) new and complex cultures. A slight difference in the mode of the curve of intelligence distribution for any race (and substantial racial differences have been found) might greatly affect the general level of ability to assimilate a new culture. This fact, together with other characterial factors no doubt underlies the differences of assimilability of immigrants of various nationalities. Difference of existing culture habits is, of course, also important. To an even greater degree would such shift of the mode of distribution affect the production, at the upper extreme of the curve, of geniuses by whose efforts sweeping cultural changes are made possible. Inventions are not so inevitable as Professor Ogburn maintains. No list of discoveries and inventions in which duplication did not occur was given for comparison with that presented on pages 90 to 102. Although several geniuses may conceive of an idea simultaneously, it is still true that there has to be *some one* with sufficient capacity (biological factor) to conceive it.

Leaving as debatable the possibility of significant biological change in the last six thousand years, there still must have been considerable de-

velopment of human capacity up to that time. It was this very improvement in human intelligence which made it possible at a certain stage of development to invent and transmit the beginnings of that culture which has grown steadily down to the present day. For the origin of culture man is thus indebted to his original traits and capacities, rather than to social heritage. In the development of culture as well as in its origin the inherited endowment is of great import. It should not be set over against the culture habits of a people as an opposite principle, but should be combined with these acquired habit systems, both going to make up human nature; and the individual thus constituted should be considered as the unit of social change.

From this standpoint the biological equipment is of profound significance for cultural development. It affords the level of capacity necessary for (1) learning by trial and chance success, which is *invention*, and (2) learning as the acquisition through contact with others of habits necessary for the use of transmitted culture materials. Biological inheritance moreover provides the prepotent (instinctive) drives which are behind these forms of inventive and assimilative learning. Interest (the biological need) is a factor which psychologists agree in assigning an indispensable rôle throughout the learning process. It is true that culture, through the cultural behavior of elders, may be said to modify this original nature. But the modification is no passive affair: the ability to be modified and the innately founded drive for acquiring modification are determining factors in social change without which the principles of culture dynamics would be but empty and inactive formulae.

Culture is the work of man. It springs jointly from his own nature and from the materials and instruction already existing at his disposal. The works of man's hand and brain naturally grow and differentiate more rapidly than the hand and brain which made them. Yet these objects are still the work of man, and always will be. To argue that, because no series of changes in biological nature can be observed to parallel the changes of culture evolution, therefore the former has slight causal relation to the latter is to lose sight of the true nature of social causation. The relatively stable biological factor forms in suc-

cessive individuals an ever renewed capacity and urge toward cultural adaptation, that is, an ever renewed cause of social change.²

It must be remembered that in so far as culture has any dynamic or causal character it is to be defined as culture-habit. Culture in this sense exists not so much in the tool as in the ability to make and use it. If a group of engineers, chemists, manufacturers, mechanics and professional men were deported empty handed from New York City to the habitat of primitive man in Australia, they could build up a creditable civilization there in a few years. On the other hand, if a portion of New York City were depopulated of Americans and turned over without instructions of any sort to a group of Australian aborigines, we might expect a rapid deterioration of our metropolitan culture to the level of savagery. In a very general sense culture may be said to be a cause, but only through the habit patterns of individuals does such a cause ever become operative. Conflict, or lack of adaptability of a new form to the cultural pattern already existing, is also readily understood through psychological categories, as habit interference. Fundamentally the conflict is in the habit system of individuals, not in the culture pattern as an abstract entity.

For the sake of further testing the claim that objective culture (social products) is in itself a cause, let us consider the following instance. Suppose the elder generation should suddenly cease, from the birth of the younger generation, to teach the latter any of the skill necessary for handling modern culture, but should bequeath to them in mute fashion all their elaborate material

² It may be objected that, while we may count upon these human factors as ever present and necessary causes of culture, their very constancy renders them valueless for explaining the particular pattern assumed in cultural change, which is after all the sociologist's chief interest. To this we should reply: (1) There is no proof of the constancy through time nor equality among peoples of the biological equipment. There exists an unfortunate tendency of sociologists to overlook recent developments in the field of socially applied intelligence and character measurement and in the psychology of race differences. Morphological aspects and community of ancestral origin are both entirely insufficient as criteria. (2) The interplay of innate drives, capacities, habits, and conflicting responses in the formation or adoption of culture is so complex that without a careful study of these elements neither the origin nor the significance of the culture pattern can be understood. Professor Ogburn himself has given excellent examples of this fact from survivals, tribal customs, tabus, and the like (pp. 156, 174-5, 185). (3) Geniuses and great leaders play an important rôle in social change. Although they are to some degree products of their age, an attempt to explain their lives and influence without a study of them as individuals would be absurd. (4) It is bad logic to ignore a permanent and relatively stable cause in pursuit of less fundamental variables. We should concentrate attention rather upon the interplay between the two. This means of course that we keep the individual ever in mind and cease trying to explain society in terms of the group as a whole, or culture wholly in terms of culture itself.

machinery, recorded thought, and unexplained formulae. It is probable that there would not be a total lapse in culture, but that the younger generation would manage to guess the use of some of the appliances, and would come by trial and error to master them to some degree. In such a case it might be said that the tool is by itself, and independently of the culture habit of its use, a *cause* in social change. It should be pointed out however that this situation is unnatural and unlikely. The universal rule in social evolution is for each generation both to bequeath the tool and teach the succeeding generation how to use it.

In order to state the factors of social change in a different manner, we may subsume them under the following heads. To produce growth and change in culture there must be:

- A. The *social factors*, comprising (1) a heritage of social products (material and recorded culture) and (2) an environment of fellow beings to transmit the habits of use of the social heritage and such cultural habits as exist without objective form, such as customs and folkways.
- B. The *individual factors*, comprising intelligence, i. e.
 - (1) capacity to invent, to learn from teaching of elders, or to learn (assimilate) diffusing cultures;
 - (2) culture habits and knowledge already of sufficiently high level to make possible either new discovery and invention or the assimilation of neighboring or imported cultures of some complexity;
 - (3) a pattern of drives, habits, and ways of doing things (culture: habits) of such a nature as not to involve reactions antagonistic to those which would be required in assimilating the newly imported or invented culture.

The chief emphasis of Professor Ogburn's book is thrown upon A, in the above scheme, and particularly upon the social heritage factor. Intelligence, the first of the individual factors, has been mentioned (e. g. on p. 33), but it has been obviously slighted through the discussion of the central theme. The existence of a stock of cultural habits (B2) as a necessary basis for acquiring further culture, and the necessity for absence of conflict in culture habits, have been clearly treated in Part III, and in certain instances the psychological nature of these factors has been recognized (pp. 174-5). But on the whole the tendency has been to discuss them as though they were traits rather of 'culture' than of human beings.

In fairness to the author we must point out a passage (p. 32) in which he states that cultural traits may be interpreted as psychological traits. Any careful reader of the book will however agree that this interpretation is steadily ignored throughout the principal discussion. The lack of sufficient attention to the development of institutions as a part of social change is perhaps due in part to this neglect of the social psychology of the individual.

One might reply that Professor Ogburn's purpose was to stress the social and cultural factors in this manner because they are usually overlooked, whereas the individual and mental factors are obvious to all. No one can deny that the author has done a real service in the clearness and skill with which he has thrown the cultural elements into relief. But *over* emphasis in order to gain attention for a neglected factor savors slightly of propaganda and is a dangerous practice.

By way of summary we may conclude that causation in social change lies fundamentally in the behavior of individuals. The processes and objects which are invented and transmitted through individual behavior may be described independently of that behavior as "culture," but they are not in themselves and independently of behavior sufficient agents for the explanation of social change. Not society as a whole, but individuals in society are the true causes. The effects of individuals reacting together to a common environment may be stored as socially modified habits of the individuals concerned and reestablished through learning as habits of a later generation. In this sense we may speak of a large class of individual habits as socialized, or perhaps as "culturized." The chief causal factor in social change would then be, not culture as an entity separate from human action, but the 'culturized' behavior of individuals. If the human element is ignored, the treatment becomes, as in the evolutionary formulations of Spencer, a way of picturing social change without contributing to our knowledge of how such change comes about. Many of Professor Ogburn's laws of culture dynamics, such as rate of growth, inertia, diffusion, and lag, are in close touch with reality and are set forth from a most scholarly analysis of facts; yet insofar as the laws of individual

human behavior are left unintegrated in the scheme of culture evolution, these culture formulae do not explain social change, but merely describe it.

This criticism should not be permitted to obscure the substantial merit of the book as a positive contribution to the study of social change. Insofar as it shows that no account of cultural development is complete without a consideration of the existing cultural attainments, it is a brilliant achievement. Professor Ogburn's thesis, aside from his criticism of organic factors, is highly important. Through restatement in terms of individual habit (and the writer is by no means certain that Professor Ogburn would object to such a restatement) it may be brought into accord

with a natural science view of causation. An interesting agreement, for example, may be shown by following up the admission that 'culture traits' are after all psychological traits, or habits, of individuals. Professor Ogburn affirms (p. 51) the methodological importance of examining the cultural factors in social change before we inquire into the biological causes. Since the cultural factors are essentially habits this statement may be rendered to the effect that in explaining social behavior we must exhaust the rôle of habit formation, or acquisition from the environment, before we ascribe the behavior in question to the hypothesis of instinct (biological factor). And this is precisely the trend of modern social psychology.

EDUCATION FOR CITIZENSHIP

MALCOLM M. WILLEY

TO THE sociologist, one of the most encouraging tendencies is the spread of the social sciences downward from the college curriculum into the courses of study in high schools, and even into the upper grades of the elementary schools. It was not long ago that the only recognition received by the social sciences in elementary and secondary school systems was in so-called courses in civics. For the most part these courses were highly formalistic. The student was drilled in governmental anatomy, memorizing the various departments of the state, the functions of each, and if he could eventually tell whether the department of education was a branch of the department of the interior, or subordinate to the department of agriculture, he was passed with credit, and assumed to have acquired the fundamentals that would make him an intelligent citizen and voter.

Rapidly this is all changing. The old formalism is giving way to a virile study of government, and emphasis is being placed upon the relation of the student to the social environment in which he is living. Government is being studied as something vital and close at hand; and the various problems that social life develops are being formulated for the boys and girls. Courses in civics, or problems in citizenship, or Americanization, as

they are variously called, have become dynamic; ideas are injected, rote memory is discounted, and the attempt is made to familiarize the student with some of the problems—social, economic, political—of the society in which he lives.

But obviously this change has brought with it certain dangers. It is all very well to make the student *think*, but it is equally important that the material which is given him should be accurate, in order not to create false conceptions in the plastic mind. When it is considered that the majority of school children leave school by their fifteenth year, that those who enter colleges are a precious minority, and that for the rank and file the only formal education is that of the grammar and high schools, the care that should be exercised in selecting material for these courses in "citizenship" is obvious. The pupil at this period of life is highly suggestible; he acquires stereotypes unquestioningly; he accepts as truth whatever is told him in the classroom. The ideas and impressions received during these early years are rarely changed. Consequently there is urgent need for being certain that erroneous concepts and biases are not acquired.

Perhaps this need for care can best be demonstrated and made strikingly apparent by reference

to three recent volumes, issued to meet the growing need for high school text-books in social problems.¹

The first of these volumes, *Actual Democracy*, is written by two members of the Newark, New Jersey, school system. The state of New Jersey by statutory enactment has required that all students before graduation from high school must have had a course "containing a treatment of some of the political, social, and economic problems of the American people."² To meet this requirement the commissioner of education of the state has prepared a syllabus, "Problems of American Democracy." The authors of this text acknowledge their indebtedness to this syllabus, and hence it may be assumed that the material in the volume would meet the New Jersey requirements.

It is clear that in a discussion of present day problems, private property must be considered, and a chapter on this is found in this volume. The emphasis of the chapter, and the material in it, is best made evident by one of the questions at the conclusion. Each chapter is supplemented by a set of topics for student discussion, and the last discussion problem on this topic of property is, "Show that private property and democracy are inseparable."³ The chapter itself is summarized on page 63 as follows:

Private property is one of the fundamental institutions of American democracy. It is an unmistakable index of social progress. It originated because of social reasons; it has grown under continual subjection to the social sanction. It is the basis on which our whole social order has been built up. It cannot be destroyed without destroying also the ideals of liberty and democracy in which Americans believe.

Needless to say, the matter is by no means so simple and by no means so established as this dogmatic statement would make the student believe. And that private property is not separable from democracy is of course preposterous. Yet the student in the New Jersey high schools has no inkling as to the factors involved beyond the highly controversial assertions contained in the text quoted.

More palpable dangers of misconception arise when the authors begin the discussion of trade

unionism. No text-book on problems of citizenship could well omit such a topic, but it is a topic that should be treated with the utmost care lest false impressions be implanted in the students' minds. How will the boys and girls of New Jersey picture trade unionism after they read this passage?:

There are several types of unionism in this country. First, we have what we may call "business unionism," which is trade conscious, but not class conscious. It is essentially a bargaining and a conservative institution: an example is the Railway Brotherhood. Second, is the "friendly or uplift union," which may be either trade or class conscious, is conservative, and favors collective bargaining and profit sharing. An example of this form of unionism was the society known as the Knights of Labor, which at one time had a large and influential membership. The third type may be called "predatory unionism." It is secret, either radical or conservative, class or trade conscious, and has two wings: "hold-up" unionism, the corrupt type recently exposed in our great cities; and "guerrilla unionism" which never combines with employers, but engages in a secret and violent warfare with capital. There is also, unfortunately, a fourth and more objectionable type of unionism which calls itself "revolutionary unionism." It may be either socialistic as was the Western Federation of Miners, or anarchistic like the Industrial Workers of the World. It is class, not trade, conscious and antagonistic to the wage and other systems of modern society. This unionism does not, as a rule, care for the rights of the employers, and is disposed to believe in the policy of sabotage, which varies from actual destruction of property to mere slackening on the job.⁴

Anyone at all familiar with the concept of stereotypes will at once recognize that such words as *predatory*, *hold-up*, *guerrilla*, and *revolutionary* are certain to raise prejudiced pictures of trade unionism in the minds of immature boys and girls. It may be safe to label unionism in this manner for maturer college students (as one or two economists have done in their writings) but even here the use of such highly colored words is questionable. Certainly their usage is not justified in high school texts; certainly the authors would never dream of labeling business concerns in the same manner.

The dangers of the careless use of words is again clear if in this same book one turns to the discussion of immigration. There is much about "the menace to America of a large unassimilated population" which because of the stereotyped

¹ *Actual Democracy*, by Margaret K. Berry and Samuel B. Howe. Prentice-Hall, Inc. New York. 1923.

² *The Common Sense of the Constitution of the United States*, by A. T. Southworth. Allyn & Bacon. Boston. 1924.

³ *Text-Book in Citizenship*, by R. O. Hughes. Allyn & Bacon. Boston. 1923.

⁴ See the Preface, *Actual Democracy*.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 64.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, pp. 73-74.

language used may be questionable, but passing over this, the following will be found under the general topic of crime and immigration:

There is no doubt that there has been a tremendous increase in criminal thought and action affecting the political sphere in recent years which has been fomented by radical foreigners. In the early spring of 1919 the authors attended a socialistic mass meeting in New York City and saw thousands of foreign faces glow with approval and with the lust for cruel action as speaker after speaker denounced the government of the United States and by inference justified acts of violence against it.*

That this is not only unjustifiable, but actually conducive to ill feeling toward foreign stocks in this country seems evident to the writer. The use of emotionalized words such as *lust* and *cruel* is not only quite out of place in a school text-book, supposed to be impartial, but is actually pernicious. The inferences that young minds will certainly draw from such phraseology are bound to be distorted and antagonistic.

But even more unpardonable in this volume is the statement, on page 169, that "today American democracy is facing a life and death struggle with Marxian socialism." There is, of course, no basis in fact for such an extreme statement. And certainly untrue statements, or such highly opinionated conjectures as this, are not the kind of material that should find a way into American high schools.

The second book, *The Common Sense of the Constitution of the United States*, is a tiny volume interpreting the constitution clause by clause. This book really belongs to the earlier period of civics, for it is formalistic. Yet even the author's formal interpretations are open to criticism at times. The analysis of the first amendment can be cited as a point in substantiation of the thesis under consideration, namely, that great care must be used in stating material for high school classes. The following is the paragraph discussing the free speech clause of the first amendment:

This amendment also guarantees the right of free speech. There can, of course, be no such thing as absolute free speech. The only persons who say exactly what they think every minute in the day are babies and fools. If a person is in church, at a meeting, or in any public place, he will hardly say aloud every thought that passes through his head. There is reason in all things, and on general principles a person may say in this country anything he pleases, provided what he says is not libelous or

slandrous, or contrary to the public morals; and provided that he does not advocate the overthrow of the government by force. In this country where we have a government, not of men but of laws, it is not reasonable that anyone should preach the overthrow of the government by force. If B says "Murder A, throw him out of office, and let me rule," then it is perfectly logical for C to advocate the murder of B after B has set himself up as ruler. This is anarchy.⁸

Anyone familiar with the writings of the social theorists is aware that this murder of A by B is not anarchy. And also, anyone familiar with the manner in which the high school mind works will also know that the student will carry away from a reading of this passage one idea: that anarchy and murder are synonymous. What anarchy really is, is not explained. The student in all probability leaves school and for the rest of his life links *crime* and a *theory of society*.

The third volume, *Text-Book in Citizenship*, contains what are probably the most convincing bits of evidence in support of the thesis that untold harm may be done unless social material is carefully presented. R. O. Hughes, the author, is on the faculty of a Pittsburg high school. His book is profusely illustrated, and the illustrations deserve attention. Many of them are reproduced "by courtesy," and one cannot but be impressed in reading the credit lines under the photographs. Included among those granting "courtesy" are The Carnegie Steel Company, The Portland Cement Association, Swift & Company, The United States Steel Corporation, The Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Company. The American Steel and Wire Company, The Westinghouse Electric Company, The Union Switch and Signal Company, The American Sheet and Tin Plate Company, The Illinois Steel Company, and others. These pictures, contributed by huge corporations, show scenes calculated to attract favorable attention: model factories, employees' gardens, model tenements, company flag raisings, faithful employees at annual picnic, classes in Americanization for workers, school children at tooth brush drills (this by courtesy of the Tennessee Coal, Iron and Railroad Company), corporation playgrounds for children, corporation classes in civil government, and many others of like stamp. On page 395 is a picture captioned, "An example of public welfare work by a great corporation,"

* *Op. cit.*, p. 167.

⁸ *The Common Sense of the Constitution of the United States*, pp. 91-2.

which shows a newsboy at a drinking fountain, and into the stonework of this fountain is carved in immense letters: National Tube Company Public Fountain. Without questioning for the moment the motives of the National Tube Company, it does seem as though the author of the text is treading on dangerous ground in this manner of presenting the picture. Similarly with all the other pictures mentioned. To an unbiased reader they cannot but seem as testimonials to vast corporations and designed to instill in students of high school age an unquestioning admiration for these corporations and all they stand for. At least there is the very apparent danger that the students will react in this manner.

But it is not only the pictures that must be considered. The reading matter warrants comment. Thus, on page 470, one finds a paragraph with this heading: "Employers of the right sort." Reading a few sentences into this, the following is met: "The United States Steel Corporation reserves shares of stock which the employees may buy and so acquire a financial interest in the business." The chances are that a student preparing his lesson will copy into his note book, "Employers of the right sort—the United States Steel Corporation." An association is thus built up in a way that does not seem altogether justified. An opinion is thus established, uncritically, in the mind of the student.

Commenting upon the I. W. W. and the doctrine of direct action, the author says:

It is hard to see how a *right-thinking American* can possibly indulge in such performances or hold such theories. A *decent* man finds it difficult to sympathize with even oppressed people who use any such means to have their grievances corrected.¹

Finally, in discussing certain phases of Russian problems, there is reference to "two able and unscrupulous leaders, Lenin and Trotsky." By the

use of the word *unscrupulous* an unjustifiable connotation is raised in the students' minds, not only concerning the men themselves, but relating to the entire Russian situation as well. No impartial and mature scholar will admit that we know enough about Russia as yet, nor its leaders, to brand the country or the men at the head of it in such derogatory terms.

These examples cited from these three recently issued text-books by no means exhaust the material that might be called to attention. It is not the main purpose of this article to attack these, or any books, as such. The purpose here is to show the need for care in gathering and presenting material on social and economic problems to secondary school students so that they may not have false and unwarranted beliefs on the many topics they will be called upon to consider in after years. It must not be imagined that it is being charged here that the writers of these books are deliberately deceitful or consciously propagandizing. No such contention is raised. It is merely being pointed out that possibly through carelessness in phraseology, haste in writing, or lack of research, these authors have printed material that may well be, in fact will almost certainly be misread in the classroom; have printed material that to the impartial observer seems calculated to bias immature students; have printed material and presented it in a way that is certain to prejudice youthful minds in favor of certain points of view, and to make them react against other points of view. These three volumes make evident the dangers that the newer methods of teaching civics introduce, and through their shortcomings should serve as warnings of the need for care in marshalling social and economic data. The fact that the books may be innocently prejudiced in no way alters the case. Innocent misstatement and misrepresentation work as much havoc as deliberate propaganda.

¹ *Text-Book in Citizenship*, p. 510. Italics are mine.

THE MORAL CHALLENGE OF SOCIOLOGY

A. W. CALHOUN

THE HUMAN race must necessarily be anthropocentric in its viewpoint and in its objective. The catechism may define man's chief end partly in terms of "the glory of God," but even the Westminster fathers were constrained to put on a parity with this eterocentric concept the pious desire "to enjoy him forever." Rationalized hedonism could scarcely compass more than was involved in this amazing flight of imagination by which "the infinite, eternal, and unchangeable" One, the source and sum of all "being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth" was put at the disposal of mankind as a means of boundless enjoyment. Surely man could afford to take the trouble in his small way "to glorify God" if so slight an exercise was to put all the riches of the universe at the command of the human race. If one were to translate the theological terminology into secular phrase, he might make the lingo of pietism intelligible to the man of today by saying: "The chief object of mankind is to conduct life in such a way that the resources of the universe may be in the highest degree available as means to the greatest possible sum of human joy."

The strivings of humanity are so multifarious and so misguided that the whole heap of teeming millions has as yet attained to no higher system and no better control than is manifested by a pailful of potato bugs. It is such a welter that the sociologist has to study. Small wonder that so little sound analysis has been achieved and that the total attainments of sociology are so disappointing. Yet it remains true that "the only proper study of mankind is man" and that non-human realms of research have significance only for their bearing on human effort. It is becoming increasingly apparent, also, that unless the population of the world can attain to a higher degree of world-group-consciousness and purposive control, there will not long be any civilization to study, if indeed, there remains any human race. It should require no argument to show that the systematic study of the inclusive human problem is the one thing worth doing, at least if we are to have higher aims than actuate grasshoppers.

The sociologist, at any rate, is not likely to deny the commanding importance of his subject matter. He will agree, also, that no science can aspire to more momentous results than constitute the proper aim of his specialty. It is a small thing to harness the ultimate forces of the physical universe as compared with the ambition to unearth the secrets by which man may attain to an orderly and ordered future on this planet through an upstanding group self-control on the part of all the race. Such a future for the world will not come by chance, nor yet by the jugglery of politics and diplomacy. If it is to come at all, it can be only by the gradual triumph of social science over superstition and prejudice and by such a universal psychoanalysis of the race as will banish the mental bogies that constitute the only obstacle to all that the heart of man could desire.

The specialists who have taken upon themselves so stupendous a research ought not to be unimpressed by the dignity of their profession. They aim to encompass all that the most ardent theology ever essayed to include; it is their work that gives meaning to the labors of all the other scientists. Law is meager and petty, medicine is minor and incidental, even the theology of today must clothe itself with befitting modesty when compared with the science of human survival and destiny. The sociologist, by every test, should be the "professional man" par excellence—the supreme minister of life.

The calling of sociology, then, is one not to be taken up for light or trifling reasons. If ever there is occasion for prayer, such an occasion confronts the young man in contemplation of so supremely sacred a mission. There is room for self-examination and self-discipline both in advance and all along the way of self-devotion. Aspiration for a career of distinction, for a remunerative chair, for leisure and congenial work, for social esteem and smooth respectability should have no larger place in the calculations of the would-be sociologist than in the plans of the aspirant to a priesthood. The sociologist is to stand in the breach, to mediate the future of mankind, to minister mundane salvation, to interpret the real riddle of the universe. The man or

woman that proceeds upon the profession with any other spirit or any lower motive than filled Isaiah or Jesus will never be a sociologist. This little-considered fact may serve to explain many things in the American "sociology" of today.

Not to speak of other lands, sociology in the United States has little of which to be proud. Those most familiar with what has been done are really betraying the fact that the degree of scientific attainment, not to speak of resulting social achievement, has been negligible. There is far less respect for genuine sociology than there was a dozen years ago. Colleges and universities establish chairs and add courses, but attention is turned largely to petty "practical" concerns rather than to the discovery of commanding principles of social salvation. Men speak and write much; but society goes on its way unheeding. The sociologist is as much of a cipher as the veriest theolog, and the people perish for lack of vision.

Such an eclipse of a promising profession could have been avoided and the nation and the world would have been vastly helped if sociologists had developed the habit of taking themselves seriously. The trouble is that the average sociologist does not respect his science sufficiently to claim leadership in the determination of grave social policies. Such matters are left to the mountebank and the demagog, and in the main the sociologists turn up in the train of these charlatans and sponsor whatever policies are offered, or at least refrain from any active protest against political hypocrisies and camouflage. So far as any one can tell, it is as easy to corral social scientists as it is to round up the unenlightened citizens. For instance, in so great a matter as the war it is not recorded that the sociologists of any country took a position at odds with the official governmental policy; but until sociology learns to transcend the claims of national "loyalties" it can not pretend to be a science. So long as

sociologists allow themselves to be herded on the same lines as the untaught multitude, they are obviously unworthy of their high calling.

It is not to be desired that professors of sociology should abandon research and teaching and seek to figure personally in the political arena. They should, however, insist that social leadership must stand far higher than the political level and that politics and the politicians shall no longer have anything to do with the determining of policies but shall content themselves with the problems of administration of policies commanded by an intelligent citizenship under the guidance of those that come nearest to knowing what is what about the issues of social life. If the sociologists do not answer to this description, they must change.

The moral obligation resting upon sociology is stupendous and the extent to which sociologists have ignored it is appalling. It is not too much to say that the professor of sociology who allows his work to be influenced in the slightest degree by considerations affecting his personal fortunes or touching the narrower welfares, as of family, church, group, class, or anything short of the ultimate good of the whole human race, is not fit to be a teacher and not worthy to be called a sociologist. There must be a tremendous cultivation of self-surrender, even to the point of asceticism if need be, before there will be a worthy science of sociology.

If each nation were as much in earnest for the solution of the problem of human welfare as it was not long since to accomplish the destruction of the maximum number of human beings and the maximum amount of property, there might be good grounds for hoping for the speedy coming of a better world. A first step toward such a general seriousness in the face of universal peril will be the regeneration of sociology along the lines herein suggested. "The axe is lying at the root of the tree."

The suggestion of The American Sociological Society that committees from the other Social Science groups be appointed to coöperate in an Encyclopedia of Social Science has been met by the American Historical Association, American Economic Association, and the American Anthropological Association.

Inter-State Reports from the Fields of Public Welfare and Social Work

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs, and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

STATE SYSTEMS OF PUBLIC WELFARE¹

D. W. WILLARD

I

PUBLIC welfare is sufficiently recognized as a state function to justify the conviction that it is one of the permanent services of government. This is a discussion of the salient features in the organization of state systems of public welfare. It consists in analyses of the dominant types of agency and state system, which then become bases for a general classification of form.

In treating the phenomena of public welfare thus generally, it has been necessary to set certain limits to the discussion. In the first place, no attention is given to local welfare organization referring to minor political units, although no doubt state administration is largely conditioned by its local connections. While functionally, and from the standpoint of actual administration, it might be unwise to dis sever state work from local work for the purposes of discussion, from the standpoint of form and organization it can safely be done, provided principles of local autonomy in administration are recognized as part of the ultimate problem of organization.

Public welfare is the aim of a particular type of public service. The various aspects of present state activity, such as child conservation, the treatment of poverty, degeneracy, crime, and maladjustment must be related administratively if there is to be effective scientific direction of the service. There is no doubt among students of society that the corresponding pathological conditions are related as cause and effect to each other, as well as to other factors of life, such as economic prosperity, education, and culture generally. Our problem, therefore, is not to determine the best means of administering these special services, but to illustrate present practices in organization intended to meet the whole matter of public wel-

fare. The systematic control of the problem seems to be as much a matter of correct organization as of actual administration. Only where special services influence the organic nature of administrative agencies do they find place in our present discussion. It will appear later that they actually influence form very considerably, and our classification of state systems is a general method of describing the manner of splitting these services up among agencies.

In order to view the problem of public welfare in its entirety, the state was selected as the unit in so far as welfare functions are considered, while the agency is the unit when a critical exposition of administrative device is attempted. For the reason that our interest is not primarily in the special services comprehended in welfare, it is not relevant to consider the functions of public welfare in detail. As a basis for selection of agencies which are regarded here the widest possible definition of function was desired, and it was assumed that a composite list from various representative states was sufficient to orient the problem of organization. The field of welfare, therefore, was roughly determined by listing the powers and duties of a number of state agencies chosen because their functions were comprehensive and inclusive.¹ With this tentative survey of the field in mind, agencies of other states were selected when their functions fell within, or substantially overlapped this field. A large number of boards, departments, and officials were included which would not usually be considered public welfare functionaries. In justification of this inclusion, it seems to be a logical procedure, and may illuminate more clearly some of the problems of organization apt to be slighted, if the usual concept of public welfare is adhered to. This applies especi-

¹ Other sections of this study will follow.

¹ See Part II, of this discussion.

ally to the economic factors in administration controlled by financial departments and boards, factors which are generally disregarded by theorists. The list of officials and agencies thus selected is given in Appendix I.

More detailed data were then secured to determine the nature of these agencies. The method of constituting each agency was determined, as well as organization insofar as it related to constitution. Special service branches, like children's bureaus and other subdivisions were omitted for reasons just stated.

Three general sources of information were utilized. Preliminary recourse was had to published bulletins and reports from the agencies in question. Second, session laws, codes, or annotated statutes in whatever form available in the University of Washington Law Library for each of the states were consulted. Supplementing these, reference was made to the literature, to correspondence, and to miscellaneous sources. The footnotes indicate many of the sources utilized.²

Having collected data, charts of organization were made. Individual agencies and state systems were charted. Types of organization for both were abstracted and represented in simplified charts. The latter (type charts) are reproduced here and accompany the discussion. The former (detailed charts) are presented in selected cases in Appendix II.

Classification from the viewpoint of particular state agencies as well as state systems was thus effected. The types may be discussed conveniently under four heads. (1) Form of organization, as found in particular agencies. (2) What is to be called, for lack of a better term, *mode* of administration. (3) Scope, as limited by services to particular classes of wards. (4) Centralization, viewing the degree of unity or discreteness of formal organization for administering all the special services of the state. This scheme is simple, and provides for the most general features. It is not in any sense final or definitive. The types shade into each other and have many variants. It should serve as a point of departure for the study of particular state systems.

I. Form of Organization. There are four forms of organization to one or other of which most of the important agencies will correspond. They are: (a) *The Departmental Form.* (b) *The Professional Board Form.* (c) *The Lay Board Form.* (d) *Miscellaneous and Subordinate Forms.* The latter are constituted very frequently by ex-officio membership.

(a). *The Department.* The term "Department" may apply to almost any division of government. It is here applied to any division administered by a single responsible appointed official. Such officials have to the governor the approximate relations enjoyed by cabinet officials to the President. Included in the term are not only the better known departments of this sort, but lesser branches administered by appointees of the governor. Thus, the "Superintendent of State's Prisons," and the "Supervisor of Purchase" in New York, as well as the "State Parole Commissioner" in Montana are department chiefs within the meaning of the term. Departmentalization has been made complete in some states. Illinois is a type. In other states it is applied only to particular branches. There is a "Department of Institutions" in California, alongside the "Board of Control" and the "State Board of Charities and Corrections" illustrating the latter conditions.

The essential characteristics of the department follow. It is headed by a single executive chosen by the governor and approved by the legislature (usually approved by the senate only). The officer is designated "Director," "Commissioner," or "Secretary." He is responsible directly to the governor who invests him with control of departmental activities. His salary varies from \$5,000 to \$10,000, and his tenure "from the pleasure of the governor" to a definite period of four or five years. Practical checks on his authority occur in two directions. The first check may be a limitation of his powers of appointment within his own department. Certain bureau heads and other directing officials in the welfare departments of Illinois, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and elsewhere are appointed by the governor, or upon the governor's approval. Minor employees, if appointed by the director himself, are frequently checked by the governor, or by "advisory boards." The practical effect of this is to increase the governor's control over the details of administering the welfare department.

² See especially, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, Vol. CV, January 1923; "Public Welfare in the United States" Ed. by Howard W. Odum. Particularly relevant is the article by S. P. Breckenridge, "Summary of Present State Systems for the Organization and Administration of Public Welfare," p. 102.

The best historical source is, *Proceedings of the Conference of Social Work, 1872 to date*, especially sections devoted to the committee on state administration.

The second check is in the constitution of an "advisory board," called in Illinois the "Board of Welfare Commissioners." It is generally appointed by the governor with the consent of the legislature. It supervises the department and advises with the chief. It is frequently given legislative and judicial functions connected with departmental activities. Such boards may exercise substantial powers like those allotted in Massachusetts. But they may be so dominated as to be practically innocuous, as happens in Illinois.³ A peculiar form of advisory board exists in California. The one-time boards of trustees of California institutions have been shorn of all but advisory functions and now coöperate with the Department of Institutions in institutional management. Other and minor forms of advisory board exist elsewhere which are discussed under the miscellaneous classification.

The state department, then, with its chief executive appointed by the governor and vested with wide powers, checked on the one hand by the governor himself, and on the other, possibly, by some form of "advisory board" appointed by the governor is a feature of much state administration of public welfare. Departments are rapidly increasing in number, and are in considerable measure a legacy of the war. Responsibility, sought by control which runs through a hierarchy of appointed officials, is the principle through which it is hoped to achieve efficiency. The form is over-simplified and there are two weaknesses in it. First, the way is open to political interference of a partisan character, and all its attendant evils in administration. Such evils still loom large in welfare work. In the second place, welfare work by nature is dependent on other factors in administration than those which may be summed up in the phrase "executive responsibility." It is only a partial recognition of the needs of good administration to propose to meet them through executive instruments alone. A better conception of these needs is implied in "advisory boards" sometimes provided. These advisory boards may, among other things, check the liberty of the executive by means of supervisory functions. This is a steady influence seriously lacking where administration is dominated by politics. In addition they are generally capable of assuming responsibility for

the graver decisions involving public policy. This is a protection to really responsible executive management. These advisory boards, however, are frequently empty appendages to the department and can rarely be considered integral features of this form. So far as the governor exercises large appointive powers within the department the principle of executive responsibility itself is compromised, and so far as advisory boards become important the work of the department tends to assume the character of "lay board" administration, later to be discussed. In general, this is the least democratic of any of the accepted methods of administering public welfare. Its inherent instability is corrected in one or other of two ways. Either by means of a board as described, or through a system of usages by which the personnel of the service is protected from rapid turnover (civil service), and where administration tends to become highly bureaucratic in kind.⁴ Given sufficient time, both of these features may work themselves into our newly adopted schemes of control through departments.

The form of the department is represented in Chart I. This illustrates a single agency and not a whole state system. Where departments exist, welfare administration is generally split *modally* among several branches. State systems of this kind are represented in Charts IV and VII. To illustrate the details of composition, the method of establishing the Massachusetts "Department of Public Welfare" is given in Appendix II.

(c). *The Professional Board.* This is typically a small board of three to five members. The members are appointed by the governor with the legislature concurring. They are all paid salaries, generally \$3,000 to \$5,000, and devote full time to official duties. The board is small because it has executive functions corresponding to those of the department chief. Unlike the chief of the department, it is a many-headed executive. The members are sometimes made individually responsible for particular divisions, working together to formulate policies, make rules, and to insure coöperation. This is the way the "Board of Control" in California is organized. Generally, however, no specific duties are allotted to individual members, the board, as such, being free

³ The Illinois legislature failed to make appropriations for the "Board of Welfare Commissioners" several years ago, and the board has since become inactive.

⁴ For a criticism of state departments see, "A Decade of Social Progress: Massachusetts," Robert W. Kelso. *JOURNAL OF SOCIAL FORCES*, Vol. II, No. 1, November 1923, p. 56. In general departmental government has many points in common with the bureaucracies of France.




Chart I




Chart II




Chart III




Chart IV




Chart V




Chart VI




Chart VII

— Legend —
 ——— Functions Largely of Supervision and Social Technique
 ——— Full Administration and Control
 ——— Partial [Financial, Business, etc.] Administration and Control
 ——— Appointive Powers.

Department
 A, Director, or Chief
 B, Staff and Organization

Professional Board

Lay Board
 A, The Board
 B, Executive Secretary and Staff.

— Organization —

- Chart I State Department.
- Chart II Professional Board
- Chart III Lay Board
- Chart IV Departments "Modally" Specialized
- Chart V Model Specialization and Partial Decentralization
- Chart VI Social Technique Centralized, Other Functions Decentralized
- Chart VII Specialization on the Basis of "Scope"

A Appointing Authorities, Generally "Governor and Senate"
 B Centralized State Agencies
 C Decentralized State Agencies

D State Institutions
 E General and Local Functions.

to organize itself and divide its duties as it deems best. The members are always appointed for definite periods of time, provision often being made for removal by the appointing authority for cause. Yet in theory, the board is an autonomous executive instrument, free from direct control by the governor. This independence is provided in the manner of appointments and in tenure of office. Terms of office expire in rotation and only one vacancy may be filled by appointment at one time. The terms are longer than those for which governors are elected, being four to six years in most cases. Hence an entire board is seldom constituted by one governor in a single term of office, and in any event, not all at one time. This puts control in a continuing body, and one therefore not wholly subject to political exigencies. These values are attained variously under varying conditions. Self autonomy is limited where the governor is ex-officio member and president of the board, as in Kansas. In California the "State Board of Control" acts always "with the consent of the governor." Obviously, four year terms are not quite long enough to relieve board members of partisan control. On the whole, however, stability is achieved through this principle of continuity attained by overlapping terms of office, which is exceedingly valuable. The practical advantages of this device are apparent if the character of institutional management in Illinois, now in the control of the "Department of Public Welfare" is compared with institutional management in Wisconsin, Minnesota, or Iowa, handled by boards.⁵

Qualifications for membership on these boards are indeterminate. The law sometimes provides that members shall be selected from opposing political parties equally; sometimes that there shall be one or more women members; sometimes that they shall be electors, etc. Large discretion rests with the appointing authority. Professional qualifications are rarely stated, yet the theory is that expert services shall be rendered by appointees. This is implied in the payment of substantial salaries and the full time nature of employment. Yet the condition of expert qualifications in persons appointed by the governor implies the existence of standards for social work

which compel recognition,—which for the most part do not exist. The governor's appraisal of the situation is apt to be narrow. Well recognized standards may play a part, but they commonly relate to business and financial ability. These, at least, are well understood. Or appointments may be frankly political.

The payment of salaries, the professional implications in the office, the small size of the board, the extensive authority it generally has over business and financial affairs, together with the antecedent conditions prompting the creation of many of the boards, unite to make this essentially an executive agency. The aim to secure efficiency through expert service is clearly implied in the form. The method is slightly different from that of the department which seeks efficiency through personal responsibility and superior political control. It is safe to say that all executives need supervision. This form of board provides little better for those basic functions of policy making, deliberation, and supervision over its own affairs than does the departmental form. The mere plural headedness of a board, invested at the same time with executive duties, possessing the more or less technical points of view which are to be expected of experts cannot save the work from narrow-mindedness. Such is characteristic of bureaucratic government.

The professional board at its best is seen in Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Iowa. It is present in slightly different form in North Dakota and Kansas. In the foregoing states it is the only important agency existing. It occurs frequently to administer particular functions. Institutions are administered by the "Board of Control" in Nebraska, finances by the "Board of Control" in California, and so on. The form is illustrated in Chart II.

(c). *The Lay Board.* The lay board is appointed in a manner similar to the professional board. It is generally larger, having five to twelve members, but averaging about seven. Its members are appointed for definite terms varying in the more important cases from three to eight years⁶, but averaging five or six. The qualifications for membership are substantially those given for the other board. In about half the cases, the purpose of the law is to secure a non-partisan

⁵ Henry C. Wright "A Valuation of a System for the Administration of State Institutions Through One Man Control as Operated in Illinois," State Charities Aid Association, 1922, p. 47.

⁶ Members of the "Board of Prison Directors" in California serve for ten years.

board; and in about half, women are included among the members. Overlapping terms of office provide the same continuity that is enjoyed by the professional board. The added proviso exists in the case of the New York Board of Charities that members must represent districts of the state. (In Delaware, and some of the southern states, this proviso may apply to all forms of board). So far this form varies little from the professional type except that it is larger, and is a representative body.

Members of lay boards receive no salaries. The only compensation they get, with rare exceptions, is actual expenses while attending to official business. (The exceptions apply to a "per diem" paid in New York and other places, and a nominal salary of one to one-hundred dollars in one or two instances). They do not, therefore, devote full time to the office. There is theoretically no professional flavor about their services.

Another essential feature of the organization is that the board has an executive officer⁷, a "secretary," or "Commissioner." He is employed by the board much as a school superintendent is employed by a school board. He is an expert, a salaried officer who is chief executive of the board and directs its technical operations. For this purpose the board delegates its authority to him, and supervises and approves his policies of administration. The functions of administration are thus split between a non-professional board which is a deliberative, judicial, and consultative body, and a professional executive who is delegated with authority from the board. The executive's responsibility in this case is directed to a non-political body within the field, and not to a political officer outside. He is nevertheless responsible, and his acts are amply supervised. Specialty of function between properly constituted deliberative and executive agents is a valuable principle in welfare administration⁸. It is implicit where boards are given functions demanding continuous exercise, and explicit for all the larger agencies. The power of selecting an executive officer is commonly given boards where functions are broader than those of a visiting committee or of inspectors over institutions. The manner of allo-

cating duties, however, seldom enters into legislation. Although the specific duties of the secretary are detailed more or less completely in the legislation of New Hampshire, Connecticut⁹, Kentucky, and elsewhere, many of the provisions are of doubtful value, if they do not definitely circumscribe the larger possibilities of the office. Others variously confuse the duties of secretary with those of board members. The principle of division of function, valuable as it may become, should be properly stated in legislation.

The advantages afforded by the lay board are as follows: (1) Division of functions discussed is a valuable type of specialization in welfare administration. (2) It relieves the governor of responsibility for appointing experts, a task for which he is likely to be unfitted. (3) The function of appointing experts is best performed by the board. It is in a position to understand the qualities of expertness, having exclusive power to formulate purposes of welfare administration. (4) Continuity affords stability. It favors a high character and long tenure of service among subordinates without bureaucratic implications. It permits the application of other policies than those of immediacy and expediency. (5) Both expertness of service and responsibility of official conduct are contemplated in executives and employees, but without the narrow, partisan, personal implications of "responsibility" in other forms. (6) There is a broad and profound basis for the whole work. The executive is responsible too, and checked by a representative body. Being less liable to lose contact with the people of the state, his office is less liable to become bureaucratic or partisan. The board retains ultimate responsibility in all things, determines policy, makes rules, decides issues, and effectively interprets the work to the people of the state, enlisting their understanding and coöperation. The social basis of the work is thus made paramount.

This is at present the most frequently occurring form of administration. An inquiry into the causes of failure in lay board administration would be useful. Social implications in welfare work are something new. Ancient mores of individualism still hamper the social point of view. This appears particularly in institutional manage-

⁷ Obviously, this is not true for boards with extremely limited functions. "Secretary" is not used in the sense of mere clerk, or recording officer.

⁸ Cubberly, "Public School Administration," Houghton Mifflin, 116, p. 33, explains the value of the same principle in educational administration.

⁹ There are two executive officers under one board in Connecticut. The system is a double-headed system of administration so far as executive functions are concerned.

ment involving control of such dependents as the criminal, the poor, and the helpless. Economic pressure has made a scandal of the exploitation of dependent classes, because expenses involved were out of proportion to results achieved. Continued exploitation requires radical and direct methods of control to effect initial correction of abuses. The demonstrative effect of centralized, executive control of institutions achieving immediate economy and efficiency naturally generates a great deal of faith in arbitrary authority, if it can only be made "responsible." Financial factors and business methods appear to occupy the center of value until science and social intelligence shall put a greater meaning into problems of the care and the control of dependency. Lay boards, as contrasted with professional boards or departments, have not received notice commensurate with their possibilities on account of the economic factors involved. Further experience in welfare administration may correct this situation.

The board actually acquires utility in the fact that welfare functions are uncertain. There is a consensus developing that it requires a professional administrator to handle the social problems in welfare work, but what is implied in the professional aspect of the work is little understood. Particular aims and values must be popularly accepted before a professional character is securely established in the service. The lay board is the traditional type for pioneering, in an educational sense. At present, executives need to be supported and guided by a representative authority. This assures them their own orientation on the one hand, and extends their support among the people on the other. Independent executives function efficiently only in fields where standards are fixed and methods are popularized. This explains the lack of constructive effort in much of our state government. The work of professional boards is apt to be impressive from the standpoint of business management, but be unable to go further simply because the rules of the game are not defined any further, and there is not an adequate liaison with the public for collaboration in pioneer effort. Standardization in social work will simplify social administration, but there will never be a time when it will all be fixed and standardized in the sense that other processes are standardized. The nature of society forbids it. The type of organization providing a flexible ad-

ministration should become permanent in this field.

Other difficulties account for many failures. Much inefficiency may be attributed to confusion with regard to specialization of function, to which allusion was made. The possibility of effecting this differentiation does not exist for boards extremely limited in duties, hence we confine our attention to the more important state agencies. Given a thoroughly centralized system with a lay board at the head of it, still more often than not, legislatures allot powers and duties which are interchangeably performed by the board, its committees or members, its secretary, agents, or representatives. The proper distribution of function is seldom explicitly made, and great confusion is possible as a result. Critics of the lay board scoff at the inefficiencies and blunders of unsalaried, nonprofessional citizen boards. Obviously, point is added to their criticisms where board members yield to the temptation to assume general administrative functions. The problem is simply one of recognizing good administrative principles which have been thoroughly tested elsewhere. As a correlate to the lay board an able executive is essential. The confusion will probably remain until a professional class of welfare administrators has been developed to supply the needs of the service. Boards need the guidance of experts as much as experts need the guidance of boards.¹⁰

Lay boards occupy a prominent place in the following states: Indiana, Missouri, North Carolina, South Carolina, Kentucky, Virginia, New York, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, California, and others. They are designated, "Board of Public Welfare," "Board of Charities and Corrections," "Board of Control," etc. There are certain "departments" which are controlled by lay boards, the term "department" here applying to the personnel and machinery of the service rather than to form of government. Virginia, New Jersey, and Connecticut possess such "departments." The type is illustrated in Chart III. This is the whole system in Kentucky, but is only one of several agencies in most other places. In combination with others it is shown in Charts V and VI. The constitution of the Kentucky "Board of Charities and Correction" is given in Appendix II.

¹⁰ The pioneer work of executive officers in Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, Illinois, and Wisconsin is striking evidence of the value of capable leadership.

SOME ECONOMIC FACTORS IN THE MAKING OF THE CRIMINAL¹

J. L. GILLEN

WHAT BEARING have economic conditions upon criminality? From a review of the discussion in criminalological literature it appears that students of the question frequently have answered it according to their views of the present economic organization of society. In Europe this has led to a curious quarrel as to the importance of the economic factors in criminality. Goring, who studied three thousand criminals in Parkhurst prison in England, came to the conclusion that while persons convicted of arson, willful damage to property, and sexual offences are selected disproportionately from agricultural laborers, seamen, and miners, that while soldiers and sailors are more prone than persons in other occupations to commit crimes of personal violence and rape, and that while the commercial and artisan classes commit less of these crimes but commit more of the acquisitive offenses, it is not occupation itself which is an influence upon crime but that the occupation provides varying opportunities for the committing of different kinds of crimes.² His conclusion is that the relative economic prosperity of the family in which his convicts were brought up has had no influence upon the frequency of their subsequent convictions.³

Tarde, the French sociologist, says that economic development as measured by commercial activity does not increase criminality as was contended by Poletti, the Italian criminalologist. On the other hand, he holds that the most laborious class, the French peasant, furnishes the least proportion of criminals to their share in the total population. Tarde's contention is that the large percentage of criminals in cities is not due to the commercial development of the cities so much as to the madness of luxury there to be found and to the unjust distribution of wealth and the inefficient direction of productive activity. On the other hand, Bonger, the Dutch socialist, and criminalologist, is of the opinion that practically the only factors which account for crime are the economic factors. He cites the studies of Fornasari di Verse as showing that wealth and criminality present a certain symmetry, to this extent, that the wealthy regions have in general a lower criminality than the poor ones. Moreover, Bonger argues that poverty predisposes to crime and furnishes the motive for it. It leads to alcoholism, which is the cause of violent crimes. It drives persons who cannot find work to vagrancy and begging, which also are preparatory schools for crime. It brings pressure even to those who cannot provide honestly for their needs and causes them to steal. When these factors act upon a man already predisposed they even lead to homicide, he contends. He cites figures from Fornasari di Verse which show that while in Italy in 1881 there were, of both sexes over nine years of age, to the 1000 of population about 391 persons who were rich, well to do, moderately well-off, or with enough to live on, and about 690 persons per thousand who had scarcely the necessities of life. Out of the 100 persons convicted in Italy in 1887 there were 56 who were necessitous, 30 having only the bare necessities of life, 11½ moderately well-off, and a little over two who were well-to-do or rich. Or to put the matter in another way. While 40% of the population had some means and 60% were in need, among those convicted there were only 13% with means and nearly 87% who were poor.

Tarde and Garofalo, on the other hand, contend that these figures are not decisive because so many other factors enter into the making of the criminal. Tarde argues that the social factors of criminality are the most important, but that the economic factors which effect the problem of crime are the transformations in the economic state of society. He cites such sudden transformations as crisis and other sudden disturbances, such as follow new inventions, which make it impossible for the working class to satisfy their needs, and the unequal distribution of wealth which excite the cupidity of both the rich and the poor.³

This quarrel could be illustrated with many citations. It suggests that those interested in any

¹ This is a small part of Professor Gillen's discussion.

² Goring, *The English Convict*, London, 1913, p. 289.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 281.

³ Bonger, *Criminality and Economic Conditions in Boston*, 1916, pp. 157-158.

one particular set of factors come to be incapable of properly appreciating the others. The biologist sees clearly the influence of hereditary factors in human conduct. The psychologist emphasizes mental defects and aberrations in crime. The socialist is inclined to believe that crime is caused chiefly by the present organization of economic society. One must wonder whether life is so simple as most of these special pleaders would have us think. A review of the whole situation suggests that it may be possible that all these various factors must be taken into account if one would arrive at approximate truth in explaining the making of the criminal. Are we not the result in part of the characteristics with which we came into the world, and in part of the development consequent upon the reaction of these characteristics to our surroundings? In some cases one may play the predominant part and in other cases another. In all they coöperate together. However, we must ignore the economic factors in the making of the criminal. Therefore, let us see what light we have thrown upon this particular factor.

POVERTY AND DELINQUENCY

In addition to the factors cited above from Fornasari di Verse, Marro, a number of years ago, pointed out in a study which he made of this problem that 79% of the criminals and 43% of the non-criminals in a given population were without property. 4% of the criminals and 10% of the non-criminals were minor children of well-to-do parents, and almost 7% of the criminals and 18% of the non-criminals had but little property, while 9% of the criminals and nearly 28% of the non-criminals had considerable property.⁴

Efforts have been made to ascertain whether there is a correlation between the rate of criminality and the price of some of the staples of life. This has been done on the theory that if crime increases with the price of the staples, economic conditions have caused this increase. La-Fargue, for example, took the annual number of failures as a measure of comparative economic conditions in a number of years. He also traced the curve for the price of flour. With these he correlated crimes, against property, with the re-

sult that he showed a close correspondence. Many other students of the question have made similar studies. Bonger has reviewed very carefully the literature of the economic causes of crime made by students of the question in different countries of the world. In almost every case a parallelism between need as measured by the increased prices of commodities or by industrial depression and crimes against property has been easy to show. However, it must be said that some of even these economic determinists in interpreting their results have admitted that these economic conditions have effected the rate of criminality indirectly rather than directly. For example, Prins says, "Let us consider our own epoch for a moment. A century of progress and refinement is a century of vices; the increasing complexity of our mechanism creates, with new temptations, new occasions of falling. The car of civilization, like that of Juggernaut, destroys many of those who throw themselves under its wheels. The world has enormous appetites that it cannot satisfy; sensuality, greed of gain, a taste for and facility in speculation, the contrast between great wealth and extreme poverty, the brutal necessities of the struggle for existence in the face of the concentration of property and of capital, the defects of the industrial organization, which abandon the proletariat to chance, keeps no watch over apprenticeship, and leaves the child of the working man to the excitations of the streets and the promiscuity of the workshop, and finally sharpens everywhere the obscure instincts of animalism; all this recoils upon criminality with deplorable certainty."⁵ Thus indirectly poverty, by affecting conditions under which people live or by providing conditions for the selection and reproduction of incapables, increases crime.

In this connection, however, it must be pointed out that so complicated are the conditions which produce criminality that even if we could cause poverty to disappear, criminality would still exist. The cessation of poverty would not prevent the continuance of those peculiar psychic conditions in the individual which cause him to incline to crime. Nor would the disappearance of poverty do away with the social factors of crime. As Garofalo says, the lazy thief of today would become the labor-hating worker of tomorrow.

⁴ Quoted from Bonger, *Criminality and Economic Conditions*, Boston, 1917, pp. 225-226.

⁵ Quoted from Bonger, *Op. cit.* pp. 178-179.

The disappearance of poverty would not destroy the forces of cupidity in producing criminality.⁶

Moreover, we must not lose sight of the fact that poverty does not entirely crush out those characteristics which make for good conduct. It operates effectively only in those cases where the personality is weak or depraved or in which poverty is the last straw on a pile of circumstances which finally breaks the camel's back. Poverty does not totally destroy sentiments like benevolence and justice.

ECONOMIC DISTRESS AND CRIME

The disproportion of worldly goods existing between the different economic classes has often been cited as one of the factors in producing criminality. Frequently the poor man, acquainted with the extravagance of the rich, feels that the present social system is one of injustice. When his children cry for bread or he is denied the opportunities accorded to the rich, he feels that the system is wrong and he is excused in his own mind for any delinquency by which he somewhat lessens the gulf between himself and his richer fellows. Furthermore, the stretch between the desires and the means of satisfying them constitutes an economic situation which, sometimes in periods of economic stress, incites to crime against property. The motives excited to action by this situation apply, however, to both rich and poor. As Garofalo says, "One is no less a thief because he is of a higher class of society and forges a check than the poor man who steals." He adds, "They should speak not of the *proletariat*, but of *economic distress*—a result attributable to the excessive disproportion existing in all the social classes between desires and the means of satisfying them, rather than to the unequal distribution of national wealth. It is a fact of the distress which explains why, so long as illicit

activity will be useful, that is to say so long as it will be found a source of gain, crime will not cease to exist among immoral men—and to these all the social classes contribute in an almost equal degree. We are speaking, be it understood, of that fundamental and not superficial immorality which is the source of crime."⁷

However, we must not forget that the ownership of property without the feverish stimulation for wealth which cannot in reason be satisfied operates to lessen crime. Tarde points out that in France there is little crime among property holders in the country, whether great or small, among persons of independent means and even among the greater part of the liberal professions, whenever their desire to hold property is not very absorbing or feverish. The French peasant participates in this moderation of desires and comparatively well-off is happier than the millionaire, the feverish financier, or the politician, and, therefore, is less criminal.

It would seem probable, therefore, that great and sudden wealth with its stimulation of feverish desire for more wealth operates to produce criminals. However, these are of a different nature from those of the poor. On the other hand, where rapid changes are taking place in the distribution of wealth and the rich are becoming richer and the poor poorer, where luxurious wastefulness on the part of the rich coexists with poverty among the poor, we find the situation described by Corre when he says that wealth corrupts and too great poverty degrades and that both lead to crime through lessening the resistance to temptation that promises the satisfaction of wants fictitious or real, and when they both appear in the same environment they give more energy to bad impulses, more violence to conflicts⁸

⁶ Garofalo, *Criminology*, Boston, 1914, p. 147.

⁷ Bonger, *Op. cit.* p. 164.

⁸ *Op. cit.* p. 150.

Conferences for Social Work

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs, and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

THREE INTERVIEWS AND THE CHANGING SITUATION

ADA E. SHEFFIELD

IN DISCUSSING the consecutive interviews which make up the major part of the treatment process in the case of Gracie Balch, I propose to test out the serviceableness for social thinking of two closely related ideas. The first of these ideas is that any individual, if he is to behave in the way which will be most satisfying at once to himself and to other people who make up his social setting, must treat himself and all the relevant physical and social factors that go to make up his situation as one controllable whole, his *total situation*. This implies that the outer setting of the individual is a constituent part of his behavior process. The second idea is that in the behavior process thus going on, not in the individual, not in the environment, but in the ceaseless activity between the two, the response of self to setting is at once an effect and a cause—the response of the self is to a stimulus received in consequence of its own activity. This is what Miss Follett terms *circular*, Mr. Dewey *spiral behavior*. The conception of behavior implicit in these two ideas become suggestive when we apply them to the treatment process hereinafter described.

Gracie Balch was a thirteen year old girl of Protestant faith and American parentage. Her mother had been divorced from the father on statutory grounds and given custody of Gracie and of the older brother. The father had remarried. Mrs. Balch wandered from place to place, obtaining a livelihood in perhaps questionable ways, and finally died. She left the two children to her unmarried brother who had living with him an elderly housekeeper. Between this woman, who was precise and orderly, and Gracie, who was slow and careless about her person and about the house, there arose considerable friction. The

housekeeper, though conscientious, did not give the girl the love she craved, and Gracie was unhappy. Apparently her uncle sympathized with her, for he consented that she visit a French Canadian family whom she had known while living with her mother.

In this family besides the parents were eleven sons and daughters of all ages, crowded together in easy-going though entirely respectable sociability. The older children, divided by sexes, slept in three untended bedrooms opening into each other and into a neglected toilet. The parents were on the floor below. It was a dirty, affectionate, happy home.

The visit was extended, became indefinite. Although only thirteen, Gracie managed to get working papers and entered a factory. Her wage of \$9. she, like the older Guerriers turned over to Mr. Guerrier and out of it he boarded and clothed her. This whole arrangement was strongly objected to by Gracie's paternal relatives, who were people of good standards, and they stirred the uncle up to demanding that she return home. Mr. Guerrier answered, "her board for ten weeks or no Gracie." Although the uncle agreed to pay this still she remained where she was. Again urged on by the relatives, the uncle and his housekeeper consulted the Prevention of Cruelty Society and this Society brought the matter to a child-placing agency in order to secure a proper guardian for the girl.

Before interviewing Gracie the visitor had made her own observation of standards in the Guerrier home, and had learned from Mrs. Guerrier that, although the family wanted to keep the girl, they did not wish to assume the responsibility of legal guardians. The visitor had also learned from Mr. Guerrier's employer that the

Frenchman had a "mania" for making money, doing some night work along with his regular day work. She therefore started her interview knowing that the Guerriers' vulnerable point was probably their attitude toward money, and that their unquestioned liking for Gracie had a definite limit. It stopped short at taking responsibility of a legal sort.

Gracie's situation then as it looked to the visitor approaching her call upon the girl was this: In spite of having respectable, fairly prosperous relatives Gracie was choosing to board in a household where she was forming slack habits, where she was insufficiently protected from moral dangers, and was being economically exploited. Her experience with relatives had been of unhappiness in a home which though well kept was rigid and unloving, whereas her experience with the Guerriers' had been of happiness in a home which with all its easy-going dirt afforded an atmosphere of good-humored sociability amidst varied interesting activities. The freedom from restraint, the laughter and merriment of friendly boys and girls her own age, work in the factory among still other companions, night school, and Saturday evenings amid the bustle of week-end business in a ten cent store—all this made a life of small social excitements such as would fill the cup of any girl of thirteen. Of all this which the visitor saw, Gracie herself saw only a part. She was blind to the fact that the Guerriers' interest in her included their attitude toward money, and was too inexperienced to appreciate that in sacrificing decorous living for her present delights she was narrowing the social opportunities which her future could hold.

The visitor's task was two-fold: she wanted to get the girl to give up her present environment and to select one, if possible with relatives, which would ensure her the opportunities and advantages enjoyed by her own kin. In order to bring this about she had first to get Gracie to recognize the drawbacks to her continuing happiness at the Guerriers and second to put before her a prospect of continuing activities that would make for even greater happiness than the Guerrier home could offer. In short, if the girl was to make this change of her own free choice—which was certainly desirable—she must be brought first to

break up and then to reintegrate her own situation. The visitor's initial step was of course to make a friendly contact.

The interview took place in the small, light, well furnished office of the McDougall Factory. Mr. Guerrier, tall, good-looking, in working clothes, entered with a manner which appeared to the visitor at once *debonair* and a bit on the defensive. The girl, clear-skinned, with a sweet expression, stocky, stoop-shouldered, and clad in a short-waisted nondescript dress, he half pulled along behind him and then pushed slightly away. She appeared frightened; her big red hands, soiled by work, were wiping her eyes as she clung to Mr. Guerrier, begging him not to leave her to be put into a Home. The visitor, who is short and slender, said, "Gracie, look at me. How could such a little thing as I take a big girl like you away unless she wanted to go?" Ignoring this facetiousness Gracie broke out: "I'll drown myself before I'll go into a Home; I'm happy where I am." The visitor assured her that no one wanted her to go into a Home, that she was glad the girl was happy and had friends but that she ought also to have a guardian. Gracie suggested that Mr. Guerrier could be her guardian. "No," said Mr. Guerrier quickly, "we don't want to be guardians." But he added that of course she ought to have a guardian. Gracie's expression and manner, in the visitor's opinion, showed her to be much taken aback at this attitude on the Guerriers' part. She then proposed her uncle fill this office. Mr. Guerrier assented that the uncle was the very man. Mr. Guerrier then left to return to his work, having stayed as the visitor thought, till he was sure she was not going to take Gracie away with her. The visitor alone with the girl questioned her about the reasons for her leaving the uncle, and got a short account interspersed with reiterations of her determined wish to stay where she was because she was happy. "They're good to me. What's the use of anything if you're not happy?" The visitor gave more assurance that she wanted Gracie to be happy, and then, with a half-hearted acquiescence from Gracie that the visitor call later in her home to talk further about a guardian, said good-bye.

The change in the situation brought about by this short interview in the Factory office was first that it left Mr. Guerrier and Gracie convinced

that the girl was not to be forced out of her present quarters and put into the dreaded Home; second, by allaying this fear and showing them the visitor as a pleasant, reasonable person, it helped show that the latter's attitude was one of friendliness; and third by bringing out from Mr. Guerrier, in Gracie's presence, the fact that he and his wife were unwilling to take up the necessary guardianship, this interview planted in Gracie's mind the first doubt as to the whole-heartedness of the Guerriers' affection for her. Having noted that this doubt was at work, the visitor left the situation to itself for awhile. She knew that no social situation ever stands still, and that an attitude of doubt once started in Gracie's mind would make her more alert to note and interpret signs of self-interest in the Guerriers' behavior toward her. She might even get an inkling of their attitude toward money. In other words, if this experienced visitor's insight was a true one, the first stirring toward a break-up of this unsatisfactory situation of a young girl boarded in a crowded home had begun *in Gracie's own mental life, in her own emotions*. Her attitude of unquestioning affection and trust towards the Guerriers was now opposed by an attitude of doubt as to the limits of their affection for her. Her mental life had to that extent become disintegrated, unstable, as she began to sense an unsuspected factor in her situation, namely, the Guerriers' attitude toward her.

The investigation proceeded, disclosing five excellent homes open to Gracie among her near relatives. It also brought from the father a promise to pay the girl's board if necessary, and from a grandmother an offer to supply clothing if Gracie would return to her family. The relatives were deeply concerned at a rumor that Gracie was pregnant by the oldest Guerrier boy. Because of this rumor and because of the girl's illegal Saturday evening work the child-placing agency referred the case back to the Prevention of Cruelty. This step they took with reluctance. The reason they did so was first that they felt quick action to be called for. The Guerriers in learning of the rumor involving their son might have turned Gracie out of their home and the girl had several times threatened to drown herself if separated from the Guerriers. Second, the visitor had not had time to make Mr. Guerrier

and Gracie understand her attitude toward the girl. Mr. Guerrier in the visitor's opinion regarded her as an emissary from relatives who wanted to get Gracie among themselves as a profitable boarder. His own attitude toward money made him see this same attitude in others. He had no conception of what the child-placing agency really wanted for the girl, but could, as this agency believed, understand a society that represented legal authority. The latter agency found upon inquiry that the rumor was unfounded.

This agency's call left the Guerriers filled with indignation at the false charge against their son. They threatened court action for defamation of character, and talked excitedly of putting Gracie on the street. Gracie also was resentful at the accusation, and appeared more frightened than ever and consequently more determined to remain where she was. Nevertheless this visit by the Prevention of Cruelty agent had carried the breaking-up of Gracie's situation further, and again the breaking-up took place *in the mental life of the people concerned*.

Gracie had seen the Guerriers turn upon her as the occasion of a humiliating charge against their son, even though she was as innocent as the boy. It was clear evidence that she was not really one of the family, and that where their own interests were concerned the Guerriers would think of themselves first. Her attitude of affection toward them still remained, for they were friendly, kind-hearted people who had made her happy and she had a recollection of unhappiness with her own relatives. But the doubts started by the Guerriers' refusal to be her guardians must have received emphatic reinforcement when they proposed to turn her out of doors. If, as is possible, she began to sense even vaguely that the situation of a young girl boarding in a crowded home with growing boys was likely to foster unpleasant rumors, this dawning perception would arouse in her a fear of future upheavals at the Guerriers. It would be another attitude to compete with the drawing of affection.

Gracie was then seeing factors in her situation to which she had been blind, namely the limitations to the Guerriers' interest in her and, possibly, the risk she ran in living with them at all. And this newly aroused perception as to how she

was situated corresponded to her newly-aroused attitudes of doubt and fear. The "activity between" herself and her setting had undergone change.

The Guerriers also had been seeing light and had discovered that the \$9. a week from a boarder who occupied only half a bed was accompanied by drawbacks. It is probable that the visit of the Prevention of Cruelty agent brought them to realize that in housing this girl they were risking just such rumors as those already experienced. Their attitude toward money, their liking for Gracie herself were now opposed by an attitude of dread of legal complications. A breaking-up, a disintegrating had probably taken place in their attitude toward the keeping of this girl.

With both the Guerriers and Gracie seeing the situation more clearly, with their attitude toward this situation and toward each other in an unstable state, the way was paved for the forming of a new situation, better adapted to the girl's needs. The Prevention of Cruelty returned the case to the placing agency.

The visitor called in the evening when all the Guerrier family were at home in the dimly lighted, untidy kitchen, the men and boys smoking and spitting on the floor—a crowded, sociable group. At sight of her Gracie dodged away behind the stove; Mrs. Guerrier set up shrieks, jeers, threats of law suits, in which the entire crowd joined till breathless. When the visitor could make herself heard, she said "I see there has been a great mistake; Gracie is not pregnant." More vehement denials. The visitor then asked Mr. Guerrier whether he wanted to prove this to Gracie's relatives or whether he wanted to make trouble. "Law suits are expensive, Mr. Guerrier." She then went on to suggest that he let her take Gracie to see her relatives so as to show them first hand that they were mistaken in their fears. Said she, "It is a simple way—and cheap, Mr. Guerrier." Mr. Guerrier approved and referred it to Gracie. Gracie asked how could she know she could come back. A chorus of voices: "Yes, how do we know she'd get back?" The visitor promised and repeated the promise to bring her back. Then a family friend who was present offered to drive Gracie and the visitor from relative to relative. Her return thus secured, arrangements for meeting the following day were completed.

The visitor had begun this interview by quieting the excitement of the Guerriers and Gracie. She had found them possessed by an attitude of angry resentment and on Gracie's part of fear in addition. Had she scolded or threatened, had she pointed out that the Guerriers had themselves to blame for rumors of misbehavior, that they had courted just such suspicions by taking a girl into their crowded home, that Gracie ought to leave them at once and go to her relatives, she might have made them more resentful and more frightened, and all hope of bringing Gracie to voluntarily reshape her situation would have been lost. Her first words, acknowledging the rumor to be false, showed them that she herself was in a reasonable frame of mind, that, unlike them, she was not in the grip of a dissociated attitude, but was trying to look at the situation as a controllable whole, a problem. They therefore became themselves more equal to thinking of the situation as presenting a problem to be solved instead of an affront to be resented. Again, had the visitor urged Gracie to visit her relatives on the grounds that here was a haven and golden opportunities awaiting her, the girl might have felt herself making the visits under pressure and might even have suspected the whole situation to have been staged for her benefit. Instead, the visitor got Gracie to make these visits on her own errand, to remove a misgiving as to her own status as a respectable girl. The incidental effect was to bring to Gracie's attention factors in her situation which heretofore she had neither known nor appreciated, the very thing the visitor was aiming at, and the visitor was doing this at a time when the girl's inner life and outer situation were in a state of unrest.

The following day the friend appeared in an automobile with Gracie prettily and suitably dressed, and drove with the visitor to five homes of relatives. At the first Gracie found happy young cousins busy with games, victrola, piano and dancing lessons, saw their tasteful clothing and their refinement of living. She turned with apparent distaste from the whole menage. Said her aunt, "Gracie, my children want to be 'high' in their tastes. Wouldn't you like to be 'high' too with us?"

Gracie, "I'm happy where I am."

The aunt, sadly, "I dare say—but, my dear, I don't see how you can be."

At the second home was an aunt, Mrs. Sarah Barrett, who longed for Gracie and told her so, and who agreed that the girl might go to work rather than school. Here there were no children. Mrs. Barrett urged her niece to pay her a visit for a week's trial. This home like the first was in a city. The three remaining ones were in country towns, and although one of these relatives offered her a variety of country pleasures as well as a warm welcome, Gracie decided at once that the country was too quiet and lonely. She wanted to live in the city where she could go to work and where she would have opportunities of making friends.

As they drove from the last place Gracie remarked:

"Aunt Sarah has a nice place." The visitor nodded.

Gracie, impulsively taking the visitor's hand, "Do you think I'd be happy there? I like Aunt Sarah. I'd like to be 'high' too."

Visitor, "But you said you were happy at the Guerriers."

Gracie, "Couldn't I be happy and high too?"

Visitor, "You might try it."

Gracie, "Only I'm afraid the Guerriers wouldn't like it."

Visitor, "You might visit for a week. I'll talk with the Guerriers if you like."

Gracie, "I do like, and I'd like to write Aunt Sarah I'm coming Monday before I see them."

They stopped for a moment, wrote and posted the letter before returning to the Guerriers. The visitor told Mr. Guerrier that Mrs. Barrett wanted Gracie to visit her for one week.

Said he gruffly,—"Suppose she likes it."

Visitor, "Well, suppose she does? It's her own aunt, Mr. Guerrier."

Mr. Guerrier, considering, "That's so, Gracie, do you want to go?"

Gracie, timidly, "I'd like to try it."

Visitor, "And if she should like to stay for good, you wouldn't object, naturally, Mr. Guerrier."

Mr. Guerrier, hesitantly, "No, not if she wants to stay."

A week later came a card in Gracie's hand, "I am at Aunt Sarah's and I like it;" a month later, came a letter from the aunt saying that Gracie was going to remain permanently. Mr. and Mrs.

Barrett were planning to get guardianship and felt they could handle the situation best if left to do it by themselves. In the same mail came a framed picture of two smiling cherubs, with the words, "I'm Happy and High. Gracie."

Gracie's situation has now moved on from the unstable and disintegrating state in which we saw it at the close of the second interview to a new, reintegrating situation which was made up of some of the old factors and some new.

The new factors which the visitor brought to Gracie's knowledge were the existence of relatives who were near enough to her so that there were natural ties and obligations between them and herself, who moreover had a warm-hearted attitude toward her and who all had reached a social status which included a regard for the æsthetic side of life. It seems quite likely that the visits to these five homes had a cumulative influence in making her see social status as a value pertaining to the family group, a value which she would share and realize as a member of that group. The visitor thus presented to the girl a new and unexpected choice. Gracie's previous experience with relatives had been of a home in which orderliness was associated with friction and nagging. Contrasted with this home was the Guerriers' in which disorderliness was associated with affection and happiness. Her choice had been an "either-or" choice, either orderliness or happiness, a take-it or leave-it alternative. The choice now open to her showed orderliness as part of a more æsthetic life, as something which could be agreeably united with warm-hearted, close, happy ties and companionship. It carried an integrating of the two values, happiness and highness, these values now standing in a "both" relation as against the "either-or" relation. She saw a life of continuing activities which could successfully compete in its variety and in its satisfactions with her life at the Guerriers. The visitor by putting this prospect, this factor in her situation before the girl, by showing her the situation as a *functional whole*, helped her to knowledge of herself. Gracie discovered that she valued and desired "nice" surroundings and the self-respect that comes from being one of a "nice" group or family. The Freudian brings self-knowledge up *out of the past*; this worker brought to an unsophisticated girl knowledge of a latent wish *out of her*

present, by confronting her with the choices that lay within her whole controllable situation. The quickness of this girl's response to æsthetic living tempts one into conjecturing what might have happened had she remained at the Guerriers. Would her desire to be 'high' have come to life only to be frustrated, or would she as she matured have realized a taste for pretty things at the sacrifice of other values, her virtue perhaps? It may be that the visitor forestalled a future repression or disharmony of inner life in this girl, and that she succeeded because she brought to Gracie awareness of a wish by showing her the means whereby such a wish might be realized.

In reviewing the steps taken in this case one realizes that an equally earnest but perhaps less astute visitor might easily have approached the Guerriers and Gracie with a moralistic appeal showing the former that they were standing in the way of a richer life for the girl and the latter that she was doing wrong to turn her back on kith and kin. She might have proposed a visit to the kin as a step in moralistic persuasion. Our visitor did neither of these things. What she did was to start an activity which sprang out of the girl's own need of reassuring her family as to her status. The very fact that the visits were made because of Gracie's anxiety over her standing as a respectable girl may have sensitized her to the evidences of respectable standing which confronted her at the homes of her relatives. In other words her anxiety over her own status caused the evidences of status in her family to

stimulate her to want to share this kind of secure satisfaction. Her behavior process was circular, or spiral, an activity between self and setting in which her response to her situation was at once cause and effect. The choice the visitor put before the girl then was not between right and wrong, good and bad. It was a choice between different kinds of living—different sets of prospective activities between herself and her setting. The activities in the Guerriers' home have been described. Mrs. Barrett's home, being in the city, Gracie regarded as affording an opportunity to get work and make friends just as she had at the Guerriers'. This aunt's household had the added attraction that it was free from young people with a prior claim on affection—she would here be the centre of interest as she had not been at the Guerriers' and could not hope to be in the first aunt's home. She would also be assured loving attention in a home to which she had a claim, she would share a family standing which in itself would widen social opportunities, and she would find her æsthetic cravings at once awakened and satisfied. Even though a girl of thirteen might not articulate these advantages, she could feel their appeal as a whole in its promise of happy continuing activities. In her aunt's home she would realize a more inclusive self than would have been possible at the Guerriers'—more of what was potential in her would have occasion for coming into being. This all lay in her total situation, her situation looked at as a controllable whole.

SCIENTIFIC STATE BUILDING

W. E. GARNETT

THE VIEWPOINT is rapidly growing among social students that social science has reached a stage of development where it can make helpful contributions in directing the current of public affairs. Undoubtedly one of its most fruitful contributions will be its insistence that public policies be based on the solid rock of exact fact, rather than the sand of conjecture and theory. Since this is true, the eyes of all social students are now focused on the great social experiment now going on in Texas.

Texas now has underway what is probably the most extensive social inventory, as a basis for public policies, ever undertaken at one time by any state.

The surveys of general interest now going forward, or projected to begin in the near future include:

1. *An Educational Survey.* This is to cover "all phases of Education supported from public funds." The State Legislature appropriated \$50,000 for making this study. It will be under the

general supervision of a committee of prominent state citizens and educators. The active direction of the survey is in the hands of Dr. George Works of Cornell University, assisted by a corps of out of State educational experts. Since the \$50,000 is not enough to cover all necessary expenses on the scale on which the survey is planned, most of the actual work of collecting the various types of data needed is being done by voluntary assistance. The law requires that the report of this survey be published by December 1.

2. *Survey of the Penitentiary and Penal Institutions.* This study is being carried out under a permissive act of the Legislature, though no public funds for it were provided. The State Prison Association has undertaken to raise \$25,000 through private subscription to defray the expense of the study. Miss Elizabeth Spear, the Executive Secretary of this Association, is the motive force behind the undertaking. The aid of experts from the National Prison Association and the National Mental Hygiene Association has been secured for various angles of the work. It is hoped that the County jails may be included in this survey.

3. *Survey of the Eleemosynary Institutions and Agencies for the Care of Dependents.* This study is likewise being conducted under a permissive act of the Legislature, but without an appropriation of public funds. The act providing for the State Eleemosynary Commission states:

"It shall be the duty of said commission to make a careful study of conditions existing in this State in connection with the above mentioned dependents and unfortunates, directing consideration toward the following particular matters: First, the prevention of insanity, feeble mindedness, delinquency, and the increase of State dependents; Second, the care and custody of criminal insane; Third, the revision of laws governing the commitment, parole, discharge, care and custody of inmates of State eleemosynary institutions."

"And that said commission shall finally report back at the opening of the Thirty-ninth Legislature in 1925, a full and complete record of its findings with such recommendations as may be deemed proper to further a State policy that will promote the welfare of the State of Texas."

Arrangements have been made with the National Mental Hygiene Commission and the Russell Sage Foundation to help with this study.

4. *Child Labor Survey.* In coöperation with several state organizations, the National Child Labor Committee has undertaken a child labor survey in the State of Texas. This will be in two parts, the Agricultural Division, and the Industrial Division. Reports from a thousand country homes from typical sections of the state have already been secured, and the material is now being digested for publication. The industrial phase of the study will probably not be undertaken for some time.

5. *Rural Housing Study.* In coöperation with the Division of Country Life Studies of the United States Department of Agriculture, the Department of Rural Sociology of the Texas A. & M. College, has undertaken to study the housing of 1,000 rural homes. The field work for this survey is nearly half complete. It is hoped that this study will furnish the basis for a rural housing code.

6. *Rural Church Survey.* Plans have been made for a rural church survey on a statewide basis, somewhat like the one made in Ohio in 1912. This study is to be made by the Department of Rural Sociology of the Texas A. & M. College, under the general supervision of a committee composed of a representative of each denomination in the State. At the preliminary conferences to prepare for this undertaking, the official representatives of the various denominational bodies pledged their most hearty coöperation.

7. *Town and Country Relationships Study.* This is a part of a National study being made by the National Institute of Religious and Social Research. This organization has the coöperation of the A. & M. College of Texas in the Texas phases of their undertaking.

8. *County Farm Management and Economic Surveys.* The Experiment Station of the College, in coöperation with the Division of Land Economics of the United States Department of Agriculture, is just bringing to completion a very intensive study of all phases of the economic situation in Rockwall County, a typical county of the Black Belt with a high degree of tenancy.

9. *State Reclamation Survey.* The last legislature appropriated \$600,000 for a reclamation survey on which to base future policies of flood control and irrigation. This study is now under way. It is being made by the State Reclamation Department in coöperation with the National Reclamation Service.

The undertaking of such a large number of fundamental studies in Texas at this time appears to be traceable to several influences. First, there is a growing feeling that the first great era in the state's development—the pioneer and exploitation era—is rapidly drawing to a close; that developments in the future must more largely be based on conscious human effort and more carefully planned social policies. Second, there is a growing number of socially minded leaders in the State. They are not only largely responsible for the undertakings in question, but also for the State institutions and research agencies giving more attention to social questions. Third, the large and increasingly influential women's organizations, as well as other groups, display a growing tendency to demand that public affairs be conducted on the most efficient basis. The women's organizations were largely responsible for pushing through at least three of the big statewide surveys mentioned.

Recognizing that many of the surveys in other states have been barren of results some forward-looking individuals have been trying to perfect machinery for an intensive public opinion campaign at the proper time, to the end that the public mind may be prepared to make constructive use of the survey results when the reports appear. Representatives of a number of organizations have already held several meetings to consider the possibility of unified support of such a public opinion campaign.

Since there is some unrest on account of the present large tax burden, and since the state will be facing a deficit of several million dollars when the legislature meets again, conditions are favorable for the reactionary forces to make a strong popular bid for the control of the next state administration. If they succeed, constructive results from the surveys will be greatly jeopardized. The socially minded people of Texas therefore, may expect to have their hands full for the next year if full benefits are to be reaped from the present auspicious start in the direction of scientific state buildings—public policies based on exact knowledge of conditions and guided by the best available expert knowledge.

Howard Knight is working out specific plans and programs, with a preliminary Committee of Secretaries of State Conferences of Social Work, to make the State Conferences more articulate. The preliminary meeting was held at Toronto with the National Conference, with representatives of about nine States present. Another meeting will be held at the 1925 Conference at Denver.

Church and Religion

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs, and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

THE SOCIALIZATION OF THE AMERICAN CHURCH IN THE LAST QUARTER OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

JOHN FRANCIS O'BRIEN

I. THE BACKGROUND

THE MOST striking fact in the history of religion in the United States from 1875 to 1900 was the growth of what might be called the "socialization" of the church. Indeed, this movement might well be deemed one of the most remarkable and far-reaching changes in the entire history of religion.

It must be understood, however, that such a change was not a sudden affair, entirely devoid of antecedent influences. The Catholic Church was an important meliorating agent in the Middle Ages; the Puritan minister was quite a figure in local politics, education and administration; the Transcendental and Brook Farm movements of the thirties and forties, made up to a large extent of ministers, were attempts to teach social reform to the world; and Rev. O. B. Frothingham, Henry Ward Beecher and Philips Brooks had been active in the pre-war slavery agitation, war discussion and, most significant perhaps of all, the reconstruction difficulties.

But the social recentering of the church following 1870-75 was so complete a revolution from the very nature of its acceleration that an analysis of its causes is imperative.

In the first place, science in the fields of human development and Biblical criticism had undermined much of the old orthodoxy through the removal of the ancient props for the accepted beliefs. Further, the new scientific knowledge in other fields, scepticism regarding the notions of immortality, heaven, hell, the efficacy of prayer, etc., served materially to reduce popular reverence for the old theology. The preacher as the interpreter of the Divine Word was, in many cases,

facing a sceptical and critical audience. Then too, the rise of the capitalist system with its premium upon the acquisition of dollars placed the wealthy man in the position of first citizen of the community. With the growth and secularization of higher education, the minister was no longer the sole representative of learning and erudition. Thus it is seen that many factors tended to depreciate the sacredness of received theology as well as the social and intellectual position of its expounders.

Another significant cause of this social centering of the church function is seen in the needs of the age. As is well known, the economic revolution which succeeded the Civil War in America was the most far-reaching change which had occurred since 1492. Without attempting an analysis of its causes and influences, it is sufficient to note that the industrialization, urbanization, congestion, competition and materialism of the age either definitely produced or else greatly aggravated social misery. The results of this change are seen in the newer, more formidable problems of existence—in industry; capital and labor—the city; crime, poverty and pauperization—the state: politics and penology—the family; divorce and delinquency—the country: agrarian unrest. It must be remembered, too, that organized philanthropy and scientific efforts at social amelioration did not keep pace with the change. It is quite natural, therefore, that the preacher and his church, in many cases driven from the old pedestal of impeccability, came down to earth and wrestled with the problems of mundane existence.

The first and theoretical reaction of the clergy to the thought and condition of the times was a

voluminous literature which advocated a practice of the principles of Christ. One of the earliest of these expositions exhorting a return to the really Christian rule of life was Sir John R. Seeley's *Ecce Homo*.¹ Although defending the old notions regarding the Bible, Seeley proceeded to show that the teachings of Christ were not merely concerned with beliefs, dogmas, and creeds. As a matter of fact, Christ's mission on earth was one of teaching virtue by example. Emphasizing the social nature of Christianity, he stressed the fact that Christ practised his principles.

Washington Gladden early held the idea that the true function of the church was a social one. His published works, notably *A Christian: What it Means and How to Begin*, *The Christian Way*, *Tools and the Man*, *Ruling Ideas of the Present Age*, *Social Facts and Forces*, *The Christian Pastor*, were all expositions of his practical application of the Gospel to social welfare. Combatting the objection that the interests of the pulpit were spiritual and not secular, he maintained that the Christian rule should be applied to all phases of life—politics, industry and economics. "Let us say that our business is saving souls. Souls are men. How to save men their manhood, their character,—that is our chief problem." Profiting by his journalistic experience, Gladden in 1878 edited and issued a religious magazine called "Sunday Afternoon, a Magazine for the Household." Its prospectus expressed these sentiments, "Questions of practical philanthropy will, however, occupy the largest space in 'Sunday Afternoon,' how to mix Christianity with human affairs; how to bring salvation to the people who need it most; how to make peace between employer and workman; how to help the poor without pauperizing them; how to remove the curse of drunkenness; how to get the church into closer relations with the people to whom Christ preached the Gospel; how to keep our religion from degenerating into art, or evaporating into ecstasy, or stiffening into dogmatism, and to make it a regenerating force in human society,—these are the questions which our readers are likely to hear most frequently and most urgently asked."

The current literature was occupied with exhortations to right living, the religion of the Gospels, the Sermon on the Mount and imitation of

Christ as the essence of religion. Ritual and creed were unnecessary to the true life, the ten commandments were deemed the essentials. Christianity as it was understood by many may have failed, but the religion of Jesus had not failed. The life of Christ himself was the most perfect example to be followed. "The Gospel of the carpenter is preferred to the gospel of the counting room." The only way in which the Church could hope to come out of its intellectual difficulties was seen in a practice of Christian principles. Scores of articles from both laymen and clergymen found their rallying point in this one idea—the Gospel of Christ—and the only fulfillment of His mission was to be gained in efforts at social amelioration, political righteousness and peaceful relations among classes. The function of the clergy as defined by one of the most important personages in it was to be found in religious teaching and practice which should possess the three characteristics of tolerance, freedom and progress and which should have as its objectives the problems of politics, wealth, divorce, the press, religious teaching and social interest.

These expositions of the social function of the church found their origin in large part in the spontaneous effort of the ministers themselves. This fact is attested to by the large number of clergymen who wrote the articles. But another influence in the production of both statement and activity was the criticism of the lack of such interests shown in sermons. All these exhortations to a return to the social teachings of Jesus either began or ended with or in some way implied a contemporary lack of attention devoted to this topic in the pulpit.

The question was asked, "Is it not possible that in the pulpit teaching of the present day we make a little too much of salvation and not quite enough of righteousness? Rev. Dr. Harry Bevan of the Brick Church in New York went back to England because he thought that American clergymen were "Too narrowly professional." Rev. O. B. Frothingham maintained that the community itself was to blame in large part for the lack of real dynamic social preaching. He asserted that it was "too quiescent; criticises too little; is too easily satisfied; accepts mediocrity of learning, talent, devotion, abuses too mildly; ridicules too gently" in its efforts at having ministers preach

¹ Seeley, Sir John R., *Ecce Homo*, Boston, Roberts Bros., 1886.

really social sermons. President Charles F. Thwing of Western Reserve University in a questionnaire sent to young men found that they wanted *practical, personal*, sermons, not entertainment nor dialectic.

Not only was the content of sermons belabored for its antiquated attention to creed and dogma, but the very oratory in which expressions of belief were couched was subject to censure. Here again, old, dry didacticism was condemned while the smooth polish of a Philips Brooks was desired and eagerly sought.

Thus the clergy and the church "went in for" social reform, etc., not only because of the inward recognition of the need for and desire to amelior-

ate conditions, but because current criticism both within and without the ranks pointed out the inadequacy of remaining aloof and the Christianity of positive activity.

But more important than the significant and necessary theoretical expositions of the newer function of the church and the clergy were the activities of the ministers themselves. Even here I feel that this newer social attention was more widespread than can be indicated because only the more spectacular and consistent work came to attention. Perhaps many of the ministers were silent, feeling that "teaching by example" was more noteworthy than mere oratory or publicity.

THE PREACHER'S RIGHT TO MARRY

FREDERICK E. LUMLEY

IN A FORMER article (The Family, Jan. 1923) the writer attempted to show that young people have no inalienable, "natural" right to marry. The argument turned on the simple fact of the exceptions found in all societies and among all species. The conclusion was reached that "the right to marry" is only a privilege extended and approved by the group and properly subject to withdrawal whenever convincing evidence of dangerous abuse appears, just as the privileges of carrying concealed weapons, taking other people's property, running a bar, etc. have been withdrawn in certain societies. And because the marriage privilege is so generally abused and the burdens, in consequence, are so heavily loaded on society, a blacklist of procreators is being gradually made up.

This study raised the question of another assumed right. If certain young people have not the right, and ought not to have the privilege, of doing wrong to others, in the present or the future, neither do any other persons have inalienable rights to do wrong; nor do they have rights to support and abet those doing wrong. And yet it almost seems, at times, when one looks into the endless stream of misery flowing out of unfit marriages, that the clergy have not been as alert, to sense this wrong-doing and to withdraw from participation in it, as many average folks. For

let it be clear: the clergy are related in a most intimate and peculiar way to marriage and have been for a long time. In all seriousness, then, we wish to open up for earnest consideration, the part that ministers are playing in relation to unfit matings. If this relation is not unfortunate, to say the least, one wonders what term would properly describe it. The evidence piles up in mountains that mis-mating is rampant. The minister is generally sought out for solemnization. Do ministers abuse their privilege—for that is all the "right" they have relative thereto—in relation to this most crucial step in the lives of young and old? No exhaustive investigation of this nature has ever been made, but certain typical facts are available. What do they show?

First and most conspicuous is the evidence from the divorce-courts and the high divorce-rates. When such an astonishing percentage of the product of the marriage-mill turns out to be defective, can any criticism be made of those who help turn the mill? Let it be admitted that many divorces are wholly justifiable and desirable, and the question how and why these evident misfits ever were married and why right-intentioned men ever sanctioned such unions, yet remains. The evils connected with J.P.'s are not forgotten and they must have their share of criticism. But it is well-known that ministers do not marry all

the sane and otherwise normal people while the rest are left for the J.P's. One may still properly raise the question of ministerial carelessness, if not of definite abuse of privilege.

Then there is the unmitigated menace of the "marrying parson." The writer sat on the bench beside the judge in a police-court some years ago and witnessed the examination of the following case. An over-grown, seedy-looking, hulk of a man appeared before the judge for obtaining a license under false pretenses. He had, it appeared, been shrewd enough to take a mature woman to the clerk's office instead of his undersized, fourteen-year-old fiancée. Obtaining the coveted paper he hurried the girl to the marrying parson—and was not refused. The irony is this: He evidently expected, and he received, less discrimination from the minister than from the clerk. The parson was brought in and, when challenged, made the feeble and ridiculous reply that he was merely concerned with the *spiritual* features of the union; the state looked after other matters. Of course the argument failed and the judge saw to it that his license was revoked. One wonders how many marrying parsons there are in the land and how general such vicious practices are.

A prominent pastor, well-known to the writer, and otherwise respectable and worthy, inserted the following advertisement in a daily newspaper of the city from which he had just moved into a border city of a neighboring state. "—has a sure enough marrying parson. Rev.—of that city has qualified. In less than two years he has married ninety-two couples of whom twenty-two came from (his former parish). The First—Church of—is a large organization of over—members. The church is located within half a block of the interurban station. The parson has an office in the church and is ready to meet young people at all hours. If people are determined to leave (his former parish) and get married they do no better than strike for (present parish) and look up the marrying parson."

Is this spiritual business or commercial business? Does this sort of thing dignify the preacher's calling and add to the sum total of human happiness or is it a gross abuse of privilege? Should not this man's license to preach be revoked also?

The writer knows a "marrying parson" who performed on the international boundary line. In five years time he solemnized (?) the marriages of nine hundred couples, an average of one every two days—a record for pastoral care so far as we know. And we cannot, for a moment, give hospitality to the idea that he displayed any discrimination, thought of himself as in spiritual business or in any other way put first principles first. There was no attempt to inject into the ceremony those elements without which it is but a meaningless mummering.

Here is the decree of annulment issued to a woman who was married while recovering from an operation in a hospital. She claimed, later, that she was "irresponsible by reason of the anesthetic; that during the whole of the marriage ceremony her mind was blighted and confused, so that she did not know what she was doing." It is impossible to believe that the minister concerned was in his right mind and alive to the vows he had taken when ordained.

Here is the report of a woman who had just married her thirteenth husband—surely an unlucky number. We might think of her as feeble-minded or an adventuress. One may wonder what those clergymen had in mind when they helped her into so many matrimonial alliances.

From the secretary to a minister of a large church comes the information that half-intoxicated persons had been united in the holy bonds of matrimony in his office. There is the case of a minister who joined forces with a wicked and unnatural mother and took oath that a girl of fourteen was old enough to marry—so that he might have the wedding.

These are but samples. The list might be indefinitely extended. What do they signify? Is there any indictment in these facts? The writer knows clergymen too well and he knows too many of them to make the indictment general. Nevertheless he knows how easy it is to be careless, and how embarrassing it sometimes is to ask pertinent questions or to refuse to marry. However, the extremity of the situation demands attention. Moreover it demands organized attention, organized effort to correct. The whole profession suffers in the eyes of many by reason of the disgraceful few. The profession needs house-cleaning at certain points. The ministers ought to be

always in the lead in preserving the purity and dignity of their profession. It would be far better if the clergy ceased marrying altogether for then the evils of unfit marriages could be fought with clean hands and a pure heart. Preaching against divorce and unfit marriages while continuing in the present way is worse than pointless.

Certain objections made to the writer deserve consideration.

(1) Other and less scrupulous officials could and would be found to solemnize marriages, therefore it would be useless for the clergy to refuse. Other persons will promote prize-fights, run brothels, engage in boot-legging—if preachers do not. Clergymen are usually clear-headed enough to see the point. The argument from necessity is inappropriate because there are always the J.P.'s.

(2) Some urge that there are too many difficulties in the way, that too much stress is now placed on the responsibility of the minister. The latter objection, and the former also, has some weight. No doubt it is a delicate matter to challenge young people at such a juncture. But the way can be paved very easily by a public announcement. And we may also ask when the clergy began to make difficulties an excuse for carelessness? The difficulties and responsibilities are ipso facto assumed on taking the vows; the uncourageous and irresponsible ought to stay out.

(3) There are some who still say that the minister has no responsibility since the state assumes it. We shall pass over the fact that some ministers find too much responsibility and others none, and point out that if there is evil here—and there is—and if the state is careless—as it is—that is no reason why the clergymen should lend themselves to wrong-abetting. The clergyman is a public official and on that score cannot morally fail to condemn evil wherever he finds it. In addition, he is a private citizen of this country and, as such, has the responsibilities of citizenship. He, like the rest of us, is harmed by public neglect. He cannot attack as a private citizen, however, what he approves as a public official.

(4) Ministers are responsible to God alone, say some. These are fewer and fewer, let it be noticed. But, accepting the objection, responsible for what? Surely if the thing is evil, as science overwhelmingly testifies in so many cases, no sane

man can arrange a decent God on the side of it. Does "responsible only to God and not men" mean that one is to go stone blind to the terrible realities about us? It would seem that this responsibility does not involve the complete abdication of intelligence and scruple.

(5) Preachers need the money. This is such honesty as is good for the soul, but of course ministers never make the argument seriously. In case there are some who would take this position it might be urged that the small amount received would hardly compensate for an uneasy conscience and the loss in caste.

(6) If preachers gave up the solemnization of marriage in order to fight for a reform of the plans, a better plan of certification, they would lose influence over many young people. The reply is that they would *gain* influence over the *right sort* of young people, and they never have had, any influence over the wrong sort. Moreover, those persons in the land, who are tremendously in earnest about improvements at this point of life's ongoing, are disappointed and disgusted because the ministers are so apathetic. It might be worth while to cultivate and win back the respect of this class.

(7) The thought of handing over marriage to some secular functionary, for the time-being, is revolting to some because, it is assumed, a spiritual officer is really required to effect the marriage. And here we have the sacramentarian view of marriage. From the pragmatic point of view, however, it would seem that marriage occurs when there are:

"Two souls with but a single thought,
Two hearts that beat as one"

whether there is anybody about to officiate or not. Marriage has always been, and clergymen have not always been. The official may aid in *conveying the meaning* but he is not indispensable.

A constructive program for clergymen to work at would seem to be the following: (1) Follow the lead of numerous ministers and require a medical examination, by approved physicians. (2) Recommend to young people that they send to The Eugenics Laboratory at Cold Spring Harbor, Long Island, for some trait blanks which they should fill out. When returned to the laboratory, examination will disclose hereditary defects liable to re-appear in the offspring. (3)

Work for what, for lack of a better term, we shall call a bench of judges. This would consist of two or three sympathetically intelligent and responsible officials, including ministers, in each locality, men and women, who would examine the medical certificates, the reports on heredity, and then make careful inquiry themselves into such weighty matters as soundness of affection, length of acquaintance, compatability, economic condition, interest in home-making and children, prospects, etc. after which a certificate of permission to marry might be granted. This is what

we mean by "proper certification," and it would at least command as much respect as the certification of a corporation or fancy breeds of stock.

The stream of defectives must be dried up at the source. All agree that there is not and never will be enough money, institutions and men available to care for the defectives born at the present rate. We must go to the source—unfit matings. At this point ministers occupy a strategic position. Their full influence is coveted in the right direction.

Inter-Racial Cooperation

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs, and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

WHAT RACIAL EQUALITY MEANS TO THE NEGRO

ANDREW RALSTON

THREE HUNDRED years ago, at Jamestown, Virginia, three races of men met for the first time in America. The civilization of the White Man then and there put itself against the savagery of the Red Man and the Black, and survives.

The Indian was in his native land, surrounded by things familiar and homelike. His savagery was his civilization, developed with his race and fitted to its needs, and he could not, if he would, change it at a word for something foreign to his life habits. He refused, not in words perhaps, to become either a part of the nation which was to rule in his place, or to be a slave; and, as a consequence, his savagery, which would not adopt the ways of the White Man and could not withstand his force, is with his race practically extinct.

The Negro was there not as a man, by choice, but as a slave, and his savagery had no opportunity to exhibit any trait or characteristic of its own. He could only accept the dress provided for him and imitate, in a way, the customs of his masters; but, in spite of all this, he has grown in numbers from a pitiful group of twenty persons to millions, numerically a tenth of the American nation, and has developed from a chattel to a citizen.

Slave labor was welcomed in all the Colonies, and if it had proved profitable wherever tried the question of right or wrong, as pertaining to slavery, might not yet have been answered. It, however, proved unprofitable in the North, because it could not supply the demand of its factories for skilled labor. For its setting, it required the broad acres of the plantation, where cheap labor could be fed and clothed cheaply from the products of the soil, and where laborers could be housed in quarters, grouped like small villages,

on the Master's land. Slavery became an exclusively Southern institution, only because it failed to meet any economic demand of Northern life. The Northern Slaves were sold to new masters, not given their freedom, and it was only after years of observation of the workings of slavery in the South that vigorous protest was made anywhere against its inherent wrongs.

The earliest movement for the alleged good of the Negro, as a race, was an attempt at self-protection on the part of those who counted slavery among human wrongs, but did not want the Negro, either bond or free, for a neighbor. It took shape in a scheme for his colonization; and the Rev. Mr. Gurley was, in 1822, elected president of the first organization for that purpose, and in accepting the office, said: "The habits, the feelings, the prejudices—prejudices which neither refinement, nor education, nor argument, nor religion itself can subdue—mark the people of color, whether bond or free, as the subjects of degradation, inevitable and incurable. The African by birth belongs to the very lowest station of society, and from that station he can never rise, be his talents, his enterprise, what they may. Here, therefore, they must be forever debased; more than this, they must be forever useless; more even than this, they must forever be a nuisance, from which it would be a blessing for society to be rid." If this was the language of sympathy, what more or worse could enmity have said?

When freed, the Negro came out of slavery, and from the protection which slavery gave from economic worry, ignorant of everything, except work under a taskmaster. As a rule he had been well housed and fed, his worth as a laborer being dependent on his physical condition. He was

ignorant and uneducated, want of education being his only inheritance, and measures had been taken by the State to keep him ignorant. He was religious, but in the public observance of his religious duties he was not allowed to pray for new blessings on earth, although he might revel in hopes of joy and ease hereafter. Every Officer of the State was at the call of the master to enforce the letter and spirit of the Federal Constitution, under which the Supreme Court had decided that "a Negro has no right which a White Man is bound to respect."

The emancipation of the Negro came as a military necessity during the Civil War, and he was given the balance as a supposed political necessity in the reconstruction which followed the War. The rulers, then and there, took upon themselves a task so full of impossibility—the making out of clay in their hands a race of rulers in a day—that the first step in its accomplishment is yet incomplete.

That no race riots occurred in the days of slavery is almost self-explanatory. When slave property was at a price, the Negro was a stranger in the states outside of the slavery limit—was, in fact, a natural curiosity there. In the Northern Villages and their adjoining countrysides there were no Negroes, unless, perchance, a runaway slave had been given a home, and no White Man was willing to face a local sentiment which would have been aroused by an attempt to surrender such fugitive for a reward. In the cities, they were present in little if any larger percentage than in the villages. Race riots were unknown in the North, because there was but one race; and where slavery ruled, preventive measures were taken that race riots should not occur. Without an entire change of conditions, both North and South, the quiet would have remained unbroken, and race conflicts would have been unknown. The Civil War brought the necessary change in the overthrow of slavery. An influx of Negroes to the North, in numbers sufficient to attract attention to them as wage-earners, followed their freedom, and the jealousy of labor organizations was aroused against them. At times they became the objects of mob violence, because of such jealousy, long before they thought of organizing to defend themselves as a race. In the South, the small drop of political control which the Negro was able

to squeeze from the apple of freedom, the ballot, was enough to give him an importance which made his former masters distrust him.

Race prejudice, which never existed in the days of slavery, began to spread throughout the land, and gave opportunity to all who would profit by the stirring up of strife. Race riots have occurred in various cities, and a committee of Congress has recently listened, with all possible grace, to a delegation of Negroes seeking legislative protection other than is now provided, for the race. The delegate said: "The Black Man has given notice that what he has suffered in the past will not be endured in the future. He means business now. There can be no compromise."—and—"The oppression of the Negro in America is reaching a point where no one could be sure that our land will be a land of peace." So far as this prejudice affects political conditions, it is a result of the reconstruction policy of fifty years ago; and in the economic world, it is nourished by the fact that the labor of the Negro, as a rule, is unskilled labor, and has been exploited by those who employ labor, or who contract to supply labor for others.

Legislation at the close of the Civil War established, so far as legal enactment could, equal civil rights and like duties for White and Black, without regard to education or wealth, thus wronging both.

This would have been sorrowfully true, if what was then done had been done with honesty of purpose for the good of all, but the work of reconstruction degenerated into an effort to secure the continuance of the control of the party then in power. A majority of the senators and representatives, charity may urge, were honest in the belief that a speedy return of the Democratic Party to power, which a full representation of the white voters of the South would secure, would with sureness annul the best results of the war, and their duty was to prevent the loss of what had been so dearly gained; and, it may be added, Congressmen then and there only obeyed the will of their constituents; and their work had the unqualified approval of their party, and of a majority of the Democratic Party in the North.

A word of excuse, a plea for charitable judgment on what the South has done to the Black Man since the Civil War, may be as much in

place as any justification of the reconstruction acts, on the ground of honesty of purpose. The respective views of the North and South concerning slavery were not shaped in a day, and could not be reshaped and blended in new agreement in a day. A majority of the white people, born and reared in the South, did not believe that the Negro had been wronged by enslavement, and with scarce an exception do not believe that the treatment of the ex-slave in the South has been impolitic or wrong. It was part of their creed that Negro slavery was a divine institution; that "Cursed be Caanan" carried with it authority, and even though it was only the after-growl of a patriarchal spree, it was as binding as "Love your enemies." The biblical authority for his servanthship was kept before the Negro, who was given every opportunity to "get religion," though in an early statute of one of the slave states "It is hereby enacted and declared that the baptism of slaves does not exempt them from bondage," and other states had statutes of like purport. A belief that slavery was the rightful place of the Negro was essential to the make-up of the slaveholder, and had become part of him. He had been taught for so many generations that slavery was right, both by human and divine law, that a belief in its rightness descended with the estate from father to son, and still descends, as a sorrowful memory, when the estate is no longer composed in whole or part of human chattels. In the few instances where such belief was unaccountably missing, the owner manumitted his slaves during his life, or by will, and made some more or less adequate provision for their start in freedom. Given such belief, with honesty of purpose, and the story of Negro slavery in the United States could not have been other than it is. The "irrepressible conflict" came when a power from without the State imposed, upon people holding such belief, duties and obligations contrary to their life-time custom, and shut slavery within territorial limits. They could see in such a regime, only an overthrow of established authority. They still forget that their belief in State Rights and Slavery has been discredited by their failure to establish it,—in the attempt, for its sake, to overthrow a Nation.

Reconstruction did not secure to all the people, North and South, civil rights with all their antici-

pated blessings, nor did it unite the two sections in a harmonious effort to restore national prosperity. It resulted in no immediate good to the Negro, if his good were its specific intent, for it predetermined a disregard of law on the part of the White Man, who took care that the Negro vote was not counted as cast, if cast at all. Its effect, apart from an actual disregard of law which was provoked but not checked by it, was immoral. It secured, or resulted in the actual mastery by one race of the other, without its actual enslavement, and made disregard of law a virtue. The White Man had owned the Black. He knew him to be ignorant, for he had discouraged his education. He knew him to be respectful in address to his master, for he had punished every showing of disrespect. He thought him peaceable, yet he had ever taken measures to make non-resistance a habit, and contentment a fact by destroying every hope of betterment. And all these things, so commendable in the slave, the ex-master determined to require of the voter. The White Man's plan was partially secured by force, but the Black Man had visions of freedom and equality, unlike the reality about him, and, urged by counsellors of all degrees of merit, he ceased to be advised by his former masters, which proved to be a new offense.

Ku Klux Klans, Rifle Clubs and kindred organizations made the Negro doubt after a time whether his political gifts were more than baubles, and whether his early political friends had either the will or the power to secure to him the continuous blessings promised with freedom, and he, himself, became a politician, and his vote a commodity. Timon, of Athens, says: "Tis not enough to help the feeble up, but to support him after,"— and the ex-slave, stumbling onto the same idea, came to feel himself friendless. It was not, however, until he had been carried North by exploiters, after the manner of his early voyaging in slave ships, to be sold under contract, or used as a strike-breaker, and there received with violence, that he sent delegates to Congress to demand racial equality and give notice that patience may be exhausted.

It was easy for the King's advisers to throw Daniel to the lions, but it required the watching of angels to keep the lions from eating him. The leaders, in Reconstruction, made of the ex-slave a

voter and threw him, politically, into a lion's den, and no angel of the Lord appeared to hinder this reckless multiplying of incompetent voters or to protect them. The Negro, who, yesterday, was an ignorant slave, became a citizen and a ruler, and his former masters became his political foes. The result must be accepted now, for no power can undo what was so recklessly done. Any attempt to set aside or limit the rights made constitutional, without regard to race or color, would end only with the extermination of a race, the White or the Black, and may not be considered. Some diseases are not aided by surgery; they can only be overcome by systematic treatment, long continued, and the evil of illiteracy is one of these.

Racial equality, which the Negro delegation asked of the Congressional committee, was not defined—at least no definition was made public—but it should not for a moment be joined in thought with what, in common parlance, is known as social equality. The one is essential to citizenship; the other is an individual adornment, and too often a tawdry one. So far as it is dependent upon governmental action, racial equality may be defined the civil equality of races. This, when assured, exhausts the power of the State in that regard, for the State may not consider races of men, but men; and men are equal before the law when the protection of law is secured to each alike. When within a State in which different races dwell each individual is a citizen, recognized by law as such, "without regard to race, color or previous condition of servitude"—citizenship being the highest gift in the power of the State—political racial equality is established. Theory there becomes fact, and when the enforcement of law becomes a habit the bare fact of citizenship will prove to have been the sole essential to equality and progress. This the people of the United States have already provided by constitutional amendment, and by legislation confirming it. This is the summit of constitutional idealism, the limit of "the inspired wording of high resolve," which was fixed when civil war compelled a choice between freedom for all the inhabitants, or the overthrow of the Union.

Social life, however, is no part of civil life, nor does social recognition follow from civil equality. In fact, the social and civil life are so distinct that the word equality does not link them together.

The one is an individual belonging; the other, the individual shares with the public. The social is personal; the civil reaches only that part of the personal life which cannot be hidden from the public and kept free from public obligation. The home may be closed to every one except the chosen guest; the community—whether a township or the nation—is public and includes the many, and may not be closed to any whom the majority welcomes. Each home is the center of a social circle of its own, and there are as many circles as there are home centers. The public, in its various divisions, numbers every individual as part of itself, and any one who conforms to the conditions binding on all alike is, in public, the equal in rights and privileges of another. At home one may lock the door on all, and be himself, and alone. The common impulse of humanity is pledged to protect the sacredness of the home, and within it the public can only be admitted in emergency.

Beyond this, and apart from it, is the social world, entered from the home, where no one is admitted or excluded except by consent of those within, free from the domination of civil law, so long as what is done therein injures no one without. Social life has its circles, and circles within circles, but it is an annex to the home, governed by its own traditions, and within it is the right to exclude whom it pleases, at whim or for reasons most profound. Social life is a limited, voluntary waiver, to chosen ones, of the right of sanctuary of the home, and such waiver may ignore racial lines and welcome merit wherever found, or if wearied of its own resources, as it often is, may welcome what is only notorious. But the right to home and social privacy is above and beyond civil control; it is in fact life itself.

Segregation follows naturally from the establishment of the home, and does not await the authority of the statute to begin its work. It is instinctive, a matter of racial or national pride and convenience. Pride of race, where civil equality is secure, seeks the contentment which belongs to congenial surroundings and should claim segregation as a right, though it might oppose it, if it were imposed by law, and civil equality were denied. Booker T. Washington's hope in his people saw in their pride in their educational and economic achievements, during their

few years of freedom, a promise of further and continuous effort. His plans for race betterment made segregation a necessity, in order that the special system of education, which he helped to provide for the Negro, might have full opportunity to reach him. In it he saw opportunity of comparison of the progress of both races.

It is not proof, not evidence necessarily, of want of equality before the law that Negro lynchings have been frequent in the South, and occasional in the North. Yesterday's newspapers told of outlaws, a hundred or more, following the footsteps of a masked man (white) who, they charged, had assaulted a girl on her way to school, intending to kill him if captured. Lynchings are proof of nothing but the brutal lawlessness of those who take part in them,—a lawlessness which awaits opportunity to break forth, and which yields to nothing opposing it, except greater force. The mob, White or Black, usually follows the trail of any accused person, asking no evidence of guilt more relevant or formal than the fact that the accused is trying to escape. The pity of it all is that lynchings and mobs too often are not premeditated, and cannot be anticipated and enjoined by law. Where there is no regard for the sacredness of human life and of law, the victim of the mob may be pitied, and, as he seldom escapes, must be buried; and, where many are pursued, it is their hopeless privilege to sell their lives, as dearly as possible, in self-defense. And where violence rules until aid from without is called upon to disperse the mob, the relief sent should be instructed, by the power appealed to, so to perform its work that none of the mob should live to be part of another mob. Lynchings cannot be adjudged good or evil by color lines; they are "evil only, continually."

When at length a point is reached where public opinion will sustain the Court in enforcing anti-mob laws, a rule of evidence should make proof of the presence of an accused, at the place where mob violence occurred, evidence per se of guilty participation in it. The law-abiding has nothing to fear from such a rule of evidence. Let him overcome his curiosity and stay away from the scene of trouble, and by so doing he will avert suspicion of aiding and abetting the wrong; and if all do this, this form of trouble will cease.

Looking backward, it is seen that civil rights have been granted to the Negro; that his educational standing has been lifted from zero to a high per cent comparatively; that the difference between his former degraded position in the State and his position as a citizen to-day is so vast that he does not comprehend it fully enough to be truly thankful. Could he but see "the hole of the pit from which he was digged," where his own endeavor to help himself would have been as nothing, without the aid of the Abolitionists, who became a reproach for his sake, he might reasonably think his present wrongs blessings—even though in disguise. That they are wrongs, and prick as spurs, is true; but all the more they should spur him on to greater endeavor, because what he is accomplishing receives clearer recognition and reward than ever before. Comparing the former with these latter days, the Negro has in fact no justifiable complaint against the twentieth century, and the things which it approves.

The Negro is a more potent element of trouble in the North as a laborer, than as a citizen. In the South his labor is necessary to every phase of production. There nothing competes with it, and without it the South would be to intents and purposes, for the time being, non-productive. In the North, however, in his attempt to obtain work he comes against organizations of every branch of skilled labor, very few of which have opened their doors to him. At the same time, in the field of unskilled labor, he meets and must compete with wage-earners of the lowest grade, a field claimed largely by foreign workmen, who are in the United States for gain only, and who make violence their only argument against whatever they think opposes them.

A recent appeal, to laborers, so revolutionary in its language that the Federal Court suppressed the newspaper in which it appeared, after the first issue, defined laborers as "all men and women employed in industry, except those who employ others," and said: "Society as at present conducted is based on ownership of the means of living by the capitalist or master class, and the consequent enslavement of the class by whom wealth is produced,"—and—"the working class must organize for the purpose of waging unceasing warfare against the capitalist class and its instruments of oppression, by an action that has for its object the

overthrow of the master class and the substitution therefor of the proletariat." In this quotation two things are stated in language easily understood, but fallacious. What is meant by revolution, which would end as described, may need explanation; but the danger which follows revolutionary suggestion is greatly heightened by urging therein, as its excuse and as fact, two things, above set forth,—the existence of distinct classes of citizens among us, based on wealth or whatever else, and the notion that labor is the sole producer of wealth. Neither is true, and labor agitation, in its most persuasive form, is based on these two vagaries. Many laborers, who would be slow to compel recognition of their own claims by studied injury to others, give heed to these statements and promulgate them. In America there are no established classes, and wealth, created by labor alone, is unknown. The law recognizes no classifications of blood or family, and wealth is too quickly gained and lost to make a class foundation. The only distinction, based on wealth, is that of poorer or richer, and the race for wealth is so free-for-all that the wealth of one family or generation in no way insures against the genteel poverty, or absolute want, of the children or grand-children of that same family. The waters of the ocean are not more completely mingled and driven apart by wind and tide, than are the individual particles of families, and so-called classes, by the ups and downs of financial change in one or two generations. And as to class distinctions based on anything other than wealth, no politician would dare to give place, above the dead-level of citizenship, to the greatest or to the descendants of the greatest of our national benefactors, or to any one else.

The nearest approach to class establishment in the United States is that which permits labor ideals to be divided into American and Foreign, and this is not marked so much by birth and nativity as by the possession of a common purpose. It is the ideal of the American laborer to have a home and wife and family; to see his children better educated than their parents, and to gain for himself a place in time among the employers of labor, where he may use his brain as well as his hands to advantage. These things he hopes and works for, with all that they can bring to him of influence and honor. If foreign born,

this ideal Americanizes him. Booker T. Washington aimed at the full Americanizing of his race, and tried to teach the Negro "to want more wants." He said: "We should get the family to the point where it will want money to educate its children, to support the minister and the church. Later, we should get this family to the point where it will want to put money in the bank, and perhaps have the experience of placing a mortgage on some property. When this stage of development is reached, there is no difficulty in getting individuals to work six days during the week."

The ideal of the anti-American laborer is foreign born. It began in the indifference to all things American, and is instinctive only in the foreign born laborer, who came to America to find the profitable employment which he could not find at home, intending when he had saved what would count as a competency there to return to his native land. He gave no heed to American ideas, nor did he make his manner of life correspond to the life which he found here. Because he could not be wholly inactive mentally, when resting from his physical labor, the settlements of foreigners became centers of complaint against customs and ways, which they would neither adopt nor let alone. The politician, whose need was followers, became the leader of this non-voting element, which then, for the price that the leader would pay for the vote, hurried to become citizens and voters, and the contagion spread. The leader of this new force in politics took his place like Absalom "in the way of the gate" and proclaimed "that every man who had any suit or cause might come to him and he would do him justice." The foreign laborer,—for the seed of the trouble was imported,—because the discoverer of class distinctions, and class distinctions so proclaimed are the breath and blood of strikes and bolshevism in America. The Anti-American is the propagandist of every change that appeals to force and bloodshed to win advantage for itself.

Concerning the creation of wealth by labor alone, only a word. Labor—unguided by trained intellect and apart from capital—has never accomplished more for the coming laborer than it did for the Indian, or for the African in his native home, from whom the ex-slave is descended. Nothing of enduring character or of worth to

those who came after was ever made by uneducated labor; nor has anything ever been created, of world-wide importance, that was not directed by educated men, and financed by the savings of those who had employed labor and obtained capital by so doing. The claim that labor is the sole producer of wealth, and that because of such production, or creation, labor is entitled to control the world's savings, is only a vagary, and is most clearly shown to be such when placed in comparison with the work of skilled labor and capital combined. "When Adam delved and Eve span" all were laborers and labor was lord, but when intellect began to unite the labor of many, for a purpose beyond the strength and control of one, labor became only one factor with others, and will continue dissatisfied and resentful until it learns to ally itself with those who unite brain and muscle, as a counterpart, with capital. There is no enmity between capital and labor, rightly viewed; no class distinction between employer and employed of whatever race; no basis for class or

race war. Selfishness may oppose selfishness in ignorant strife, but only the fittest will survive.

By no deep laid plan of either, has the White and Black Man become acclimated and equally citizens of the United States. The coming of the Negro was involuntary, and after years of enslavement, which have ended in his comparative civilization, his stay in America cannot be refused him or, in fact, prevented. The selfishness, which sought to profit by the labor of the enslaved African, unwittingly put in the way of civilization and christianization more Negroes than all the missionaries, who have given their lives to missionary work, have been able to reach since such effort began, and together the two races must continue to live and work. When the time comes, as through education it will come, that observance of law is recognized as a duty, and duty fulfilled is accepted as consideration for benefits claimed, class distinctions and race equality and labor's rights and wrongs, and the talk of them, will no longer lead to violence.

County and Country Life Programs

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THE RURAL SOUTH

WILSON GEE

SOUTH ESSENTIALLY RURAL

THE SOUTH today is the most rural section in the United States. The Fourteenth Census of 1920, the latest available data, shows this fact unmistakably. The division of states having the highest percentage of the population rural (77.6 per cent) is the East South Central, which includes Alabama, Mississippi, Kentucky and Tennessee. Next in order (71 per cent) come the West South Central States, embracing Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma and Texas. The third most rural division (69 per cent) is the South Atlantic. The states in this group are Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia and Florida. Omitting Delaware and the District of Columbia, the percentage rural in the remaining states of this division is 71.6.

Combining the figures for all of the states of these three divisions, with the exception of the two mentioned, adding Missouri, and consequently including all of the distinctively Southern States, we find the percentage rural in the population to be approximately 74. In other words, in the South, 74 out of every 100 of our people are rural, while in the United States, as a whole, only 48.6 per cent are country dwellers in the census measure of the term.

The most rural state in the Nation is Mississippi. Approximately 87 per cent of her folks are rural. The most urban state is Rhode Island with 97.5 per cent of her population dwelling in cities and towns of 2500 and over.

STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF SITUATION

There are, at the same time, elements of unusual strength and decided weakness in this situation. Strength, because of the inherent en-

vironmental superiority of the country as a place in which to breed men and women of upstanding and outstanding character. Weakness, because the concentration of wealth and political leadership in the urban centres means the development of far better schools and other cultural agencies in those parts than in the country sections. This condition creates an inequality between the country child and the city child, now long existent, and becoming increasingly apparent and insistent in its demand for remedy.

MAJORITY IN SOUTH NATIVE BORN

Let us first consider the favorable side of the problem. The immigrant class in recent years, except in the case of a few nationalities, has never been attracted in any considerable degree to the country. They have preferred the grouping within the city according to nationality, and practically three-fourths of the foreign born in the United States are to be found among our urban population. This tendency, together with the presence of the negro as a competition barrier, has preserved the racial purity in the original stock in the South as has been true of no other section of the Nation. The matter does not have to be left to speculation. The United States Census of 1920 reveals the fact that in the nation as a whole, in that year, 13.2 per cent of the total population was foreign born. The New England States register a percentage of 25.5 in this particular; the Middle Atlantic of 22.3; the Pacific, 20.3; the East North Central, 15.1; and the Mountain, 14.1 per cent foreign born.

Compare with these figures the ones for the Southern States. The South Atlantic States record a figure of 2.4 per cent; the East South Central of 0.8 per cent; and the West South Central, a 4.5 percentage foreign born.

Manifestly, the South is still a strong foundation stone of the Nation, and holds in greater degree of original strength and purity than any other section the native stock and institutions which have made us a great people among the powers of the world. ?

Some very interesting details are to be discovered in a further study of this same situation. For example, in the total population of the United States, 67.2 per cent were born in the state in which they reside. In the South, the percentages are as follows: Virginia, 85.7 per cent; West Virginia, 76.1 per cent; North Carolina, 93.4 per cent; South Carolina, 93 per cent; Georgia, 89.6 per cent; Florida, 57.8 per cent; Kentucky, 88.3 per cent; Tennessee, 85.3 per cent; Alabama, 87.5 per cent; Mississippi, 89.1 per cent; Louisiana, 84.7 per cent, and so on in a decreasing percentage in the remaining more westerly of the Southern States. From these figures, we can quite safely say that in the majority of the states in the South, 85 per cent or more of their citizens were born in their state of residence.

The situation is essentially the same as regards the white population. In North Carolina as high as 93.4 per cent of the white people of the State were born within its borders. The percentages of some of the other Southern States in this particular are as follows: Kentucky, 88.7 per cent; South Carolina, 87.8 per cent; Georgia, 87.1 per cent; Tennessee, 86.4 per cent; Mississippi, 85.8 per cent; Virginia, 84.1 per cent; and Florida, 53.6 per cent born in the state of residence.

The meaning of these data is clear. There is emphasis enough in the recital of them to reinforce the claim that in the South are the best potentialities of citizenship in the Nation; and 74 per cent of this asset are rural inhabitants.

COUNTRY DEVELOPS BEST CITIZEN

The brief has been made that the country develops bigger and better man and women than does the city. Of course it may be correctly said that our nation until very recent years has always been predominantly rural, but if thoroughgoing researches are made into the matter, my conviction is that the case can be proved in favor of the country. In qualities of individualism, conservatism, democracy, family-mindedness and religiosity, the country-bred, as a type, is immeasurably stronger than the city-bred.

A long list of names such as Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln, Jackson and Calhoun might be called of those who have typified these characteristics in their lives and in that of the Nation. In almost every instance they will be found to have grown up in the country. The city environment can never foster these traits of character as does the country, but it is the duty of our leaders in education, religion and business to see that, both by precept and example, these qualities are emphasized more than ever before in the life of our cities.

BACKWARDNESS IN SOUTH

Thus, in the South, the fact that we are yet largely a country dwelling people constitutes a heritage and a hope for the future in the life of the Nation. But there are tremendous responsibilities involved; because the rural South is a backward South in many of the important counts of life.

There are innumerable instances of marked progress in the South during the past few decades, but they are more urban than rural. It is true that there has been progress in the country sections—marked progress—but it has not been proportionate with that of the cities.

It is mainly with these evidences of backwardness and hindered development in our great birthright—the country people of the South—that this article will deal.

EDUCATIONAL STANDING OF SOUTH

In 1918, a small volume entitled "An Index Number for State School Systems" was published by the Russell Sage Foundation of New York City. It attempted to measure comparatively the educational efficiency of the several states in the Nation. The method used was that of the index number. Ten sets of educational data were determined upon for inclusion in this index number and the standards were applied impartially to all of the states. The rank of the South in this connection was deplorable.

In a consideration of these figures, it must be remembered that they are for both whites and negroes. A recent thorough study made under the direction of the writer in South Carolina shows that if the white schools alone are considered, in some counties of the State, the rank is almost as good as that of any of the states; but many coun-

ties show a distressingly low index figure even when the white schools exclusively are concerned in the study. The same situation would doubtless hold for most of the Southern States. The fact that the South must maintain a dual system of schools is an extenuating circumstance, but it does not change any too materially the relative educational efficiency rating of her school systems among those of the other states of the Nation. A separate consideration of the index figures for the whites would merely show, from that point of view, that our school systems are deserving of a somewhat higher index figure, without changing to any great degree the fact that due to the neglect of our rural schools, we must accept a low rank educationally.

Including the following sixteen states, Missouri, Oklahoma, Maryland, Texas, Florida, West Virginia, Virginia, Tennessee, Kentucky, Louisiana, Georgia, North Carolina, Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi and South Carolina, they are found to be among the nineteen states with the lowest index figures.

Plainly, the important remedy for this low relative educational statue of the South is to provide more funds for rural schools, and to accelerate thereby the program of consolidation already beginning to get well under way.

PERCENTAGE OF ILLITERACY

A corollary of the above mentioned situation is the rank of the Southern States in illiteracy. In the item of total illiteracy, on account of the negro population, we should expect a low rank, and we find it. Excepting Missouri with 3 per cent, the fifteen other states dealt with in this article rank among the nineteen showing the highest percentage of illiteracy.

The states with their percentages of illiteracy are as follows: Louisiana (21.0 per cent); South Carolina (18.1 per cent); Mississippi (17.2 per cent); Alabama (16.1 per cent); Georgia (15.3 per cent); North Carolina (13.1 per cent); Virginia (11.2 per cent); Tennessee (10.3 per cent); Florida (9.6 per cent); Arkansas (9.4 per cent); Kentucky (8.4 per cent); Texas (8.3 per cent); West Virginia (6.4 per cent); and Maryland (5.6 per cent).

The showing in the matter of native white illiteracy is little if any better. These sixteen states rank among the nineteen with the highest per-

tages of white illiteracy. They are as follows: Louisiana (10.5 per cent); North Carolina (8.2 per cent); Tennessee (7.3 per cent); Kentucky (7 per cent); South Carolina (6.5 per cent); Alabama (6.3 per cent); Virginia (5.9 per cent); Georgia (5.4 per cent); West Virginia (4.6 per cent); Arkansas (4.5 per cent); Mississippi (3.6 per cent); Texas (3 per cent); Florida (2.9 per cent); Oklahoma (2.3 per cent); Missouri (2 per cent); and Maryland (1.8 per cent).

It must be remembered in this connection that by illiteracy is meant the inability to write ones name in any language—the sheerest form of illiteracy. With so much of sheer illiteracy, how much of near illiteracy must there be in the South.

Be it said, however, to our credit that these same states ranking so low in literacy are among the twenty-one showing the greatest percentage reduction in total illiteracy during the past ten years. They are as follows, with their percentage decreases in total illiteracy from 1910 to 1920; South Carolina (7.6 per cent); Louisiana (7.1 per cent); Alabama (6.8 per cent); North Carolina (5.4 per cent); Georgia (5.4 per cent); Mississippi (5.2 per cent); Florida (4.2 per cent); Virginia (4 pre cent); Kentucky (3.7 per cent); Tennessee (3.3 per cent); Arkansas (3.2 per cent); West Virginia (1.9 per cent); Oklahoma (1.6 per cent); Texas (1.6 per cent); Maryland (1.6 per cent); and Missouri (1.3 per cent).

FARM TENANCY IN THE SOUTH

Farm tenancy and illiteracy go hand in hand. Our theory of a sound agriculture is that every man should dwell under his own vine and fig tree. At a progressively increasing rate we, as a nation, are departing from this basic principle.

Especially is this true in the South. Forty years ago, approximately one-third of all of the farms in the South were occupied by tenant farmers. Today, more than half of our farmers are tenants, and where cotton and tobacco are the leading crops, nearly three-fourths of the farmers belong to the tenant class. Nearly two-thirds of the tenancy in the United States is to be found in the South. These tenants are located on approximately 1,600,000 farms and number about 8,000,000 souls. And, contrary to the view customarily held, in the thirteen states which produce cotton as a cash crop, 61.5 per cent of all tenants are white farmers, and 38.5 per cent are negroes.

There are eight states which have more than fifty per cent of their farms operated by tenants. All of these are Southern states. They are as follows: Georgia (66.6 per cent); Mississippi (66 per cent); South Carolina (64.5 per cent); Alabama (57.9 per cent); Louisiana (57.1 per cent); Texas (53.3 per cent); Arkansas (51.3 per cent); and Oklahoma (51 per cent).

There is a tendency towards a "tenant caste." The children of tenant farmers tend to become tenants themselves. Education is the best remedy. Compulsory attendance laws and their strict enforcement are necessary. From the pulpits, in the school room, through the newspapers, across the store counters and out of the cashiers windows should emanate ideals of ownership to encourage these landless multitudes. Once imbued with such vision, and displaying the characteristics of the thrifty, no insuperable barriers are in the way of any white man's owning his own farm and home. Particularly should this be true in a section where there is so much of good land, idle and undeveloped.

PER CAPITA WEALTH IN SOUTH

The most recent figures available on the wealth by states are those of the federal Bureau of the Census for 1922. The twelve states ranking at the bottom in per capita wealth are all Southern states. Of the remaining four in this group, West Virginia ranks highest in this particular with a position of 27th. This means that the Southern States are among the twenty-three states having the lowest per capita wealth.

They are as follows, including the average wealth per person: West Virginia (\$3,040); Missouri (\$2,903); Maryland (\$2,665); Florida (\$2,358); Virginia (\$2,050); Texas (\$2,010); Oklahoma (\$1,864); Louisiana (\$1,855); Tennessee (\$1,773); North Carolina (\$1,703); Kentucky (\$1,459); Arkansas (\$1,439); South Carolina (\$1,385); Georgia (\$1,306); Alabama (\$1,244); and Mississippi (\$1,216).

It is significant in this connection that two Southern states lead the nation in the percentage increase in per capita wealth during the past ten years. North Carolina is first with a 135.2 per cent increase and Tennessee second, showing a 113.6 per cent development in this item.

It is illuminating in this regard to compare the distribution of country wealth per capita of the

rural population in 1920. The sixteen Southern States are among the twenty-eight lowest in this particular. Excepting Missouri with \$1,425, Texas, with \$1,312, and Oklahoma with \$1,115 per rural individual, the remaining thirteen states rank among the nineteen lowest. They are as follows: Kentucky (\$847); Maryland (\$798); Virginia (\$731); Tennessee (\$728); South Carolina (\$685); Arkansas (\$632); Georgia (\$630); Mississippi (\$622); North Carolina (\$604); Florida (\$539); Louisiana (\$504); West Virginia (\$453) and Alabama (\$375 per capita country wealth).

These figures, when compared with a per capita country wealth of \$5,707 in Iowa, present additional evidence of the backwardness in the development of the rural South. There is necessarily a close degree of correlation between the low educational levels previously pointed out and the per capita wealth distribution. Education is truly a wealth producing factor in the life of states as well as individuals.

The per capita wealth of a people is a fair relative gauge of their material prosperity—about as good as is available. And wealth is fundamentally necessary to the reasonable enjoyment of the advantages of modern civilization. While there are many mitigating circumstances such as war and the negro, nevertheless the fact is that the South is as yet backward in the production and retention of wealth, particularly in the latter, and needs to make considerable strides along these lines as a basis for substantial progress. Fortunately, the prognosis is very favorable in this regard.

COMPARATIVE COSTS OF STATE GOVERNMENT

It has been the custom of the United States Bureau of the Census for some years to publish annually a report entitled "Financial Statistics of States." This bulletin gives among numbers of other items the per capita costs of state governments. The report for 1922 is the last one from the press.

The four lowest states in the per capita cost of state government are Southern states, and fourteen in that division are among the twenty lowest. Missouri, with \$12.30 per capita is 23d from the top, and Maryland comes 24th with \$12.06. The remaining Southern states are: Florida (\$11.18); Louisiana (\$11.06); Virginia (\$10.62); North Carolina (\$9.58); Texas (\$9.48); West

Virginia (\$7.91); Mississippi (\$7.85); Kentucky (\$7.71); Oklahoma (\$7.17); Alabama (\$7.00); Tennessee (\$6.39); Georgia (\$5.34); South Carolina (\$4.08); and Arkansas (\$3.90).

The data reported are perhaps sufficient to warrant the statement that the South is getting what she pays for. Low per capita expenditures for state government mean low per capita educational advantages, health machinery, road development and all that go to make up good government in progressive sovereign commonwealths.

THE PROBLEM AND ITS SOLUTION

All of these conditions, in a considerable measure, are the reflection of the situation in the countryside. Educational inefficiency is due to the numerous one-teacher schools dotting the rural sections of the South. Illiteracy is a by-product of the same factor. Low per capita wealth is directly correlated with illiteracy. And tenancy is due to a lack of thrift and ideals of ownership, both of which a good education teaches. Low per capita expenditures for state government are both the cause and result of all of these things.

There is a challenge in these conditions. Perhaps never before in the history of the nation was the migration from the country to the city so great. The most important element of the loss,

too, is the qualitative one. It is usually the best of the county that finds a place in the city, standing with outstretched arms to welcome them into its fold.

The remedy fundamentally is that of greater expenditures for education. Better schools must be provided for the country sections. Educational opportunities as far as possible, must be equalized between the city and the country. This means more consolidated schools in the real sense of the term with sufficient accompanying high school facilities.

And farming must be made to pay better. The key to that problem is in the hands of the farmers themselves. The solution, in considerable degree, is the organization and loyal support of co-operative marketing associations based along the lines of those on the Eastern Shore of Virginia, in California, and now applied generally to cotton and tobacco in the South.

Our country people in the South are potentially among the Nation's greatest asset. The future of the South and the security of the Nation depends upon the development of this best portion of our people. Heroic efforts are necessary, but that we will not fail our duty in this important matter is clearly evidenced by the marked progress all along the line in the Southern States during the past few years.

Progress in Town and City Programs

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs, and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

ONE CITY'S PROGRAM FOR LEISURE TIME

T. EARL SULLINGER

THIS IS the brief story, told in general figures, of the means for the use of leisure time in Omaha. The emphasis placed upon Recreation in previous issues of THE JOURNAL does not need to be reiterated here and so the story begins at once with playgrounds of which Omaha has eleven municipal, twenty-five under the auspices of parochial schools, and fifty-three at the public schools. The school playgrounds average less than 100 square feet for each pupil using them, and these are not equally distributed, some schools having no playground space at all. All the playgrounds are poorly equipped. The municipal playgrounds are located near the outlying residential sections of the city and were enjoyed by 206,285 children during the past year, at a minimum cost of 1.6 cents per child. The Director of Recreation is employed by the public schools and city. He has sixteen part-time playground supervisors. Juvenile delinquency has been reduced more than 50% in many cities by means of supervised playgrounds. In a recent study¹ of juvenile delinquency of Omaha for the past two years it was found that 88% of the homes, in which there was one or more delinquents, were located more than one-half of a mile from the nearest municipal playground. It was also found that the greatest amount of delinquency occurred in the most congested sections of the city.

Among the out-door activities are the eighty Boy Scout troops, with 2,000 members, which are furnishing an outlet for the primitive instincts of boyhood. The Girl Scouts, Camp Fire Girls and Girl Reserves, with a total membership of

more than 1,500 girls, are playing a similar role in the girl's life. They have adapted their programs sufficiently to include the acquisition of much needed knowledge relating to affairs of house and home. The recreational activities are prominent features, and out-door life is exalted.

The motion picture has for the first time brought valuable recreation and amusement within reach of the masses. Only a few of the children and adults in Omaha are not within reach of some picture show. In 1923, thirty-five motion picture houses were in operation. They have a total average daily attendance of more than 20,000 people. The average single admission is 25 cents for adults and 15 cents for children. This means that one out of every ten persons in Omaha attends the motion picture show at least once a day, at a cost of between \$4,600 to \$5,000 daily, seven days of the week. The character of the motion picture entertainment is of average wholesomeness, and the general conditions of ventilation, cleanliness and safety are fairly satisfactory. The three theaters listed are higher class and are also well patronized by the public, especially the aristocratic class of society.

The social center idea is new in Omaha. There are nine social centers in operation; one of which is controlled by the city park commission. The eight others are neighborhood enterprises, controlled by community councils or Improvement Clubs. The weekly programs are of special interest. Local talent is used for the entertainment and it is estimated that about 1,800 people attend weekly. Eight additional social centers are maintained by missions and settlement houses. A great need is felt for more social centers, especially in the schools as they help to mold and crystalize community sentiments and ideas.

¹ Sullinger, T. Earl, "The Young Malefactor, A Study of the Juvenile Delinquent and the Dependent Child," University of Omaha Bulletin, 1924.

No single factor contributes any more to the recreational life of a city than a good system of parks conveniently located to the various local centers of the population. The parks of Omaha compare favorably with those of other large cities. For natural beauty, location and future development, Omaha's parks are envied by all the middle western cities. There are twenty-four which cover a total area of 998.51 acres, or .0049 acres of public park for each inhabitant. They range from .33 acres to 303.51 acres. A series of band concerts has been provided in all of the principal parks during the summer season. These concerts have an average daily attendance of about 5,000 people. All the larger parks have municipal golf links which were used by 2,971 golfers last year. There are ten baseball diamonds in the parks; 2,275 permits were issued to ball players, and the city furnished umpires for 626 games. One hundred and fifty-one organized teams played in the leagues. Seven municipal skating ponds were supervised during the season.

Special attention should be called to the one down-town park. It covers an area of only 1.72 acres and is crowded to its fullest capacity all the time. A great many of the poorer people who live in this neighborhood take their children to this park to seek shade and relief from warm and crowded living quarters. More parks should be located in the poor sections of the city. The congested population needs the parks, but the suburban districts get most of them.

The six country clubs have golf links and tennis courts which are filled to capacity most of the season. The combined membership of these clubs is nearly 3,000. The buildings are equipped for most kinds of recreation. The Omaha Athletic Club, with its membership of 1,400, furnishes recreation of the highest organized type. The Walking Club has but a small membership. It fosters out-door sports in the form of walks, hikes and camping.

The records in the city clerk's office show that pool and billiard hall licenses were issued to fifty-nine persons in 1923. Of this number of halls very few can be considered desirable. A large number of them are underground, poorly ventilated and have little light from the outside. It is estimated that 6,000 men and boys spend from one-half to one hour or longer each day in the

pool halls. They are open until midnight, poorly supervised and seldom molested except when some special disorders draws the attention of the police department. Most of such places serve lunches and soft drinks, and have one to four chair barber shops in connection. The pool and billiard halls could be made more desirable places of recreation by proper laws and efficient inspection. Hundreds of young men have no other place to spend their leisure time. Can the highest type of manhood be developed in this environment?

The six bowling alleys are open all day and half of the night. They are higher class and are used mainly by the employees of the different commercial companies. It is natural that very few use the one licensed shooting gallery.

From 20,000 to 25,000 persons attend daily, in season, Omaha's amusement park. Figures show that approximately \$5,000.00 is spent daily by the public at this park.

The forty-five licensed public dance halls are furnishing recreation for an aggregate of more than 180,000 people. In 1923, 2,615 public dances were held, with an average attendance of sixty-six. One thousand nine hundred eighty-seven of these dances were visited by the welfare board inspector. An appointee of the welfare board is in charge of the dance floors at each of the large halls. He is given full power to enforce all rules and regulations prescribed by the city ordinances. It is estimated that 2,000 attend the semi-public dances daily, and many more the private dances. Public dance halls are problems in every city. Effort is being made to keep them clean and wholesome here. Well-meaning folk have instituted model dance halls, and have hoped to preserve so high a plane of conduct that all objectionable features would be eliminated. It is doubtful, however, whether the commercial dance halls, no matter how well manager or supervised, can furnish entirely wholesome amusement and recreation for young people. Recreation must be socialized. The burden is on our philanthropic and public agencies.

The recreational programs of the Y. M. C. A. reach more than 3,000 young men annually. Its modern building is efficiently equipped for all kinds of good recreation. The recreation department, in addition to its regular gymnastic work, clubs and other organizations, conducts the

church athletic leagues and sponsors and directs picnics for churches and other organizations of the city. This association is doing all within its power to help solve the recreational problem of the city.

The same may be said of the Y. W. C. A., with its recreational work divided into two divisions; the industrial girls and the general public. These programs of physical training and games reach thousands of girls, and are contributing much toward profitable utilization of leisure time.

The recreational programs of the Jewish organizations reach nearly 1,500 men and women of the city annually. The Jews of the city are now building a modern recreational center which will afford a place for all kinds of recreational work for all the Jewish organizations.

The Knights of Columbus organization has a small recreational program which is open to its 2,000 members.

Seven of the leading department stores provide definite organized recreation for their employees. This is in the form of Welfare Associations, composed of the employees, in the well organized stores. Recreational rooms are provided by the companies where entertainments, banquets and dances are held. Vocational classes are conducted by a few of the companies. Periodic picnics are held for the employees, and in one store where many young girls are employed, certain groups are sent to the Y. W. C. A. camp over the week end, with all expenses paid. One company states that the chief values received from such organizations are: increased loyalty of employees, greater coöperation, greater congeniality among employers and employees and contentment of those employed. Other department stores, factories and organizations employing seventy-five or more men or women should give such activities earnest consideration.

The four large packing plants employ about 12,000 people. All have recreational programs for the office forces, but only a few of the daily laborers take part. At present no social welfare secretaries are employed by any of these companies. There is a great need for such an official in the larger plants.

The fifteen patriotic societies do not emphasize recreational activities, but they have dances and socials occasionally.

There are certain loafing centers in the heart of the city that attract the vagrants. These centers are always congested. Second rate employment agencies are located near, which serve as loafing places. The only municipal bath house is located in "loafers park." A city of more than 200,000 inhabitants and only one public bath house!

The city library is centrally located, and from the standpoint of the traditional hours open to the public, is apparently rendering satisfactory service. Story hours are conducted at the main and the four branch libraries each week where special attention is given to the needs of the children. These exercises are well attended which speaks for the interest being shown. Free art exhibits and programs are occasionally provided for the public.

In many communities the churches have done pioneer work in establishing recreational activities for the young people. The churches of Omaha have done more along this line than those of many other cities of its size. A recent survey shows the following results: 162 organized churches, exclusive of missions, 73 or 45% of which have some form of definitely organized recreation. Thirty-four have gymnasiums, and three have community houses. Basketball and motion pictures are the leading recreational activities. Baseball, class socials, football and tennis follow with a good percent. The churches of Omaha have a great opportunity to take the leadership in bringing public opinion to the point where it will demand that adequate provisions be made for properly equipped and supervised playgrounds and recreation centers for the youth of the city.

We hear various statements as to how the modern American high school student spends his leisure time outside of school hours. In order to determine these activities a survey was made among 536 girls and 540 boys, students in two of the largest high schools of the city. Each one was asked: "What do you do for recreation outside of school?" Fifty-seven different activities were mentioned in the replies. Most students mentioned at least two. The theater led in popularity with 57.3%. Hiking was next with 57.2%; while 48% said they found amusement in books. Forty-four percent play baseball. Dancing found favor with 31%, while motoring came next with

29%. Baseball, emphasized in sports at this season, was chosen by 334 boys and 141 girls, tennis ranked next with 207 girls and 161 boys.

Swimming was mentioned by 122 girls and 176 boys and 19% of the students designated skating as a winter sport.

Twenty-one percent named gardening. Of this number there were 143 boys and 86 girls. More than 20% of the replies mentioned unsupervised music. Girls predominated in this. Among the boys, 12% stated they were spending much leisure time with radio. Only 4% of the boys mentioned pool as a form of recreation.

We made a similar study of 339 boys and 369 girls in the grades from the 4th to the 8th inclusive. A summary of the results is as follows: Fourth grade, average age 9.3 years; Fifty percent of the boys play baseball, while 61% of the girls help their mothers. Thirteen percent attend movies, and most of the others just play.

Fifth grade: average age 10.4 years; Thirty-nine percent play baseball, while 40% attend the movies. Twenty-six percent spend their leisure time reading, others play in the parks and swim. Few play tennis and listen to radio.

Sixth grade: average age 11.9 years. Baseball again leads the list with 43%, while only 20% attend the movies. Reading ranks next with 37%.

Seventh grade: average age 12.3 years. Baseball is on the decline with only 40%. Motion pictures and reading next in order with 40% each. Many are now interested in radio as shown by 22%.

Eighth grade: average age 13.4 years. Forty percent list baseball, 32% mention the movies and 33% skating in its seasonal forms. Thirty-eight percent designate swimming, while 28% read. (23% are girls). Other activities mentioned by several are, basketball, football, picnics and many other minor sports.

All the school activities are exceptionally well managed. The fifteen gymnasiums furnish ample room for most of the upper grades as well as the high schools. Efficient full-time directors are provided for both the boys and girls. Motion pictures and various forms of entertainments are furnished by the schools, but the buildings are so crowded that many pupils receive very little benefit therefrom. The greatest fault with school activities is that so few can actually participate.

There are many other minor forms of recreation and means of spending leisure time in Omaha that are not mentioned in this article. Thousands never patronize the public and semi-public forms of recreation. The desire for recreation and amusement is a normal expression of every person, which must be considered in every activity of life. Parents as well as others should be educated as to the importance of recreation, both indoor and outdoor, under trained leadership, and especially adapted to the groups of different age. It behooves the entire 200,000 people to do all within their power to make their leisure time activities pure, wholesome and conducive to the making of Omaha a better place in which to live.

MUSEUMS—EDUCATIONAL STORAGE BATTERIES

LAURENCE VAIL COLEMAN

A CENTURY and a half ago museums began to exert an influence upon the community, and though the early institutions were not strong in their resources, still their surprising virility served to lay a sound foundation for the museum movement.

During the nineteenth century, the museum idea became somewhat confused with the commercialism of the traveling showman, but all through this time, when side-shows vaunted them-

selves as museums, there were real museums undergoing their own independent evolution. Most museums then were attached to societies or institutions of learning, and as it has been aptly put, "college museums of natural history played a dramatic part in molding the intellectual life of the time, for they were the laboratories of the natural theology of those days and were triumphantly drawn upon for demonstrations of design in nature."

With the increase in prosperity during the closing years of the nineteenth century, museums of art first made their appearance in numbers, and so great has been their development of late, that now they share about equally in public interest and support with science museums of the new order.

Museums of history have had a long but singularly uneventful career, having for the most part arisen as appendages of historical societies. The ever-present interest in ancestry and tradition brought historical societies into being at an early date in our national career, but in most instances localization of interest and the unspectacular character of the work have kept these societies in comparative obscurity and lack of facilities coupled with lack of the popular point of view, has held their museums unexploited save in a few notable instances. Potentially historical museums are powerful agencies for the molding of society. The director of the Chicago Historical Society has quite rightly said, "Historical Museums used to be storage houses. Now they are becoming storage batteries. The ultimate objective of every American historical society, whether it knows it or not, is the making of better Americans."

The most important single development in the field of museum administration has been the discovery that a museum has more than funds to gain through a measure of public support. Public service is the keynote of museum work today. As now conceived, a museum is essentially a popular university, extensive in its method and limited in its field to some one subject—art, science, history or some other speciality. Public museums of art and of science are numerous, active and influential. Public museums of history are relatively unimportant. Public museums of industry have not been developed to any extent in this country, but there is every indication that they are soon to appear in numbers.

MUSEUMS OF ART

A general interest in art is born of prosperity. It finds expression partly in the creation and encouragement of museums, and these museums in turn exert an important influence upon the social state.

Nor is their influence brought to bear only upon the casual visitor, for museums are aggressive institutions. By exhibiting the best in contemporary art and by selling pictures and objects non-commercially from their exhibits, museums are putting good pictures into homes. By carrying on organized instruction of the rank and file of school children, they are raising the general level of common understanding of things æsthetic. By selecting and training the most promising children, they are contributing to the artist group of the future upon whom we must depend not only for the supply of better things in the fine arts, but also for the quality of many of our commercial products.

In this last connection it is interesting to note the gravitation of museums to the field of applied art. Upon American designers we must depend largely for successful competition with European producers of costumes, textiles and many other lines of applied art objects. The interest which museums are now showing in this work brings with it a very essential contribution of better American design, for the masterpieces of art, upon which designers are so much dependent for their inspiration, are now becoming available for more intimate and practical use than ever before. The collector's point of view is disappearing in the face of the ever-increasing desire to use treasures of art.

MUSEUMS OF SCIENCE

Museums of science too are contributing to national development. Their first function is to collect, but this is just a means to various ends, the most important of which are the increase of knowledge by research and its diffusion by teaching. Largely through the instrumentality of museums, some of the fundamental conceptions which govern our modern ways of thinking and living have come into being, and almost solely through the work of these same institutions, the popular acceptance of these conceptions has been instrumented. *Dinosaur* has become a household word through museum agencies, and with the knowledge that dinosaurs lived long ago under conditions quite different from those which we know today, has come a truer conception of the scheme of things so that when attempts are made to control teaching by legislation, it is possible to stem the tide of demagoguery—and by the nar-

row margin of that victory, we may be assured that had it not been for museums, the cause would surely have been lost.

Museums of science are carrying today a burden which some time will be assumed by the schools themselves, and this is the task of making available to the school teacher, illustrative material for the teaching of those subjects which are most intimately linked with material things. The products of agriculture and costumes enliven and rationalize the teaching of geography. Birds and insects and rocks bring home the facts of nature. Indian implements and other muniments serve to make history more vivid. But some day this work will probably be taken over as a routine function of the schools and the then-to-be school-museum will take its place among the social forces of the community.

MUSEUMS OF HISTORY

We must speak now more of what museums of history might be than of what they are, though there are some striking illustrations of what all such museums might become among the active and successful ones that are to be found. They might serve a dual purpose—that of recording today for tomorrow, and that of interpreting yesterday to today. Today we are most interested in the latter work.

If we are to take our place among the nations or, for that matter, if we are to remain aloof, we must base our action upon understanding of the true relationships between ourselves and those whom we call "foreigners." History is the key to this true understanding, but history is forbidding as usually presented. History is unreal to the child, but all this can be changed in the presence of those objects with which history has been made—the old coat which makes George Washington a man, the chariot wheel which might once have rolled beneath Caesar, the notebook kept by some pioneer whom we have dreamed of as a myth.

To rationalize history then is the work before historical societies, and in making real the past, they will help to make better citizens for the present.

MUSEUMS OF INDUSTRY

The round peg in a square hole is largely the product of our catch-as-catch-can system of thrusting people into their life work. Before the time arrives for a decision between this road and that for life, if a slow and sure approach to the decision could be laid by interpreting to the school child the whole range of possibilities which lie open for its future, then we might expect to see a higher percentage of happy choices and a smaller number of self-made misfits.

In Europe, museums of industry function somewhat in this way, and the day may not be far distant when, in this country, museums of industry will visualize the world of productive effort. Then the child will carry in its mind, pictures of the pursuits of life. Then the average man will be able to cope more understandingly with the puzzle of social adjustment for he will know better why he is where he is, and will understand better why others must occupy their respective places on the economic chessboard.

THE FUTURE OF MUSEUMS

The chief task before museums is to catch up with the work which they see open before them. We understand today what museums should be and just why. Here and there we see scattered examples of the practical outworking of this or of that detail in the plan which we visualize for the future. So we know these things are practical.

The greatest development of museum work in years immediately to come must be an increase in the number of museums much more than in the ramification of their activities. Some communities have no museums; others have inadequate museum resources; only a few have fair museum service, and not one community has an approach to adequate facilities. "A museum in every town" must be our slogan, and when we have made some progress in this direction, it will be time so to coördinate the work that we may say with justice that America is served by her museums.

The Work of Women's Organizations

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs, and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

THE FARM WOMEN OF FRANCE

E. C. BRANSON

A FINAL measure of the farm civilization of a country is the lot and fate of the women and children in the farm homes. If they are overworked beasts of burden—just critters as the knee-farmers of Europe say—then the farm civilization of that land is poverty stricken beyond redemption. Or what is even worse, it is cursed with the self-imposed poverty of pinching parsimony. Describe in detail the farm homes, the tasks that are turned over to the women and children indoors and afield, the presence or absence of home conveniences, comforts and luxuries—books, magazines and newspapers, musical instruments and music, electric lights, telephones, running water, waste disposal systems and the like—the look of hopefulness or blank apathy in the faces of the women and the children, the sickness ratios of the family and the death rates of infants and children, and you have a graphic, photographic picture of the farm civilization of a country.

Whatever lifts the level of the farm home lifts the nation; whatever depresses the farm home dooms the social order it supports. It is a matter worth considering, because under modern conditions our own small-scale farmers are moving little by little toward the low estate of the knee-farming plebeians of the Old World countries where the farm burdens rest in the main upon the backs of the women and children. Signs of it appear in our tobacco patches, in our cotton fields in the chopping and picking seasons, in our truck and fruit areas everywhere, in the cranberry bogs of New Jersey and Wisconsin, and the sugar beet farms of the West. And the native farm women of America will not bear it without revolt.

The cityward drift of country populations in more than half the states of the Union is largely

the result of impossible living conditions in our farm homes. The small-scale farmers of Denmark found a way of escape (1) in ownership farming, (2) in self-feeding farm systems, (3) in the abundant use of small labor-saving machines, (4) in business machines created by coöperative effort, and (5) in community-culture organizations and enterprises. The result is farm homes on the highest possible levels of happiness and hopefulness for the women and children. And I see no other way of escape for the small-scale farmers of our southern cotton-tobacco belt.

If the women and the children of the farm homes live happy hopeful lives then the persistence and the progress of the country life of the nation is assured. But not so otherwise. Goldsmith's Deserted Village was a farm village, you know—a farm village in a land where factory systems, transportation, trade, and banking developed big cities and destroyed agriculture, a land where wealth accumulates and men decay. Said a yeoman farmer to me at the Royal Cattle Show in Islington in 1909, "England's a paradise for pigs and a hell for humans, town and country."

With these things said, let me remind my readers of the contrasts I exhibited a little while ago between the farm women of Denmark and the peasant women of Germany. I have never seen farm homes better equipped with conveniences, comforts, and luxuries than the farm homes of Denmark. There is perhaps no happier life for country women and children anywhere else on earth. But the lot of the women and children on the peasant farms of France, like the lot of the peasant women of Germany, offers a sad contrast to the life of the farm homes of Denmark. The women and children on French farms work

just as hard as the peasant women and children of Germany. Like the German peasant woman the French farm woman is a wife and mother, a housewife and cattle keeper, a field worker, draft animal and beast of burden. And in every farm region of France they work as I never saw women work even in central and south Germany. For instance, instead of picketing their dairy animals like the Danes and leaving them to graze alone, an old woman or a young girl in France will have charge of two or three cows and follow them about in the pastures and along the roads all day long in any and every kind of weather. I saw literally thousands of women and children stalking the cows, sheep, geese, and goats in a steady downpour of rain that lasted all day long all the way from Strassburg to Paris. No umbrellas, no rain coats, no gum shoes in sight anywhere. Only weather-soaked shawls protected their heads and shoulders. Only wooden shoes or sabots saved their feet from the mud and puddles of water. It made me shiver to look at these drenched figures in their lonely vigils.

It is not easy to get into either the peasant or bourgeois homes of France. The German peasants live in villages with their farm animals under the same roof, but their homes open wide on the streets. The French peasants also live in farm villages but their farm buildings form squares set close together behind the high walls that line the roadways. An occasional window opens outward and frequently only a slit in the high outer wall serves to indicate the homes behind the barricades of stone that line the streets. The peasant life of Germany is open to the eye. The little children play together in the streets, and the housewives gossip between whiles in folksy fashion around the front doors. Not so in France. A walk down the street of a French village is like moving along between the stark walls of a little Rocky Mountain gorge, and the silence is almost as funereal. The family life of the French peasant is as concealed from neighbors and strangers as old King Tut ever was in his tomb. The Danish peasant homes are open to all the world, with the latch strings hanging on the outside, and a rare warmth of welcome awaits neighbors and strangers alike. If you get into a French farm home—peasant home, middle-class home, or chateau—you must be certified by the ambassador of

your country, vised by the minister of agriculture or some other minister of state, and then vised by the prefect, the sub-prefect, and the sous-prefect, clear down the line from some almightiness at the top to some little tin god at the bottom. For France is a complicated hierarchy of fonctionnaires, reaching from the minister of state through countless grades to local midgets in the public service. Richelieu made it so four hundred years ago, and so it is today with no essential change anywhere. And France is fonctionnaire France. You are not allowed to forget that fact for a single minute. Without fingering a long line of red tape, you would get into a French home at the risk of your life.

But with all the diplomatic manoeuvres and flourishes properly attended to, the French home opens to you and the lord of the house is proud to receive you and show you everything he has in the farm square; that is to say the barns, the farm tools and utensils, the supplies of food and feed stuffs, the wonderful variety of farm animals, the rabbit warrens and the dovecotes, and last of all the sitting room where a meagre fire burns in a small grate or glows in a charcoal brazier. The living room is usually the only room in the house you get to see. It is the only room open to strangers or even neighbors. I say neighbors—the word has almost no significance in France in peasant or bourgeois circles. Neighborliness is almost unknown no matter how long the next door family or the other dwellers in the farm village may have lived in close proximity during one or a dozen generations. The living room is a catch-all space devoted to the things the family uses and handles constantly in the daily life of the farm. The kitchen and dining room, if there be such a separate room, adjoins it on one side, and if there be a parlor or what the Danes call a drawing-room it opens out of the living room on the other side. If you are taken into the parlor you have a chance to look at the medals and blue ribbons the farmer has won in departmental or national contests. There may be other things in the parlor that remind you of its name but the peasant is wholly bent on showing you his parchments and diplomas, blue ribbons and medals. It is rare for anybody outside the family circle to get a look into the bed-room quarters of a French peasant home.

And there are reasons for the hidden life of the French peasant family, reasons why the family life is shut in and safe-guarded from curious prying eyes, why the family life is removed from the gaze of fellow villagers as well as from strangers. And here we come to a characteristic distinction between the peasant life of Germany and the peasant life of France. The peasants of both Germany and France are small-scale farmers. In both countries they work their wives and children to the limit in the business of farming, both are thrifty to the core, instinctively so, but here the likeness ends. The German peasant saves but what he saves is not money mainly. His savings are at once converted into producing properties—a little more land, another farm animal, a new wagon, a new farm tool of some sort. And during the war and after their savings went into building brand new farm houses, putting new roofs on old farm houses, and paying off of debts in cheap money. The German peasant's dream is to get fixed comfortably for bigger business as a farmer. His pride is to have more farm animals and a larger manure pile in front of his house.

The French peasant is not thrifter than the German peasant but he saves for altogether another purpose, and he will slave and save and starve both himself and his family in order to accomplish that purpose. That is to say, what he saves is money. What he hoards is money. He hoards it like a miser. He fingers his savings like Silas Marner. His joy is in counting over his francs or his securities. If he turns his money a loose at all he wants a state bond for it or a municipal bond or an industrial stock or a lottery ticket. He counts his wealth in land to be sure, but above all he counts it in francs, stocks and bonds, and least of all in home comforts. Pinching parsimony and sordid miserliness are ingrained peasant traits. Hoarding money is occasional among Danish farmers, it is well-nigh universal among the peasants and the bourgeois farmers and villagers of France. With this difference, the home comforts and luxuries of the middle class farmers and town dwellers in France will usually be ample or even ostentatious, but never so unless the family is on the safe side of solvency. No matter what happens, whether he have much or little or nothing to eat or wear, or whether the wife and children live on scraps and

go in rags, the French peasant must always be at least "one brave sou" ahead of the game. It makes the peasant nature of France hard and cruel as death itself. The women and children suffer unspeakably both in their home life and in their field work, but they have been bred to dire deprivations during countless generations, and even the Hindoo devotee finds his bed of tacks tolerable at last.

The peasants of France have been home-owning farmers from the earliest days of feudalism until the Tennis Court oath of the Commons at Versailles. Upon the terms of feudal tenure, to be sure. They were taxed, harassed, degraded, and goaded into savagery by their feudal overlords and the state, but when the pent-up wrath of centuries exploded in the French Revolution they owned right around one-fourth of the arable land of the realm. Today they are something like one-half of the entire population and they own about four-fifths of the improved farm lands of France. Farm tenants or metayers as the French say, are few—less than twenty percent of all the farmers the state over, against forty-five percent in North Carolina. The ratios run highest in the grain and livestock areas. The farm laborers are still fewer and their lot in the villages of the middle-class farmers is lower than that of our country negroes at home—so much lower in food, dress, manners, and morals that an American rubs his eyes in amazement. Or so I found it on the nine-hundred-acre farm of the best or reputedly the best farmer in northern France. And by the way, this hobereau or country squire owns one of the estates that once belonged to the Count Girardin who sheltered Rousseau at the Hermitage in the Montmorency Forest just before the French Revolution.

The change from feudal tenures to fee simple deeds in land ownership is a fundamental fact in the social structure of France. It is the one lasting result of the French Revolution. The varying forms of government since Napoleon's day, the stubborn resistance to priestly domination in politics and the rapid rise and fall of ministries are all episodes in recent French history directly related to the majority vote of home-owning farmers who hoard money, who are frightened out of their wits by the dwindling worth of their securities, and the diminishing exchange value of

their dividends, who dread increasing taxes even more than they fear death itself. When their francs fell from twenty cents to four cents in purchasing power, and they faced Poincaré's twenty percent increase of taxes, then whoever knew the soul of France knew that another volcanic upheaval was at hand. Clemenceau knew it. Said he, "The French love La Patrie, but increase their taxes by a single sou and you have a revolution on your hands." What the French peasants crave is security and peace in the possession of their small properties. If they crave anything else I did not discover it in a five-month sojourn among them. These insured, they will tolerate with careless unconcern any form of government whatsoever. Liberty, equality, and fraternity are words of sentimental sound and fury signifying little or nothing in France, and nobody knew this fact any better than Napoleon.

Agriculture is the most despised occupation in France. I heard this statement on every hand, and it is easy to see that it is a fact. The farmers are despised, dreaded, and cajoled by the politicians who are themselves held in light esteem. The farmers are despised by the wealthy classes whose interest in country life is mainly in game preserves, shooting boxes and the gay parades of the hunting season; or in preserving, restoring, and maintaining the ancient chateaux as priceless treasures of art and beauty. But the French nobles who live on their country estates the year around and farm from sheer love of agriculture are as few today as they were in Arthur Young's time. He found ten in the seventeen eighties, in four trips that took him into every province, and I found eleven in 1923—among them the Marquis de Vogue and his son the Count Francois who head the French Society of Agriculture with its one and a half million members. Such men as these are few and rare but they are worth more to France than all the French Ministers of Agriculture in the last hundred years.

And the French farmers despise themselves. They suffer from what Freud calls an inferiority complex. The evidence lies in their sullen mien and sensitive, fierce assertion of equality—an attitude and humor that demands and receives punctilious courtesy in the market places and the army service alike. What they lack is what the

Danish peasants have, namely a worthy personal pride in themselves, their families and their homes. The privacy of a farm home in France must be respected. It cannot be invaded without risk. Behind its walls the family lives as it pleases, without let or hindrance. It is their sacred right. How they live is nobody else's business. And not always but commonly the French peasant family pleases to live like pigs in a litter,—all for the sake of hoarding money and owning interest-bearing securities. They live in thousands in caves like the troglodytes of twilight times. There are today miles of cave dwellers along the Cher river near Loches in Touraine and elsewhere in France as in Arthur Young's day, and in these holes in the limestone bluffs the peasant ripen their cheeses and rear their children in foul damp atmospheres today exactly as they did a thousand years ago, regardless of appalling death rates.

But the rights of privacy are no more stoutly maintained among the cave dwellers than in the peasant homes of the better sort in France. As a result birth rates are low and death rates are high. By nineteen fifty the excess of births over deaths will be zero, and recruits for the army and navy will have disappeared. The French are aware of it and mightily disturbed about it, but nothing can be done in rural health promotion and disease prevention because the farm homes are sealed and steeled against invasion. Feeble beginnings in public health work in country areas are evident in only three of the ninety-odd departments of France. I mean health work of the sort that is common in American states. Free clinics and dispensaries are common for the sick in many or most country towns in France, but home sanitation and hygiene are almost unknown. So because of the sacred rights of the French family to live in such concealment and privacy as it pleases. This same sealed privacy in French family circles defeats such work as an army of home demonstration agents does in America. The work of such public servants is unthinkable in France. It would be regarded as unnecessary and unspeakably impertinent. There is no need of it; we have nothing to learn more than we already know, said a French official sent to investigate this movement in the United States.

Speaking of the low birth rates of France, I may add that my conclusion singles out one of many contributing causes as being primarily responsible for it: namely, the marriage of convenience, the canny purpose of which is to lift the contracting families in the social scale, to strengthen their business connections, and to increase their political influence. All of which turns upon the ability of the family to make the daughter tempting with the largest possible dot and the son tempting with the largest possible marriage portion. The fewer the children the greater the chance to advance the family in marriage contracts. For two children the French father and mother must accumulate two fortunes. If there be three children, a third fortune must be made. The wilful limiting of births is therefore the rule, especially in the middle class and aristocratic circles, but less so among the peasants because children are distinctly an asset in small-scale farming. Thrift is therefore the rule in France

among all classes, and among the peasants it easily becomes pinching penury and sordid self-imposed poverty.

The reader may have intimate glimpses of French peasant homes in Balzac's *The Peasants*, Zola's *The Soil*, Roupnel's *Nono*, and Guillaumin's *The Life of a Simple Man*—all of them in English and all in the seminar library of Rural Social Economics at the University of North Carolina.

The most hopeful farm civilization in Europe is that of the Danes. The country homes are convincing evidence of it. The farmers of America are poor in many areas, sometimes mortally poor, oftentimes poor because they are trifling and thriftless; but if the country civilization of any county of North Carolina were as sordid as it is in France, as steeped in the self-imposed poverty of pinching parsimony, I should feel like sitting down in sack-cloth and ashes.

COLONIAL WOMEN IN BUSINESS AND THE PROFESSIONS

WILLOUGHBY CYRUS WATERMAN

A NEW WORK* by Dr. Dexter will be welcomed as an important and scholarly contribution to American social history. It effectively disposes of two widely accepted but manifestly erroneous conceptions of the status and activities of women in the colonial era, namely, the allegation that colonial women invariably felt or were made to feel that their place was exclusively in the home attempting as best they might to measure up the standards laid down for them in Proverbs 31, and that if there were any cases of deviation from this well enforced norm of feminine conduct the records of such economic and professional accentricity and aberrance are so few and incomplete as to make any study of the business and professional women of colonial times a futile investigation. Dr. Dexter has made a painstaking and thorough search of printed and manuscript sources, including business and professional records and accounts, and

has unearthed a large amount of original and interesting material, often as amusing as it is instructive. This she has put together with real ingenuity and has drawn for us a captivating sketch of "the colonial woman of affairs." There are included numerous quaint and illuminating excerpts from business notices, advertisements, wills, epitaphs, and newspaper observations which enliven the text and give local color to the study. The book is well-written in a style characterized by both insight and a sense of humor. It is elaborately and intelligently illustrated and the mode of publication makes it a high testimonial to the modern art of book-making.

Dr. Dexter's survey covers such occupations as the inn-keeper, the "she-merchant," the manufacturer (by handicraft methods), the mid-wife and nurse, the school-teacher, the landed proprietor, the preacher, writer and publisher. She finds that all of these activities were extensively followed by women in the colonial age, with a large, if somewhat varied, degree of freedom.

* *Colonial Women of Affairs*. By Elizabeth Anthony Dexter. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1924, xvii, 202 pp. \$5.

The general import of her study can probably best be set forth through some citations from her conclusions:

It should be remembered that most women in the colonial era had husbands to support them. Marriages were early, nearly every one did marry, and in case of widowhood remarriage was frequent. According to the census of 1900, on the other hand, more than one quarter of the total female population, sixteen years and over, was unmarried, and from this quarter came about two-thirds of the female bread-winners; the other third was formed of the married, widowed, and divorced, combined. Again, the woman's part of the family work was more pressing before the days of apartment houses and vacuum cleaners. Few colonial women turned to outside work because time hung heavy on their hands.

On the other hand, everything indicates that, should need arise, there was nothing in the social or economic code of the times to prevent a woman's supporting herself and her family in whatever way she best could. In a new country, there was plenty of work to be done, and the accumulation of capital either in families or in the community which could be devoted to charitable purposes was limited. Furthermore, the Puritan religion abhorred idleness. For these reasons, the single woman, the wife with incapacitated or deserting husband, or the widow, were encouraged to work. Under the system of domestic industries then in vogue, it was common for a woman to help her husband in his work, and there were no social prejudices to prevent her carrying on the business if he died. Neither was she debarred from continuing it if she remarried. Indeed, it appears that there was no objection to a married woman's supplementing the family income by any means she found convenient. Numerous married women have been noted among the teachers—a contrast to modern conditions, in which it is doubtful whether change has been altogether on the side of progress. . . .

The variety of occupations, and the number of women engaged in them, appear to increase as one approaches 1776; how far this was the fact, however, is open to question. It must be borne in mind that the records for the later period are much more abundant. Probably the greater complexity of society brought greater specialization in work, which would attract more women; certainly some activities entirely new to the western hemisphere came into existence—as, for instance, acting. Furthermore, the increase in population would augment the absolute number of women at work. On the other hand, certain tendencies opposed to women's participation in industrial life, which will be discussed later, probably began to affect the larger cities at least before 1776.

This study has shown colonial women carrying on work, apparently in a legal and social atmosphere of almost entire freedom. Women's activity in church matters, or in literature, was certainly questioned, and medical careers were kept within definite limits. At first women had even a legal monopoly as midwives, and no objection

to them in that capacity appeared until the nineteenth century. As far as general business went, women were to be found buying and selling, suing and being sued, acting as administrators and executors, and having power of attorney, with what appears to be the utmost freedom. The widow was commonly executor for her husband, a daughter frequently acted for her father, and women with less claim were sometimes chosen. . . .

The idea has been current that the women of colonial days suffered from severe legal and social handicaps, if they made any attempt to go outside the limited home circle. Handicaps, according to present notions, may well have existed; but the evidence here presented indicates that they did not interfere with women's activity in a large variety of undertakings. Most of the discussions, such as were frequent a few years ago when the question of "women's rights" was acute, really take little cognizance of the colonial period. A few references to days before 1776 are generally to be found, but the greater part of the argument is based on conditions in the early and middle parts of the nineteenth century. . . .

The achievements of the women here chronicled rest on a substantial foundation, and justify at least one conclusion. These women were no more all the stereotyped pilgrim mother of painting and sculpture, or the colonial dame of fancy dress ball, than we of to-day are all missionary heroines or fashion-plate models. They were of all kinds, and very human. Some of them did not pay their debts, some overcharged, some became bankrupt, some broke their agreements, and one, we are told, was insufficiently supplied with those "amenities which give to female charms their crowning grace." A perusal of the court records would suggest many other, and more offensive, faults which might be laid to their account. But most of these women, and many others like them, showed courage and devotion which are beyond praise. When one thinks back to the "fearful experiment" of peopling a wilderness and establishing a new civilization, he may well be filled with wonder at what has been accomplished. Among the achievements of this new country has come, somehow or other, a freedom and consideration for women probably never equaled elsewhere. Many causes have worked together to produce this result, but it is quite possible that not the least of them was the respect of society and the self-respect which the working women of an earlier day quietly and unconsciously won for themselves. These might be overlaid by the excitements of new wealth and changed customs, but the tradition did not wholly die.

All in all, the book forms an admirable introduction to those studies of women in the United States since the Industrial Revolution, such as that by Miss Abbott. It is likely to be regarded as a significant addition to the literature of the economic, social and cultural history of the United States.

The JOURNAL of SOCIAL FORCES

Editorial Notes

A More Articulate South

IN THIS number THE JOURNAL is continuing its efforts to contribute something to regional interpretations. That its interest is not limited to any region may be seen from its special emphasis in "The Library and Workshop" upon renewal of the publication of *L'Année Sociologique*, Professor Branson's "Farm Women of France," and other similar discussions, and by the fact that the greater part of the contents of the September issue deals with scientific studies and interpretations made available from a wide area. Nevertheless, one particular emphasis in this number is directed toward the study and interpretation of Southern situations and problems. Later issues will continue this feature, applying it to different sections and different states. While it is very clear that no section of the United States, or of any nation, can work out most effectively its own direction of progress without the coöperation and assistance of other sections or nations, it is even more clear that any large and permanent growth and progress must be worked out through its own agencies, personnel and direction. If its agencies, personnel and leadership are inadequate, then it must develop them. In his series of articles on "Roads to Social Peace" Professor Ross has pointed out effective modes of coöperation far better than the increasing tendency of one section to ridicule and criticise another in provincial and unscientific manner. One evidence of the ineffectiveness of this latter method is found in data that are being collected now showing how leading journals and periodicals while properly berating the distorted propaganda of the super-patriots, are wont to publish alleged situations and reactions in various sections of the country, so lacking in any basis of fact as to subject themselves justly to the same criticism. One is inclined to affirm that the two most potent influences retarding regional progress are the unscientific, pro-

vincial, professional, amateurish agitators from without and the unscientific, provincial, and professional regional patriots from within.

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Need of Self-Criticism

In devoting this series of editorials, therefore, to the discussion of "A More Articulate South" these considerations are not overlooked. In a later editorial it is planned to discuss more fully the unscientific methods utilized by many of the professional social technicians and publicists whose limited specialization is constantly being interpreted by them to include broader training, more comprehensive knowledge, more unselfish enthusiasm, and more reasonable scope of application than can be justified. But in reality these considerations are not important in the present discussion of plain questions and direct analysis of Southern situations, except in the bare recognition of their existence and relative value. That the South needs criticism, and severe criticism, there can be no reasonable doubt. That there is no substitute for critical analyses will generally be admitted. It is equally clear, however, that the best method of criticism is that which forms the groundwork for immediate scientific study, clear interpretation, and remedial action.

* * *

A Less Articulate South

In what is said about "A More Articulate South" chief emphasis is placed upon leaders and all those who essay to be representative of the best spirit of the South—its education, its politics, its religion, its press, its literature; and secondarily, of course, the great body of a great people who suffer limitations but who are not so much responsible as are those whose opportunities and positions give them guidance of the greater number. Nevertheless, the two groups are inseparably interrelated and develop power and personality, become adequately articulate in direct ratio, the one to the other. In this discussion, therefore, of a more articulate South, it is readily seen that there are implications of a *less* articulate section which used to be estimated to provide a distinctive sort of leadership in politics, in social character, in the promise of literature, in the development of forceful personality and initiative, in intellectual

expression, and in religious integrity. The viewpoint of this analysis is not that of the outside, objective, and exceedingly provincial criticism so common in the usual appraisal, the one section of another—East of West, West of East, North of South, South of North—but rather the searching subjective challenge for the development of a potential to lead instead of follow, to master instead of drift, to become frank and bold instead of sensitive and hesitating, to look forward as well as backward to the glory that shall be the South, to the grandeur that shall be the Nation.

* * *

Seven Points of Analysis

We may proceed directly and plainly to point out certain deficiencies in the South today, which give rise to corresponding difficult problems, upon the remedying of which will clearly be dependent the issue as to whether we make the present period an epoch in the history of the South and the Nation, or whether it shall simply become a tragic crisis in an era of social change. The South and Nation have had one such, the effects of which loom large in the causes for present deficiencies and problems. Certain deficiencies and problems may be stated as follows:

The South is not learning enough: Its problem of ignorance and experience.

The South is not thinking enough: Its problem of emotional response and control.

The South is not reading enough: Its problem of interests and taste.

The South is not writing enough: Its problem of creative effort and work.

The South is not working enough: Its problem of energy and standards.

The South is neither leading nor following enough: Its problem of guidance and leadership.

The South is too proud of its non-progressive fundamentalisms: Its problem of social progress.

These are plain statements. That they are true can scarcely be doubted. That there will be grounds for difference of opinion as to the bare facts is not likely. If there is any difference of opinion it will be found in the degree to which these things are true of us here in the South more than of other sections and more than our reasonable expectations, on the one hand; and on the other, in the relation of these facts to a South the

more articulate in itself and in a nation and an age which manifestly need what the South has to offer, if only she will bring it forth, fruits meet for a great opportunity.

* * *

Prevailing Ignorance in High Places

Let us examine briefly something of the validity of each of these statements. We can no longer plead poverty or past misfortune or lack of opportunity as an excuse for our ignorance. And by ignorance is not meant illiteracy; that is bad enough, but it is the smallest and least important aspect of our ignorance at this time. What is meant is our lack of knowledge of the greater fundamentals of life and literature, together with the ability, the opportunity, and the willingness to work out such knowledge through normal intellectual, self-sacrificing processes. Of course the South has traveled far in the last few years and has acquired vast amounts of knowledge of many things as compared with other years. But what has it done, by and large, in the acquirement of knowledge, the search after truth that shall make it free—not in comparison with what we have achieved heretofore, but in comparison with the great needs of a changing world, and commensurate with that which shall be necessary for the development of the South into a section of maximum opportunity for the coming generation, for the greatest happiness of its people, and for the largest service to the Nation? Of particular importance is our need and lack of knowledge concerning social situations and the social sciences. Recently a leader in one of our states,—thinking to be generously broad in his concepts—proclaimed the doctrine that we must deal fairly but firmly with anarchists, bolshevists, socialists, and sociologists! They are all the same to him. And in the midst of constant excited and dogmatic discussions, with the ever-recurring use of the terms, I have yet to find a body, even of college men, who could give the correct meaning of the terms sovietism, communism, bolshevism, anarchy, reds, socialism, radicalism, I. W. W.-ism, the youth movement, and all that vast number of red-flag shibboleths so mixed and so welcome to the intellectually indigent and to the panicky mass-minded tired populace so prevalent throughout

the country. The very admission of the fact that these terms have a meaning is likely to subject one to severe criticism. Whole legislatures are being turned into forces for warping the social fabric, aided and abetted often by civic, commercial, military, and religious organizations, all centered around a misunderstanding of the meaning of science and its relation to life, of evolution and its monkeyfied misinterpretation. Large numbers of illustrations might be cited. Here is a legislator fighting progress, with the proud claim that no man needs more than three books: The Bible, a hymn book, and an almanac! Here is another legislator introducing his anti-Darwin bill, explaining that he "got it out of his own head" and proudly defending it in a bitter denunciatory sentence of a hundred and eighteen words of non-coherent, jumbled, unrelated scientific terms, the cataloging of which is offered as evidence that he knows his subject. Here is a senior bishop of one of the great churches quoting and following political demagogue and proclaiming that the child labor amendment is "unadulterated bolshevism," utilizing the essential bolshevistic method of protest. Surely any fair-minded Southerner is jealous of the type of leadership he follows.

* * *

Afraid of the Truth

If anyone really doubts the degree of our limitations let him measure them more simply and objectively. If we want the best book on science or literature or religion, where must we find it? Outside of the South. If we want a comprehensive study made of an educational system, we must find someone outside to do it for us. When we need specialists in the varied fields of human endeavor, do we find them in the South, or elsewhere? If we want to attend great universities where stores of knowledge may be had and where the largest opportunities for learning are available, do we find them in the South, or elsewhere? One need only mention these general situations to recall many other similar ones and to remind ourselves that the time ought soon to arrive when we cease to boast of the little things we do in comparison with a crippled past, rather than to judge them critically in terms of standard values and standard maximum progress elsewhere. There is yet one other point with reference to our first

characterization. We not only limit ourselves in our practice and facilities for the search after knowledge, but we are afraid of the truth.

* * *

Unthinking Attitudes

Our second characterization is that we do not think enough or well enough. This is true, you say, of people everywhere. And so it is. And yet there are certain instances in which we excel in the predominance of feeling over thought more than is necessary. To select three problems as illustrative, it seems to me that the moment any criticisms or suggestions are made to us with reference to our race problem, our industrial mill villages, or our religion, we tend forthwith to abandon the reasonable attitude for the sensitive, emotional, and unreasoning one, and without adequate reason. I do not believe this emotional sensitiveness is typically Southern—witness California and the Japs, New York and the Lusk laws, the Hirschfield report, the New Jersey legislature, the West and I. W. W. Psychologically, such an attitude always exists toward intimate problems. The time has come, however, when we cannot afford to continue a supersensitive attitude, even though based originally on historic grounds, toward the problems about which we should think clearly. If we are eternally tired of having the South made the happy hunting grounds of many who come to "study" us and to criticize us and advise us, then above all else we ought to begin to work out and think out our own problems. The truest loyalty and patriotism do not consist simply in boosting one's native heath and whitewashing all the dark places that, if not cleaned up, will undermine the whole fabric of permanent social welfare. Another point of importance is this: We constantly emphasize the fact that this after-war period is the beginning of a new epoch in history. We speak eloquently about it and give evidence to indicate the sureness of its approach. And yet, we appear surprised when problems of social change in relation to our institutions and our life arise, seemingly expecting to be ushered into a world epoch without so much as the travail of thought, or the struggle of spirit, or the mastery of conflict. Surely there is no people more responsive to a great challenge than those of the South whose heritage justifies a better expectation.

A Non-Reading Group

Our third characterization is that we do not read enough or well enough. This statement will need little substantiation further than the actual figures of libraries and publishers. There is no ground for debate on this score. Nor is there, I dare say, any difference of opinion as to the absolute necessity of a greater reading background if we are to develop the individual wealth of citizenship in our midst and if we are to establish, both among ourselves, and in the Nation, the appropriate standards of leadership to which we are entitled. We are told again and again, with reference to many of the more serious and scholarly books of the day, and with reference to scholarly journals of social study and interpretation, that we cannot expect the South to read them. But we do expect other sections to read them! And other sections do read them. But we must not expect the South to be interested! And the sad part about it is that it is true. Now we are not raising questions as to why it is true; there are good reasons. But we are raising the question as to how long this must be true; and we are stating a fact. If it shall remain true, then to what shall we ascribe it? And shall we simply come to assume that in this particular the South is and shall always remain different from the rest of the Nation? Dr. L. R. Wilson's studies of libraries and reading as published in *THE JOURNAL* have shown the South to be low in the scale of states both in regard to periodicals and books. It will be a great day for the South when our record of reading becomes a more important index of our participation in the larger leadership of the Nation; and we can no longer plead poverty or lack of opportunity as our excuse for neglect of books and periodical literature.

* * *

The Creative Impulse

By our fourth characterization that we do not write enough, we do not mean simply putting into words superficial expressions concerning commonplaces; or the setting down of personal opinions; or the collecting of hearsay evidence unsubstantiated and set forth as truth; or the attempt to treat with finality in a few weeks or a few months what ought to take the study and work of years; or to expect to write with substantial

content and acceptable style that for which we have made no preparation and paid no adequate price. But I do mean actual contributions to knowledge and to literature, such as will take their place among the great forces that mould a better life and civilization; that are worthy to become classical in the realm of future judgments; such contributions as will bring us to add at least our pro-rata of the national output of better things; and, if possible, to excel in certain qualitative contributions whose quantity will not be small. What of our present status? How far wrong is Mr. Mencken in his estimate of our recent total production? Is the symptom which DuBose Heyward notes in our renaissance of poetry typical of other fields? Do the publishers constantly look to the South for the best authors? Do they count us in at all as appreciable factors? Do we ourselves expect them to? Are we surprised when a Southerner achieves something of national character—that is, if he is still living in the South? Even our graduate students who go to Northern universities fully expect that it will be demanded of them that they contribute or create something to add to the subjects studied; we expect our Southern universities to expect and to demand less, and our students expect for themselves less here than they would elsewhere. Must this always remain so? The whole assumption is disappointing in the extreme, and detrimental to the creative spirit of Southern institutions. We need not censure Northern opinion which holds this view of Southern limitations when we have first set the premise ourselves. Or how we can very well expect any marked increase of Southern writers when we give little support either in the way of financial returns or social recognition to those who do produce literature of the first rank. Now here again we are not inquiring into the reason for this situation. We have been too busy and we have not had time or training, and our college faculties do not have time to do creative work; and yet this is precisely the serious part about it—have we no Southern constituency which will either provide setting and facilities for creative writing and research or which will appreciate it when produced? Is there no economic background or material basis upon which we may hope in the future to make possible an articulate South? Are we to understand simply that we can't or won't achieve

in this respect and this admit inferiority and go about our other several ways? I do not believe that we shall. I believe that for us the present is to be the critical generation which will be followed by the beginnings of a new creative era in the South. But the signs of it are all too few!

* * *

Inferior Work

The next criticism is that we rank none too high in the outward and visible expression of our multiple modes of life. That is, we do not do enough in material representations to give us high rank in the judgment of the Nation, or even of ourselves. If it were only a matter of low ranking in wealth, in roads and railroads and factories and farming and merchandise, we might very well take pride in the finer things of the spirit for which Southerners have such an excellent background. But are we not tired of being ranked last in education, in literacy, in law-abidingness, in prison and penal standards, in the simplicity and beauty of our homes, of our towns, of our countrysides and communities, of our churches and school houses, of our treatment of the under-privileged, whether of individual or race? These are all in the realm of the finer things of life. They are all in the realm of the greater objectives of religion and good government in which we have commonly believed ourselves to excel. Here again we ourselves have set the standards; we have not learned how to work or the high standard of long application. Our young men and women are counted able if they shall have finished a college course; exceptional if they proceed to years of graduate work. We expect too much to be done in too short time and with too easy methods; or so the evidence seems to indicate. And in our recent economic adversity we do not seem to have shown the spirit of the old South, but rather, in many instances, inclined to "quit." There have been few more discouraging symptoms than this tendency in some parts of the South to face adversity with bitterness and cowardice.

* * *

Problems of Leadership

The final negative characterization has to do with our attitudes toward our own abilities, our own interests, and our own leaders. I do not

believe I exaggerate when I say that we commonly assume that as a rule nothing that is of national or international importance is likely to be done in the South. If it is done in the South it must be forsooth Southern; it is true that we talk about its being time something of national standing should be produced from the South; but we neither expect such an effort to fail or we are surprised if it does not. The same attitude is provokingly prevalent in the North—namely, that if a thing is done in the South, it is a matter of fact Southern only. It is difficult to decide which is more provincial—our own assumption that what we do is not of the best, or the assumption of other sections that, as a matter of fact, what we do may be pretty good for the South, but it is scarcely worth looking into. And yet we find here a very marked paradox—that whereas the North has taken us on our own estimate and our past performance there is an eagerness to assume also that there are certain distinctive abilities in the South which the rest of the nation needs and wants. This has been especially noted in the cordial reception to our JOURNAL OF SOCIAL FORCES which has resulted in more than three-fourths of its paid subscribers coming from states other than the South, with the continuing increasing ratio consistent. So that in many ways we come back to our own estimates. We need not blame any section for appraising us at our own valuation. In one Southern State there are almost twice as many men of distinction who were born there as are now citizens of that State; in another, out of 282 men of distinction born there, only 121 or 43 per cent now reside there, while 57 per cent have achieved distinction in, or gone to, other states. The ratio of men of distinction born here is certainly, omitting the negro population, far and above the average for the country; so that there can be no doubt as to our potential ability. What does seem apparent is that our states do not want citizens of distinction or cannot offer them equal opportunity with other states.

* * *

A Six-Fold Fundamentalism

There remain other points of analysis. Maintaining our negative characterizations as previously discussed, there is real danger from an ingrowing, organic fundamentalism which seems now to be permeating the whole country, and in

which we in the South appear to excel. This fundamentalism appears to me to take a six-fold form. There is the *religious fundamentalism* which *violates the principles and spirit of Christianity*. Would the Ku Klux Klan leave Abraham Lincoln or Thomas Jefferson alone; or would Abraham Lincoln be allowed to teach in some of our state universities on the grounds that he was an atheist? There is the *social fundamentalism*, running riot in the mass-minded, dogmatic accusations that anybody and everybody who may strive passionately to search after the truth in new ways and to serve humanity in a trying, changing age is a radical. Would the Ku Klux Klan leave the Great Teacher unmolested on the grounds that he was a socialist and a radical? Such fundamentalism *violates the principle and spirit of human progress*. There is the *political fundamentalism* which *violates the spirit of human freedom*. Do the militarists and the bureaucrats, on the one hand, or the professional politicians and demagogues, on the other, think much of democracy, while opposing progress with all the ardor of religious zeal? Over against religious fundamentalism is *intellectual fundamentalism* which *violates the spirit of truth and social values*, albeit loudly proclaiming steadfast allegiance. Some of the "Scientists" would scarcely accord the Great Teacher, or any of the great popular leaders, a mental age up to normal or an I. Q. creditable to the bright individual, or take any cognizance of the great factors of emotions in human beings. Over against the social fundamentalism is the *individualistic fundamentalism* which *violates the spirit and principles of social contract and moral obligations*. Could the scandals at Washington or the gross unrighteousness abounding in high places occur were it not for the intolerance of those whose life and principles exclude them from the folks, in forgetful self-righteousness, or brazen condensation. This is

no less fundamentalism, reverting to the individualisms of past epochs. And finally there is the *economic or industrial fundamentalism* which *violates the spirit of human growth and opportunity*. Is the wealthy industrial leader who refuses to see any difference between correcting the evils of present production processes and the destruction of the capitalistic system fit for leadership in a democracy? He would most assuredly call Woodrow Wilson, in his last great message, "The Road Away from Revolution," a socialist.

* * *

Immediate Tasks

Now it is not claimed that these tendencies are not prevalent in other sections of the country. They are; and wherever they obtain they present the same obstacles to progress. But it is doubtful if any group will be found so nearly proud of a lack of knowledge and interest in things social or so aggressively militant in non-progressive fundamentalism. Certain it appears that progress in the South is being retarded unnecessarily so long as these types of fundamentalism tend to retard the development of social institutions whose purpose is to serve humanity and to meet the needs of social change. What we need more than anything else is the ability and willingness to face the truth, through social study and interpretation, with the corresponding ability and willingness to make the necessary readjustments. And in this search after truth and values two major problems must be faced at once: The one is the problem of developing a leadership to take the place of the old Southern leaders; the other is the problem of determining and developing the social potential of the newer generations in the South now coming into dominant power, alongside the material and intellectual awakening of a region from which the Nation ought to expect much in the future.

Library and Work Shop

Book Reviews directed by HARRY
ELMER BARNES AND FRANK H.
HANKINS.

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ANNOUNCEMENT OF RENEWAL OF L'ANNÉE SOCIOLOGIQUE

ANY ONE who has worked over the literature of sociology since the early nineties must have been very grateful for that excellent survey of the literature of the social sciences known as *l'Année Sociologique*, published by the late Professor Emile Durkheim, his students and associates. Originally intended as an annual the great labor and expense involved in its

preparation led to its publication in the years after volume ten, 1905-1908, triennially. In all twelve volumes appeared, and the thirteenth volume was already largely prepared when the war intervened. In all probability the publication would have been renewed before now had it not been for the death of Professor Durkheim, as well as a number of younger scholars, and the

consequent disruption of the scholarly coöperation and enthusiasm which the great French sociologist had been able to develop.

It is now announced by Professor Marcel Mauss, who was intimately related to Professor Durkheim and undoubtedly served as his first lieutenant, that the renewal and publication will commence next February. Professor Mauss succeeded Durkheim as Director of l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes of the Sorbonne. Associated with him has been Professor Hubert. These men have continued their investigations into the social and religious phenomenon of primitive society and the history of social, especially religious traditions, which studies were some times published in *l'Année Sociologique* and some times in the *Collection des Travaux de l'Année Sociologique*. Professor Mauss states that the publication of the *Travaux* is also to be renewed. The next volume of *l'Année Sociologique* will appear from February to June, 1925. During the coming year the following studies to constitute new additions to the *Travaux* are also to be put out as follows: Durkheim's *Education Morale* and Halbwachs' *Conditions Sociologiques de la Mémoire*.

This renewed undertaking has been guaranteed by the organization of l'Institut Français de Sociologie. Following is a list of the charter members of this new organization: M. Aubin, Inspecteur Général de l'Instruction Publique, Ministère de l'Instruction Publique; C. Bouglé, Professeur à la Sorbonne; G. Bourgin, Archiviste aux Archives Nationales; H. Bourgin, Agrégé de l'Université; V. Branford, Directeur de la "Sociological Review"; S. Czarnowski, Warsaw; G. Davy, Doyen de la Faculté des Lettres de Dijon; C. De Felice, Professeur à la Faculté de Theologie de Montauban; A. Demangeon, Professeur à la

Faculté des Lettres d'Alger; P. Fauconnet, Chargé de Cours à la Sorbonne; M. Gernet, Professeur à la Faculté des Lettres d'Alger; M. Granet, Directeur d'Etudes à l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes; M. Halbwachs, Professeur à la Faculté des Lettres de Strasbourg; L. Hourticq, Inspecteur d'Académie, Commissariat Général, Strasbourg; H. Hubert, Directeur d'Etudes à l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes; P. Huvelin, Professeur à la Faculté de Droit de Lyon; P. Jeanmaire, Chargé de Cours à la Faculté des Lettres de Lille; P. Lapie, Directeur Général de l'Enseignement Primaire, Ministère de l'Instruction Publique; R. Lenoir, Agrégé de l'Université; E. Levy, Professeur à la Faculté de Droit de Lyon; H. Levy-Bruhl, Professeur à la Faculté de Droit de Lille; L. Levy-Bruhl, Membre de l'Institut, Professeur à la Sorbonne; Cl. E. Maitre, Directeur Honoraire de l'Ecole Française d'Extrême-Orient; J. Marx, Archiviste Paleographe; R. Maunier, Professeur à la Faculté de Droit d'Alger; M. Mauss, Directeur d'Etudes à l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes; A. Meillet, Membre de l'Institut, Professeur au Collège de France; D. Pardondi, Inspecteur Général de l'Enseignement Secondaire, Ministère de l'Instruction Publique; G. Ray, Agrégé de l'Université; L. Roussel, Professeur à la Faculté des Lettres de Strasbourg; F. Simiand, Professeur au Conservatoire des Arts et Metiers. It is to be sharply distinguished from l'Institut International de Sociologie, of which Professor René Worms is director.

Renewal of this publication should prove of enormous interest to all students of sociology in America. The JOURNAL will later publish information enabling those who wish to subscribe for it to do so in advance of the appearance of the first number.

F. H. H.

RECENT TRENDS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

L. L. BERNARD

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. By F. H. Allport. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. 1924, pp. xiv + 453.

FUNDAMENTALS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. By E. S. Bogardus. New York: Century Co., 1924, pp. xiv + 479.

SOCIAL DISCOVERY. By E. C. Lindeman. New York: Republic Pub. Co., 1924, pp. xxix + 375.

PAPERS ON SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY PRESENTED BEFORE THE 1923 MEETINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY (Washington, D. C.):

The Relations of Sociology and Social Psychology, by Charles A. Ellwood, *The Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology*, Volume XIX, Number 1, pp. 3-12;

Can Sociology and Social Psychology Dispense with Instincts? by William McDougall, *Ibid.*, pp. 13-41; Discussion of Professor McDougall's Paper, by L. L. Bernard, *Ibid.*, pp. 42-45;

The Institutional Foundation of a Scientific Social Psychology, by J. R. Kantor, *Ibid.*, pp. 46-56;

Discussion of Professor McDougall's and Professor Kantor's Papers, by William F. Ogburn, *Ibid.*, pp. 57-59;

The Group Fallacy in Relation to Social Science, by Floyd H. Allport, *Ibid.*, 60-73;

Discussion of Professor Allport's Paper, by Alexander Goldenweiser, *Ibid.*, 74-76.

THERE ARE two outstanding fields of interest in these various essays, of diverse lengths, in social psychology. Both are controversial and both apparently are about to be "settled" in the academic mind. One is the problem of the place of instinct in individual character development and social control, and the other refers to the basic character of social psychology itself. Is its proper field that of the behavior of individuals reacting to social stimuli, as Allport contends, or should we extend it to include a sort of collective psychology of the group? To understand the significance of these two controversies it is necessary to recall that three separate schools of social psychology have developed within the last two generations. The oldest of these is the study of group behavior in its psycho-social aspects of planes and currents. It is sometimes called group psychology and was developed by Bagehot, Tarde, Sighele, LeBon, and Ross, among others. The second school has attempted to account for the development of a socialized individual under the dominance of inherited qualities or instincts. The outstanding representative of this viewpoint is William McDougall of Harvard University, but he has a rapidly diminishing cohort behind him. The third characteristic type of social psychology is the one which attempts to explain the socialization of the individual in terms of environmental pressures and learning. Professor Cooley is our foremost representative of this viewpoint. There are, of course, many crosses among these schools.

Professor McDougall makes a sort of last stand in defense of the instincts in his paper, which appears in much more extended form than that in which it was read at the Washington meetings of the American Sociological Society. Perhaps

it should be called a flank attack upon some of his numerous critics, for he resorts to the ingenious device of counter criticism of writings by Professors Dewey, Dunlap, Giddings, and Josey. Nowhere does he take up his problem of the indispensability of instincts for sociology and psychology in a direct frontal attack and discuss it on its own merits.¹ He closes his paper with the statement that he believes the concept of instinct still has its uses and counters criticism with, "It is perhaps worth while to point out that behaviorism enjoys the appearance of a much larger popular success than it can truly claim" (p. 41). Is this the beginning of the end?

Not one of the other works here cited defends the instinctivist viewpoint. Allport dispenses with complex types of instincts altogether and substitutes prepotent impulses (ch. 3), which are apparently in the main basic reflexes which are conditioned into habit adjustments through learning, that is, conditional responses to environmental pressures. Habit sets also become prepotent and basic to further learning (p. 338). While the child's consciousness of himself is largely made up of his understanding of the attitudes of others toward him (p. 333), thus evidencing character development under social pressures, the drives to action and adjustment come rather from within than from without (pp. 69 ff., 310). It is the readiness (inherited or acquired) of the organism for food, sex, familial, or other contacts or satisfactions which produces action in the presence of proper releasing stimuli. Some may mistake this type of statement for another (and disguised) form of the now unpopular instinct theory. Two facts, however, must be noted in this connection. The author specifically rejects the complex instincts of the older writers, such as a general fighting instinct (pp. 58, 401), gregariousness (p. 163), or the social instinct (p. 167). Also, specifically and in great detail he offers a substitute explanation of the origin of such complex dispositions in the form of the theory of the conditioned response. Scarcely any other American writer has made such extended and successful use of this theory of learning. Not the least convincing aspect of Allport's book is that, by this means of explanation of the de-

¹ A criticism of Professor McDougall's paper by the writer of this review is cited above. The argument need not be repeated here.

velopment of the individual's character or personality, he puts a degree of concreteness and reality into his writing which is to be found in no other social psychologist. Even Professor Cooley, with the wealth of illustration which he has employed in his *Human Nature and the Social Order* has not been able to make so clear to the reader just *how* we come to be what we are. The treatments of Watson and Woodworth, in their respective psychologies, are briefer and less well worked out from the standpoint of the mechanisms of learning or character growth considered.

Ellwood, Bogardus, and Lindeman, though formerly instinctivists, have now dropped the category or handle it with the gravest suspicions, remembering its former stings. Ellwood finds that the individual is the product of habit. Civilization is not inborn, but acquired by every individual through communication in the group. While "animal groups . . . are undoubtedly dominated by the hereditary or instinctive element . . . human society, on the other hand, is characterized from its earliest beginnings by *acquired* uniformities due to habit" (p. 7). Professor Ellwood has for several years shown definite signs of making the transition from the instinctivist to the environmentalist camp. Each new book which he has published within the past twelve years, since the appearance of his *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects* (which has more than four hundred references to instinct) has shown more moderation in applying the term.

Bogardus, however, has made a much more rapid reversal. Although an instinctivist of the instinctivists in his previous work on social psychology appearing about three years ago, he now consistently avoids the term. In fact, in this volume of nearly five hundred octavo pages he has but one instinct, (the herd instinct, used twice, pp. 47, 48), and even this he applies to animals rather than to men. In no other respect has Bogardus so largely changed his concept of the content of social psychology. His critics have literally made his viewpoint over for him in this regard.² Yet he makes no acknowledgement to (1921). this source of his information. He dismisses the whole subject of his change of viewpoint—or, rather, he avoids it—with the following brief

statements: "The assertion that inherited tendencies are essential springs or motive forces of feeling, thought, and action, whether individual or collective, has probably been overstressed by William McDougall. The rôle played by habituation has clearly been neglected" (p. 7). As evidence of this change of viewpoint in general he cites two articles by Dunlap and Faris criticizing the instinct concept (presumably his sources of information).

While Bogardus avoids the term instinct, the fact comes back through the kitchen door in such terms as "innate potential impulses" (p. 8), "tendencies" (p. 35), etc. These are not the same as Allport's prepotent reflexes, for they lack the specific definition of the latter. Sometimes Bogardus appears to think of them as general drives and at other times one gathers that they are vague substitutes for unanalyzed forces.

Kantor is most virulent in his attack upon the concept instinct. He is opposed to all types of "animisms." He urges that psychology and sociology adopt the objectivity of the natural sciences (p. 46), declaring that "we find the field of human sciences literally weighted down with conceptions of psychic forces and psychic processes," which he regards as subjective and non-measurable. "It so happens that the instincts are among the most obnoxious of these animistic conceptions now in use. Whichever of the numerous meanings of instincts one may accept the least harm that any one of them can do is to absolve us from the arduous investigation of numerous but essential psychological facts, necessary for the understanding of human conduct" (p. 47).

Thus at last the fight to free sociology and psychology from one of the most cloying metaphysical concepts from which they have suffered since they were relieved of the theory of an innate conscience two generations ago is within sight of being accomplished. Leading, and formerly rather militant, advocates of the theory are obviously revising their views.³ Of course works using the concept will still continue to appear, at least for some years; but its prestige is gone and uncritical acceptance of it will be fatal to any book of scientific pretensions in the future. The

² See for example review of his *Essentials of Social Psychology* in *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 27, p. 412 (Nov.,

³ For an account of the extent of the use of the term instinct and the forms of usage, as well as detailed criticisms of the viewpoint, see *Instinct: A Study in Social Psychology*, by the author of this review (Holt and Co., New York, 1924).

concept itself has been for the most part used uncritically, even in serious works, and one could imagine McDougall truthfully saying of the habit and value complexes which are being substituted for his so-called instincts: "This is just exactly what I meant to say, but in my day we called all institutionalized habits instincts, so that I have still to bear the brunt of a bad usage, although I am no more culpable than many another."

The second historical type of social psychology, the instinctivist school, having in effect been despatched by its enemies, schools number one and two are now in turn struggling for supremacy. As far as our citations are concerned, it was McDougall against the whole field in the matter of the instinctivist brand of social psychology. In the second struggle for supremacy, it is almost equally the whole field against Allport. The latter reiterates, again and again, that the proper field of social psychology is the science or study "of the social behavior and social consciousness of the individual" (p. 382). "Social behavior comprises the stimulations and reactions arising between an individual and the social portion of his environment; that is, between the individuals and his fellows" (p. 3). Ellwood, on the other hand, points out that there would be little content in any sort of psychology which would not come under this description. To him, social psychology means the subject which deals with "the psychic aspects of social groups and social life generally" (p. 9). Its subject matter falls particularly in the field of "mental interstimulation and response, especially in the form of intercommunication," and takes on the aspect of such psychic processes as suggestion, imitation, and sympathy. These, he conceives, fall within the range of acquired uniformities due to habit (p. 7). In other words, he accepts essentially the Tarde-Ross viewpoint.

But, according to Ellwood, the province of sociology is also the study of mental interstimulation between individuals in groups in order to understand the group and its behavior (pp. 8, 10). How then are sociology and social psychology to be distinguished, if they deal with the same subject matter? By their problems (p. 9). But the relationship is also inclusive: "Social psychology, in the sense of the psychology of

group behavior, is accordingly a part of sociology" (p. 9). Allport, of course, might, with equal appropriateness, maintain that his brand of social psychology also is distinguished from psychology by its problems and that it, by analogy, is included under the more general field of psychology. Obviously this sort of controversy gets us nowhere, since, as Lindeman would say (p. 313) there is no agreement as to facts.

The net result is that we have in practice two schools of social psychology, so called, both with their enthusiastic followers. Lindeman would, however, be willing to leave the term social psychology to the psychologists and to adopt in its stead the term collective or crowd psychology. This separation of the fields is well illustrated by the contents of Allport's and Bogardus' texts. The one may almost be said to leave off where the other begins. Bogardus' definition⁴ is sufficiently general not to conflict essentially with Allport's definition, except that the latter studies the psychic processes by which the development posited by Bogardus is attained. One is concerned with psychic processes, the other apparently with all types of processes which can contribute to the total result, i. e., the building of socialized character and psycho-social adjustment. Allport never deals directly with institutions and objective or realized social values, but only with the psychic mechanisms by which these are achieved and with tests by which they can be measured. Thus, those chapters which approach most closely to the sociological (those included under the second part, called "social behavior," which is always the behavior of individuals, not of groups) bear such titles as Social Stimulation—Language and Gesture—Facial and Bodily Expression; Response to Social Stimulation, in the group and in the crowd; Social Attitudes and Social Consciousness; Social Adjustments; and Social Behavior in Relation to Society. On the other hand, Bogardus devotes more than 80 per cent of his book to the study of groups and leadership and those more or less institutionalized carriers of "interstimulation and response," such as custom, tradition, fashion, imitation, sugges-

⁴ "Social psychology studies intersocial stimulation and response, social attitudes, values and personalities. It begins with individual human beings and original human nature and traces their growth through intersocial stimulation into persons with socialized attitudes" (p. 3).

tion, which Allport only briefly explains and treats as largely static concepts. From Allport's standpoint Bogardus' book would consist mainly of sociology. Also, being a behaviorist, he is not particularly interested in forms, but in processes, of activity; in the making of adjustments rather than in their fixation.

Allport would justify his limitation of the field of social psychology, without disparaging the importance of the group treatment, by pointing out that each science is based upon the findings of the science next antecedent to it, whose business it is to formulate conclusions for utilization in explanations of its phenomena by the science next above it: "Thus the sociologist describes social or collective phenomena and explains them in terms of individual behavior; the psychologist describes behavior and explains it in terms of reflex mechanisms; the physiologist describes the reflex mechanism and explains it in terms of physical and chemical change (*Journal*, p. 71).

Is Allport able to make good with his viewpoint? Does he give to the sociologist categories of behavior, operating under social stimuli, which are of value to him? Most decidedly, yes. Here again he brings in the method of learning by conditional response and develops it to such a degree that he is able to transform the traditional psychological treatment of language, gesture, groups, crowds, conflict situations, and the like. Language and gesture communication, including facial expression, are methods of getting words, actions, and expressions tied up, arbitrarily or otherwise, with meanings. These associations become institutionalized, that is, are conditioned largely uniformly in each new individual who comes under the social pressures of the group. In this way the achievements of the race are made the common possession of all its members. The conditioning phenomena may work out with bad as well as with good results for society, especially where learning is affected by the pressure of others. What he calls social facilitation (conditioning of responses in the presence of others) and the illusion of universality, which comes from crowd contacts, may easily work for superficial results or even anti-social behavior. In his last chapter he applies his categories (of social psychology as he conceives it) to the explanation

of the behavior of people in various social situations and throws them into relation with the accepted categories of sociology. This chapter is really a sample demonstration of the uses that can be made of social psychology, and even his opponents must admit that he has made a remarkably good showing.

The strong point of Allport's method is always his concreteness. He takes discussion out of the realm of vagueness. He is not content to tell you that a thing happens. He tells you exactly *how* it happens, or at least, how he thinks it happens. His method is always convincing. Bogardus, on the other hand, tells the reader but little of the mechanism and deals primarily with the results. So often he leaves one with a feeling of vagueness and uncertainty, with a suspicion that he has listened to rationalization or gossip instead of to demonstrated fact. He gives no means of testing his results. He speaks as one with the all-seeing eye who reveals the wisdom pertaining to social relations and values, but he does not, as a rule, let you into the method by which he became possessed of this wisdom or these conclusions.

To be sure, Bogardus cites authorities. But one frequently gets the impression that this does nothing to clarify the method, that he is only paying compliments and exchanging amenities with other seers and prophets.⁵ There is a marked contrast in this respect with Allport, who never cites an authority to pay a compliment, but instead refers to an investigation. One is the essayist in social psychology; the other the scholar. By way of extenuation, it should be said that it is more difficult to give the sanction of concreteness to the more general and less well worked material with which Bogardus has to deal. Nor would the reviewer give the impression that Bogardus' book is rendered valueless by his faults or the limitations of method. Especially in the latter part there are many chapters which appeal to the present writer as containing most excellent material and analyses, from his point of view. This is especially the case with the discussions of group opinion, patriotism, conflict, group control, fash-

⁵ Bogardus' method of citing is sometimes at fault. In some cases he repeats an initial statement from an author and cites it by page and then continues to use his material for sometime without further citations, thus unwittingly leading the reader to infer that what follows is Bogardus' own material.

ion imitation, etc. Bogardus is essentially a compiler. He works extensively rather than intensively, for the most part, and amasses opinions, classifications, more or less tested data, about almost everything within the range of his subject, but the reader feels sometimes that he would be willing to sacrifice some of the advantages of the cyclopaedia for definiteness, discrimination, and depth. He is weakest where he deals with human nature or the individual, and strongest where he analyzes groups and group processes objectively. Allport and Bogardus might be used together to cover a synthetic view of the field if there were any way to adjust their categories or to balance the one's precision of method with the other's lack of it. But Bogardus would inevitably suffer from the resulting enforced comparison.

What Bogardus does not do in defining his concepts and in relating them inductively to something tangible in the individual and social processes, Lindeman attempts to accomplish, and frequently with a large degree of success. While he does not profess to write a social psychology,⁶ he draws from his first hand analytical study of coöperative associations some of the best characterizations and definitions of group categories and processes which we have. At times he suffers from an overly intellectualistic interpretation of his material, but this can be corrected by the careful reader. In spite of the fact that I closed the book with the feeling that I should have read it from the back towards the front, and despite the fact that he has by no means justified some of the rather extravagant claims made for the work as a transformer of the field of social science, his final chapters have actually made a worthy beginning in the inductive processes of removing generalizations regarding group behavior from speculation to the plane of fact. One peculiar slip in his definition of terms should not be allowed to pass unnoticed. He makes tradition of essentially the same character as custom, instead of drawing the usual distinction between them on the basis of the mental and overt aspects of behavior (p. 237).

While Allport has made a very striking contribution with his method and has maintained this method rigorously, the candid critic must con-

cede something to the contentions of the opposing school of social psychology. Goldenweiser characterizes his discussion of the group mind fallacy as forced and as an anachronism (p. 74). Allport, however, does show that such a concept is used symbolically and analogically (*Journal*, pp. 63-70). But after all, does not Allport leave out something essential in placing the whole emphasis upon the consciousness of the individual? To be sure, all social adjustments are conditioned in the consciousness or the subconsciousness of the individual, and therefore all social adjustments which are also psychic must in the last analysis be made here. This is really the heart of his contention, to put it in commonplace language, and it is true (*Journal*, pp. 60-62). And as an individual behaviorist dealing with the mechanisms of conduct, that is perhaps all he needs to see. But the sociologist, and the social psychologist, who see processes from the standpoint of social behavior or dynamics, rather than from the standpoint strictly of the individual, are impressed with the fact that we can understand neither the transformations of society nor the springs of behavior in the individual until we study also the *stimuli* which produce individual behavior immediately and social change and adjustment ultimately. It is some such notion as this, I think, which Kantor has in the back of his mind when he speaks of institutional stimuli and institutional psychology (pp. 49 ff.). He is more interested in the causes of that behavior which has significance for social processes than he is in the mechanisms of conditional response under social stimuli. Thus, has not Allport really fallen into his own pit of the substitution of description for explanation which he dug for the sociologists (*Journal*, pp. 70-71)? Although he differentiates social psychology from psychology by distinguishing the stimuli to behavior with which it deals as social, he is merely content to describe the resulting behavior mechanisms without adequately explaining the causal relation of the social stimuli to the character of the behavior or thought content. In other words individual behavior is a function of the social environment. It is the organization of the social environment—groups, if you will—which determines individual behavior in the immediate instance and "socializes" this

⁶ Only part two of his volume, the part dealing with groups, is reviewed here.

behavior in the long run. Allport criticizes the group psychologists, saying, "The 'group mind' in the same sense employed by its exponents is a static mind. It is a result, not a cause, of individual behavior" (*Journal*, p. 62). But neither is the individual mind or behavior such a cause. It is only the *method* or mechanism by which the factors and forces operating back of groups (economic, physical, biological, all sorts of phenomena or environmental pressures, in fact) operate through the human consciousness or the unconscious behavior to produce social changes. And surely the accumulated psycho-social environment⁷ is one of the prime movers of individual behavior. It is this need of emphasis upon the causal or environmental and stimulus aspect as well as upon the mechanism of conditioning responses which Goldenweiser has in mind when he demands a study of the cultural factors involved in social transformations as a phase of social psychology (p. 75).

This almost exclusive emphasis by Allport upon the vastly important concept of conditioning also leads him to discredit some of the categories of the Tarde-Ross type of social psychology, especially imitation (p. 239). To the sociologist, imitation is an extremely valuable term when employed as a short cut symbol for certain processes; and when brought into adjustment with the category of conditional response, i. e., when explained as a phase of conditional response, it can be defined as accurately as any other category in social science.

The net result of this struggle between the "individual" and the "group" schools of social psychology need not mean the elimination of either. The latter may gain immensely in accuracy and definiteness and adequacy of explanation by getting down to the analysis of processes in behavior which Allport offers them. In this way much of the vagueness which suffuses Bogardus' text, especially in earlier parts, might be removed. Likewise, those who follow Allport may gain in breadth by concerning themselves with stimuli as well as with transformation. Perhaps they still carry much of the subjectivism of the old instinctivist theory and its limitations,

and in finding a substitute for instinct in the conditional response, they have not yet expanded their viewpoint to take in the environmental pressures which set up the conditionings.

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YOU CAN CHANGE IT: (THOUGH YOU WON'T). By Charles Lawson. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1924, 215. \$1.50.

PSYCHOLOGY AND MORALS. By J. A. Hadfield. New York: Robert M. McBride & Co., 1923, vii, 186 pp. \$2.00.

THE UNSTABLE CHILD. By Florence Mateer. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1924, xii, 471 pp. \$2.50.

Two questions are forced upon the reader of *You Can Change It*. Who will read it? Why was it ever published? The best thing about the book, one might almost say the only good thing about it, is its title, which carries considerable suggestion of a wholesome sort. The author claims originality at only one point, and perhaps a quotation will best reveal the barrenness of the book. On page 137 one finds this characteristic bit: "For words were once ideas, living thoughts indeed; and their inmost messages, if thoroughly dug out, may yet reveal some valuable novelties of ancient truth. So I have found in several instances, notably in this of duty; and as this is the one bit of valuable information that I got from two years' graduate study of Old English, I absolutely insist on dishing it up.

"My novel discovery, then, was that duty really meant something due, a debt. 'Hm! Somewhat obvious,' you grunt. Yes, just so *obvious*, just so plainly in the public way (more philology) that it has got kicked aside in all modern discussion that I ever read in my desire to master the whole duty of man. Shortly we shall arrive at some of these strange versions of duty, which it is no wonder never made many feel very dutiful; but just now, I want to show you some of the workings of the original and only genuine idea."

Yet the book has a very great significance, and every sociologist should be made to read a portion of it and then ask himself this question: "Is science creating a popular interest in the understanding of conduct and, by its own failure to popularize its findings, leaving the well-meaning but untrained reader and book-buyer with the task of trying to extract wholesome counsel for life from books like *You Can Change It*?"

⁷ See "The Significance of Environment as a Social Factor," in the *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, 1921, pp. 84-112, and "Neuro-psychic Technique," *Psychological Review*, Nov., 1923, for an analysis of this phase of environment and of environment in general.

It is interesting to see how the new psychology spreads itself into new territory. It was to be expected that morality would sooner or latter feel the influence of the new understanding of conduct. Any book that seriously attempts to bring into moral behavior the insight of the new psychology deserves a welcome from the sociologist. In *Psychology and Morals* Professor Hadfield gives us a very good presentation of the new psychology in the effort to bring to the moralist information of great ethical importance. His practical experience leads him to the belief that neuroses and nervous breakdowns are essentially moral problems, and should be so treated. He is far more skilful in his exposition of the new psychology than in the application he makes of it to the moral realm.

Indeed one gets the impression that at times he strains himself in his attempt to give a good scientific foundation for the present moral conventions. This occasionally leads him to statements that seem inconsistent with his basic viewpoint, as for instance in his definition of sin as compared with moral disease: "What then is the essential difference psychologically between sin and moral disease? It is that sin is due to *wrong sentiments*, moral disease is due to *morbid complexes* giving rise to uncontrollable impulses. The full and efficient cause of a sin is a deliberate and conscious choice of the will moved by a 'false' or wrong ideal. The sinner and the morally diseased both see the ideal; but whereas the former does not, the latter cannot, under ordinary conditions, respond to it. As their conditions are different, so must their treatment be, that of the sinner being the persistent presentation of a higher ideal, whilst that of the morally diseased is adequate treatment by psychotherapy."

Professor Hadfield tries to guard himself against appearing dogmatic, recognizing that the brevity of his statement would give the impression of dogmatism. It certainly would be better if he were not so sure of some of his declarations, as for example when he says, "Every neurosis is unconsciously desired. There is no exception to this law." His treatment of habit is very suggestive. The emotional side of habit is so seldom understood, the author's statement might well have been expanded, for no part of the book has

greater ethical significance: "No good habit is worth much unless it be backed by a large and healthy emotional disposition. Good habits, if not inspired by healthy emotions, fall into disuse like diaries in the opening year."

The most unfortunate statement in the entire book appears with reference to fear, where Hadfield says: "There is no more common nor more valuable instinct than fear: without it we should constantly step into danger and be killed." The emotion of fear actually has little utility in modern life. This the author seems to recognize a little later when he writes: "The protection of civilized life leaves us with little to fear, and, therefore, with an enormous surplus capacity for fear. So the superfluous fear becomes attached to all kinds of indifferent objects and we fear ourselves and develop 'phobias,' the *perversion* of fear, in which fear is attached to morbid objects."

We can expect before very long an adequate presentation of the significance of the new science of conduct in the field of ethics. The successful writer of such a book will produce one of the great discussions of modern life. It can not, however, be merely an exposition of the new science, content with being suggestive in its relation to moral conventions. It will tackle the question of what is morally wholesome in real, actual facts of human behavior. The author of *Psychology and Morals* sidesteps his task. He has written a satisfactory exposition of the new psychology with suggestions of value to the preacher and teacher, but he has not given us any significant insight into the psychological basis of morals.

Amid the mass of printed material that exploits the new psychology, it is refreshing to come across such an excellent and useful treatment as *The Unstable Child*. The author states that the reason for the book is her desire primarily to give exposition to an attitude. She believes that we should bring to the study of the maladjustment of the child the attitude "that back and beyond mental age lies the socially significant factor of mental function."

The book is divided into two parts. In the first, the author discusses the unstable child in theory. Here we have a detailed, interesting account of the development of clinical psychology, its present tendencies, its immediate problems,

and the function of the psychologists. It is unusual to find a psychological specialist declaring: "The question of the limitation of the study of the individual with a disturbance of intelligence will undoubtedly pass in the same way, provided psychology can make good and offer some help to the solution of the problem. Most of the contentions as to the relative limitation of the prerogatives and lines of research of medicine and psychology seem to the writer to be wars waged over the obvious. There is sufficient work for all interested in the study of human behavior, no matter what angle appeals most. Moreover, the problems of the disturbed, diseased, erratic, or psychopathic mind are the same for the psychiatrist and the psychologist, the lawyer and the layman, the educator and the social worker. Facts arrived at by one group are facts for all the other groups."

Dr. Mateer goes even further and admits that the clinical psychologist is not a perfect being capable of settling destinies of human personalities without the aid of physicians, lawyers, nurses, teachers and preachers. Her emphasis upon the risk of using intelligence testing for problems of diagnosis is something that some testers need to take seriously to heart, or the reaction to their extravagant claims will be such as to make their important contribution to the science of conduct underestimated. She rightly stresses the quality of personality as contrasted with the quantity of mental capacity. The following is a characteristic quotation: "He who knows mental tests and measurements as a course in the statistical rating of human beings by mental age has one aspect of the problem. If his one-track training has embraced nothing else, he can see the whole problem of human behavior so clearly, that its very clearness makes him dogmatically refuse other explanations or opinions. For instance, to him human beings must fall into some simple serial classification such as very feeble-minded, backward, normal, bright, very bright. Disposition is then equally simple. Send the very feeble-minded to institutions, the higher-grade feeble-minded, too, in many instances. Let the dullards do the laborers' work. Push the bright ones ahead. The multitudinous articles

and books representing this view solve social problems with equal ease. Criminality is due to feeble-mindedness, prostitution is due to feeble-mindedness. Most delinquents are feeble-minded. Slums are the homes of the feeble-minded. Just where the problems of the epilepsies, the psychoses, nerve breakdowns, and other equally serious mental conditions enter into such a scheme the writer is not sure."

The second part of the book deals with the practice of psycho-therapy. The author says there is no such thing as a bad boy or girl. Either the child does not know any better or else he can not help doing what the adult considers wrong. The problem of delinquency is entirely a problem of maladjustment. The normal child just grows, and as he develops his adjustment keeps pace with his responsibilities. This the abnormal child can not do. His habits and attitudes fall behind the adjustments demanded by his environment, and sooner or later he expresses failure. He needs study and also sympathetic guidance. This is the only right way of dealing with the unstable child. Such treatment will result in the largest possible social advantage. In spite of her optimism, however, Dr. Mateer suffers no delusion as to the prospects of the future. The psychopath is the product of civilization. He will certainly not grow less numerous. He has promises as well as weaknesses. "He feels intensely, lives exceedingly. He is a bundle of contradicting desires, abilities, and defects. He has potentialities. What he needs is early detection, long years of training, supervised parole without stigma, and a chance to make good. He will repay such care as no feeble-minded individual can. He is like the desert sands, and like them he needs an understanding and all powerful master to be made fertile and productive; left undirected, only evil and waste result. No individual can supply that mastery. We need institutions, hospital schools for psychopaths, hospital schools where the young delinquent will be treated, educated, trained, made independent and self-directing, and then sent out to redeem his delinquency."

E. R. GROVES.

Boston University.

PSYCHOLOGY AND PRIMITIVE CULTURE. By F. C. Bartlett. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923. 294 pp. \$2.75.

Since the days of Spencer and Tyler there has been a great change in the manner of viewing the social heritages of primitive peoples and the methods of approaching their study. In the last hundred pages of his "Ancient Civilization," Goldenweiser has given us a most excellent summary and criticism of the theories of early mentality of Spencer, Frazer, Wundt, Durkheim, Lévy-Bruhl and Freud. He would today take account of this new work by Bartlett. Less masterful than the works just referred to, less redolent of intimate familiarity with the life of primitive peoples than some of them, it is an original and significant contribution to social psychology in general and to the study of primitive mores in particular.

On the basis of an acute criticism of McDougall's well-known classification of the instincts, the author seeks to reduce gregariousness—which he views as a complex—back to certain fundamental forms of social relationship. These he finds to be: (1) The tendency to primitive comradeship, or the relation of equals; (2) the tendency to assertiveness or dominance; (3) the tendency to submissiveness or acceptance. Added to these as fundamental traits are: (4) The tendency to conservation, to preserve the familiar, which is selective in its operation; and (5) the tendency to social construction which is the source of all social organization. There are two other primary postulates. (6) One is designated "group difference tendencies," or tendencies which center about certain institutions and are important in differentiating one group from another. This idea is more familiar in this country under the phrase "run of attention." (7) The other is called "individual difference tendencies" since they differentiate one person from another.

From this basis the author presents an interesting and illuminating discussion of how these primary tendencies influence the development of customs, institutions and social structure. He applies his primary analysis to the psychology of such phenomena as folk-lore, contact of peoples, transmission of culture by borrowing, the diffusion of culture, and the elaboration or simplifi-

cation of culture, and shows that his analysis is pragmatically sound. Throughout he insists on the fundamental importance of the particular conjuncture of circumstances in which the primary tendencies are operating. The simple and crude associationism of Tyler and Frazer are rejected. Likewise is repudiated the doctrine of Lévy-Bruhl that there is a wide gulf between the pre-logical "primitive" man and the logical modern. This is really a distinction between the superstitious magic-ridden mind of any time and place which deals with primary causes only and the scientific mind with its interest in immediate and secondary causes. As Bartlett points out (pp. 282-5) the difference is not in the processes involved but in content to which attention is given. The difference between primitive and modern, therefore, is exactly like that between various cultural levels in our own society and should be approached with the same assumptions and by the same technique. Consequently, Bartlett considers that he has written a sort of prolegomena to social psychology, for, from the psychological viewpoint, modern social life differs from primitive in its greater complexity rather than in the psychic tendencies and mechanisms involved.

Bartlett has written a real book. The general line of attack which he envisages is clearly sound. There will be much difference of opinion as to the completeness and finality of his classification of fundamental tendencies. In view of the incompleteness of our knowledge of elementary human nature any such list must appear arbitrary. Moreover, the elaborate rejection of McDougall's instinct only to fall back on "tendencies" shows little theoretical advance—if "instinct" be defined as a "tendency." One wonders, for example, how his "primitive comradeship" differs from Trotter's herd instinct. One may note also that he fails to attribute an adequate role to the outstanding individual. And it is important to ask whether phenomena of cultural diffusion can be adequately explained without reference to states of group excitation and their causes. But in his emphasis on the necessity of intensive concrete investigations to replace the broad all-inclusive generalizations of social philosophy he is in harmony with the newer tendencies everywhere. He has taken a large leaf out of the theories of the

cultural determinists but he adds that certain primary tendencies of the human psyche constitute an essential intermediary between one stage of cultural evolution or diffusion and another.

F. H. HANKINS.

Smith College.

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THE UNADJUSTED GIRL. By William I. Thomas with a Foreword by Mrs. W. F. Dummer. Criminal Science Monograph No. 4. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1923, xvii, 261 pp. \$3.00.

It is not until recently that the standpoint in social psychology for which Mr. Thomas has long contended has begun to be accepted. It was he, then professor of sociology at Chicago, who nearly fifteen years ago began formulating the study of human behavior in social environment in terms of attitudes and habit patterns. Moreover, he was one of the first Americans, next to Stanley Hall, to recognize early the important meaning for the social sciences of the work of Freud with whom he had come in contact during his research on the Polish peasant in Europe. On the basis of extended studies of the negro, the Jew and especially of the Polish peasant, Thomas formulated a scheme of wishes in the individual which seemed to him to be fundamental, at least, to social behavior. These are: the wish for security, safety and conservation of the old and tried; the wish for novelty, for escape from *ennui*; the wish for recognition from others, the desire for prestige; lastly the wish for intimate face-to-face response, the desire for love mates or comrades. This list is purely tentative and serves simply as a convenient set of labels to identify a mass of attitudes and the behavior connected therewith.

In the present volume Mr. Thomas has given perhaps the most thorough theoretical account of the place of wishes and attitudes in his writings. He traces the wishes and the concrete attitudes back to certain innate reflexes of motor and emotional sort, such as developed from the researches of Watson and others.

The desire for new experience is based upon man's craving for excitement, for fresh stimulation, for conduct that involves pursuit, fighting, capture, and adventure. Gambling and speculation and the vicarious living in newspaper "sen-

sations" as well as exploration and discovery rest, in part, on this trend. It is fundamentally connected with the hunting patterns of the human mind of which Dewey and Carveth Read have written. It finds its highest expression in the product of an artist or in the "research magnificent" of a Pasteur.

The desire for security is ambivalent to the first. It is "based on fear" and is related to flight and to hiding and to making one's self safe from harm. Here are rooted those attitudes which preserve the *status quo* and keep us in the line of social duty.

The desire for response is basic to the love making of the sexes and in substituted forms finds expression in comradeship and congeniality. Thomas indicates by a number of cases how common is the fact that girls become delinquent from a sheer wish for companionship. Loneliness, lack of someone to whom they can respond in a close personal way, these are factors of importance in their social maladjustment. While other writers may find a good deal in the economic aspect of delinquency, the present writer is undoubtedly correct in calling attention to non-economic determinants in this behavior. He remarks:

In general the desire for response is the most social of the wishes. It contains both a sexual and a gregarious element. It makes selfish claims, but on the other hand it is the main source of altruism.

It may be said parenthetically, moreover, that Thomas does not follow Freud in over-emphasizing the merely sexual, although he rightly gives it an important place in the desire for intimate response.

The desire for recognition "is expressed in the general struggle of men for position in their social group, in devices for securing a recognized, enviable and advantageous social status." And furthermore:

The importance of recognition and status for the individual and for society is very great. The individual not only wants them but he needs them for the development of his personality. The lack of them and the fear of never obtaining them are probably the main source of those psychopathic disturbances which the Freudians treat as sexual origin. . . .

On the other hand society alone is able to confer status on the individual and in seeking to obtain it he makes himself responsible to society and is forced to regulate the expression of his wishes. His dependence on public

opinion is perhaps the strongest factor impelling him to conform to the highest demands which society makes upon him.

These wishes in connection with the temperament, which is largely physiologically determined, make up the character. The wishes are dynamic, motor and expressive.

The regulation of the wishes takes place under the aegis of the social order. Society has put forth a number of "definitions of the situation" which lay down the paths for its members to follow. Morals are nothing else than a congeries of these definitions, which are generally accepted as good and right. Gossip, punishment, ostracism, even death, may be resorted to to enforce conformity to community standards. In this field language plays an enormous role and the definitions, in fact, are usually couched in words and phrases which carry great emotional freight and meaning to the individual: naughty, no good, dirty, nasty, immoral, bad, or lovely, good, all right, correct. So too, gestures, nods, winks, shrugs of shoulders come into the control of other persons in the expression of their wishes.

Upon the basis of this extended analysis of human motives the author presents his case materials on the "unadjusted girl" that is, the girl who is demoralized, or de-socialized, in large part, by the breakdown of our older social order and by the present chaos of changing industrial-commercial system. Many of the previous sanctions are gone. It is the author's contention that the modern age tends to make for the "individualization of behavior," that is, it encourages the person to adjust on his own personality-level rather than in terms of the community and the family which was the case in simpler conditions, say peasant life in Europe or life in rural America. Normally, the rôle which the girl is supposed to play in life has been laid down by the definitions of the moral and aesthetic situations made by the parents backed by the community. This condition is passing with changes attendant on our present age and the family finds itself unable to cope with the behavior of its children. In other words the family seems incapable of affecting a shift from the older mores and conventions to a newer set.

To assist the family, even to take its place in some instances, in bringing about the shift from

one set of standards to another the social agency has come into existence. Some agencies are effective; some are not. Too frequently the social agency is soaked in philanthropic sentimentalism. However, the more forward-looking organizations are putting their work upon an understanding basis. Such is the excellent work at El Retiro in Los Angeles under the direction of Miss Van Waters. Here the problem of the unadjusted girl is handled in a humane and comprehensive way and the success in rehabilitating a large number of young women is one of the most encouraging signs on the horizon of social work.

In the course of his discussion of ways and means of dealing with the question of the misadjusted girl, the author points out the rather marked failure of our public education to cope with the problem, first, because it assumes a simple uniformity of personality capable of a rationality which modern science denies. Secondly, the school fails to give the child opportunity for freedom of expression, rather compressing him into the common mold of the standard curriculum. In the third place, the planlessness of even the valuable cultural materials, techniques and information, which the school furnishes, enhances the unfortunate effects just noted. Lastly, there is too much accentuation by the schools of petty faults and divergencies of conduct and a general lack of sympathetic knowledge of human nature. This is certainly a strong indictment of the program and personnel of our public schools which is worthy of notice.

In the final chapter Thomas gives us his own views on the larger problems of social adjustment. Drawing upon the analogy of the control of natural forces brought about by the physical sciences, he raises the issues whether or not man by experimentation and observation may not be able to develop a more rational social control. The author does not suffer from any quick utopian schemes for reform. Rather he would caution us against mixing any reforms in any first-rate social-psychological investigation. He well remarks:

A method of investigation which seeks to justify and enforce any given norm of behavior ignores the fact that a social evolution is going on in which not only activities are changing but the norms which regulate the activities are also changing. Traditions and customs,

definitions of the situation, morality, and religion are undergoing an evolution, and a society going on the assumption that a certain norm is valid and that whatever does not comply with it is abnormal finds itself helpless when it realizes that this norm has lost social significance and some other norm has appeared in its place.

What we want is to turn, irrespective of any immediate social programs, to a study of the influences of the family, neighborhood, church, industry, school and other social institutions upon the growing individual. Only when we probe the nature of the social order, on the one hand, and the nature of the personality, on the other, can we expect to arrive at a knowledge of social laws and of psychological mechanisms.

For the author the individual is the measure of the society. If the person is cramped, warped and incompletely developed, this is a reflection upon the social order which formed him in large part. He says:

Eventually the life of the individual is the measure of the totality of social influence, and the institution should be studied in the light of the personality development of the individual.

Thus the problem of the unadjusted girl, of the delinquent person, even of the psycho-pathic and feeble-minded, returns, in the broad sense, to the matter of personality. In this book we have a very important approach to one phase of the question.

The methodology which has been adopted here is the case method, with the clinical picture of medicine as a convenient analogy. Statistics, as a method, are only indicative of problems to be solved. They are useful as showing trends in social data, but they can not take the place of experimentation or of careful observation and interpretation of cases. Certainly without taking into account the qualitative features they cannot be thought of as revealing exact causal relations of social data. Mr. Thomas would not deny, however, that statistics are extremely valuable just now in handling mass materials wherein individual study is impossible.

The foreword to this volume by Mrs. Dummer, who has done so much for the study of juvenile problems in this country, is one of the ablest statements of the faith of the sane social reformer which the reviewer has seen. It might well be

read, as should this entire book, by every person dealing with youth, from social workers and juvenile court judges to deans of men and deans of women in colleges and school administrators generally. Last of all the book might well be perused by college instructors whose work touches the social sciences and by those progressive parents who have an objective attitude toward their own children.

KIMBALL YOUNG.

University of Oregon.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS IN BUSINESS. By A. W. Kornhauser and F. A. Kingsbury. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924, ix, 194 pp. \$1.90.

This book is concerned with "the use of psychological tests in business, and particularly in employment selection." It is a thoroughgoing general survey of the research in this field and appears at a time when there is no comprehensive statement of the results of the application of testing to business enterprise. Both as a research summary for the industrial psychologist and as a reference source for college classes in applied psychology the book supplants other briefer statements and fills a real need in bringing together the reports of research which have heretofore been scattered widely throughout the journals. The critical review of the results of experimental work in business (chapters three and four) is particularly valuable for reference.

A functional classification of tests is offered in which the term "aptitudes" is used as descriptive of abilities, both general and specific:

1. Tests of proficiencies.
 - a. Educational tests.
 - b. Trade tests.
2. Tests of aptitudes.
 - a. General aptitude tests.
 - (1) General intelligence tests.
 - (2) Mechanical aptitude tests.
 - b. Special aptitude tests.
 - (1) Physical tests.
 - (2) Motor tests.
 - (3) Sensory tests.
 - (4) Tests of other special mental functions.
3. Tests of character and temperament traits.

Human ability is regarded as "a vast complex of separate abilities." Proficiencies are "items of knowledge and skill in some well-organized field—a trade, or a school subject—which have been

acquired through definite training and experience." Trade tests may be of various kinds: samples of the job, devices for measuring the separate abilities used in the job, devices for measuring the central or outstanding ability used in the job, imitative repetitions of the job and devices bearing no apparent or obvious relation to the job. "Aptitudes refer to specific human capacities which have not been systematically developed toward definite ends, but the possession of which enables one to acquire with reasonable training the proficiency desired." Other phases of behavior, referred to as "habits of character, emotional and temperamental tendencies, volitional qualities, traits of personality, etc., can hardly be classified either as aptitudes or proficiencies, since they indicate not so much abilities to act, as natural or habitual levels of acting."

Recognition of exact scientific procedure in the construction and application of tests is emphasized. It is held that *method* particularly distinguishes psychology testing, not content. "To obtain the point of view of scientific research in employment procedure is more important than to decide the pros and cons of particular tests or even of tests in general." Most important is the methodology that has been developed for use in further test research.

There are comparatively few ready-to-use tests available for industry. The authors urge that all tests be given experimental try-outs on the group in which they are to be used, before actual administrative application. The decision as to the tests to be tried out should be based upon a knowledge of the work for which the tests are needed and upon a wide familiarity with tests of all sorts. The better equipped the test expert is in both directions the better the chances of getting results. The final criterion for the use of a test is given as follows:

Is the proposed process of selecting individuals for this job (including the use of this test) appreciably better, cheaper, or more expeditious than any reasonable alternative method that is available?

Employment tests are regarded as a product of practical industrial needs quite as definitely as they are an outgrowth of psychological research. Tests are to be recognized as only one item in the list of devices calculated to introduce greater pre-

cision and efficiency into the judgment of men in personnel selection. They constitute, however, "the most distinctly psychological contribution to vocational selection."

Results of testing for office occupations are summarized. The writers believe "a favorable view of intelligence tests is justified as a device for indicating the alertness and future possibilities of various classes of office workers, ranging from office boys to secretaries and perhaps to minor executives." Selection by means of appropriate educational and trade proficiency tests is also found feasible. But the selection of individuals for any specialized office position with respect to their future possibilities in these occupations, *on the basis of specific aptitude*, has not yet been found possible, although the writers consider this a promising field for research.

Test research of some twenty-five to fifty different lines of work, aside from office occupations, is reviewed. A consideration of these studies leads to an appreciation of the possibilities of aptitude tests for special manual jobs while emphasizing the present relatively slight achievement. The value of general intelligence tests for factory occupations is not clear. The possible usefulness of trade tests is emphasized although their application in business is practically nil. In the testing of sales aptitude little positive progress is reported. Results vary as to usefulness of intelligence tests, although, *"other things being equal"*, general intelligence is an asset for salesmanship."

The last part of the book is concerned with the administrative phases of testing in business, concluding with a statement of future outlook. The fields for use of tests are outlined as not only those of hiring and placement, but also in readjustments in the working force, in connection with training programs, personal surveys, investigations into causes of labor turnover, etc. Not more than forty concerns are listed which are known to have used tests to any considerable degree, while it is estimated that perhaps half a dozen large firms in England have a testing program. "Industrial tests are still in the experimental stage. But they have proved worth experimenting with. A scientific technique has been well established. . . . What we need now is to accumulate, with the aid of this technique, a

much larger body of facts. . . . We know something about selecting suitable employees for a considerable number of occupations and a great deal concerning few. But about most occupations we know little or nothing of scientific worth." The outstanding undeveloped fields are the professions, salesmanship and general executives. In so far as tests can aid in the solution of the various problems which the human factor in business presents the writers are optimistic for the future.

DOUGLAS FRYER.

New York University.

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TWELVE TESTS OF CHARACTER. By Harry Emerson Fosdick. New York: Association Press, 1923, xii, 213 pp.

SEEING LIFE WHOLE. By Henry Churchill King. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923, 163 pp.

THE VIRGIN BIRTH. By Frederic Palmer, D.D. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1924, 56 pp.

"Twelve Tests of Character" consists of essays on "practical religion and right living" which had previously appeared serially in a popular journal. It is a series of sermons, adapted to an average church audience, and of interest mainly to those who enjoy pulpit methods of presenting problems of personal morality and social life. He says that he here presents "an old emphasis but indispensable," the need of personal character in men under the present social order. The subjects treated are about as follows: the varying importance of individual interests; the need of increasing self-control under changing social conditions and democratic tendencies; the great worth of man and some consequent contemporary necessities; the importance of religion and the church with its institution of worship; the effect of Christian faith in producing an optimistic evaluation of man and life; individual self-control as a prerequisite to social control and progress; necessity of obedience to group authority; the use of natural impulses and desires—which he calls instincts—for worthy ends—a thought which he elaborates under the title "Harnessing the Cave-Man."

The author's object is evidently to preach to a larger congregation than his church will hold, giving his views on miscellaneous problems of personality and social welfare, in the hope of in-

spiring people to socially useful conduct. To one who finds help and enlightenment in the homiletic style of presenting social truth, Fosdick is unusually successful; to the scientist who may be familiar with the social problem in its complexity, such a popular collection would make slight appeal. Since the former class is numerous, Fosdick's style serves a purpose.

There are commendable things as one reads. Dr. Fosdick realizes the gravity of world conditions; he sees rather clearly at times the main factors in our social disorder. Repeatedly he is superficial, evidently lacking the biological and psychological background for his discussion. His attacks upon war, child labor, industrial exploitation, repression of personality, ought to do good by awakening the popular type of reader; while his fears of evil results from the widespread interest in sex, his failure to get beneath the surface of many current questions, render him quite unable to stimulate or instruct the scientific mind.

"Seeing Life Whole," by President King, is a volume of lectures delivered at New York University which purport to give a Christian philosophy of life and seems to be the usual peculiar combination of aridity and profundity characteristic of the author.

He is trying to give unity and meaning to life, and essays a six-fold approach: scientific, showing how recent science contributes to idealism; psychological, inferring practical ideals from psychology; valuational, pointing out a "unified way into the values of life"; personal, stressing the religious and moral significance of personality; philosophical, interpreting experience; and Christian, seeking to make Christ's view of life normative.

The most readable and suggestive parts are chapters I and VI, on the scientific and Christian approaches respectively. Starting in chapter I with the attempt of science to understand the whole of life and describing well the scientific method of procedure to attain to truth, he passes very abruptly to the challenge to democratic ideals afforded by the material achievements of science and the need of greater coöperation and socialization. Because science has made necessary the consideration of the task of social reorganization, he finds no natural antipathy necessary between the scientist and the idealist. The balance of the

chapter is a defense of the Christian evolutionist's viewpoint on the question of the relation of Christian faith to the doctrine of evolution. The injustice to Darwin of social Darwinism is clearly indicated and the opinion strongly urged that evolution strengthens rather than weakens Christian faith.

The sixth chapter opens with the definition of a Christian as one who finds in Jesus "the best life, the best ideals and standards, the best insight into the laws of life, the best convictions, the best hopes, the best dynamic for character, the surest revealer of God, and the greatest persuader of the love of God." Then follows a modern and clear presentation of the obstacles to an understanding of the Bible found in literalism and apocalypticism, the doctrine of Biblical infallibility, and aberrant religious types such as Christian Science and Spiritualism. The chapter closes using the temptation experience of Jesus in quite an original way to teach the inability and futility of materialism, emotionalism and the worship of power.

Discussing the psychological approach, the author finds that the behavioristic psychology offers no new difficulties to religious faith and that, in fact, several inferences of value follow from psychology. The inferences, however, are not particularly vital and by no means indisputable. For example, one wonders whether the follower of Christ, who has been "unselfish, true, and friendly" is freed any more than others from "the deeper wretchedness of poverty, of suffering, of defeat, of old age, of death."

In making the "personal approach" to his problem, he treats largely of the value of personality—though with no clear attempt to tell what personality is—and the worth of the individual as a human being, with appropriate corollaries for conduct. It is sketchy and suggestive rather than full or analytical—a weakness, however, which may be pardoned on account of time limitations in giving the lecture. The chapter on the philosophical approach is a defense of theism and, although more modern than most philosophical literature, contains much that impresses the scientifically trained as vague and unintelligible—merely "words, words, words."

One concludes after reading these lectures that the expositor of Christian conceptions of life

might be more effective could he ground his discussions more thoroughly on the accepted findings and principles of biology, psychology, and sociology. Even though one may agree with Dr. King's conclusions, he can only wish that the method of reaching them had led through the paths of genetic psychology and social science.

In "The Virgin Birth" Dr. Palmer deals in a clear succinct fashion with the biblical and historic bases for the traditional church doctrine. The New Testament shows that there was belief in normal birth as well as the doctrine of the virgin birth among the disciples. On this point, so utterly insignificant to intelligent men but so important to some of the faithful, Dr. Palmer is quite convincing: Fundamentalists might profitably peruse the chapter. Then follows a reasonable explanation of the way in which the doctrine arose as a result of several thought tendencies of the first two centuries. Hazy materialistic ideas of the soul, together with the exaltation of Jesus in the eyes of Christians, account for the doctrine and its credibility to those ancient worthies.

The revelation of the theological mind of the writer in the chapter on miracles is perplexing. Staring with the large assumption that "miracles are continually happening" and that a religion "without miracle would be no religion," the writer attempts to explain and make reasonable three types of New Testament miracles, those of healing, resurrection stories, and nature miracles performed on other natural objects than men. Only when he admits that "those who maintain that a miracle is an event contrary to natural law will of course assert that a miracle has no law" does he seem to have even an inkling of the modern man's difficulties. To square any religious conception of miracle, Biblical or other, with scientific faith in orderly sequence is preliminary to his discussion, and he passes the problem by. He has nothing to say of the steady retreat of miracle-mongering before the steady advance of knowledge. And when he soberly defends the resurrection stories on the ground of twilight zones between death and life—degrees of deadness indicated by peculiar behavior of the dying—and expresses belief in the phenomena of Spiritualism, the reader is tempted to drop the book in despair.

One concludes the reading of "The Virgin Birth" with the puzzled consciousness that a Christian scholar can be in all three of Comte's stages of thought simultaneously.

ALBERT P. VAN DUSEN.

Syracuse University.

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STUDIES IN MENTAL DEVIATIONS. By S. D. Porteus. Publications of the Training School at Vineland, N. J. Department of Research, No. 24, October, 1922. 276 pp.

This book sets forth the method and results of several years of research work bearing on mental diagnosis as carried on at Vineland. There is some discussion of the association of feeble-mindedness with other mental characteristics such as psychopathic and delinquent tendencies; and of wider implication are the re-

searches that show a relation between such physical traits as brain capacity, head form and bodily fitness and intelligence. The Porteus Maze Test, an educational attainment scale, the Porteus Form and Assembly Test, and an industrial rating scale are described as to construction and application and a penetrating analysis is given of the merits and limitations of the Stanford Binet Test. If there be a dominant theme running through the book it is the stress on the need for a broad appreciation of personality traits and social relationships rather than mere I Q determination. The book is perhaps rather technical for the taste of the general reader but for all interested in any form of mental deviation it has much to offer.

C. KIRKPATRICK.

University of Pennsylvania.

SOME BOOKS ON LABOR, ECONOMIC THEORY, AND IMPERIALISM

AN OUTLINE OF THE BRITISH LABOR MOVEMENT. By Paul Blanshard. New York: George H. Doran Company, 1924. Pp. 174.

THE NEW WORLD OF LABOR. By Sherwood Eddy. New York: George H. Doran Company, 1924. Pp. 216. \$1.50.

A GENERATION ago, the young men and women who toured England felt in duty bound to visit the Lake Country and to pay homage at Stratford-on-Avon. It is not so with the present generation. The mining districts of South Wales and the shipyards of the Clyde are instead far more fascinating to them. Swinburne and Wilde have given way to Sydney Webb and G. D. H. Cole, while the London School of Economics has replaced the Saville as a point of interest.

Mr. Blanshard's excellent little handbook furnishes an admirable labor Baedeker to the socially minded tourist or to the stay-at-home who nevertheless wishes to let his mind wander. Less impressionistic and colorful than the books by Arthur Gleason which first interpreted the British labor movement to us, it is no less accurate. The four branches of the movement, namely The Labor Party, The Trade Unions, The Coöperatives, and The Workers' Education Movement are all scientifically described within the compass

of a hundred pages, leaving space for chapters on Women and Labor, the Whitley Councils, and the various social insurance laws.

Mr. Blanshard's descriptive material is clearly written while his analysis is generally quite accurate. The reviewer has been particularly impressed by the reasons which he ascribes for the relative absence of the union label in England—namely, the existence of many unions with overlapping jurisdictions, the strength of the coöperative movement which is a better guarantee of goods than the label, and finally the secure position of the unions as bargaining agencies which makes a special appeal to the consumer unnecessary. There is throughout a realistic comparison between the English situation and our own which is fresh and illuminating. The book is marked by a chapter devoted to the land question which is a problem that has hitherto been too much ignored by students of the British movement. Despite the war-time gains in organizing the agricultural laborers, the rural districts did not return a single Laborite to Parliament at the last election and as long as these districts continue to be anti-labor, the permanent accession to real power of the Labor Party is distinctly doubtful. The question may well be raised that if these regions, with

their great concentration of land ownership are obstacles to the British Labor Party, how much more would our extensive farming areas with their wide diffusion of property obstruct the growth to power of an American Labor Party?

Mr. Sherwood Eddy's volume is a somewhat uneven piece of work. The chapters on the effects of the present industrial revolution upon India, China, and Japan are by far the most valuable. Mr. Eddy knows his East well and he sees the full significance of the industrial development of the Orient. His pictures of living conditions in the manufacturing centers are graphic in their horror. Unless prompt and effective action is taken, capitalism in its transitional period will work tremendous havoc in the East and will cause infinitely greater suffering than attended the advent of the Industrial Revolution in England and on the Continent. Mr. Eddy is especially happy in the pictures which he gives of the forces of good-will and humanitarianism which are at work beneath the surface. Kagawa, the heroic Christian radical and the Tatas, benevolent Indian employers, are indications from two very different extremes that there is a distinct leaven in the midst of what seems to be the conquest of the East by Western industrialism.

The chapters on the British and European labor movements are less fortunate. The account here is hurried and sketchy and adds little or nothing to the subject. The comparison which Mr. Eddy draws between the American and the European movements is so unflattering to our own that it has already roused the ire of Mr. Samuel Gompers who insists that the A. F. of L. should be the instructor and not the pupil of Europe. Mr. Eddy concludes with an eloquent and moving appeal for the adoption of the spirit of love as the method of overcoming the forces of hatred and class antagonism.

These are not books for the scholar, but they are admirably adapted to rouse the interest and waken the sympathies of the earnest but relatively uninformed men and women who are beginning to realize that there is an industrial problem and who wish to help solve it. As such, both are worthy of a place in the kingdom of books.

PAUL H. DOUGLAS.

University of Chicago.

THE AMERICAN LABOR YEAR BOOK, 1923-24. By the Labor Research Department of the Rand School of Social Science. Solon De Leon, Editor, Nathan Fine, Associate. New York: Rand School of Social Science, 1924, pp. 584. Volume V, \$3.00.

It has been two years now since the last issue of the American Labor Year Book appeared, and in that period there has been effected a complete change in the policy and editing of this handy volume. The editor of the present issue, Solon De Leon, working with the Labor Research Committee of the Rand School of Social Science in New York City, has attempted, with no small degree of success, to make the present volume rather a complete compendium of the labor movement in America and in its international relations, rather than the somewhat disjointed series of essays by persons specially interested or fitted to write on topics more or less vaguely related to the work as a whole. And, as a result, we have a reference work that is of the highest standard, and which should go a long way toward fulfilling the need that is so greatly felt by all students of the American and International labor movements for authoritative and up-to-date information. It is to be hoped that the stated purpose of the editor to issue the Year Book annually, instead of every other year, as has been the custom, will be realized, and that workers in the field of labor, trade-unionism and labor problems will have at hand an edition of this work which will always give definite and late information as to the ever-changing world of labor.

The aspects of the volume which first strike the reader are its comprehensiveness and the detachment with which the material in it is handled. Indeed, it is a work such as any academic research organization might be proud of having produced, and the fact that it has come from an institution of avowed Socialistic tendencies makes one hopeful for the possibilities of scientific work from organisations deep in the labor struggle. One need only look through the table of contents to see how many phases of the labor movement are considered. Commencing with a very practical calendar of labor conventions, both in this country and elsewhere, for 1924, it proceeds to an "International Labor Diary" for the years 1922-1923, in which practically every strike, wage-change, important incident in labor or radical politics, injunction, or internal change in labor organizations

is noted. The first section concerns itself with a condensed discussion of general industrial and social conditions. In short space, with comprehensive and helpful tables, there are presented the facts of income, concentration of industry, the numbers and wages of workers in various industries, unemployment, the cost of living and the hours of work, accidents and disease in industry, women in industry, and the status of the farmer and of workers' education. The section on the Negro migrations as affecting social and economic conditions is especially excellent, and the short discussion with its facts and statistical data give a clear picture of the situation of the Negro migrant and the effect he has had on industry in the North and South.

The next section, dealing with the labor organizations of this country, is packed with figures showing membership and membership changes, and facts concerning the various conventions held, the officers elected and removed, the main changes in policy determined at these meetings, and the general status of the organizations. The catholicity of the work is demonstrated by the fact that the American Federation of Labor is treated in the same fashion as are such of the more radical bodies as the Needle Trades Unions, the Trade Union Educational League, and the Industrial Workers of the World. The third section, on labor disputes, is again filled with helpful tables. Particularly do the ones "Industrial Groups and Numbers of Disputes in Each" and "Principal Causes of Disputes Beginning in Each" for the years from 1916 to 1923 give a sweeping view of the general situation. The more outstanding strikes are treated in some detail, and the larger industries given each its section. The following chapter on labor politics treats of some eleven separate movements in this field, from the Socialist party and the Farmer-Labor groups to the milder Conference for Political Action and the redder Workers' Party. The strictly American aspect of the volume closes with sections on Labor Legislation and Court Decisions affecting Labor, on Civil Liberties, Workers' Education, an interesting discussion of the growth and character of Labor Banks, and on the Coöperative Movement.

The International section of the work is in three chapters, one on International Relations of Labor, one on Trade Unionism and Labor Polit-

ical Movements Abroad, and the last on Coöperation Abroad. The latter two comprise sections country by country, outlining the status of the movement in each and the principal events which have occurred in connection with each in the past two years. There stand out particularly three tables, the first showing Membership of Trade Unions in Various Countries, 1911-1922, the second the Percentage of Trade Union Membership to Population, and the third the Labor and Socialist Representation in Lower Houses of Parliament, 1923. The sections on China, where a labor movement is rarely thought of as existing, on Japan, where, for example, we learn that there were 277 labor disputes during 1923, on England, France, Germany, and Ireland, and particularly the section on Russia, are illuminating in their brevity. And it is of interest to learn that in Java, for example, there was a large railway strike in July, 1922, and that there is a Communist organization there of some 1,300 members, or that there is a Fisherman's Protective Union in Newfoundland with about 30,000 members. The preceding chapter gives an excellent idea of the status and aims of the various international labor organizations, particularly the Red International of which we have heard so much in condemnation through the mouths of Mr. Gompers and his lieutenants. The book concludes with an International Labor Directory which must bring joy to the heart of any hard-worked corresponding secretary of a labor organization, giving, as it does, the names and addresses of the secretaries of each organization listed.

The work is intensely a practical thing, as can be seen from the inadequate exposition given above. And the Research Department of the Rand School is to be congratulated both on the Year Book, and on having found so evidently competent an editor as Mr. De Leon. A man who has been active in the radical and labor movements for years, and who has edited various labor periodicals, he is specially and completely equipped for his task, as must be apparent to any one using the Year Book. As a reference work to be used not only in the labor movement itself, but in University libraries and by classes in economics, sociology and labor problems as well, it cannot be too highly recommended.

MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS.

THE WORKER IN MODERN ECONOMIC SOCIETY. By Paul H. Douglas, Curtice N. Hitchcock and Willard E. Atkins. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1923, xxxii, 929 pp. \$4.50.

This is another volume in the excellent series of readings being issued from Chicago University as "Materials for the Study of Business." In the "Preface" the authors state that the theory on which the volume is based is that the student "secures an infinitely more vivid and real understanding of the industrial problems of today, if he is placed in contact with the basic researches in the field of labor, and if upon controversial issues, the protagonists of the different interests are allowed to speak for themselves, than if these are worked up and given to him in the usual text-book fashion." This is undoubtedly true. But when the authors go on to imply a rejection of the text-book in favor of materials, they are open to the objection of flying from one extreme to the other. No text can be complete; it needs to be supplemented. But neither is a set of readings complete in itself; it needs, for the elementary student, to be used in connection with a more systematic treatise which enables the student to see the problem as a whole and maintain his perspective.

The contents of this volume are comprehensive, carefully selected and logically arranged. Some might doubt the advisability of the first seventy pages which deal in a very scrappy way with certain aspects of human nature and social development. Not only is the treatment inadequate but seems only remotely connected with what follows. Would it not be better to begin with Part Two, "The Development of Economic Organization," and put an expansion of Part One at the end of the volume in order to relate one's findings regarding the worker to those psychological and sociological facts which enable one to see the problems of labor in the broader setting of social philosophy? In any case this is a book which should prove indispensable to teachers and students of both general economics and labor problems.

F. H. H.

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ESSAYS IN ECONOMIC THEORY. By Simon Nelson Patten. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1924, xvii, 399 pp. \$5.00.

Professor Seager in his Introduction to this posthumous collection of previously published es-

says well says that "Simon Nelson Patten was the most original and suggestive economist that America has yet produced." If American economic thought had passably assimilated the pregnant truths brought to light by Dr. Patten, or had busied itself adequately with the vistas he opened, the sociologist would find at his command a much better economic foundation than is now available. The present volume is not easy reading, and it teems with suggestions that the sociologist is not equipped to follow, but a perusal of it is worth while for the sake of the realization it gives of the meaning and possibility of substantial scholarship.

The book consists of a series of writings of very different length and of diverse veins, yet throughout the work runs a thread of unity and a sense of power that makes one wish that the author had seen fit to write one great master work in Economics. The characteristic features of what he has done for economic theory are, however, sufficiently outstanding in these essays. They include a wide survey of the development of economic thought, a searching reinvestigation of the foundations and method of economic science, an exposition of the relation of economics to the general field of human interest, especially as cultivated by the social sciences, a refreshing formulation of the nature of the economic problem, a masterly criticism of the work of modern economic scholarship, and a stimulating outlook toward the tasks of the future.

The work of Dr. Patten, revealed in these essays as in his better known writings, is of more than ordinary interest to the student of social forces. The analysis is often so subtle and the thought is often, to the novice, so elusive, that the reader is tempted to wonder whether an amateur has any right to read the book; yet it can never be forgotten that the author is marking out in bold lines the principles on which mankind has to depend. Dr. Patten's whole work is so sociological and withal so human; he is so unfailingly optimistic, and so well grounded in his confidence in man's power to master Nature and attain to the fullness of creative life; he is so profound and scholarly while at the same time manifesting such a warm human interest in the strivings of the common humanity that one can have respect for and patience with the minutiae

of reasoning and the intricacies of deduction that otherwise would make the work so forbidding.

Professor Seager agrees with Professor Tugwell, the editor of the volume that Patten's

most characteristic contributions to economics were the evidence he presented in support of the economic interpretation of history, his distinction between the pain-deficit and pleasure-surplus stages in human progress, his insistence that there is no natural limitation on progress but that productive power is subject to the law of increasing rather than decreasing returns, his recognition that improvements in consumption may contribute to further progress quite as much as improvements in production, his emphasis on dynamic economics, his confidence in programs calling for the aggressive interference of government with the free play of economic forces varying all the way from protection to prohibition and the economic emancipation of women, and his distrust of competition as a regulator of economic relations and confidence in co-operation and other forms of socialization.

Such positions are outstanding in these essays.

When it comes to passing judgment on the worth of such a publication, the reviewer finds it hard to believe that the work will have a wide reading or meet with much favor outside the company of Professor Patten's friends and disciples. Others will find it a mine of material for every special research; but most persons disposed to use it in this way could doubtless have found the essays elsewhere. Nevertheless it is to be hoped that the editor will see his way clear to proceed with the publication of the other material to which he refers. Dr. Patten's "comment on social movements, economic institutions, and the working of social forces" and his "essays on economic psychology" are bound to find a much wider welcome. It will be unfortunate if their publication must, as the editor indicates, depend upon the commercial success of the present collection.

ARTHUR H. CALHOUN.

Brookwood College.

* * *

THE ECONOMICS OF A FOOD SUPPLY. By W. O. Hedrick, Ph.D. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1924, xiv, 336 pp. \$2.50.

The plan of Professor Hedrick's volume is attractive, though the ground he promises to cover in relation to his number of pages may tend to place the reader a little on his guard. Perusal of a few pages, however, shows that the work is so carelessly done as to exclude it from serious con-

sideration by the scholarly reader. A few samples will suffice. On page 7, cereals are given as the type of protein-yielding foods and meats as fat-yielding. On page 9 we are told that the discovery that food changes in the body are of the nature of oxidation was made in 1870 by Lavoisier (who of course was beheaded in 1793). On page 16, the annual use of food by the entire population of the United States is 130,000,000 calories per year, while on the next page it is 4,228 calories per person per day. The percentages of the nutrient components of eggs in the table on page 21 add up to 113.9. The diction and grammar are equally weird. The first sentence in the book refers to the "danger that we may lack having enough to eat;" the author says satisfactions when he means satisfiers (p. 23), "heat or lack of it" when he means temperature, (25) and on page 24, we are informed that "food preparing was a 'rule of thumb' task in those days instead of the precise art toward which it is now tending everywhere to become."

Surprising as these things are in a book from so reputable a publisher and an author who is a professor of economics in a reputable institution, the list could be greatly extended without going beyond the first twenty-five pages. The book contains material for a useful popular treatise on the food question, and the author commands the elements of an entertaining style. But the work as printed would have to be rewritten and completely proof-read.

F. H. KNIGHT.

University of Iowa.

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ECONOMICS AND ETHICS. By J. A. R. Marriott. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, x + 293 pp. \$5.00.

In spite of its title and numerous courageous citations from Ruskin, the Christian Socialists and even the Bible, this book turns out to be just a good, popular treatise on economics, involving no important departures from conventional patterns. A slightly larger proportion of space than in the average text-book is given explicitly to the welfare aspects of economic relations, and—again aside from the brave religious words—that is the extent of its claim to the term ethics. In no sense is it a treatise on the relations between the two fields of inquiry. There is a chapter on the scope and method of economics, brief and conventional

in content; of the term ethics the book contains no definition or acknowledgment that it calls for definition. The "ethical" conclusions in regard to the economic order give it the usual vindication on the usual prudential and worldly grounds: "There would seem, then, to be no reason why conscience should disturb the satisfaction derived from a bargain mutually advantageous to the parties directly concerned, and not less calculated to confer conspicuous benefits upon the community." (P. 139, in connection with the ethics of interest taking). "'Good' people might . . . think it worth while to make some economic sacrifice . . . for the sake of the ethical advantages which might be supposed to accrue from equality of conditions. . . . But it is not with such arguments that we are . . . concerned." (P. 268, in discussing socialism). Such terms as "advantage" and "benefit" are undefined, and evidently have the meanings given to them in the "street"—or the chamber of commerce. In short, the author sets the bounds of his treatment of economics and ethics at the point where anything of the nature of a critical discussion would have to begin.

Viewed as a treatise on economics for the educated general reader, the book deserves praise. The author knows the reputable general literature of his subject and the facts of economic conditions and their history, and has a most excellent expository style. Matters in controversy among specialists are avoided, as well as all theoretical subtleties and intricacies of the science. But the chapters are informative and interesting, the discussion of current problems clear and in general sound, the doctrine liberal and the presentation tolerant. The book work is admirable. Its cost may somewhat reduce the circulation of the work, but its restriction to British data and viewpoints would exclude it from wide use in this country in any case.

F. H. KNIGHT.

University of Iowa.

* * *

ECONOMICS FOR EVERY MAN. By J. E. LeRossignol. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1923.

This book is designed as "an introduction to social economics for high-school seniors and college freshmen," on the lines of the National Educational Association's report on social studies in

1916. As to its value for college use, opinions will vary with the view taken of the introductory survey course; but granted its general aim—and certainly for high-school work—the volume deserves strong commendation. It is social in outlook without becoming sententious; serious and sincere in purpose; comprehensive without being diffuse; and far better written than the vast majority of books in its class. The institutional approach, leading through analytic description to a final survey of social forces, is well handled, and the illustrative material apt and never redundant.

A suggestion that might possibly improve its suitability for teaching may be made apropos of the supplementary readings. The author apparently started with the idea of giving to each chapter specific assignments of reasonable length as well as general collateral book-lists, and it is to be regretted that he did not carry this through. The high-school teacher's difficulties—always considerable in this field—are increased when, from an average of two or three chapters of Ely, Seager or Taussig the assignment suddenly jumps to six or nine on a single topic, or loses itself for several chapters in the general book list. The latter, always well chosen, have a haphazard appearance that might easily be avoided. The list for chapter XI, for example, includes without other differentiation than that of title, such diverse references as Cassel's *Money and Foreign Exchange after 1914*, Friday's *Profits, Wages and Prices*, and Robertson's *Money*. In the list to chapter XX there is the following sequence: Gollancz' *Industrial Ideals*, Goodrich's *Frontier of Control*, Higgs' *Physiocrats*, and Hoover's *American Individualism*. Of course, the teacher should know something of all the books likely to be useful; but an arrangement in order of difficulty or prior knowledge needed, with an indication of scope where necessary, might be more useful than an alphabetical order—and the average high school teacher starting social economics needs, and deserves, all the help he can get.

In so far as the matter of the book is open to criticism, the liability arises rather from its aim than its shortcomings, and opinions are necessarily somewhat personal. Wisely, the author attempts no discussion of 'economic laws' as such, no general theory of value or prices. But since the task of theoretic synthesis is postponed, the descrip-

tive and analytic work should be all the more careful. In the reviewer's opinion, the chapters on money and credit would have gained in descriptive value by a more precise account of the nature of credit instruments and of index numbers, as to which too much is taken for granted; and on the analytic side, by an explanation of the functions of the discount rate. Seeing that the general discussion includes business cycles and the inter-allied debts, this is hardly asking too much. A further comment, not to be pressed too far, arises anent the use of terms. Descriptive writing constantly tempts a writer to an occasional looseness of expression to which he would not be liable were he dealing with theory. Sentences like the following are of doubtful value, even in an introductory volume: "If, however, all men were equal and perfectly mobile, and there was keen competition among employees and employers, wages would be equal in all parts of the world," (p. 150); "it is over-population and poverty that drives people to poorer and poorer lands, until they reach what economists call the 'margin of cultivation'" (p. 159); "it is often said that labor could do far more if all the workers were unionized; but it is probable that they could do less, as there would then be no monopoly of labor," (p. 300). It is doubtful whether controversial social issues should be passed upon in a volume of this nature. As against the plea that interest is awakened, it may be argued that the limits of the discussion, so far from inculcating a scientific habit of mind, militate against an appreciation of the complexity of the problems, and tend to foster the habit of loose and superficial generalization which has been the bane of the social sciences.

WILLIAM A. ORTON.

Smith College.

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LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM. By John R. Commons. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1924, 388 pp.

In the latter part of the eighteenth century an industrial revolution took place in England which transformed the mechanism of industry and necessitated the re-vamping of laws relating to industry. In the latter part of the nineteenth century an industrial revolution occurred in the United States, less obvious in its manifestations,

but equally significant. Whereas the introduction of and utilization of steam as a motive power throughout England was reflected at once objectively, changing the physical aspects of industry through the setting up of the Factory System, in the United States the revolution was rather subjective, revealed through a definite, deliberate, and thorough-going shift on the part of the Supreme Court of the United States in reaching decisions in industrial cases.

It is of this shift of opinions and methods and of the results flowing directly from this shift that Professor Commons' book deals. The author portrays very graphically his idea of the situation as far as industry in this country was concerned: Economic theory had undergone an evolution through the Newtonian principles of Mechanism and the Malthusian tenets of Scarcity into the Working Rules of Going Concerns; Business methods had taken on new forms and assumed proportions of unlooked for magnitude; The Supreme Court of the United States alone seemed untouched by the developments in its environment. The endowment of this court through popular acquiescence of the authority to apply the "yardstick of the Constitution" to the legislative enactments of nation and state gave that tribunal a position of vital importance as arbiter in controversies dealing with the content and application of the working rules of business. The peculiar status of this body, in the words of the author, served to establish for it "the unique position of the first authoritative faculty of political economy in the world's history." But the Supreme Court, possessed of such a distinctive attribute, was guided in its decisions by the precedents and dicta of a feudalistic England of the seventeenth century;—it was even unswayed by or oblivious to the effects of the industrial revolution of England of the eighteenth century. It exhibited the persistence of obsolete textual methods and the dominance of an archaic spirit of literalism.

Article III of the Constitution makes no provision for advisory opinions, hence the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts consists in applying the terms of that document to "transactions" consummated by the parties of interest. By virtue of this fact these courts are committed to the principles of the Volitional School, which in con-

trast with the Mechanistic School starts "not with a commodity or with a feeling" but with a transaction. Such transactions are human will in action revealed through conduct. These are the factors whose play and interplay are worked out by the author into an evolutionary and behavioristic or volitional theory of value.

The ultra-conservative position of the United States Supreme Court was rarely assailed in the adjudication of cases arising under the first ten amendments to the Constitution. When, however, the Fourteenth Amendment proceeded to do for the states what the "Bill of Rights" had done for the Nation, the situation was changed. The Fourteenth Amendment, born in the struggle over the civil rights of the lately emancipated slaves, lived as a principle of action determining the course of conduct of a recently emerged, but assertive, industrialism.

In 1872, in the Slaughter House Cases, the Supreme Court was called upon to set forth the content of the concepts of "Liberty" and "Property" as found in the Fourteenth Amendment in the light of contemporaneous business realities. The decision was strictly in line with traditions, traditions of English origin, antedating the eighteenth century, and discarded by English courts operating under the industrial influences which superseded the feudalistic order. Liberty was declared by the court to be primarily civil liberty and directly connected with status, and its contacts with business vague and unrecognized. Property was declared to consist solely of physical things held exclusively for one's own use.

Two outstanding facts of prime importance, however, were revealed by this decision; one, the distance separating the Federal Supreme Court from living touch with the changed social and economic conditions produced by the war, and, the other, the presence of an aggressive, almost militant minority, on the Supreme bench, intent upon squaring the findings of the court with current economic tendencies. In the year 1897, the minority of the Court in the Slaughter House cases was transmuted into a triumphant majority in the case of *Allgeyer versus Louisiana*. The victory was in no wise abrupt; it was progressive or, rather, evolutionary, through such cases as *Munn versus Illinois* and the *Minnesota Rate Case*.

The decision in the *Allgeyer* case marks the transition in the definition of Property from merely physical objects to exchange value of every sort and kind and likewise the transition of the definition of Liberty from a negative concept, consisting in the absence of restraint, to a positive concept, evidenced by the presence of Powers of definite legal import. Henceforth the United States was committed to a recognition of the economic power of property as distinguished from the physical power of property exercised on behalf of citizens. As expressed by the author (pp. 164-165) "the shift in the meaning of property from things to the capitalization of things as assets and liabilities is a shift from the feudal law meaning of physical things, held exclusively for one's own use, to the business law meaning of property as purchasing power, exchange value power of acquisition or prices available in one's business." As the *Allgeyer* case was the evidence of the changed sentiments of the Court with respect to the working content of Property and Liberty, so the case of *Hurtado versus California*, of date 1884, marks the great and important change in the definition of "due process of law." The earlier expressions of the Court showed no variation from the time-honored English viewpoint; it was either law of the land or a certain prescribed procedure. There was no differentiation to be made in its application to civil and criminal matters. In the *Hurtado* case such a discrimination was made in favor of the civil jurisdiction, when the opinion of the majority of the Court declared that in civil questions "due process" becomes "due purpose" rather than "due procedure" and this distinction finds place in all the subsequent decisions of the Court turning upon the significance of "due process of law." In the case of *Frank versus Magnum* (1915) dissenting opinions suggest the logic and expediency of extending the "due purpose" construction to the criminal branch, thus restoring the identity of civil and criminal jurisdiction in this particular.

The present volume, the first of a promised series, is largely a treatise of Constitutional Law. The focus of analysis is that of an economist who sees Business working in and through and under political forms all the while modifying, overturning, and supplanting in the exercise of its primacy among jurat relationships. The historical back-

ground is admirably worked out and replete with valuable citations. The book commends itself alike to the favorable attention of the student of Jurisprudence, Economics, Psychology, Constitutional Law, and Sociology. The collation, classification, and coördination of materials makes this study of Professor Commons a unique and highly practical contribution to science. The author, however, has seen fit to characterize the work as "essentially theoretical."

JOHN C. DUNNING.

Brown University.

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THE OIL TRUSTS AND ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS. By E. H. Davenport and Sidney Russell Cooke. New York: Macmillan, 1924. \$2.50.

No one needs to be told that the importance of oil as a factor in international affairs—not to speak of domestic politics—is due to a technical revolution. And not many need to be reminded of the vital part which fuel oil for the fleets, light spirit for aircraft, gasoline for motor transport played in the recent war and are likely to play in any wars of the immediate future. Nor has any well-informed person been able to doubt that this condition has conspired with the commercial duel of two great cosmopolitan trusts seriously to disturb international relations since the war. But there has been lacking hitherto any plausible, connected survey of this duel and its political concomitants.¹ Two young Englishmen have now supplied the lack in a book which is as welcome for its readability as for its critical insight.

Two major delusions, according to Messrs. Davenport and Cooke, have turned a simple business competition for markets and sources of supply into a grave international problem. One of these was American, the other chiefly British. The American delusion was premised on the dogma of oil-exhaustion. American oil-fields were played out; and everybody was in a conspiracy to prevent Americans from controlling any

more. Even before the war this notion had a bearing upon our Mexican policy. At its close the chorus of opinion swelled into unison on the theme that the peak of oil production within the borders of the United States had passed, and that American industry and American pleasure must look increasingly to foreign sources of supply for a commodity essential to them. For half a century the United States had supplied the bulk of the world's consumption of petroleum. The Standard Oil combination dominating the home market had extended the use first of kerosene, then of petrol, into foreign markets, vanquishing all competitors in most of them. However, as it had never engaged largely in the actual production of oil at home, it had given no heed to the acquisition of prospective oil fields abroad. A rival trust, taking advantage of its negligence, had arisen in Holland and Great Britain, headed by the redoubtable Sir Henri Deterding, which was rapidly gaining control of undeveloped sources of oil supply far exceeding the American reserves. "Just when the point has been reached that 'oil is King'," wrote a London banker with oil shares to sell, "the United States finds her chief source of domestic supply beginning to dry up" and wherever she turns abroad "that British enterprise has been before her, and that the control of all the most promising properties is in British hands."

That in this process the Royal Dutch-Shell group had a good deal of the sort of support which is referred to in British blue-books as "unofficial" no one has denied. The belief spread rapidly in American opinion and was voiced by the State Department that this support was official and a matter of deliberate contrivance on the part of the British government to work injury to the United States.

Davenport and Cooke do not contend that the belief in foreign discrimination was wholly without foundation. But they have no difficulty in showing that it was greatly exaggerated. On the other hand they contend with much reason that the prospective decline of American oil production was wholly mythical. As a matter of fact, production has not yet begun to decline. In 1913 domestic production was roughly 248 million barrels, in 1919, 377 million. In succeeding years it increased to 443, 472 and 551 million barrels respectively. And in each of these years it was

¹ The booklet by Francis Delaisi (*Oil: its Influence on Politics*, London, 1922) was a gorgeous narrative of the struggles of Standard Oil with the sinister menace of Royal-Dutch-Shell. Its melodrama, however, was not able to employ complete accuracy as a tool. And the narrative broke off unfortunately at the San Remo agreement of April 24, 1920, when the international position of Standard Oil was apparently at its nadir. Davenport and Cooke cite no evidence for their suggestion that Delaisi's book was inspired by Standard Oil. But had Mr. A. C. Bedford desired a book to knock his Shell rivals he could not have procured a better one. Delaisi is a disciple of Saint-Simon; so too are more masters of finance than generally realize it.

solemnly announced that the peak of production had been reached and that further increases in consumption would have to be met from foreign supplies. Reckoning imported oil from Mexico in production, and oil exported from the United States in consumption, the authors show that production has in fact been increasing more rapidly than consumption, which a glance at the price of gasoline would have assured them more quickly. Doubtless the production of American oil approaches exhaustion as a limit. But until that limit is reached, a remote speculation, demand brings out the oil. Consequently the concern which the American oil interests have manifested about the disposition of foreign oil reserves has nothing to do with an approaching dependence of American industry upon foreign oil. The dependence is that of their own business organization for the supplies with which to compete effectively with foreign business rivals for foreign markets.

The second major delusion which the authors stress was the belief held with special tenacity in Great Britain that "oil is power." President Harding is said to have declared that "of two countries, one with access to oil and one without, but equal in other respects, the one without access to oil is at the mercy of the other, both in a commercial and a military sense."

That there is some commercial sense in this if for "country" be substituted "business concern," the authors do not convincingly dispute. The strategic importance of oil, however, is less simple than strategists of the geological school make out. In the case of Great Britain it was a belief in the mystical qualities of oil-power which led that government to carry out Winston Churchill's scheme of purchasing control of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. There was no oil in Great Britain. The supplies of it were in the hands of two trusts. Oil was so vital that the British government should have its own supplies under its own control if it had to prospect the four corners of the globe for them and involve itself in endless political entanglements to protect its business commitments. In fact the business enterprise in which the British government engaged in Persia spread rapidly to Mesopotamia. To date the Anglo-Persian has taken participations in oil companies in Roumania and Hungary, has oil rights to the

whole of Macedonia, and in the form of the D'Arcy Exploration Company has been prospecting in Venezuela, the Argentine and elsewhere outside the political frontiers of the British empire. Some of this activity has had special political aims in view, the exploitation of strategically located oil; some of it has been more purely commercial. Yet at no time has this commercial control of oil resources been of strategic importance apart from British seapower. Given seapower, Davenport and Cooke argue in effect, the oil in Persia and Venezuela can be secured whether Great Britain owns the wells or not. Without it there is no way of making these remote supplies of oil available when they are needed. There is no strategic virtue in the mere ownership of wells.

Upon these delusions of oil-power and oil-exhaustion the authors place responsibility for most of the political consequences of the struggle for oil. The story is a long one and only some of its episodes may be referred to. It shows an American Secretary of State demanding recognition of the open door in mandated territories upon the high ground of principle only to abandon it as the argument turns to his disadvantage to make a frank appeal for a share in the spoils. It shows the British government sacrificing the commercial interests of its oil company to bribe the Standard Oil ineffectually to hold its peace. It shows conference after conference summoned for European reconstruction, disrupted and thrown into confusion by the intermeddling of American "observers." It shows proposals of Soviet recognition held up pending arrangements for Russian oil development which will satisfy the rival trusts and their satellites. It shows Belgium and France playing the game of Standard Oil in the confused period which succeeded the Genoa conference. It shows "open door in mandated territories" translated into "participation of the strongest in monopoly." It shows the American government clamoring for such an open door in British territories, and excluding British tankers from the coast-wise trade, British oil companies from the Philippines (until 1922) and British prospectors from the public lands. It damages seriously the illusion many Americans entertain that since 1919 the United States has not taken part in European affairs, or in effect sided in its quarrels. And while not giving the British government a clean

bill of health, it reveals a quantity of ineptitude, inconsistency, ignorance and insincerity which would be surprising in a cabinet of "best minds" had not domestic politics previously disclosed the truth. From Mr. Bryan "talking just like a Standard Oil man" in 1913 to Mr. Fall foisting forged proclamations onto the British government so clumsily constructed that it seems impossible that they could have deceived a congressman, American public men seem to have been at the mercy of every piece of tittle-tattle which interested parties could bring to their attention. The government has had no intelligence service adequate to evaluate at its real worth the propaganda which private oil interests kept in circulation to boom the markets or aid their commercial strategy.

As Englishmen, the persuasiveness of the authors is directed chiefly at urging their government to surrender its share in the Anglo-Persian Oil company, to divest itself of business activities outside the area of its political control which have unavoidably led it into compromising diplomatic positions, not to say numerous expensive military ventures. They would view with favor complete international control of the oil business, with the pro-rating of expenditure and profit, but only if the principle were applied to fields in the United States as well as elsewhere in the world. Realizing that this is not at present within the sphere of practical politics, they urge as alternative the principle of the "open door" all around; no discriminations; no pooling of monopolistic concessions; above all, no intermeddling with rights already acquired.

Messrs. Davenport and Cooke see a propagandist up every oil-bearing tree. Their own proposals must gladden the heart of the Napoleonic Sir Henri Deterding, for they would secure the Royal Dutch-Shell group in the enjoyment of the fruits of their forehandedness. Nevertheless they lie definitely in the direction of the disinterested conduct of public affairs. And they are in the direction of removing the hysteria and public clamor from the oil business.

An inference which the authors do not draw but which lies on the very surface of the facts which they assemble, is the absurdity of regarding a cosmopolitan business enterprise as a "citizen" or "subject" of any particular state. Sir Henri

Deterding, Dutch by birth, becomes naturalized in England and at a stroke the combination of which he is the master-mind becomes a British undertaking and claims protection from the very government which is competing with it for markets and oil-fields through the Anglo-Persian company. The Standard Oil, insufficiently "protected" by American "observers," constitutes subsidiaries in European states, which enable it to use the governments of those states to carry out its plans. An unpopular domestic trust by aggressive business adventuring abroad runs afoul a foreign government, turns hero for political purposes, and without stooping to the vulgarities of a Doheny or a Sinclair, rallies an overwhelming public opinion to sustain its negotiations. These materials may go some day into a book on the incidence of the international trust upon the theory and substance of the modern state.

LELAND H. JENKS.

Amherst College.

* * *

THE COMING OF COAL. By Robert W. Bruere. New York: The Association Press, 1922, 123 pp.

A very well written little book designed for the general reader, aimed to stimulate an attitude of ethical idealism and to apply specifically to the problems of the coal industry the social message of Christianity. Bruere relates the coal industry to the whole "drama of civilization," beginning with the Carboniferous Age. He shows how it was the industrial revolution which made coal a decisive factor in man's life, and intensified the acquisitive struggle while at the same time making that struggle less necessary.

After describing vividly the cruel exploitation of labor in the British coal mines of a century ago, and the planless development and wastefulness of the American coal industry, he uses the formula "consciousness of kind" to interpret the organization of the exploited miners for self protection, the organization of the operators, and the movement toward greater public control of the industry.

He brings skillfully to the reader's attention certain older habits of social thought which are being superseded by a more collectivist philosophy, such as "greed is held in check by greed," "to allow mishap and disaster to have its natural effect as the penalty for and the cure of the evils

which result from negligence," "the rights and interests of the laboring man will be protected and cared for, not by the labor agitators, but by the Christian men to whom God has given the control of the property interests of the country."

The newer technical advances, such as the substitution of oil and water power in part for coal, the burning of coal at the mine and the superpower plan, and the coal by-product industries, are discussed as necessary material means for still further "building up the good life." His whole train of thought works up to a climax which social scientists will heartily approve:

"... the Brotherhood of Man, cannot be built by fiat or verbal proclamation. The building of a worthy civilization is as definitely an engineering enterprise as the building of the Panama Canal. . . . The theory of nationalization, like the theory of collective bargaining and the traditional theory of progress by free competition, must each be tested, as the existing social and industrial order must be tested, in the light of painfully ascertained facts, and in terms of their effect upon the individual personality."

"As to the relative merits of the policy of national ownership . . . and the policy of free competition and unrestrained private initiative . . . it is for the informed public ultimately to judge."

There is nothing in the book which will be new to the sociologist, but as a means of popular enlightenment and for the stimulation of students it should prove of great value.

It would seem that an author who projects his social imagination so far into the past and the future ought not, as Bruere does, to overlook the following two phases of the problem. His vision of the future seems to be merely that of a continually increasing material production, and that an increase of all sorts of commodities without discrimination. (1) Sooner or later, probably before we can have the "Kingdom of God on Earth," we have got to solve the problem of controlling the increase of population itself. It would be a mistake to let our idealism rest wholly upon increasing production which may some day find its limit. (2) Sooner or later we shall have to decide whether any further increase of *per capita* consumption of material goods is worth while, or whether we shall not rather devote our increased productive power to a radical shortening of the hours of labor, and to the encouragement of those leisure-time activities which funda-

mentally satisfy the human spirit without laying upon it, as does our present day "competitive consumption," ever heavier burdens of material cost.

But on the other hand, Mr. Bruere might well claim, those questions are properly the subject of another book.

A well selected bibliography is appended.

JOSEPH K. TOLSOM.

Dartmouth College.

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COAL'S WORST YEAR. By Helen S. Wright. Boston: R. G. Badger, 1924, 202 pp.

This will prove a useful reference book for the student of the coal problem who wants a conveniently assembled record of events and official statements in the industry in the United States from the beginning of the strike in April, 1922, until about May 1, 1923. The author makes her chief contribution in her following up with thoroughness the development of definite situations, such as the Herrin massacre and riot trials, the reaction of New England to the coal shortage, and the conflict between the local and national interest concerning the shipments of coal through northern New York into Canada. The teacher or writer who wants illustrative material in the field of general labor problems, economics, or sociology, will find here concise summaries of events for which he might have to spend hours searching through newspaper files, and which are not given in sufficient detail for his purposes by the regular yearbooks.

The book consists largely of quotations from current periodical literature and of digests of published statements. Fair space and impartial treatment is given to both operators and mine workers. There is no attempt at any original analysis of the problem, and the author's attitude as far as revealed is mainly one of deploring the inefficiency of the industry and of urging in a general way vigorous measures for controlling it in the interest of the public.

In style the book is somewhat choppy and gives the impression of being hastily thrown together, perhaps a necessary defect of this kind of work. A few facts and statistics concerning the historical and economic background of the coal industry are thrown in for the reader's convenience, largely in the first chapter, but these

seem to be selected and organized in hasty journalistic fashion, and such economic analysis and generalization as occurs is superficial.

JOSEPH K. TOLSOM.

Dartmouth College.

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INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL POLICIES, with special reference to the United States. A text-book. By George Mygatt Fisk (deceased) and Paul Skeels Peirce. New York: the Macmillan Company, 1923, xii, 322 pp.

This is a much revised and up-to-date edition of Professor Fisk's "International Commercial Policies" written in 1907. It is a scholarly, systematic treatment, probably the best available in English within its particular scope, on the methods of political control of international trade. A well organized bibliography and set of problems for each chapter, and a general bibliography and 16 page index at the end, greatly add to its usefulness. Great care has been exercised in the selection of material and in securing criticism from others. It does not, like Culbertson's "Commercial Policy in War Time and After," attempt to present an interpretation of the phenomena of policy and a program for the future, and it does not advocate or condemn anything. It does not describe any of the private business machinery of international trade, and devotes just one chapter to "quasi-public and private trade promoting in-

stitutions." But within its own field it is comprehensive, at the same time avoiding detail.

Mercantilism, free trade, and protection are discussed in connection with their historical development, and the economic theories on which they were based are merely stated. About half the book is given to description of the different kinds of tariffs, commercial treaties, and other methods of trade control, and their administration. Three chapters are given to the governmental promotion of export trade and two to the promotion and politics of navigation.

The weaknesses of this book are mainly the weaknesses of the whole field of literature which it represents. There is a great need for the treatment of commercial policy in intimate connection with the fundamental economic conditions on which it is based. This should include the outstanding facts of economic geography; some simplified, well chosen quantitative data on international trade, which are perhaps best presented through maps and charts; and furthermore a description of the political alignment of the major economic interests in the various nations. We need an explanation of the "why" of commercial policies, not however in terms of general economic theory, but in terms of geographic, commodity, and social facts.

JOSEPH K. TOLSOM.

Dartmouth College.

BIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF HUMAN PROBLEMS

F. H. HANKINS

WHAT IS MAN? By J. Arthur Thomson, New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1924, x, 331 pp.

A COMPLETE natural history of man, reaching all the way from his zoological pedigree to questions of race mixture and problems of progress. It is written in that limpid, entertaining style for which Professor Thomson has become justly famous. While extremely simple in form it is scientific in tone and content, though in no way can it be considered a contribution to knowledge or understanding. It is too comprehensive and too general to contribute any matter or points of view of special interest or value, although there are occasional suggestions

of points of view which it would be interesting and valuable to have treated in further detail. It is a work which should be of great usefulness in connection with introductory courses in sociology, because of its readability and interest and its logical arrangement.

Following the chapter on "Man's Pedigree" come in succession: "Primitive Man"; "Evolution of Man's Mind"; "Man as a Social Person"; "Behavior and Conduct"; "Variability and Inertia"; "Sifting and Winnowing"; "Contact of Races"; "Disharmonies and Diseases"; and "What Is Man Not?"

Among interesting points of view is the dis-

cussion of the significance of infant helplessness; arborial descent; the origin of marriage; the evolution of mental capacities; a compromise view of instinct; the conflict between cultural advance and the preservation of racial soundness; and the possibilities of human progress.

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EVERYDAY BIOLOGY. By J. Arthur Thomson. New York: George H. Doran Company, 1924, 262 pp. \$1.25.

This is one of the volumes in a new series being issued by Doran in the Modern Readers' Bookshelf, a series designed to carry out the purposes set forth by James Harvey Robinson in his "Humanizing of Knowledge." Robinson had said: "Of all human ambitions an open mind eagerly expectant of new discoveries and ready to remold convictions in the light of added knowledge and dispelled ignorances and misapprehensions, is the noblest, the rarest and the most difficult to achieve." This work pretends to no new discoveries; it is not comprehensive. It is "an unconventional introduction to biological ways of thinking." It sticks close to everyday experience, is full of human interest, and imbued with the spirit of both scientific inquiry and a ripened philosophy of living. It is a book for the educated layman, rather than for the class room, but one must say this primarily because our pedantry and our strenuous efforts to divide the domain of knowledge into narrow special preserves is forcing us to make our students into ignorant specialists rather than to acquaint them with the knowledge most worth while for sane living. There will be few, even among students of biology, who will not find this book worth reading.

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EUGENIQUE ET SELECTION. By E. Apert, L. Cuénot, Le Major Darwin, F. Houssay, L. March, G. Papillaut, Ed. Perrier, Charles Richet, and G. Schreiber. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1922, 248 pp. 15 fr.

This is a collection of essays growing out of discussion at l'Ecole des Hautes-Etudes Sociales in 1920-1921. They reveal the concern of French scientists over the havoc wrought by the war in the population basis of national life, and the state of scientific thought on questions of human heredity. On the whole one gathers the impression that the primary object was not to present a realistic story of after-war conditions but to reassure the

nation by a process of rationalization that all's well, or at least nearly so. There is in most of the essays an overt or tacit recognition of the inheritance of acquired characters, so that the emphasis is on the improvement of environmental conditions rather than on questions of eugenic selection. Perrier, Houssay and March align themselves definitely with the Lamarckians, while Richet, Apert and Scheiber confuse the effects of bodily hygiene, sanitary science, and social prophylaxis with the operations of heredity. There is throughout a marked tendency to minimize the effects of the war in killing the young vigorous males and leaving the older and defective at home to reproduce. There is a noticeable emphasis on the necessity of increasing the birth-rate (regardless of quality) and favor for the numerous measures, actual and proposed, for inducing the population to multiply.

There are, of course, exceptions, as when Richet makes a vigorous attack on the assumption that military rejects are fit to father the race. To the objection that legal prohibition of the marriage of defectives will increase the number of "free unions," he replies that control will always be limited to what is feasible, that such unions must always remain beyond control. He regrets that the heroic measure of sterilization cannot be resorted to. He would prohibit the marriage of idiots, insane, criminal and the weak, and would seek to restore a measure of sexual selection in mating by emphasis on attraction rather than cupidity. Papillaut also shows little sympathy with any maudlin sentimentality and emphasizes the role of hereditary factors.

By all odds the best essay is that by Cuénot on "Génétique et Adaptation." This is a thorough and penetrating discussion of the deeply philosophical question as to how adaptations are brought about. It involves a full discussion of the inheritance of acquired characters, in which the author rejects all evidence as to the inheritance of mutilations, doubts the validity of Kammerer's claims, is sceptical of the recent results obtained by Smith and Guy, inclines to the acceptance of inheritable effects of climatic factors, and points out that selection seems to play a larger role in producing adaptations than much recent theory would admit. While rejecting any suggestion of vitalism or entelechy, he suggests that there is in

the play of organic forces some factor not yet isolated which will help to make clearer how nature produces the extraordinary structures whereby organic life is adapted to envioning conditions.

Taken as a whole this volume is not particularly creditable to French science. There is nowhere any indication of familiarity with those numerous statistical studies which have derived from Galton; there is no evidence of familiarity with those numerous recent studies in the mechanism of heredity as illustrated by the work of Morgan and others in this country. The work deeply reflects French conditions in its emphasis on a higher birth rate, in its failure anywhere to point to the dysgenic selection of war, and in its general reliance on hygienic measures to improve racial quality.

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HISTOIRE DES DOCTRINES DE LA POPULATION. By René Gonnard. Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 352 pp. 15 fr.

A comprehensive survey of ideas about population. One-fourth of the book is devoted to the ancient and mediaeval writers, nearly one-half to those of the Mercantilist and Physiocratic periods, and the remainder to Malthus and recent writers, especially French. Though sketchy it is a work of considerable value.

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MATHEMATISCHE BEVOLKERUNGSTHEORIE AUF GRUND VON G. H. KNIBBS' "THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF POPULATION." By Dr. E. Czuber. Leipzig: Verlag von B. G. Teubner, 1923, xxvi, 357 pp. Paper cover, M8.40; cloth, M10.60.

A work of first-rate importance in the treatment of population in its dynamic aspects by advanced mathematical and statistical methods.

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YOUTH AND THE RACE. By Sir James Marchant (Editor). New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1923, xx, 378 pp. \$6.00.

THE CLAIMS OF THE COMING GENERATION. By Sir James Marchant (Editor). New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1923, 175 pp. \$2.50.

The first of these volumes is the Fourth Report of the National Birth-Rate Commission 1920-1923; it deals with the specific topic of what and when sex instruction should be given to young

people. Its subtitle is: "The development and education of young citizens for worthy parenthood"; and this very well expresses the aims of the second of the above works. The Commission which has carried on its work under the direction of the National Council of Public Morals has published two works already well-known in this country, "The Declining Birth-Rate" and "Problems of Population and Parenthood." A third comprised "The Report of the Cinema Commission." This fourth report, which includes the original evidence, limits itself specifically to the question relating to sex education. There are still to come volumes dealing with the Sociological, Physiological, Religious, Statistical and International aspects of birth-rates, parenthood, motherhood, etc. The smaller volume is the outcome of a special conference under different auspices and includes essays by Dean Inge, Sir Arthur Newsholme, Sir Frederick Mott, J. Arthur Thomson, Sir James Yoxall, Dr. Mary Scharlieb, and others. These volumes and these commissions and related works and activities, such as the National Council for the Promotion of Race Renewal and the Eugenics Education Society, indicate that the English public is aware of the tremendous importance of preserving and even improving the quality of the race.

The Commission takes a cautious and restrained position. It believes sex instruction should not be forced, should come simply and naturally in answer to questions or curiosity. It should not be exploited or unduly magnified and should not be separated from moral instruction in general. Emphasis should be on the achievement of a healthy and happy marriage rather than on the dangers of illicit intercourse. Recognizing that knowledge in itself is not a complete safeguard of virtue the Commission emphasizes the desirability of giving sex instruction under conditions which elicit sympathetic understanding between listener and instructor. The content of the school curriculum is surveyed and plans for carrying out the general responsibility of the community for the adolescent are presented.

Among the essays in the second volume may be mentioned especially "The Value of Mental Hygiene," by Sir Frederick Mott; "The Sex-Instruction of the Young," by Sir Arthur Newsholme; and "The Moral Training of Modern

Girls," by Dr. Mary Scharlieb. Throughout the volume the tone is elevated but free from cant and sterile moralizing. There is recognition of a new social order in which the mores of a passing age do not fit. As Dr. Scharlieb says, the modern girl has set herself toward "a more complete realization of self, a greater determination to self-government, and to the achievement of economic and social independence" (p. 190). We no longer believe that "ignorance is innocence." There is a belief that life can be fuller and freer and at the same time richer. But there is also evidence that many think of freedom in terms of the rutting stag and would degrade love to mere animality. These volumes seem to agree that the psycho-analytic literature has grossly exaggerated the evils of restraint and repression; they emphasize rather the psychic values which can only be won by those who learn the power of self-control and the degradation and weakness which result from an easy self-indulgence. But the old taboos are gone. It may take a generation of experimentation to find new modes of adjustment which shall secure at once sex freedom for women, the reproduction of the race, the rearing of children under wholesome conditions, the elimination of venereal disease, and the wider realization of the psychic satisfactions of a sane and life-renewing marital relationship for both sexes. There will be many tragedies; but these we have always had. Such volumes as those under review serve a useful purpose in bringing out into fuller public discussion subjects too long tabooed in England and America. But one leaves them with the feeling that they are too general and too little specific, too little charged with the illuminating realism of science.

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THE MECHANISM AND PHYSIOLOGY OF SEX DETERMINATION. By Richard Goldschmidt, trans. by Wm. J. Dakin. New York: George H. Doran Company, 1923, viii, 259 pp., 113 illustrations. \$6.00

A welcome summary of many recent investigations into the nature of sex and sex differences. While a necessity for the biologist, it is written in a style and so clearly illustrated that it will prove of the greatest interest to those students of the social sciences who wish to inform themselves as to the present state of expert biological knowledge on so important a subject. Whole

generations of American students were brought up on the obsolete theories presented by the late Lester F. Ward in the fourteenth chapter of his "Pure Sociology." Those theories were effectively demolished and the modern views summarized in a doctor's thesis, "The New Biology and the Sex Problems in Society" by M. M. Knight and published in a volume entitled "Taboo and Genetics" (1920). Knight's thesis was based largely on the work of Goldschmidt and it is of great interest to note that the view he presented needs no modification in the light of this translation. It is of interest also to note that Goldschmidt's summary of recent experimental evidence draws upon the same sources as did the thesis, namely, Goodale, Morgan, Loeb, Lillie, Neugebauer and Riddle. Goldschmidt, however, makes no reference to the earlier work of Otto Weiniger (1901) nor to the contemporary work of Blair Bell (1916), both of which had been drawn upon by Knight.

But this work is written strictly from the standpoint of the geneticist who has an interest also in endocrinology. In the first place, sex is treated as a Mendelian trait, maleness or femaleness being either dominant and present or recessive and non-apparent. Experimental evidence has established that one parental sex is heterozygous for the sex determining factor and the other homozygous. The heterozygous sex produces two kinds of gametes, usually one with an odd and the other with an even number of chromosomes. These gametes are sex determining. For the Insecta the sex thus fixed in the zygote is definitely and irrevocably fixed and cannot be altered by the removal of the gonads or by the implanting of the sex cells of the opposite sex. But for some invertebrates and all birds and mammals the development of the secondary sex traits is profoundly affected by the hormonal secretions of one or more ductless glands. These secretions are essential to the development of these traits and, therefore, an alteration in the glands alters the traits.

These principles give rise to the concept "intersexuality" and to the explanation of such abnormalities as cock-feathered female birds, free-martin cattle, hermaphrodites, gynandromorphs and all other forms of mixed-sex and inter-sex types. The intersex is an individual

which has developed as one sex up to a certain point from which the development continues in terms of the other sex. It does not, therefore, reflect an intermediate stage between the sexes so much as it represents male traits in some parts of the soma and female traits in other parts. There are many examples, notably among the insects, of zygotic or genetic intersexuality which may be explained by a lack of balance or normal harmony between the factors for maleness and femaleness in the zygote. This results in a disturbance of the normal valency and rapidity of development of the endocrine factors which affect the development of the traits distinctive of the sexes. Then there is the strictly harmonic intersexuality of the alteration of the sex balance by castration or by the transplantation of sex glands. Other forms of intersexuality are of little sociological interest.

On this basis the author studies hermaphroditism, parthenogenesis and sex, the numerical ratio of the sexes, and sex determination in man. Some of the conclusions of the last section are of interest. It seems probable, though not certain, that there are two sorts of sperms in man with forty-seven and forty-eight chromosomes respectively. The older work on this subject had indicated a diploid number of twenty-four chromosomes; Guyer (1910 and 1916) found only twenty-two; Winiwarter (1912) found forty-seven, which in the maturation division formed two kinds of sperms with twenty-three and twenty-four chromosomes. He found forty-eight to be characteristic of the female and forty-seven of the male. The manner of inheritance of sex-linked characters is explained, even that of haemophilia which is inherited only through apparently healthy females but appears in males only. Pseudohermaphroditism is a form of zygotic intersexuality, which implies intersexual harmonic activity because "the internal secretion of the sex gland is interpolated as the intermediary between the sex factors and the definitive differentiation" (p. 249). One of the most interesting observations is that homosexuality may be viewed as a form of intersexuality which may be corrected by the transplantation of normal glands. The author finds no safe answer to the question why the human sex ratio differs from the normal of 1:1.

Hereafter those who discuss sex differences and the question of superiority and inferiority must take full account of the concept of sex as fundamentally a matter of endocrine balance and give full weight to the evidence of inter-sexual gradations.

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EDUCATION OF GIFTED CHILDREN. By Lulu M. Stedman. Yonkers-on-Hudson: World Book Company, 1924, viii, 192 pp. \$1.80.

One of the Measurement and Adjustment Series edited by Lewis M. Terman. It is an effort to find out something more about gifted children by means of case studies of sixteen remarkable children and to determine the results of various experiments during five years in giving them full opportunity for the development of their gifts. It should be the forerunner of many similar studies, for it is gradually dawning on the educational world that it is not possible by education to create talent, that intellectual superiority is a matter of natural inheritance. Moreover, as Professor Terman points out, the gifted child is no longer looked upon as a pathological monstrosity, as a pitiable abnormality, to be safeguarded from stimulation. He is seen to have, as a rule, both physical and mental superiority and to carry this superiority with him into maturity. Our sentimental attachment to the idea of innate equality has prevented us from realizing that these gifted children are the sole sources of our geniuses and that one of them is worth to the advancement of our culture many thousands of mediocrities.

In most cases gifted children are found to have the same traits as ordinary children only in higher development. Some of them have specialized talents; some have a pronounced aversion to physical activities and learn manual things only under mild compulsion; some seem unsociable or highly individualized. As a rule they have superior health, are exceedingly studious, and show a superior development of critical ability. The fundamental principle of pedagogy here adopted is not to push the gifted child through the grades as fast as possible but to provide an "opportunity room" in which supplementary activities can be carried on. In other words, the curriculum can be broadened and enriched at every stage. A list of nineteen ways in which this can be done

is given. Thus we have a new type of "special class"; not the defective but the superior. The author suggests the necessity of efforts to correlate the work of such classes with the high school and the college.

To the reviewer the problems and possibilities envisaged in Miss Stedman's book seem almost epoch making. Superior children carry such immense potentialities for the rate of social advance and the character of social achievements that society can afford every necessary expense to cultivate and give free reign to their powers. Their very superiority has been a source of their disapproval in a naively democratic community. Of course, it is easy to exaggerate the possibilities in this line for we do not yet know how much formal education can contribute to adult superiority. But even if its benefits be mostly negative, in preventing wasted years or warped purposes, the development of the educational technique of giving superior children the full advantage of their superiority will represent a triumph of science over sentiment.

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DAEDALUS, OR SCIENCE AND THE FUTURE. By J. B. S. Haldane.

ICARUS, OR THE FUTURE OF SCIENCE. By Bertrand Russell. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1924, 93 and 64 pp. \$1.00 each.

These are both extremely interesting little books. Professor Haldane combines with a remarkable imagination and gift for brilliant expression a sparkling wit. Russell, in this volume, is typically himself in that he engages in mild Utopianism and paradoxical speculations. Both volumes need to be read to be fully appreciated.

When Haldane sets forth the possibility that through synthetic chemistry many fundamental foods may be made as cheap as sawdust, the dependence on the farmer eliminated, the whole nation urbanized and the race reproduced by means of artificial fertilization of ova developed *in vitro* he reminds one of Jules Verne at his best. His work may be taken more as an imaginative dream of what a super-science may accomplish rather than what it seems likely, in view of immediate prospects, to accomplish. And yet it is impossible to deny that all of his dream or the equal of it may some day come true.

Russell's work is less interesting but not less valuable. In his presentation of the dangers of the growth of science he says much less than many others have said. In characteristic vein he points to industrialism as the cause of war, but fails to point out that international capitalism may well become the chief safeguard against war among western nations in the future. He emphasizes the danger of over-centralization and control in modern industry and politics, but fails to note that social integration with consequent centralization of control is an inevitable accompaniment of advanced civilization. Even when he points out that the fundamental dilemma of every scheme of social reconstruction is the conflict between selfishness and altruism he restates an ancient theme. His manner of putting it is quaint: "Only kindness can save the world, and even if we knew how to produce kindness (which we do not), we should not do so unless we were already kindly" (p. 62). This harmonizes with his view that world stability can only be achieved by force, which at first will be cruel and despotic, a view which does not reflect even a jot of the pacifist who made Bertrand Russell a world figure in war time. Nor does it set well with his concluding remarks that probably the only hope for the preservation of civilization from the mobs which science is raising up through the easy gratification of passions is in the establishment of a world dominion by the United States. But on second thought "the collapse of our civilization would be preferable to this alternative." In reading Russell one must remember that he is merely playing a little game with his mind; he is too sophisticated, if not too cynical, to take himself seriously and one should read him for entertainment and mental exhilaration, but not for systematic or constructive thought.

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BEHIND AND BEFORE. Two Essays on the Relation of History, Politics and Eugenist Warnings. W. E. Heitland. Cambridge: University Press, 1924, xv, 166 pp.

This book includes two very thoughtful essays and several appendices by a man who is seriously concerned over the questions why popular government is so inefficient and whether there are any means whereby it can be made more efficient. In the course of his discussion he ranges over a

very wide field of political and historical fact, and broaches numerous theoretical problems in the field of anthro-po-biology, politics, social psychology and ethics. He posits the fundamental and permanent importance of personalities in the determination and application of political policy. He likewise posits the general stupidity and easy deception of the mass of any population. He sees the need of education, but doubts whether democratic training will develop the popular wisdom essential for great national crises. Under the influence of democracy he sees the inevitable encroachment of the popular will upon the independence and judgment of experts in the government service. While recognizing that *vox populi* has not only a large value but also a certain inevitable finality in modern states, he doubts whether any state has ever been governed by an actual majority. Considering then that leaders are supremely important and that wise leaders are few he believes the greatest immediate problems of practical politics two-fold: (1) The devising of effective means for training leaders; (2) the cultivation of a popular tradition of toleration, non-partisanship and recognition of the necessity of leaving to experts matters concerning which only experts are entitled to respectable opinion.

It will be recognized that this is a very large order. Moreover, the reader of this volume will search in vain for anything new in answer to the inevitable questions as to how the leaders are to be chosen in the first place, and how, in the second place, people who avowedly move in the realm of tradition and emotion are to be induced to follow the judgment of the so-called experts on questions of broad public policy. Theoretically, the author is right in holding that a careful study of history ought to show that certain political policies have produced certain effects in the development of national life. But it is even more apparent that the actual determination of what policies have produced what effects is still primarily a matter of private opinion and personal predilection. Students of political and social evolution approach their study with numerous assumptions regarding fundamental causal relationships for the operation of which evidence is readily discovered. The actual processes of cultural evolution are so extremely complex that it is possible for a mere

tyro to cite concrete proof of the soundness of whatever theory appeals to his emotions and imagination as sound.

In the second essay the author considers the relation of heredity and eugenic considerations to questions of class stratification and democratic ideals. He stresses vigorously the fallacy of equality; points to the progressive elimination of the middle class (a result which has been almost wholly accomplished in Russia and Germany, and in all probability has proceeded very far in England); emphasizes the tendency of the successful classes to breed out through small families; and points out that in a democratic society there is a constant rising and sinking of individuals from one class to another. He shares the pessimistic views of the biological student of modern society as to the general trend of democratic institutions, but thinks that if vigorous thought is given to the matter it is not too late to mend. He makes the interesting but apparently wholly impractical suggestion for "associational emigration," that is, organized emigration from English towns and cities under a scheme whereby the public authorities assume the original cost both of transportation and of the purchase of lands for settlement in the Colonies. Britain would gladly export a horde of low-grade types, but the Colonies will not receive them. He concludes that the main hope for the preservation of civilization is in the operation of religious motivation in public affairs. He doubts the possibility of influencing the mass by rationalistic methods and finds in some sort of "religious motive" the main driving power for social advance.

To the reader who approaches the study of social evolution with a strong predilection in favor of positivistic assumptions this conclusion will seem like a counsel of despair. It is no doubt true that the mass of any large modern democratic nation cannot be greatly influenced by purely rationalistic appeals. Men in the mass must always be moved by their emotions. But it still remains as true as any one ever conceived it to be that only the light of reason can serve as a guide in the direction of emotional forces. After all, a very excellent type of Utopia is that envisaged by Aldous Huxley in his "Chrome Yellow" in which he pictures, after the manner of Plato, a group of superior social scientists deter-

mining what should be done in the light of scientific learning and analysis, below whom, in the Tripartite classification, come a large body of popularisers and promulgators who connect these policies with popular tradition and emotion. In this way the mass of people, still thinking of themselves as the real sovereigns but actually manipulated from above, are lead to pronounce as their own the wisdom arrived at by cold scientific analysis. On the whole Mr. Heitland has written an interesting and worth while book even though it fails to make any definite contribution to either viewpoint or technique in consideration of the problems now confronting civilization. Moreover, sociologists will be interested in various of the appendices, especially those dealing with Benjamin Kidd, Lothrop Stoddard and Madison Grant.

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PROTOPLASMIC ACTION AND NERVOUS ACTION. By Ralph S. Lillie. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1923, xii, 417 pp. \$3.00.

Since Benjamin Moore set forth in his "Origin of Life" in The Home University Library the state of research as to the chemical basis of life there has been notable progress in this field. There is the work of Loeb, Jennings and others on the physical basis of life and heredity, the remarkable results of Barrows and Carrel in cultivating living tissues *in vitro*, almost the whole of the developments in endocrinology, and the more esoteric but even more fundamental researches into the physical and chemical nature of protoplasmic structure, stimulation and response. Professor Lillie may well lay claim to eminence in the latter field and in this volume of the University of Chicago Science Series presents the present state of knowledge in terms which the sociologist will often find difficult in spite of the claim for popularity of treatment. The author disclaims any intention of inquiring into the origin of life, but obviously the discovery of how substances can be so combined in a physico-chemical sense as to exhibit the phenomena of metabolism, growth, reproduction and integrated activities must throw much light on the more philosophical question. The earlier chapters, "General Characteristics of Living Matter," "The Cellular Organization of Living Matter," and "General

Characters of Living Organisms" will appeal to sociologists who are interested in the relation of living substance to the broad evolutionary view of things in general. Some may be moved to read farther into the chemical and electrical accompaniments of living phenomena.

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THE SWEDISH NATION IN WORD AND PICTURE. By H. Lundborg and J. Runnstrom. Stockholm: Hasse W. Tullberg Company, 1921. 128 pp. and xx plates, medium quarto.

This is a jubilee volume prepared under the direction of the Swedish Society for Race-Hygiene, beautifully printed in English, with excellent photographs of 32 leading scientists, authors and statesmen, and plates representing every racial type in the country. The essays are mostly by leading anthropologists and biologists and deal primarily with Swedish racial history and present eugenic investigations and problems.

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AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY DEALING WITH THE CLASSIFICATION AND INSTRUCTION OF PUPILS TO PROVIDE FOR INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES. By Charles W. Odell. Urbana: The University of Illinois. 1923. 50 pp. 50 cents.

This is the sixteenth bulletin issued by the Bureau of Educational Research of the College of Education of the University of Illinois. It contains a list of 346 titles with brief characterization of each.

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OF ETHNOLOGICAL INTEREST

RACE PROBLEMS IN THE NEW AFRICA. By Rev. W. C. Willoughby, F. R. A. I., F. R. G. S. New York: Oxford University Press, 1923, 296 pp. \$4.50.

THIS IS ONE of many books recently published in England dealing with new additions to the Empire. The object of this one is to increase the efficiency of the church and its missionaries in saving a part of Bantu Africa for British Imperialism and its herald and apologist, Christianity. It is expected to serve "traders, miners, planters, doctors, missionaries and government officials" who are preparing for an African career. In view of the havoc recently wrought by certain features of European culture one might be pardoned a certain scepticism as to

the advisability of replacing African by European civilization. But that would doubtless be a purely moralizing attitude and hence lacking in historical realism. Africa will be Europeanized, after a fashion, and the queries which the sociologist should raise are not, "Is that right" or "Is it morally justifiable," but rather, "Why is it taking place" and "How is it being accomplished and with what effects."

This entire volume will interest the sociologist. After a short chapter giving a questionable classification of African "races," there is in Part II "A Study of Bantu Life and Thought" in which are treated their magic, religion, law and politics, family and education. The author's prolonged residence among the Bantu and his scholarly orientation give to his descriptions qualities of authenticity and authoritativeness not encountered in books of travel and only recently found in books of this nature. It is, in fact, one of the signs of the times that the missionaries tend to lose their dogmatism and begin to realize the significance and value of "primitive" religions and moral ideas and codes.

Somewhat more than half of the book is devoted to "The Europeanization of Bantu Africa." The last and longest chapter deals with "The Task of the Church" in a practical matter-of-fact manner. Between the lines one learns that there is a great deal of sectarian rivalry, petty jealousy, and proselytizing in the service of the Lord, and that the cultivation in the African mind of that state of religious frenzy known in orthodox Christian circles as "a conviction of sin" is a rare and fleeting phenomenon. Apparently these Bantu are much like white folks in that they find it easier to imitate the external formalities of Christianity than to live its professed realities.

The next longest chapter deals with "Native Labour" in which the doctrine of "White brain and Black brawn" is set forth as logically inevitable. "The prosperity of every British territory in Africa depends on the same factors. For not only do all the mines, railways, irrigation works and farms of these countries owe their existence to the coöperation of African muscles and European minds, but crowds of Europeans earn their living from Natives and from those who earn theirs from Natives. Compound managers, overseers, labour agents, interpreters, policemen, pos-

tal and railway men, government officials, doctors, schoolmasters, dealers in cattle, corn, skins, ivory and horns, up-country traders in European goods, shippers, bankers, shareholders who never see the workers by whom they live, and even missionaries—how many of these would be left in Africa if the Native foundation were withdrawn from our economic structure! And yet Whites make little effort to secure the welfare and contentment of Blacks" (p. 188). The author finds the question of Native labour truly a tragic one. The White man's aim is: "Teach the nigger to work"; but the Black man "is loath to leave freedom, home, lands and cattle for the sake of the slender rewards of the White man's service" (p. 189). But the White man must and will be served,—hence labor recruiting, labor agents, forced labor, and even a wide demand that the government make itself responsible for maintaining the labor supply. That is one problem which has been solved variously and usually crudely.

An even greater problem is how to make the Bantu industrious. On this the author says some very wise things. Far from being innately indolent the Bantu will walk a hundred miles to visit a friend or to exhibit a particularly choice product of his industry. But his tradition holds that the accumulation of wealth is a sore temptation to tribal enemies and leads to war and death. The Bantu may, therefore, be expected to become more industrious as the significance of peace and security penetrates his mores and as his wants expand under the seductive influence of Levantine traders and European customs. But it will be necessary to overcome the strenuous opposition of white craftsmen to the instruction of natives in skilled trades. And this is only one aspect of what the author calls the "Colour Bar" and which he treats in an interesting chapter (pp. 222-249), in which missionary and Christian zeal occasionally obtrudes itself into the otherwise illuminating discussion.

Those parts of this book dealing with primitive law and custom should form excellent reference and source reading for classes in social evolution; and much of the remainder should prove useful to students of imperialism, of the relations of advanced to backward peoples, or of the Negro and his future.

F. H. HANKINS.

Smith College.

THE REPORT OF THE MACKIE ETHNOLOGICAL EXPEDITION TO CENTRAL AFRICA. By John Roscoe, M.A. Part I, The Bakitara or Banyoro, pp. 370; Part II, The Banyankole, pp. 176; Part III, The Bagesu and Other Tribes of the Uganda Protectorate, pp. 205. Cambridge: The University Press, 1923 and 1924.

THE RELIGION OF LOWER RACES, as Illustrated by the African Bantu, by Edwin W. Smith, pp. 82. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923.

The value to sociologists of monographic material on primitive folk has been largely ignored by most persons in the realm of social theory. It is, of course, true that it is much easier to read works such as Spencer, Ratzel, Westermarck and Tylor and the various other compilations which have made social theorising so simple a matter, but the sad result has been that, when called upon to substantiate his theories with definite points, the sociologist has turned to one of these works, abstracted such customs as apply, and gone on blissfully ignoring the facts that in almost any aspect of society the trained ethnologist can find as many contradictions as confirmations. The first three works under discussion are among those which, perhaps, the sociologist might be asked to read. Despite certain defects in the treatment of his material, Cannon Roscoe has succeeded in giving us a vivid picture of the lives of at least two of the peoples he portrays, and excellent sketches of others. To most students of society, "primitive" man is pictured more or less *en bloc*. The American Indians are all large and red and use wampum for economic purposes and, above all, wear war bonnets of eagle feathers and go about uttering weird cries which are summons to the never-ending use of the tomahawk. Similarly, the Polynesians, or South Sea islanders, are all beautiful men and women, who somehow never do any work but lie about in graceful poses, wearing their tapa garments and palm-leaf girdles, and singing songs that are vaguely reminiscent of "Aloahe." The Africans are usually thought of as fierce cannibalistic heathens, living in unspeakable dirt and utter disorganization, and too lazy to do other than to eat the fruit that is theirs from the tropical growth that is everywhere about. Of course, this may be unduly stressing some of the ideas that are prevalent, but they are not uncommon, slight inquiry will readily demonstrate. One rarely thinks of the life of the Africans as something closely integrated, with kings and dynasties, roads and

police, law-courts and careful economic systems, slaves and serfs,—sophisticated, adult civilizations. And yet, it is just this that a reading of Cannon Roscoe's Report will reveal.

These books constitute the report of the Mackie Ethnological Expedition to Central Africa, and are the result of the travels of Mr. Roscoe in the Lake Victoria Nyanza region during the years 1919-1920. They are the result not only of observations on this trip, but also of the excellent background which their author possesses, the result of long stay in the region of which he writes, and of which he has written in his monograph on the Baganda, and in his shorter work on the Northern Bantu. The first two volumes are detailed studies of the Bakitara, or Banyoro, as they are also called, and the Banyankole, both of them tribes in which the domination of cattle in the daily life of all East African tribes is brought to its highest pitch. The third volume deals with a number of other peoples who live to the north-east and west of the great lake, and who cluster about Mount Elgon and the shores of Lake Kioga. The author has lived for many years in the region in which these people live, as missionary and student, and, although the missionary point of view is apparent in certain aspects of his writings, the scientific interest holds him to a detachment that is unusual in works on African tribes.

The Banyankole and the Bakitara are essentially herding peoples. There is agriculture performed in their territory, but it is not done by these people, but by a servile element which, most probably, represents what remains of the aboriginal population. The land itself is ideal grazing country, and the cattle the people possess are all to them that the dollar is to us, and more. The aristocracy is composed of these cattle-keepers and none of the upper class would dream of doing any agricultural work. Indeed, the worst penalty which can be inflicted on an erring wife of a chief is that she be sent to be the wife of a chief of a neighboring tribe which is agricultural. The king is the great herdsman; he must tend his herd symbolically every day; when he drinks milk everyone in the sacred enclosure where the royal cows are kept must kneel; no sound must be made on pain of death; he is the owner of all the cattle and the chiefs under him are merely the headherders over his animals. Until recent times, the

members of the upper class might eat no vegetable food, and every boy of the dominant group had to learn all about cattle,—how to herd and tend them, their weaknesses and ills and how to cure them. Each cow has its name and responds to it, and the taboos which surround every move of the herds are innumerable.

Rank is of great importance, and the throne is inherited by that son of the king who is the strongest in a contest between the surviving princes. There are three courts maintained, that of the king, his mother, and his wife. The chiefs must keep constantly in touch with their subordinates, and, on the other hand, must always keep the king informed of what is happening in his kingdom. Each official is a judge, and the legalistic tendency toward the settlement of disputes so generally manifest in Africa is highly developed here. There are specialists in salt-extracting, pottery and wood-working, and iron-working, who belong to distinct classes, and trade their products for sheep, goats, or cowrie shells. For the herders to eat meat and drink milk together is quite taboo,—a custom reminding us of a similar one of the orthodox Jews of our own culture. The reign of the king is absolute, and, as usual in absolute monarchies, the value of life is not great. The king's spear is always present, and is readily used. Human sacrifice is indulged in on special occasions, usually to strengthen the king, but there is no trace of cannibalism. The women of the dominant class are thought beautiful as they remain fat, and therefore they do almost no work,—among the agriculturalists, however, the lot of both sexes is a hard one, and the work always heavy.

The third volume of the report is more in the nature of field notes than anything else. The Bagesu, an agricultural and herding people living in huts and caves on the side of Mount Elgon, are described at some length, but other peoples in the region, such as the Bateso, the Busoga, the Bakyiga, and others, are merely sketched in a short space. Certain objections may be stressed in the presentation in the three volumes,—the tendency to place the entire report in the past tense, which heightens the feeling which those not ethnologists have that "primitive man" is synonymous with "prehistoric man," and makes

one lose sight of the fact that it is contemporary peoples who are being described, and another tendency manifested in a predisposition to read into facts interpretations which tend to fall in with the general theories of Frazier on religion and social organization. It would have been well, also, had Cannon Roscoe presented the customs of the peoples he describes more in their own language, in the form of translated textual material, such as is the custom among American anthropological field workers, rather than to employ the somewhat scientifically dangerous method of describing them in his own words. However, the three volumes constitute a distinct contribution to the African material, and can be recommended to those sociologists who agree that it is important to go through some of the more readable and extended descriptions of the lives of primitive societies.

The other little work is something quite different. On the basis of his own wide experience with the Ba-Ila and other peoples in Northern Rhodesia, and apparently with Roscoe's book on the Baganda, Mr. Smith gives us what purports to be a study of all Bantu religion. The great objection to this sort of thing is that it blankets the customs of numerous societies and millions of peoples, and again gives the false idea of simplicity which we are all prone to hold when speaking of primitive man. The work is a little volume in a missionary series, and, while it is hopeful that such a series includes a work by such a competent person as the co-author of "The Īla-Speaking Peoples of Northern Rhodesia," one of the great African monographs, certain of the author's concepts, such as his assumption that the religion of these people is necessarily "elementary," or that it represents "survivals," or that "all clans were matrilineal originally" and "some have become patrilineal," when the social organization of Africa is notoriously patrilineal, cannot be sustained. It is felt that his definition of religion, that it is "in its lowest as in its highest form, an act of trust," and that "faith is essential to it" is particularly colored by his missionary background, as is his chapter on the Bantu conception of the Supreme Being. And the final chapter, on the "Christian Approach to the Bantu," is a practical set of directions, which,

indeed, must be admired for their broadness, but which of course are not of particular interest to the sociologist. Again, however, one turns from this work with relief to the monographic study, where the religion is treated in a particularistic fashion, and where there is no attempt to impart the beliefs of a few hundred or thousand people to many millions.

MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS.

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THE GODS OF MEXICO. By Lewis Spence. New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1923, xvi, 388 pp. \$7.50.

An authoritative work by a Fellow of the Royal Anthropological Institute who has already written "The Civilization of Ancient Mexico" (1911), and a popular work on "The Myths of Mexico and Peru" (1913). He opens his "Preface" thus: "This book deals exclusively with the religion of the people of ancient Mexico. With the history and archaeology of that country I am not concerned." Moreover, by Mexico he means only the area of central Mexico inhabited by the Aztec and Chichimec peoples; the Mayas of Yucatan are excluded. Finally, as a further limitation of scope, the author defers most of the matter relating to rituals, sacraments, priesthood and religious architecture to a later volume. This work then, besides two introductory chapters on general questions of Mexican religion and cosmogony and a short but highly technical appendix on the Tonalamatl or "Book of Fate" and the Solar Calendar, is thus devoted to a description of the various deities, from the minor gods and the gods of stars, planets and the underworld to the gods of fire, rain, earth and creation.

The author avoids dogmatism in his study of the origins of Mexican religious ideas. The data are still confused and only "senior wranglers," to use his term, are entitled to an opinion. But he inclines to the view that its tap root will be found in the worship of the elements of growth,—earth, grain and rain, to which was later added the sun. The reason is that agricultural economy in the Valley of Mexico rain came to be looked upon as the most important life-giving element so that at the time of the Conquest religious ceremonial had become primarily that of an elaborated rain cult. By processes of reasoning intelligible to students of magic the doctrine arose that the

amount of rain would be proportionate to the quantity of blood shed in human sacrifices. The Mexican bargained with his gods: "Give us rain and we will give you blood," this blood being considered necessary to sustain the gods in their labors connected with the growth of crops. Another important root is found in the ancient worship of obsidian for this was used in slaying the deer by which life was sustained. But with the transfer from a hunting to an agricultural economy there came a transfer from deer to human sacrifice, captives and slaves being slain with obsidian arrows and knives. Thus obsidian, the source of blood, came to be looked upon as the source of all life, the very principle of existence.

All of which is only the barest introduction to this effort to unravel the tangled skein of old Mexican religious practices. It does not seem probable that the actual origin of the varied elements can be clearly unravelled, for conquest and historical accident played a great role in the final elevation of various deities. This is a book for the specialist, though the general student of society will find much in it to interest and even entertain him. Its contents are actually broader than the author's introduction suggests; and its illustrations are both numerous and excellent, except for some scale to indicate the size of objects represented. The bibliography is full and critical.

F. H. HANKINS.

Smith College.

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FOLK-LORE IN THE OLD TESTAMENT. STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE RELIGION, LEGEND AND LAW. By Sir James G. Frazer. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923, xxx, 476 pp. \$5.00.

This is a most welcome one-volume abridgment of an earlier three-volume work. Here is a brief account of all the familiar stories and myths of Hebrew tradition together with a rich and varied account of a multitude of similar stories and myths from all parts of the world. Thus the creation story is paralleled by others from Babylonian, Egyptian, Grecian, Australian, Tahitian, Polynesian, Tartar, Melanesian, Indian, Philippine, African and other sources. There is similar treatment of the "Fall of Man," "Story of the Cast Skin," "The Mark of Cain," "The Great Flood," "The Tower of Babel," "The Covenant of

Abraham," "The Heirship of Jacob or Ultimo-geniture," and a dozen other topics. There is only a modicum of theoretical material; and references to original sources are omitted. It is thus a book for the general reader and the general student. It should have a wide usefulness in connection with courses in sociology and Bible. It is safe to say that the vast majority of American college students enter upon their college work

thoroughly imbued with the idea that the myths, manners and customs described in the Old Testament represent a unique and divinely inspired experience. The reading of even a few of the chapters of this work will serve to show that Jewish tradition is intimately connected in form and content with ancient law and custom in all parts of the world.

FRANK H. HANKINS.

CULTURE AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA

SOCIAL POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES. By Fred E. Haynes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1924, xii, 414 pp. \$3.50.

THIS WORK is a contribution of no little importance to the socio-political history of the United States by the University of Iowa sociologist who has earlier given us two important works on economic and political radicalism in American history—*Third Party Movements since the Civil War*, and a biography of the Greenback-Populist leader of 1880 and 1892, James Baird Weaver. There have been a number of books which have dealt with some of the specific topics handled in this work, but no one has before brought together the history of the diverse social reform programs which have been proposed in this country, mostly upon the basis of imitation of European precedents. To a certain degree Haynes has produced a synthesis of the work of Commons, Ely, Simons, Hillquit, Noyes, Hinds, Buck and Brissenden.

The movements covered are the following: the background of social reform to be found in American economic history; utopian socialism; Marxian socialism; anarchism; the labor movement from 1825 to the Amalgamated Clothing Workers under Hillman and the Farmer-Labor Party; the single-tax panacea; Bellamy and economic nationalism; such third party movements as the Liberal Republicans, Greenbackers, Populists, Bryan Democrats and the Progressive movement of 1912; the Non-partisan League; and the Farm Bloc. There are also chapters on the Socialists in the World War, and the progress in social legislation, such as workman's compensation, mother's pensions, social insurance, child labor

and farm loans. The chapters on these specific topics include a good list of well chosen references for further reading.

The tone of the book is reasonably objective and mildly sympathetic, but sufficiently guarded to protect the author against onslaughts by Hundred Percenters in the state legislature. The book will constitute a very useful aid to students of American social history and economic reform by virtue of its readability and its comprehensive compilation of material from numerous sources. Since the triumph of Jackson, radicalism has fared rather poorly in the United States, but while few if any radical movements have triumphed in their own name since the days of Jefferson and Jackson, many have had an important influence upon the programs of more conservative groups. Hence, their development and programs provide something rather more than curious information. They are of particular interest to the student of social economy of an historic cast of mind, for they almost invariably reflect the chief abuses and social maladjustments of the period which produced them. Sociologists, economists, political scientists and historians alike are placed in debt to Professor Haynes by this work, which is by far the most satisfactory history of American radicalism which has yet appeared. Perhaps the most important impression that it leaves is the fact that what one generation may view as incendiary doctrine and dangerous practice may be accepted quite complacently by those of a later era.

The one noticeable defect or weakness of the book is the fact that too much space is devoted to the personalities, episodes, programs and details of the organization of these radical movements,

and far too little is assigned to the more fundamental and significant problems of the forces and conditions producing these movements, the antecedents and derivation of the groups and programs, and their permanent influence, if any, on American society.

HARRY ELMER BARNES.

Smith College.

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THE GENIUS OF AMERICA. By Stuart P. Sherman. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923.

If an American be constructed after the model Dr. Sherman suggests he will in all probability be an urbane and cultivated gentleman of the neo-Brahmin type, carefully grounded in the American classics and holding in much higher esteem the second-rate native authors than the minor Englishmen. His philosophy will be that of Puritanism, modified and rearranged to include values dear to his creator but not existent in the figures supposed to exemplify it. Beauty will have for him a heart full of service and literature will be a sort of social policeman. Although profoundly disillusioned as to the dogmas of equality he will still entertain the notion that the masses of men thirst for culture and are determined to get it, and to do so they will modify the standards to their own conceptions of value. He will be convinced that Mencken and his kind are inimical to the desired end and that they are leading the callow minds of the searchers astray. The snobbery of Katherine Fullerton Gerould will be as distasteful as the vulgarity of Roosevelt and the futility of the latter day Adamses. Andrew Carnegie he will admire. His chief desire will be to bring about a rapport between modern business and a modified Puritanism. His chief difficulty will be to integrate an emotional sympathy for experiment with an intellectual conservatism.

To readers of Sherman's earlier volumes, *On Contemporary Literature* (1917) and *Americans* (1922) this portrait will not contain new elements. Sherman has dedicated his talents to the proposition that Puritanism is the genius of America and his books are polemics in defence. To him Puritanism is a liberating force: "the Puritan is profoundly in sympathy with the modern spirit, is indeed the formative force in the modern spirit." He searches for ways of liberating the spirit, is not concerned with details of

conduct, allows his women to smoke and puts drinking of intoxicants among 'matters indifferent.' Apparently discomforted by the historical Puritan as contrasted to this myth, Sherman excuses Cotton Mather's bigotry by reference to his conduct with regard to inoculating: "For his conduct on this occasion, he deserves to have his sins forgiven, and to be ranked and remembered as a hero of the modern spirit." And so on, until the Puritan emerges in the image sketched above.

So it comes about that Sherman can dogmatise that beauty has a heart full of service, while Emerson said "Beauty is its own excuse for being." He advocates the application of his morality to literary judgments. An author is excellent or poor insofar as he meets or diverges from the mores of the group. Much ingenuity is expended in forcing some of them into the preconceived mold. During the war the standard was the author's acceptance or rejection of the Wilsonian idealism. Always application wavers between Sherman's sympathy for innovation and his intellectual position as defender of the ethic of what has been quaintly called the Christian Endeavor Belt.

"What the average man now wants," he writes, "is the wide diffusion of science, art, music, literature, health, recreation, manners, human intercourse, happiness (note the juxtaposition!)—the best to be had; and he is going to get them and to glorify whole-heartedly the heroes of culture who provide them for him." Sherman is of course one of the heroes. He has appeared on McCall Street. Mrs. Babbitt has given him ear. But can you imagine Mr. Babbitt discussing incisively Hawthorne or Poe, or the problem of Mark Twain as analyzed by Van Wyck Brooks? No more can I.

C. HARTLEY GRATTAN.

Urbana Junior College.

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THE FEDERAL SERVICE. By Lewis Mayers, New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1922, xvi, 607 pp. \$5.00.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES. By Lloyd M. Short. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1923, xviii, 514 pp. \$5.00.

THE REORGANIZATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. By W. F. Willoughby. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1923, xv, 298 pp. \$3.00.

No field of political activity is more significant than that comprised in the general term "Administration," however it may be defined. Our knowledge of and achievement in this field are increasing more rapidly and more surely than in any other. Public authorities and private agencies alike are exploring its practical workings and its implications for the "balance of powers." On the one hand the courts are already evidencing a cautious retracing of some of the steps by which judicial review of administrative discretion and legislative delegation of authority have been stretched to what the controversialists, in their bulky literature, protest as the breaking point. More significant, however, is the developing attention paid to the practical analysis of the problems involved in the performance of what everybody recognizes as the necessarily widening range of governmental functions. The machinery of Government Committees in Great Britain and Canada, the Lehlbach Committee in this country, have made notable contributions to our understanding of these problems from the practical experience of public servants.

Among the private agencies in this country none is accomplishing, in the sphere of national administration, more toward an understanding of the principles underlying the conduct of administration than the Institute for Government Research. Its staff publications are the most significant attempt yet made at a synthetic analysis of administrative problems both in their structural and in their dynamic or personnel aspects. In three of its recent publications both these aspects are considered from the standpoint of historical interpretation and constructive proposals.

Lewis Mayers' "The Federal Service" is not only the first adequate account of the national civil service but an unusually penetrating study of the problems to be solved in working out a personnel policy for a force of well nigh half a million government employees. As he points out the problem is two-fold; first there must be eradication of political influence; only then may such technical questions as promotion and recruitment, reassignment and promotion, working conditions, the maintenance of efficiency, employee representation and the like, be approached and solved. "The political problem is purely a negative one . . . not until this problem has been substan-

tially solved can the positive and technical problems of personnel administration, or indeed of administration generally, be successfully attacked." A timely warning for those who dismiss the civil service problem as a mere question of "spoils." Dr. Mayers has produced an admirable study of these newer and more intricate problems as they affect the federal service. Both as a handbook of the development of the service and its present condition, and as a pointer on the road of most fruitful development for the future it is by far the most useful book available. The discussion of various technical problems is instinct with the author's intimate acquaintance with their practical solutions, his criticisms are always the result of contact with current practices. That the Classification Act of 1923 did not accomplish more to correct some of the faults of haphazard growth is due more than anything else to the absence of an informed public opinion on the very questions Dr. Mayers discusses.

Lloyd M. Short's "The Development of National Administrative Organization in the United States" and W. F. Willoughby's "Reorganization of the Administrative Branch of the National Government," carry us at once from the dynamic to the structural problems of administration. The first is essentially a historical study of the growth of the various executive departments from their simple origins in the early administrations to their present impressive categories of functions and activities. Here, perhaps even more glaringly than in relation to a personnel policy, is exhibited the fatal defect of the absence of any effective supervision of the development of administrative agencies. Few realize, until confronted by the overwhelming evidence of such a painstaking study as this, how uncoordinated the various activities of our government are. The President's Commission on Reorganization has already submitted two plans for the realignment of functions along more logical lines. But what the principles of this reorganization should be are neither clearly visualized nor consistently carried out. It is the purpose of Dr. Willoughby's book to lay down first of all what the guiding principles should be, and then to outline a specific plan which embodies them. His plan is an interesting and in many ways an ingenious one and takes its place along with the other proposals enumerated in Dr. Short's excellent summary of proposed plans of

reorganization (Chap. XXIII). More significant is his lucid exposition of the principles of which any plan must take cognizance. Briefly summarized they are:

1. The type of organization to be adopted should be that known as the integrated or departmental.

2. A clear distinction should be made between those services which are of a purely administrative character and those of a quasi-legislative, quasi-judicial, or other special character, and the attempt to apply the principle of departmentalization should only be made in reference to the administrative units.

3. The principle of departmentalization should be that of grouping services according to their purpose or function rather than the character of activities engaged in.

4. Each should, as far as practicable, be made unifunctional in the sense that it will embrace only those services whose special functions pertain to the general function for the performance of which the department is established.

Both books are distinct contributions to a field too little developed. The studies of the national departments hitherto available have either been monographs (of which the Institute has itself issued over fifty) bearing on a single activity or of so general a nature as to give no adequate picture of the growth of these departments as a whole. Dr. Short has filled a conspicuous gap in both the historical and analytical consideration of our national administration. While Dr. Willoughby's is not the first, it is one of the most suggestive discussions of the whole problem and lays down with admirable clarity the principles of governmental reorganization which to date have received all too little attention.

PHILLIPS BRADLEY.

Wellesley College.

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THE GOVERNMENT—STRIKEBREAKER: A study of the Rôle of Government in the Recent Industrial Crisis. By Jay Lovestone. New York: Published by the Workers' Party of America, May 1, 1923, 364 pp.

The thesis of this book is that in case of a strike of employees against their employers, the government—Federal, State, and Local—is always on the side of the employers in the effort to break the strike. This is true because the fundamental instrument of government, the constitution of the United States, was framed and adopted by the capitalist class and has been interpreted by the representatives of that class since its adoption. Hence while the government is theoretically committed to the protection of the

life, liberty and property of its citizens, in practice it always protects property—especially the property of employers—at the expense of the life and liberty of the employees.

The most valuable part of the book is found in Chs. 3-9, pp. 50-247. In these pages the author describes in great detail the strike of the Textile Workers, the Coal Miners, and the Railway Workers in 1922. He shows how the government in each of these strikes lined up on the side of the employers and against the employees. The courts through the injunction, and the executive and administrative officials of the government, through the army, the national guard and the local police, united in the attempt to intimidate and coerce the strikers into accepting the wages, hours, and conditions of labor laid down by their employers.

While the language is intemperate and unrestrained, yet the book is so well documented from authoritative sources, that one is compelled to conclude that the writer has made a strong case for his main contention.

The book could have been condensed into about one half the space with profit both to the publisher and reader. It has an excellent table of contents and a very good index.

W. M. HUDSON.

DePauw University.

* * *

THE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR IN AMERICA. By Norman Thomas. With an Introduction by Robert M. La-Follette. New York: B. W. Huebsch, Inc., 1923, xix, 292 pp.

This book is largely descriptive and historical in its nature. The author has described in considerable detail the religious, political and social backgrounds of the conscientious objectors in the late war. From authoritative sources he shows the policy of the government toward the conscientious objector and the methods of administering that policy in the various military camps and prisons of the United States. The conscientious objectors are carefully classified and the reactions of each class to the treatment of the government is clearly set forth. The author has tried consistently to state the facts in the situation without bias toward any person or group.

The well known personal views of Mr. Thomas are largely confined to the first and last two chap-

ters. Keeping these personal views in mind the book is characterized by a tolerance and impartiality that is highly commendable at a time when so much ignorance, stupidity, and prejudice are being exhibited on such a complex and difficult question.

W. M. HUDSON.

DePauw University.

* * *

CULTURE AND DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES. By Horace M. Kallen. New York: Boni and Liveright, 1924, 347 pp. \$3.00.

"This book is a study in the psychology of the American peoples. It brings together a series of reflections upon the nature of culture and of democracy, upon their bearing to one another in the United States, and upon their underlying dynamics in the nationalities, the cultural traditions, the political forms, the economic pursuits, and the social and spiritual endeavors of the many peoples striving toward life, liberty and happiness amid the varied settings of the American scene." (p. 9).

Under such a pretentious text, Mr. Kallen gathers up a series of essays which attempt to analyse the major cultural problems which have confronted American intelligence so acutely and ominously since 1914—the Klan, Americanism, Americanization, the Melting-Pot, Industrialism and Democracy.

The author shows how the rudeness of the impact which Englishmen of established mores encountered when they attempted to subdue this inhospitable country in colonial times and how the insecurity, fear and Puritanism thereby engendered was gradually mitigated and remodeled into a rather optimistic idealism and confidence in the great virtues of the new country and its possibilities. This new faith and self-glorification found expression in the patriotic societies, the later nationalism and such epics as *The Americanization of Edward Bok*. But this attitude, which was partly a result of prosperity and partly frontier confidence, was violently shattered by the war. This cataclysm only accelerated the revaluation of standards which was inevitable following the exhaustion of the public domain and the new influx of hordes of immigrants. As a result of these three dislocations, in a purely defensive reaction based upon fear and insecurity, the "older stocks"—the economically and politically dominant elements—sought to preserve the old and revered through the Klan—a revived Know-Nothingism—through industrial repression by "Americanization"; through political selection by

disparagement of the "newer and inferior" racial elements. Backed by the intelligence testers and the Anglo-Saxon myth, the defensive literature and activity of this group consisted of a program of teaching or, if necessary, forcing conformity to the static standard set by the prejudice of the strong and entrenched—knowledge of the language, conformity in politics and economics and optimism in everything. In Mr. Kallen's own word, a "unison" of all voices and elements was to be established.

But to the author, such a program seems misguided, incompatible with democracy and destructive of the greatest cultural virtue—the free interplay of differences. He maintains that only through the untrammelled functioning of all types can American culture be its richest. Not only is such free exercise the only matrix from which may come the highest and most luxuriant flowering of the American life, but this activity is the only type in accord with the three fundamental American ideals of "Liberty, Union and Democracy." This notion he calls "Cultural Pluralism" which must be the foundation for the "harmony" of American expression rather than the coerced "unison" of short-sighted Americanizers.

Analysing some recent estimates of American practical and artistic expression, he roundly castigates "Mr. Stearns' thirty tummyachers."¹ Criticising the portrait's lack of continuity or synthesis, its omissions and superficiality, its failure to approach the urbanity of its model, the French Encyclopaedia, its "destructive" character, Mr. Kallen finally condemns its prejudicial and emotional treatment. In a more kindly fashion and upon other grounds, George Santayana's analysis² of the American scene is criticised for its over-simplification and attention to only the "topmost turn" of the cultural life as seen at Harvard, in Chicago and San Francisco.

The final essay sets forth the author's evidence for and faint prediction of a new Humanism which he sees emerging from the industrialism of the age. Lighted by science, tempered by tolerance and warmed by coöperation and sympathy, this new movement will be characteristically Humanistic in its destructive and constructive activity.

¹ *Civilization in the United States*. Edited by Harold Stearns. New York, 1922.

² Santayana, *Character and Opinion in the United States*. New York, 1920.

The sanity of Mr. Kallen's views on social change, the firm scientific and historical bases for his interpretation, the approach to the problem and the form of treatment commend this volume as a trenchant analysis of the background and present evolution of the American cultural situation.

One may, however, adversely criticise the seriousness with which the Declaration of Independence is taken as a basis for the ideal of Liberty, while the cultural solidarity of the colonial period is somewhat open to question. Further, even though the intelligence testers may be methodologically inaccurate and some of their implica-

tions pernicious, Mr. Kallen's whole-hearted condemnation of this group and his acceptance of the environmentalist standpoint result in a failure to give due recognition to the tremendous significance of individual differences. Growing out of this criticism is the more fundamental one that the author fails to make clear the position and function of those elements of the population whether immigrant or not whose "timbre" is such that for hereditary biological reasons they are unable to actively function in the orchestration of the American cultural harmony.

JOHN O'BRIEN.

University of Iowa.

THE GREAT MAN AND HIS ROLE IN SOCIAL EVOLUTION

WOODROW WILSON: A CHARACTER STUDY. By Robert Edwards Annin. New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1924, 404 pp. \$2.50.

IN THIS volume the reader will find something different. If he belongs to that small group who looked upon Woodrow Wilson as a second Messiah, or if he finds himself among those at the opposite extreme, to whom the very name of the former President is anathema, he may be disappointed. The consolation he experiences will be derived from the acknowledged eloquence and leadership of his hero or from the damaging attacks upon the probity and statesmanship of this dramatic character. But to the great majority of readers will come the conviction that here is a volume remarkably free from the prejudices and animosities of the average contemporary biography of a political leader. That it is the fruit of prolonged investigation and diligent study even the most hostile critic will admit. In his "Foreword" Professor Sloane says that the author expresses "no bitterness in his text and yet his psychological analysis of his subject softens and conceals nothing." To the fullest extent he has felt his responsibility and has assumed it.

Mr. Annin explains that it is not a life of Woodrow Wilson which he proposes to write. "A Mysterious Complex"; "Professor and President at Princeton"; "Plans, Projects and Problems"; "The Quadrangle Quarrel"—such are the titles of his opening chapters. The early life of

his subject is entirely ignored. And in the thirty years covered—roughly from 1890 to 1920—the author is interested only in striking incidents which may be used to confirm his character study. He believes he has stated nothing as a fact which has not been established by "direct proof, tacit admission, general consent, or all three." He says he has given preference to criticism from friendly sources and eulogy from unfriendly sources, and in his acknowledgments Baker, Keynes, Bishop, and Young take precedence over all others.

As a subject for character study the author believes that American history affords few if any careers more strikingly dramatic than that of Woodrow Wilson. He did not enter active politics until he was fifty-four years of age. At fifty-five he had become a national figure, and at fifty-six he was elected President of the United States. His second term brought him an opportunity unique in the annals of American statesmanship—a dominating influence in a council of nations of unprecedented significance. Upon his arrival at this World Conference millions looked upon him almost as a new Christ. From this mission he returned with his European laurels withering, and sought approval first from Congress and then from the people of the West. In both efforts he failed. His appeal to the people in 1920 brought added sorrow to an already aching heart, and on the fourth of March, 1921,

"Woodrow Wilson retired from the Presidency after one of the most spectacular careers, both in success and failure, to be found in the history of popular government." Mr. Annin thinks, "This is remarkable, perhaps unparalleled, influence to be exercised by a man who cannot be said at the time of his retirement to have attained final success in any of the four careers which he essayed—law, letters, teaching and politics." This was probably due to his inability to hold his admirers. Indeed one of his peculiar idiosyncracies was the consistency with which he lost his friends.

From what has been said the reader will conclude that the author's method of presentation is antithetical—a method which is employed on the whole in such a way as to give credence to the apparent desire of the writer to be fair. But one may occasionally wonder whether or not Mr. Annin has overleaped himself. Certainly members of the "saving remnant" of "intellectual adventurers" and "political Second Adventists"—those of the "lunatic fringe"—will adjudge him guilty. "An an orator," he says of Wilson, "he was probably without a peer in his generation of English speaking men. With an audience before him the man seemed transformed. In the exercise of his art his self-consciousness disappeared. A subtle flattery of his audience breathed from his confidential smile and intimate manner; giving to the average man a vague sense that he was being admitted to the inner shrine of a high intellectualism." But his "higher flights approached closely to rhapsody" and his efforts were not infrequently "marred by an incongruous and inept intrusion of the personal element." Or again, "Mr. Wilson was an expert in all the tactics of the trained public speaker," but he was almost "as impervious to unwelcome logic as a child, and particularly resented being confronted with his own arguments after he had changed his position." He was "so agile in his opportunism that those who followed his leadership were in constant danger of meeting him coming back." But there are worse charges than these. While his "severest critics would admit that his personal life was blameless and his financial integrity as far above suspicion as Caesar's wife," few of our Presidents "have more often been attacked in the matter of veracity than President Wilson." And

there are implications of duplicity which will jar those accustomed to judge the former President by the standards implied in the idealistic teachings they are accustomed to associate with his name.

Two other subjects may provoke objections, even among some of those otherwise friendly to Mr. Annin's point of view. These are his account of the struggle at Princeton during Mr. Wilson's administration of the University and his treatment of the World War.

Differences of opinion are inevitable in the discussion of a character like the one under consideration. Perhaps the author is right in asserting that Wilson might have left a name behind him such as no statesman in history has ever achieved, if he could have eliminated the personal element from his calculations and could have corrected or modified his own judgment by the experience and judgment of men of the first class. Time will be his arbiter, but Mr. Annin's study will make it more difficult for time to give Woodrow Wilson the high place among the statesmen of the world which his staunch supporters predict will be his.

CARDINAL L. GOODWIN.

Mills College.

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INDIA IN FERMENT. By Claude H. Van Tyne. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1923, xi, 252 pp.

In 1922 Professor Van Tyne, head of the Department of History of the University of Michigan, spent three months in India studying Indian nationalism and the problem of the future relations of India to England and the British empire. He went with the highest possible introductions and was passed about among the British officials with a great deal of care. As the author recites his many contacts with high personages and the many rare opportunities thrown in his way, one wonders whether he might not have got closer to the real India if his mission had not received so much publicity and he had gone about the country in a quieter way.

The author's analysis of the English-India issue is the best I have seen and sheds much light on the problem. His reactions are those of a typical American scholar, and he evidently desires to be perfectly fair. His conclusions are in favor of the British contentions and against the case of

the extreme nationalists. He records quite frankly the conflicting impressions made upon him by various scenes and contacts and at times one wonders whether the Professor has had enough experience with men of other races to be able to appreciate quite the positions and arguments of the nationalists.

EDWARD A. ROSS.

Wisconsin University.

* * *

MAHATMA GANDHI, THE MAN WHO BECAME ONE WITH THE UNIVERSAL BEING. By Romain Rolland. Translated by Catherine D. Groth. New York: The Century Company, 1924, 248 pp.

In this small volume we have one idealist leader interpreted by another of a different race and background. The great French writer realizes that Gandhi is the most remarkable man Asia has produced in our time and his effort to make him live to us Occidentals is a labor of love. Although he has no first hand knowledge of India, Rolland's gifts of imagination and intuition stand him in good stead, and there is no doubt that here we have a portrait which the disciples of Gandhi would recognize. Traced with the stylistic grace of a master hand the Mahatma stands out from the page as a real man. Sociologists will do well to acquaint themselves with this book, for the non-violence philosophy of Gandhi is likely to spread widely and make history in our time. As the Lenin doctrine of how to correct social injustices becomes discredited by the outcome in Russia the Gandhi doctrine of how to do it may have its innings.

EDWARD A. ROSS.

Wisconsin University.

* * *

FROM IMMIGRANT TO INVENTOR. By Michael Pupin. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923, 396 pp. \$4.00.

A remarkable and entertaining story of how a Serbian boy who began life as a cattle herder ran away to America at the age of fifteen and grew up to be a physicist of the first rank and a wireless and telephone inventor of international importance. It's a good book for those to read who think that environment is more important than heredity in individual achievement. It can also be read with profit by those who think that

early childhood experiences determine the level of adult intellectual activities. It can also be read with much profit by those who still think that the spirit of adventure and the capacity for leadership have been monopolized by the tall blonde, whereas the roundheads are a race of peasants always and everywhere. The book has an interesting bearing also on the immigration policy. Would it not be the wisest possible policy for the national government to appropriate anywhere from one to ten million dollars a year for the purpose of assisting the immigration of youths and maidens of any European country who appear to be especially promising? Questions of race and nationality would be eliminated as having no bearing on native worth or desirability. It would be difficult to work such a policy, as it would be resisted by foreign governments; but the possibility of capturing a few more Pupins by such a method would fully compensate the outlay.

* * *

HENRY FORD, AN INTERPRETATION. By Saumel S. Marquis, D.D. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1923. \$2.50.

The practical turn of mind of Americans is often exhibited in the practical way in which they write. Dr. Marquis is decidedly anxious to tell the world about the genius of Henry Ford; but beneath a certain panegyric enthusiasm is the coolness of the reliable critic. The primary aim of the book is to make Henry Ford intelligible to the public. Agreeing with Oscar Wilde that whereas we used to canonize our national heroes today we vulgarize them, Dr. Marquis delicately avoids making Mr. Ford too democratically human. The Ford personality is looked at from three angles—human aspects and idiosyncracies, his philosophy of life, and a general estimation of his value to society. The book being intended for popular consumption is simple in language and the metaphors plain but effective. Very little is said of Mr. Ford's rise to success. Though the author starts with the man of power and fame he later relates in a few brief sentences how Mr. Ford ascended from a bare-foot boy to a most up-to-date Croesus. To thus lift a man from insignificance to world position in a few brief sentences is to leave the reader with feelings of wonder and awe.

An indelible conception of the Ford personality is given the reader. The writer has realized that no great personality can be reduced to stereotyped description. The reader is told that the Ford personality is ever on the make and that no man can say that he knows it completely. The Ford theories of how business should be run is entertainingly set forth. This part of the book is particularly valuable because underlying a popular presentation of Ford business theories are some revolutionizing principles that have been on the tapis of theoretical economic discussion for many years and their practicality can now be observed.

The minister cannot forget his gospel training and Christian criteria for making moral judgments. Mr. Ford is liberally scorched for a certain capriciousness and brutality of temperament. He may be a great man from the standpoint of American industrial development but his philosophy of life has obviously evolved from one of broad human interest to one of narrow business expediency.

Dr. Marquis is only one of many recent writers who have attempted slow motion pictures of celebrities but one out of many who has successfully told the valet's truth about the master without captiously belittling him.

W. J. BALLINGER.

Amherst College.

* * *

BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE. By Harold F. Gosnell. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924, xxii, 370 pp. \$3.00.

Thomas Collier Platt for two decades was the recognized boss of perhaps the most closely articulated "machine" in the country, dominating the Empire State, and more than once "breaking even" in New York City politics. His "Sunday School" at the Fifth Avenue Hotel, was the controlling force in nominations and appointments, his command of the "Black Horse Cavalry" gave him complete mastery over legislation in Albany, a mastery which consolidated the "corrupt alliance" between politics and business. He could even boast of "influence" on national nominations—had he not "shelved" the troublesome Roosevelt into the Vice-Presidency?

His career covered a half century of American politics in which his style of playing the game came to its fruition. The tragedy of his life lay in the emergence of new methods of political domination dramatized by Roosevelt; the contrast between the two men is the background of Dr. Gosnell's analysis. The wresting of control from Platt signaled the triumph of the new technique, the essentials of which are being forged in the party struggles of the present day.

But the significance of his analysis does not lie in the biographical account of a career centered in a state and in a period peculiarly rich in political materials. Professor Merriam in his suggestive "introduction" on the study of political leadership sums up its contribution:

He has examined the social, economic, and political background of Mr. Platt; he has studied as carefully as material permitted his personal equipment; he has traced his training and achievements; he has examined the weapons at his command, and the strategy and tactics of his political warfare; he has shown how the power that was so built up began to decline and disintegrate; and he has made an estimate and appraisal of this particular leader from the point of view of individual technique and social significance.

This is pioneer work of the very greatest value and significance to every student of party phenomena. It is the kind of solid investigation that must underlie the advance of genuinely scientific politics, and as such it is worthy of the most careful study by the observer of American political life as well as by the student of technical political science.

As Professor Merriam points out, American party politics have produced many leaders worthy of the same careful study as Dr. Gosnell has here applied to Platt. He has set a high standard for such studies. It would have been interesting to have had somewhat fuller analysis of some events which vitally affected Platt's career, as, for instance, his emergence from the defeat over senatorial courtesy (the "me-too" episode) to recon- trol of the state machine. There are a number of unfortunate typographical errors. Nevertheless, Dr. Gosnell has, indeed, "blazed a new trail"—one which his pioneering should stimulate others to follow.

PHILLIPS BRADLEY.

Wellesley College.

A PHYSIOLOGICAL BASIS FOR ETHICS

THE ETHICS OF HERCULES. A STUDY OF MAN'S BODY AS THE SOLE DETERMINANT OF ETHICAL VALUES. By Robert Chenault Givler. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1924, iii + 204 pp. \$2.00.

WITH THE decline in the influence of organized religion among the intelligent—a decline now visibly accelerated by the disintegrating factional struggles resounding at the moment within the sacred walls—it is inevitable that inquiring minds should scrutinize anew the traditional fundaments of ethics and seek to discover some better grounding for a science of conduct than is afforded by the largely outmoded and discredited pronouncements of revealed faith. It is true that philosophy has never wholly lost sight of the fact that conduct is the product of the human body, but there has never yet been made a thoroughgoing effort to interpret *all* activity in terms of bodily function. Whenever what we call "higher things" are in question, there is always a retreat to mysticism or superstition.

Professor Givler's book is the outcome of a courageous attempt to do away with all this. "It deals with ethics as a strictly natural science," he says, and "regards the realm of ethics as coterminous with the arena of human activity." The springs of ethical knowledge are to be found, it appears, in the mechanics of the human organism; ethics and physiology must be studied together; and "the well-being of the physiological organism is the final criterion of whatever is ethically valuable." In this work a long step is taken toward the founding of an empirical science of conduct because here, for the first time, adequate use is made of scientific data which seem to be sound and which are at least definite and open to critical attack and defense. Whoever feels impelled to attack Dr. Givler's scheme must be prepared to undermine the data of modern biology, an enterprise which we shall postpone indefinitely in favor of one more modest. Let us try simply to set forth in brief the main features of the work under review.

By way of introduction we are made acquainted with those who may be expected to resist "any proposal to deal with ethics in a thoroughly naturalistic manner," i.e., those who believe that

all necessary knowledge (regarding conduct) has long since been vouchsafed by Infallible Wisdom; those who regard a really unattainable, abstract ideal as the only proper basis for a philosophical ethics; and those vitalistic biologists "who regard the human body essentially as a corpse animated by a psyche." These conscientious objectors are briefly answered in advance, and then, after some remarks on the history of the ideas involved, in which the names of Socrates, da Vinci, Spinoza, Mill, Spencer, Brühl, Dewey and others are called upon, two fundamental implications are set forth: (1) "that just as man's body, by means of brain, sense organ, muscle and gland, makes, upon stimulation, all the mind it ever manifests, so likewise that same body of man, through the mechanisms just enumerated, creates ethical notions"; and (2) that a scientific attitude towards ethics recognizes the need of continual revision, demands an accurate description of human nature as it is, and rejects a priori standards, ideals set in advance.

In the next chapter we find the essential feature of the new scheme, developed in answering the question: "Why do our ethical judgments always occur in pairs of antonyms?" (such as "good" and "bad," "right" and "wrong")? In answering this question the author first considers William James' idea of "the stream of thought" and shows that thought is a function of the body, owing not only its existence but also its labile character to the activities of glands, muscles and brain. Conduct, it would seem, differs only from thought in the degree to which the body is excited to visible behavior. "The old dualism of mind and body, and the older superstition that mind rules matter, have both received their death blows." Next the author argues that *meaning* is given to words because of the "action-patterns," "specific responses," or "motor sets"—as described by the psychologists—that are aroused by those words, overtly or covertly. Thus thought is shown to be dependent on bodily arrangements, and this applies to abstractions as well as to concrete matters. In explaining the apparently difficult point of "covert" action, in the case of words that are unaccompanied by any visible motion,

clever use is made of the physiological "all-or-none" principle, i.e., the fact that a single neuro-muscular unit always acts fully and positively, so that the difference in the equality of movements—vigorous or languid, visible or invisible—is merely a matter of the number of units involved. Finally it appears that the antonymous nature of ethical judgments is at bottom due to the fact that the neuro-muscular mechanism is constructed in antagonistic pairs. Antonyms arouse action-patterns of opposite natures.

From this point a large part of the book is devoted to analyzing the more important pairs of terms employed in expressing ethical values. To illustrate the method let us see what is done with the word "good" and leave it to the reader to follow up "bad," "evil," "right," "wrong," etc., for himself. The 79 dictionary meanings of "good" are listed and then classified under five heads, as follows: A. Useful for any purpose; B. Dependable, continuously useful; C. Fulfilling expectation, normal; D. Exceeding expectations, above the normal; E. Expletive, indicating surprise or shock. This classification was evolved through prolonged experiment and a chart (p. 45) was constructed to show the results obtained when 100 college students engaged in the mental exercise of placing the various dictionary definitions in the appropriate classes according to first, second, and third choices, and so on. From all this it appeared that there was much overlapping of classes, that "good" must mean something *in general*, in spite of a great diversity in special significations. To reduce a long discussion to a few words, it is found that "good" implies a certain specific motor attitude. "The action-pattern involves the following physiological conditions: (1) the presence, maintenance, or even heightening of muscular tone, (2) [proper nervous connections], (3) selective activity and selective excitability, and (4) normally, the nice co-ordination of the motor responses involved in overt action. This positively responsive condition of the organism may now be expressed in simpler words by saying that the word "good" is the sign of an *outgoing reaction*. That is to say, in the first place, the things we call "good" release the energy that is ready to be discharged; in the second place, we participate more fully in

that environment which contains a "good" than in one that does not; and in the third place, the effect of the presence of continuously "good" stimuli is to render us more and more responsive, and to provide a wide margin of resiliency for our organic interior. Our definition of good in physiological terms has now been achieved."

In the subsequent analysis of other words having an ethical connotation, it is pointed out that, for instance, "bad" and "evil" separately or together do not constitute a complete and diametrical opposite of "good," although theologians and mythologists of all sorts have commonly asserted such an antithesis regardless of the ethical deadlock to which it leads. The musculature of the body is, however, for the most part of the oppositional type and so the concept of ethical opposites is a basic formula of thought; but it is only in pathological states that rigid muscular antagonisms are maintained, and thus it would seem a valid inference "that the mental rigidity of most adherents to the bi-polar theory in ethics is likewise a pathological sign." In an elaborate analysis "bad" is shown to signify *thwarting* in general (due to physiological incoördination), and usually manifested in a withdrawing reaction accompanied by a slump in muscular tone or a sudden onset of unrelieved tensions; while "evil" means that energy is being mobilized to compensate for an outgoing reaction that has been inhibited. What a man does in the presence of evil defines his ethical standards, depending on the nature of his inherited and acquired physiology. The word "right" has 114 significations in actual use, which, on analysis refer to situations characterized by "the controlling and directing of human energies, the employment of technique to further man's purposes, or the attainment of any good whatsoever." The word "wrong" has only 18 meanings, which by no means form a complete antithesis to the significations of right; it is used to designate some very special behavior situations where the purposes implicit in "right" cannot be achieved. It is because extensor (outgoing) reactions are exploratory of the environment and accomplished by an anatomically different mechanism from the one employed in flexor (withdrawing) reactions that right and good are not exactly antonymous to bad, evil, and wrong.

"Virtue" and "vice" refer to things going on within the organism, whereas the terms already considered apply particularly to the environment. But these two words are none the less to be defined with reference to behavior and not as abstract entities existing apart from and regardless of man's existence. The virtues have been variously catalogued but always, it appears, with regard to the bias of the cataloguer toward the chief problems of his period, as is clearly indicated by a comparison of, say, the Greek and the Christian virtues. Viewed objectively the word "virtue" means simply something that is praised, and physiologically it has the general meaning that "energy is either being mobilized or expended to obtain what the organism considers to be a dependable good." The virtues emphasized by early Christianity are all withdrawing reactions, while those of the Greeks are outgoing reactions—no recognized, traditional system is complete. It would appear, then, that the emancipation of ethics from official religion is essential if the subject is to attain scientific generality and validity. "Vice" involves censure and can only be defined with reference to group standards evolved from the need for defence, progeny, and solidarity. It is not wholly an opposite of virtue and indeed often becomes virtue through individualistic reaction against group mediocrity.

Conscience, "supposed by many persons to be the foundation of all morality," is a comparatively recent product of philosophical thought. Givler presents a clear historical view of the concept and shows that Kant's "categorical imperative," and Reid's "moral sense," while underlying the modern, superstitious notion of conscience, are clearly fallacious and worthless for a scientific ethics in the light of the criticisms of Locke and of Mill. To gather empirical data in the manner already illustrated in connection with other ethical concepts is at present impossible for obvious reasons; but a few points are immediately clear. The popular, common form of conscience implies fear—the fear of being found out, which is a painful, withdrawing reaction. It is hence often unethical and even pathological, a means of suppression, not of direction. This negative type of conscience frequently leads the "conscientious" person to become an exacting, domineering nuisance and not rarely a neurotic invalid. The posi-

tive, ethical type of conscience, says the author, is hardly definable in exact terms; but it exists and is characteristic of those persons who view the world objectively, whose sentiments are founded on knowledge, and whose judgments are based on successful experience.

Freedom and obligation are discussed in a brief but clear chapter. The old conception of "unitary faculties"—intellect, reason, will—has broken down under the scrutiny of modern psychology; for these faculties are all complicated, interrelated, and more or less dependent on experience and the workings of brain and gland. The mind is a function of the body and a means by which the body gets on in the world. From the standpoint of a mechanistic ethics there are five conditions of freedom: physical possibility; absence of external restraints; specific training or sufficient skill; use of an uninhibited bodily mechanism; and success in enlarging the individual's environment, providing for continuity of action. The last requires and also reinforces the others; in fact, it is in its attainment identical with virtue, in its loss or decline with vice. Such activity is right and its stimulus a good. Obligation follows directly from this view of freedom. "Whenever an action is possible, when it is not opposed by restraints beyond a man's power to overcome, when he has the skill with which to perform it, and when he can will it as well as wish it, and when also the performance of this action increases the range of his effectiveness, then, but not till then, can it be said that he *ought* to perform it." Obligation is simply the resultant of conditions, not a fiat from above; and ethics like any other science should be devoted to the description of the conditions under which phenomena occur.

In the last chapter an ethical technique is discussed. The scientific method is of course fundamental; the methods of the new, objective psychology must be adopted and extended; comprehension rather than biased judging must be cultivated; the graduated scale which is always established upon trait analysis is to take the place of a bi-polar, antithetical classification; and character must come to be recognized as the result not the cause of characteristics. In regard to ideals Professor Givler has this to say:

"When the mechanist asserts that we *are* what we *do*, he does not thereby denounce ideals;

on the contrary, he thus only affirms his purpose to take the whole question of ideals seriously, more seriously, in fact, than it was ever taken before. . . . For while he must admit that there is . . . no class of people who can truthfully be said to be 'the pure in heart,'—owing to the fatigue of attention incident to all other-worldly contemplation,—yet he also asserts that the man who knows his capacities and powers as the result of an objective analysis, is by that means equipped to advance to more inclusive levels of conduct than he who merely cultivates an inner life of private mystery. The mechanist would therefore let new standards grow out of the development of natural human capacities, out of the struggle to educate men so that their desires and abilities mature simultaneously, and out of the freedom which can thus be achieved by those able to achieve it. . . . We can be well assured that the type of soul which is composed of self-stifled desires, of restless sentiments due to an ignoble retreat from reality, of the fear of ulti-

mate annihilation, not only *will* die, but it also *ought* to die. There is another and better kind of soul,—the one created out of sagacity, skill, and kindness, which generates power, wisdom, and peace,—and this type of soul . . . will have its immortality guaranteed"—as long as the earth remains habitable.

Professor Givler's book of ethics is important and may well prove the basis for one of the great revolutions in human thinking. It is, therefore, unfortunate, in the reviewer's opinion, that so poor a title was chosen for it and that a few vulgar blemishes of style occur in it. But on the whole its subject matter is well and clearly expressed—not without some quiet humor—; and certainly no one with an interest in ethical problems, no student of human conduct, however ignorant of physiology, can wisely omit to give it careful study.

H. M. PARSHLEY.

Smith College.

LITERARY AND MISCELLANEOUS

THE ELEMENTS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE. By Henry Pratt Fairchild. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1924, ix, 484 pp. \$1.50.

THIS book constitutes a remarkably successful effort to produce a readable and attractive introduction to modern social organization and processes for use in high schools. The style and approach are admirably adapted to the interest and intelligence of the grade of students for which the book is intended. The content is as frank and progressive in tone as would well be possible in a book for which a market could be found in the public schools. As might be expected of a book written by an economist rather than a sociologist, the greatest emphasis is placed upon economic and political factors, but some space is given to the family and the types and agencies of social control. Of real originality and high pedagogical value are the numerous and ingenious illustrations provided by Francis J. Rigney. They represent the most successful effort known to the reviewer in the way of providing a visual aid to the instruction in the social sciences for younger

students. Books of this sort should inject new reality and vision into the somewhat wooden and conventional curriculum which graces the contemporary high school.

H. E. B.

* * *

FOIBLES AND FALLACIES OF SCIENCE. By Daniel W. Hering. New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1924, xiii, 294 pp. \$2.50.

The sub-title of this book—An Account of Celebrated Scientific Vagaries—indicates its general nature. It deals with such subjects of common interest and illusion as astrology, alchemy, divination, prophecies, almanacs predicting the weather years in advance, perpetual motion devices, legends connected with geographic discovery, including Dr. Cook's conquest of the North Pole, hoaxes, such as the Cardiff Giant, charlatanism and quackery, *elixir vitae*, fountains of youth, universal solvents, and human flying. It is written by a distinguished scientist, but in interesting and untechnical style. It is a valuable

contribution to intellectual history, and a most illuminating exhibit in the case for human gullibility and credulity.

H. E. B.

A HISTORY OF MINNESOTA. By William Watts Folwell. Saint Paul: Minnesota Historical Society, 1924, two volumes, xvii, 533, xiii, 477 pp.

These are the first two volumes of a projected four volume work on the history of Minnesota from the period of the mid-American explorations to the present day. The volumes thus far published bring the narrative down to the era of the Civil War. While the material is chiefly anecdotal and episodic, narrative and descriptive, it is of no little sociological importance as a study of social and political origins and evolution. Much material on economic and social affairs has been included. There is a valuable appendix containing a number of important documents. This work is another testimonial to the excellent products of the Minnesota Historical Society under the able direction of Dr. Solon J. Buck.

H. E. B.

THE ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE. By Sir Thomas Erskine Holland. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1924, xxvi, 458 pp. \$4.70.

This is the thirteenth edition of the standard English manual upon jurisprudence. It has been revised to take into account the changes in English legislation and legal procedure since the War.

H. E. B.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AFTER THE WAR. By Otfried Nippold. New York: Oxford University Press, 1923, xv, 241 pp. \$2.50.

This modest volume by a native born German, whose home and nationality he transferred to Switzerland before the War, is the welcome English translation of a work originally published in 1917 in German. It is one of the earliest statements of the necessity of post-war reconstruction of the society of nations to come from the pen of a German writer. But, although Professor Nippold's original home was Germany, he is here, as he had been previously, a severe critic not only of German practices, but of the whole German theory of "might against right."

The first part of the book deals with that development of the structure of international society, which, in the first months of 1917, he saw to be inevitable. Ten years earlier he had advocated in his "Die Fortbildung des Verfahrens in völkerrechtlichen Streitigkeiten" the expansion of the procedural machinery of international intercourse, especially in cases of dispute. He still stresses the importance of procedure but here indicates the necessity of further attention to the structure of international society itself. An organization "to enforce the observance of international law by the creation of 'real guarantees'" he considers essential. If, at first, a "League" were not universal—and he considered, even during the War, that it must begin from the Entente side,—he thinks that it would gradually expand to include all the nations. "The League might also, if need be, rightly demand of the states outside the League that they make use of the international procedure (provided for pacific settlement of disputes). With special reference to these very states, the League should, in case of necessity, seek to enforce law and peace; for it is to be assumed that just these very states outside the League might be the first to imperil law and peace." As to the methods and machinery of "enforcement," Professor Nippold outlines a system of economic boycott and a series of coercive measures enforced by instrumentalities startlingly similar to the League of Nations as drafted in the Treaties of Peace. It is, indeed, a significant forerunner of the work of the Versailles Conference.

Part II of the book deals with "the law of war" which he distinguishes clearly from international law. "In the endeavor to interpret war also from a legal standpoint as far as possible, the doctrine (of universal law) has deemed it necessary to invest war with the character of a legal institution, and the doctrinal discussions about war have often strayed far from reality. . . . It is a fact that war is not a legal institution, but simply the application of force." His discussion of the doctrine of self-help is admirable. Despite his approval of the development of humanitarian rules for the conduct of hostilities, he brings out forcibly the close connection—proved by the events of 1914-1918—between economic suprem-

acy and military success, and the consequent necessity of the belligerent right to cut off the enemy's trade intercourse with the outside world. Such a doctrine in regard to war rights over commerce (he upholds the British rather than the German doctrine of freedom of the seas) carries to its logical application his principle of the economic boycott to enforce "real guarantees" of peace, and so rounds out the theory of international legal development which he saw clearly must result from the war.

An appendix contains Professor Nippold's newspaper controversy in 1916 with Professor Zorn over the interest of Germany in peace as evidenced by her activities at the two Hague conferences. The former maintains a most critical attitude toward Germany's sincerity in her efforts for world peace. An index would have been a most helpful tool in running down the large number of citations and quoted opinions which Professor Nippold has collected. The reader interested in the legal approach to the problem of peace will find here liberal and suggestive treatment of the many problems raised but not settled by the war-problems, as Professor Nippold has set forth so cogently, which require more than the machinery created by the Hague conferences for their solution.

PHILLIPS BRADLEY.

Wellesley College.

* * *

THE SEVEN LIVELY ARTS. By Gilbert Seldes. New York: Harper and Bros., 1924. \$4.00.

This is a unique and important book. In the din of battle it has aroused among the aesthetic intellectuals its interest to the sociologist may be missed. So far as I know there exists nothing exactly similar except certain monographs on the Italian *commedia dell arte*. That is, it attempts to present from a critical point of view those arts, conventionally called low-brow, and here dubbed lively, which are closest to the masses of the people and which most truly interest them: motion pictures, vaudeville, comic strips, ragtime and jazz, juggling and so on. And literarily it considers such as Ring Lardner, Mr. Dooley and the columnists. To be sure Mr. Seldes, much associated with the *Dial*, occasionally strains the interest by a technical critical jargon, but the funda-

mental verve of his concern for his subject sustains the book. Sometimes, also, he rather overestimates, it seems, the quality of his subject in an excess of enthusiasm. But, other than occasional magazine articles, there exists no such introduction to the popular amusements. The book approaches the subject from the aesthetic angle but a sociologist will quickly arrange the material for his own purposes. As a dissolvent for fatuous worship of the acclaimed but hollow high-brow art, and as an experience for those whose culture exceeds their intelligence, there is nothing better.

C. HARTLEY GRATTAN.

Urbana Junior College.

* * *

NONE SO BLIND. By Albert Parker Fitch. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1924, 366 pp. \$2.50.

With the traditional Fair Harvard as his background, Mr. Fitch offers us his conception of a college boy struggling against forces of darkness into the realm of sweetness and light. The author has a sincere affection for the Harvard tradition, and his descriptions of the Yard are not without charm. One cannot escape the conviction, however, that he is less successful with the people of his story. Indeed, the characters are not infrequently stifled in a fog of Mr. Fitch's principles of moral right and wrong.

Dick Blaisdell's first three college years profit him nothing. He is blind to what Fair Harvard offers him. Mr. Fitch now takes him in hand (Chapter One) and revives his connection with Felicia Morland, the daughter of a family of Beacon Hill aristocrats. Her beauty and gentility inspire Dick to better things. He is then buffeted about between the characters representing good and those representing evil. And on page 93 he "gets religion."

"He got into his sleeping suit and quite unconsciously fell upon his knees beside his bed. It was many years since he had discontinued the childhood custom. Indeed until this evening he had probably never prayed, but to-night prayer seemed a part of him, inevitable."

And so on, until one has the feeling that the hero is saved, not through any honest struggle with his own soul, but because he accepts and practices Mr. Fitch's own standards of what a college boy should or should not do. Dick, once

triumphant, holds doggedly to the path of virtue, and on page 365 one learns that virtue has been rewarded: the hero, a rising young surgeon, is married to no less a person than the daughter of a former Canadian prime minister!

Some years ago Mr. Fitch wrote a little volume called "Can the Church Survive in the Changing Order?" It was an ably done and interesting essay. Mr. Fitch has far more to offer the world in the field of the essay than in the novel.

CARL A. WILLIAMS.

THE BLACK HOOD. By Thomas Dixon. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1924, 336 pp. \$2.00.

Let us remember: first, that although the issue of the Ku Klux Klan was the dominant one in the recent Democratic National Convention, yet despite the strong Catholic vote of that party its leaders dared not openly oppose the Klan in its platform; and second, that the Republican National Convention, with no questions asked, made no mention whatever in its plank of this national scandal which is almost daily on the lips of the one hundred ten million.

If, then, Nominee Davis and Nominee Coolidge remain dumb, let us turn to Mr. Dixon's highly engaging melodrama which, according to his prefatory note, is intended as a warning to the five million or so misguided 100 per-centers who constitute the personnel of the organization which has under false colors appropriated the name Ku Klux Klan.

The Black Hood has a hero, John Craig; a heroine, Claudia Hawkins; a villain, George Wilkes; the hero has his "loyal friends;" the villain his "band of followers." (Villains, you know, never have "loyal friends.") Craig and Wilkes are rivals for the hand of the fair Claudia. The scene is laid in the Reconstruction Days of the South. Craig was the leader of the original Klan which, after its war against the Black and carpetbagger rule in the South, was disbanded. Wilkes, however, reorganizes the Klan and takes into membership irresponsible hot heads, politicians, rogues—in short, anyone with an ax to grind joins the new order under Wilkes for the purpose of using it to further his own personal ambitions. No leader, of course, could control such a secret body of masked men, and its pranks and raids soon strike terror into the hearts of

honest men throughout the country. It is Craig, naturally, who brings to an end the machinations of the nefarious crew, exposes Wilkes as the dastardly villain that he is, and kisses Claudia passionately on page 318—or thereabout.

Mr. Dixon's self-stated purpose in writing the novel was to discourage members of the 1924 Klan by a portrayal of the lawless and indecent performances of another group who appropriated the name Ku Klux Klan after the original order was disbanded. Unless the novel enjoys an enormous sale and arouses discussion, it cannot accomplish a great deal in that way. I wish the book might enjoy such a sale, for the cause is a worthy one. But it is doubtful. The story is cast in an extremely conventional mould, and has almost no purely literary value. Let us hope, however, that some of the five million present members will read and profit by the story of the unjust persecution of the honest and industrious Jew, Nathan Klein, by a band of the Klan whose leader had an imaginary grievance against him; by the story of the raid on the home of an eighteen year old girl for whom the disguised leader of the group had been an unsuccessful suitor.

By the way, will someone page Mr. D. W. Griffith? There is marvellous material for him in this book; as a movie, *The Black Hood* would be a world beater. And the moral good of such a film (Mr. Griffith is an ardent exponent of virtue, I believe) would be unlimited. Or would Mr. Griffith, like Mr. Davis and Mr. Coolidge, prefer to remain dumb?

CARL A. WILLIAMS.

THESE EVENTFUL YEARS. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY IN THE MAKING AS TOLD BY MANY OF ITS MAKERS. London and New York: Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 1924, 2 vols., 692 and 695 pp., \$11.50.

Two extremely interesting volumes. In fact, they are truly noteworthy in the prestige of their contributors. Not that any one or two of them would give particular distinction to volumes of such size and scope but that it would be impossible to find in any language two volumes including contributions from so many men of international distinction. Here are, for example, complete descriptions of the Battle of Jutland, first by Admiral Jellicoe and then by Admiral Scheer; stories of the German Army and Navy by General

Ludendorff and Admiral von Tirpitz; studies of recent political and social developments in France by Albert Thomas, Director of the International Labor Office, in Italy by former Premier Francesco Nitti, in Japan by Ambassador Hanihara, in China by Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wellington Koo, in Germany by Maxmilian Harden, in Scandinavia by George Brandes, and so on for many other countries large and small, European and non-European, while Sir Harry Johnston tells of "The Dark Continent As It Is To-day."

But it would be a mistake to assume that the volumes are limited to the military and political history of the last decade or two. The reader is given a summary of new light on the origins of our civilization in Breasted's chapter, "Man's Early History in the Light of Recent Revolutionary Discoveries," and a vision of the future trend of world power in H. G. Wells' "A Forecast of World Affairs." Prof. Breasted does not limit himself to the disclosures of Tutankhamen but goes back to the stone "artifacts" of a million years ago of Western Europe and touches on the rise of civilization in the valleys of the Nile and the Euphrates and in America. While he is thus able from a study of the "New Past" to show the essential unity of man's career, Mr. Wells impresses the same view by declaring that "the present system of competing and warring sovereign states may and probably will continue for many generations to come." After this it is no surprise to have him call the League of Nations a blind alley into which many well-meaning forces are futilely pouring their energies, for a League based on the principle of independent nationalities and designed to preserve every little sovereignty that exists can only be another arena for jealous contention. But elsewhere in the work this viewpoint is offset by Leon Bourgeois' account of "The League of Nations: What It Has Accomplished."

The chapters we have mentioned are only a few of the many dealing with political and social history, ancient and modern. The two volumes combined contain altogether eighty-four chapters, numerous maps and charts and a multitude of photographs. Most of the first volume is devoted to the World War and related recent history. The first four chapters (193 pp.) by J. L. Garvin,

editor of *The Observer*, London, gives a comprehensive setting and are followed by a chapter on "Causes" by Prof. Carlton J. H. Hayes and another on "Secret Treaties" by Prof. Chas. Seymour. Besides the chapters dealing with the military aspects of the war there are four dealing with war finance and reparations, followed by "Social and Revolutionary Unrest," by Philip Snowden, "The Wealth of Nations" by O. P. Austin, and "Have Real Wages Gone Up" by Arthur Bowley. The latter study alone is worth a large part of the price for the set.

If then we pass over three dozen chapters dealing with as many different countries we come to three on literature, two on Music and Art, followed by chapters on Science, by J. Arthur Thomson, Radium by Mme. Curie, Invention by H. E. Howe, Medicine by President Wilbur of Leland Stanford, Psychoanalysis by Dr. Sigmund Freud and Psychical Research by Sir Oliver Lodge. Similar prestige attaches to the authors of chapters on Education, Religion, Women in Politics, International Law, Big Business, Prohibition, Sport and Exploration. The second volume closes with a chapter by Col. House on "Anglo-American Relations and the Peace of the World."

They are volumes about which another might be written. They will arouse discussion and controversy. They will be used for reference for some years. They are obviously a money-making venture but on a plane dignified by the Britannica standard and tradition. Only such an organization could have secured the joint coöperation of so many distinguished authors and welded their contributions into so satisfactory a unity.

F. H. H.

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NATIONALISM AND EDUCATION SINCE 1789. By Edward H. Reisner. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923, xiii, 575 pp.

Professor Reisner has written "a social and political history of modern education" in text book form with suggested readings for further study. He treats of the development of the educational systems since 1789 in France, Russia (and the German Empire), England and the United States. He stresses the growing realization of the significance of the educational program upon the development of national policies

and politics which the war has forced upon this country. "The pre-eminent importance of education as a phase of public policy had not been so clearly recognized in the United States as in some other great nations of the world. . . . The war has considerably changed this attitude, and we suddenly find citizens and legislatures making all kinds of demands upon the school system." Professor Reisner has made good use of foreign sources which he suggests for further reading; and while not an exhaustive or original study, it is a most useful summary of the growth of the more important school systems of the world, and their relations to and influence upon the political programs of the countries treated.

PHILLIPS BRADLEY.

Wellesley College.

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LA PLACE DE LA SOCIOLOGIE DANS L'EDUCATION AUX ETATS-UNIS. By F. W. Roman. Paris: Marcel Giard, 1923, 428 pp. 25 fr.

An encyclopædic compendium in which sociology is identified with all sorts of methods and manners for so-called social improvement after the manner of the naive "up-lifter." The range of materials is sufficiently broad to satisfy the most unsophisticated enthusiast for a sociological regeneration of the world through the medium of education. Here are included such diverse matters as the stabilization of the dollar, the tariff and the law of rent on the one hand and poverty, prohibition, and physical and vocational education on the other. Chewing-gum, cigarettes and cosmetics come along in their proper relation to education from the sociological view-point; but one notes with regret the omission of all reference to jazz, fussing and hair-bobbing as problems of educational sociology.

There are no doubt many excellent sections in this work but it contains nothing of the least

theoretical interest and hence one must feel that it will fail to give to French students an appreciation of the character of sociological development in this country, even in relation to education.

F. H. H.

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SCHRIFTEN ZUR SOZIOLOGIE UND WELTANSCHAUUNGS-LEHRE, I. BAND, MORALIA. By Maz Scheler. Leipzig: Der Neue Geist Verlag, 1923, 176 pp., M7.50 gold.

A series of essays after the manner of the philosophy of history. Principal titles are: Sociology and the philosophy of life; the positivist law of the three stages in application to the development of the sciences; the meaning of suffering; love and knowledge; eastern and western Christianity.

F. H. H.

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PORTLAND CEMENT PRICES. THEIR BASIS, CHARACTER, AND PRESENT POSITION. By Henry Parker Willis and John R. B. Byers. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1924, 123 pp. \$1.25.

A review of prices and profits in which the conclusion is reached that there is little evidence of monopoly or combination.

F. H. H.

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ARITHMETIC ASSIGNMENTS FOR VOCATIONAL AND TRADE SCHOOLS FOR GIRLS. TEXTILE ASSIGNMENTS FOR VOCATIONAL AND TRADE SCHOOLS FOR GIRLS. ENGLISH ASSIGNMENTS FOR VOCATIONAL AND TRADE SCHOOLS FOR GIRLS. Prepared by the Teachers in the Manhattan Trade School for Girls. New York: A. S. Barnes & Co. 1924. Pp. 102, 26, 70, respectively. \$.90 each.

GALAHAD. Linwood Taft, Ph.D. New York: A. S. Barnes & Co., 1924, pp. 15.

Four little pamphlets prepared as aids to teachers and school officers.

F. H. H.

ALABAMA:

Alabama Polytechnic Institute, Auburn.

Birmingham Southern College, Birmingham.

Woman's College of Alabama, Montgomery.

FLORIDA:

University of Florida, Gainesville.

Florida State College for Women, Tallahassee.

GEORGIA:

Agnes Scott College, Decatur.

Emory University, Emory University.

Wesleyan College, Macon.

Georgia School of Technology, Atlanta.

KENTUCKY:

University of Kentucky, Lexington.

TEXAS:

University of Texas, Austin.

Agricultural & Mechanical College, College Station.

LOUISIANA:

Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College, Baton Rouge.

Tulane University of Louisiana, New Orleans.

Educational Leadership

A Task of Cooperative Social Concern

MR. WILSON'S "common prudence" in the August *Atlantic* "that we should look about us and attempt to assess the causes of distress and the most likely means of removing them" constitutes a welcome challenge to southern institutions of learning.

To that end will be expected larger endowments and support for adequate faculty, adequate physical plants, comprehensive curricula, thinking student bodies, more fellowships and scholarships for the social studies.

MISSISSIPPI:

Mississippi Agricultural and Mechanical College, Agricultural College.

University of Mississippi, University.

VIRGINIA:

University of Virginia, Charlottesville.

Washington and Lee University, Lexington.

Randolph-Macon Woman's College, Lynchburg.

Randolph-Macon College, Ashland.

Virginia Agricultural and Mechanical College and Polytechnic Institute, Blacksburg.

Sweet Briar College, Sweet Briar.

NORTH CAROLINA:

University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

Davidson College, Davidson.

East Carolina Training School, Greenville.

Elon College, Elon College.

North Carolina College for Women, Greensboro.

North Carolina State College of Agriculture & Engineering, Raleigh.

Meredith College, Raleigh.

SOUTH CAROLINA:

Converse College, Spartanburg.

Wofford College, Spartanburg.

TENNESSEE:

University of the South, Sewanee.

Southwestern Presbyterian University, Clarksville.

University of Chattanooga, Chattanooga.

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Carola Woerishoffer Graduate Department of Social Economy and Social Research.

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Preparation for positions in Social Agencies, Social Institutions, Community Organizations, Manufacturing and Mercantile Industries, Organizations dealing with Industrial Problems, Social and Industrial Research. A Graduate School—One and Two Year Certificate. Degrees of Master of Arts and Doctor of Philosophy.

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Margaret Morrison School, Department of Social Work.

MARY CLARK BURNETT, Pittsburgh, Pa.

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ARTHUR B. WOOD, Ann Arbor, Mich.

College and University Courses for Training Social Workers.

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EDITH ABBOTT, Chicago, Ill.

A Graduate School offering courses leading to the Master's and Doctor's Degrees, organized on the quarter basis.

JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY:

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THEO JACOB, Baltimore, Md.

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U. G. WEATHERLY, Bloomington.

ROBERT E. NEFF, Indianapolis.

Courses in professional training for social work correlated with field work, in which unusual facilities are available under direct supervision of the faculty.

In view of the diversity of courses of instruction for training social workers and the variety of administrative systems under which the instruction is given—systems which include separate schools, graduate and undergraduate schools or departments of endowed colleges and universities and of state universities, as well as schools under the auspices of religious denominations and the apprentice and institute courses of national service organizations—the Executive Committee of the Association of Training Schools for Professional Social Work considers it desirable to make at this time a statement of the fundamental principles underlying adequate professional education for social work. The Committee hopes that this statement may be a service to those who contemplate the establishment of new schools, as well as to those concerned with the determination of policies for the existing schools.

1. Data collected from social workers and special investigations that have been made recently show clearly that the most satisfactory preparation for social work is that which is conducted on a broad basis of professional education. Preparation of this character utilizes the technical contributions of allied professions, requires unity and continuity of instruction and is contingent upon centralized responsibility of direction and administration.

2. It is highly desirable, in order to meet these requirements, that a school offering preparation for social work should approximate the following specific organization, whether as an educational unit it be separate from, affiliated with, or constitute a part of a larger educational institution:

A. An organic grouping of relevant courses of instruction into a special curriculum for the stated purpose of vocational training or professional education for social work.

B. These grouped courses of instruction should consist, in general, of four types:

(1) *Background of pre-professional courses*, to be given by a regular member or members of the faculty in good academic standing.

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY:

School of Sociology.

FREDERICK SEIDENBERG, Chicago, Ill.

A two year training course for social work, with facilities for field work.

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI:

1. *Missouri School of Social Economy.*

GEORGE B. MANGOLD, St. Louis, Mo.

Public health nursing, medical social service, psychiatric social work, family treatment and social case work, community organization and field work.

2. *Department of Training for Rural Service.*

E. L. MORGAN, Columbia, Mo.

NATIONAL CATHOLIC SERVICE SCHOOL:

Founded and maintained by the National Council of Catholic Women. 2400—19th St., Washington, D. C.

MISS ANNE M. NICHOLSON, Director (on leave).

WILLIAM J. KERBY, Acting Director.

Two year basic course open to college graduates and others who give satisfactory proof of equivalent training and capacity. Affiliated to the Catholic University of America which confers the M.A. degree upon students who satisfy the requirements set by the University.

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA:

Course for Social and Civic Work.

F. STUART CHAPIN, Minneapolis, Minn.

Four and five year courses in social case work, group work, medical social work, rural social work, leading to B. S. and A. M. degrees.

NEW YORK SCHOOL OF SOCIAL WORK:

PORTER R. LEE, 105 East 22nd Street, New York City.

A two year's course of training, scheduled on the four quarter plan. Departments include: Industry, Social Research, Community Organization, Criminology, and Social Case Work, which includes Family Case Work, Child Welfare, Mental Hygiene and Hospital Social Work. Conducts summer sessions.

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA:

School of Public Welfare.

HOWARD W. ODUM, Chapel Hill, N. C.

Primarily a graduate school with one and two year courses looking toward social work in town and country. Social case work, community organization and recreation psychiatric social work, social research, field work. Correlated with other social science departments. Master's Degree and certificate.

OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL WORK

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY:

Department of Social Work, College of Commerce and Journalism.

JAMES E. HAGERTY, Columbus, Ohio.

Four year undergraduate courses in Social Administration, Family and Child Welfare, Penology, Recreation, Community Organization, Americanization and Industry. A year's graduate course leading to the A. M. degree is given.

UNIVERSITY OF OREGON:

School of Social Work.

PHILIP A. PARSONS, Portland, Oregon.

Special training offered in Family Case Work, Delinquency, Abnormal Psychology, Child Welfare, Medical Social Work and Public Health Nursing.

PENNSYLVANIA:

School of Social and Health Work.

KENNETH L. M. PRAV, Philadelphia, Pa.

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Affiliated with the College of William and Mary. Three groups of courses: I. Social Case Work, II. Recreation, Playground and Community Work, III. Public Health Nursing.

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Full courses for professional training in Hospital Social Work—Family Welfare—Children's Work—Psychiatric Social Work—Rural Community Work—Community Organization—Industry—Research—Court Work. Write for a Bulletin.

- (2) *Specific knowledge courses*, providing a broad scientific equipment for social work, to be given by specialists in good professional standing outside the field of social work.
 - (3) *Technical knowledge courses*, dealing with special branches of social work, together with clinical field work, to be given by one or more social workers eligible for senior membership in the American Association of Social Workers, with adequate academic qualifications for teaching, whose further status is that of salaried and voting members of the faculty of the school.
 - (4) *Technical training courses*, to provide the skill which a practitioner must possess, consisting chiefly of intensive field work centrally supervised and directed by one or more social workers eligible to senior membership in the American Association of Social Workers, with adequate academic qualifications for teaching, whose further status is that of salaried (at least half-time) and voting members of the faculty of the school:
- C. An administrator or director chosen or appointed as the executive head of the school, who is empowered, in co-operation with the faculty of the school, to exercise control over admission requirements, curriculum, credit basis for class-room and field work, and admission requirements to courses of instruction.
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
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